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Abstract	 	This	thesis	studies	the	rise	of	the	modern	self	in	France	from	the	aftermath	of	the	French	 Revolution	 until	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 First	Wold	War.	 Building	 on	 the	work	 of	Michel	 Foucault,	 the	modern	 individual	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 result	 of	 collective	practices	 and	 beliefs	 that	 change	 across	 time	 and	 space,	 as	 well	 as	 being	inseparable	from	the	problem	of	governing	and	shaping	the	conduct	of	oneself	and	others.	The	 focus	 is	placed	on	how	 the	experience	of	being	a	nineteenth-century	self	was	 structured,	 by	 considering,	 on	 the	one	hand,	 the	 explicit	 discourses	 and	logics	 that	naturalized	specific	 forms	of	selfhood	and	made	 it	possible	 to	 identify	oneself	and	others	as	modern	subjects	and,	on	the	other,	the	rise	of	techniques	and	technologies	aimed	at	producing	and	reproducing	this	modern	self.	These	included	practices	of	the	self	such	as	moral	analysis	or	self-mastery	strategies,	as	well	as	the	mechanisms	for	 instilling	selfhood	in	others,	such	as	education	or	domesticity.	 In	particular	this	thesis	considers	the	mutually-supportive	role	of	the	nuclear	family	at	the	micro	level	and	social	assistance	programmes	at	the	macro	level.	The	home	and	 charity	office	participated	 in	 a	new	 form	of	 governing	 and	understanding	of	authority	called	guardianship	or	tutelle.	This	was	a	conceptually	non-coercive	way	of	moulding	those	not	yet	able	to	govern	themselves	and	others	in	accordance	with	freedom,	 but	 whose	 effects	 extended	 far	 beyond	 the	 pauper	 or	 child.	 Through	mobilizing,	 sensationalist	 and	 threatening	 images	 of	 non-normative	 subjectivity	and	family	breakdown,	social	reformers	and	administrators	generated	a	troubling	narrative	of	both	 lack	and	ideal	against	which	poor	and	rich	alike	could	contrast,	measure,	 and	 correct	 the	 normativity	 of	 their	 own	 habits	 and	 domestic	arrangements.	This	 thesis	 therefore	contributes	 to	our	understanding	of	how	the	modern	 individual	 was	 produced	 and	 reproduced	 as	 the	 normative	 subject	 of	modern	collectives.		 	
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Introduction.			 ‘Man	is	a	creature	who	makes	pictures	of	himself,	and	then	comes	to	resemble	the	picture’.		Iris	Murdoch.1			This	 thesis	aims	 to	be	a	 contribution	 to	 the	ongoing	debate	on	modernity.	While	the	 topic	 remains	 highly	 elusive,	 with	 literary	 scholar	 Anthony	 J.	 Cascardi,	 I	understand	modernity	 to	 be	 characterized	 by	 the	 simultaneous	 and	 inseparable	emergence	 in	 history	 of	 the	 couple	 formed	 by	 the	 modern	 individual	 and	 the	modern	state.2	By	emphasizing	the	analogies	between	the	individual	and	the	state,	and	 locating	 the	 characteristic	 contradictions	 of	 modernity	 within	 the	 modern	subject,	 Cascardi	 has	 offered	 a	 meaningful	 reduction	 of	 the	 complexities	 of	modernity	 which	 may	 now	 be	 grasped	 by	 historians	 through	 a	 history	 of	 the	modern	 individual.	 Michel	 Foucault	 moved	 away	 from	 the	 notion	 that	 the	individual	 referred	 to	 the	universal	and	ahistorical	human	being.	He	emphasized	how	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 person	 as	 a	 subject	 or	 agent	 changed	 profoundly	through	 time	 and	 space.	 This	 historicity	 of	 the	 subject	 is	what	 is	 understood	 as	subjectivity;	 the	concepts	of	a	subject	and	a	person’s	sense	of	him	or	herself	as	a	subject	are	historical.	As	Foucault	argued,	‘the	problem	of	the	self	is	not	to	discover	what	it	 is	 in	 its	positivity,	maybe	the	problem	is	not	to	discover	a	positive	self	or	the	positive	foundation	of	the	self.	Maybe	our	problem	is	now	to	discover	that	the																																																									1	Iris	Murdoch,	Existentialists	and	Mystics	(New	York,	1999),	p.	75.	2	Anthony	 Cascardi,	The	 Subject	 of	Modernity	 (Cambridge,	 1994),	 pp.	 8-9,	 180.	 See	 especially	 the	introduction	and	chapter	4.	
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self	 is	 nothing	 else	 than	 the	 historical	 correlation	 of	 the	 technology	 built	 in	 our	history’.3		Thus	 by	 the	 modern	 individual	 I	 will	 understand	 a	 specific	 form	 of	 historical	subject	 that	 gradually	 emerged	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 century.	After	the	 French	 Revolution,	 the	 modern	 individual	 became	 the	 central	 problem	 of	government	 to	 which	 the	 modern	 state	 sought	 to	 respond.	 Instead	 of	understanding	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state	 as	 opposed	 to	 each	 other,	 Foucault	equally	sought	 to	de-centre	 this	dichotomy	and	 ‘cut	off	 the	king’s	head’.	Foucault	reclaimed	 the	 concept	 of	 power	 from	 those	 who	 viewed	 the	 state	 as	 a	 rational	agent.	Such	views	tended	to	occlude	the	way	both	state	and	non-state	‘disciplined’	and	 ‘normalized’	 society.4	Instead,	 Foucault	 gradually	moved	 from	 the	 state	 and	the	 individual	 as	 ontological	 and	metaphysical	 categories,	 towards	 the	 notion	 of	governing,	both	of	the	self	and	of	others.	Thus	the	notion	of	government	should	not	be	confused	with	that	of	political	government.	Instead,	 ‘governing’	can	be	seen	as	unifying	the	question	of	power	by	focusing	on	ideas	and	practices	from	the	self	and	the	home	to	society	and	the	state.			This	 thesis	 will	 explore	 the	 dual	 history	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century,	 principally	 through	 the	 discourses	 and	 practices	 of	 social	assistance	and	its	focus	on	parenting	and	the	family.	The	most	coherent	theoretical	framework	that	makes	it	possible	to	analyse	the	dual	object	of	the	individual	and	the	 state	 remains	 the	 approach	 Foucault	 developed	 in	 his	 later	 years,	which	we																																																									3	Michel	 Foucault,	 About	 the	 Beginning	 of	 the	 Hermeneutics	 of	 the	 Self:	 Lectures	 at	 Dartmouth	
College,	1980	(Chicago,	2016),	p.	76.	4	Alan	 Finlayson	 and	 James	 Martin,	 ‘Poststructuralism’,	 in:	 Colin	 Hay,	 Michael	 Lister	 and	 David	Marsh	(eds),	The	State:	Theories	and	Issues	(Basingstoke,	2006),	p.	166.	
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will	now	outline.	The	full	repercussions	of	his	novel	understanding	of	‘government’	have	until	now	not	received	a	consistent	scholarly	application.		
Foucault’s	‘government’.		Foucault	developed	 the	study	of	governmentality	 in	 the	 last	years	of	his	 life	as	a	response	to	criticism	for	his	focus	on	localized	‘microphysics’	of	power	that	evaded	the	wider,	 global	 issues	of	politics,	 society	 and	 the	 state,	 and	 for	his	disciplinary	model	 that	 seemingly	made	 freedom	 impossible.5	Governmentality	was	 therefore	first	and	foremost	a	way	of	decentring	the	problem	of	 the	state,	since	 it	 included	under	 the	 banner	 of	 ‘government’	 both	 the	 work	 of	 state	 institutions	 (the	macrophysics	of	power)	and	the	manners	in	which	persons	attempted	to	conduct	themselves	 and	 others	 in	 daily	 life	 (the	 microphysics	 of	 power).	 By	 doing	 so,	Foucault	 argued,	 ‘it	was	 possible,	without	 paradox	 or	 contradiction,	 to	 return	 to	the	general	problems	of	the	state,	on	condition	precisely	that	we	[do	not	make]	the	state	[into]	a	transcendent	reality	whose	history	could	be	undertaken	on	the	basis	of	
itself.	It	must	be	possible	to	do	the	history	of	the	state	on	the	basis	of	men’s	actual	practice,	on	the	basis	of	what	they	do	and	how	they	think’.6			However,	his	work	on	government	also	revised	his	understanding	of	micro-power.	From	 1975	 to	 1984,	 he	 gradually	 distanced	 himself	 from	 his	 previous	 work	 on	discipline	 and	 its	 often-excessive	 emphasis	 on	 oppression	 and	 restriction. 7	
																																																								5	Colin	Gordon,	‘Governmental	rationality:	an	introduction’,	in:	Graham	Burchell,	Gordon	and	Peter	Miller	(eds),	The	Foucault	Effect:	Studies	in	Governmentality	(Chicago,	1991),	p.	4.	6	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1977–1978	(New	York,	
2007),	p.	358.	Square	brackets	in	original.	Emphasis	added.	7	Ibid.,	pp.	48,	66.		
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Foucault	kept	exploring	the	‘positivity’	of	power,	meaning	its	capacity	to	generate	and	 maintain	 a	 sense	 of	 self	 and	 promote	 desirable	 behaviours	 that	 were	voluntarily	adopted,	rather	than	power’s	capacity	to	punish.8			Historically,	 the	 term	 ‘government’	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 a	 rather	 wide	 semantic	field.	 One	 could	 speak	 of	 the	 government	 of	 oneself,	 of	 souls,	 of	 children,	 of	 a	household	and	of	 the	 state	by	 the	prince.	One	 could	 therefore	govern	 the	 self	 or	others,	 the	micro	or	the	macro,	a	person,	school,	 town	or	state.	What	the	diverse	forms	 of	 government	 had	 in	 common	 was	 the	 attempts	 to	 shape	 behaviour	 or	‘conduct	conduct’.	This	directing	of	behaviour	did	not	imply	oppression	or	negative	effects.	Although	Foucault	 is	best	known	for	his	 theorizations	on	power,	he	made	plain	 in	1982	 that	 ‘It	 is	not	 therefore	power,	but	 the	subject,	 that	constitutes	 the	general	 theme	 of	 my	 research’.9	Power	 was	 relevant	 to	 Foucault	 insofar	 as	 it	shaped	 and	 constructed	 subjects.	 This	 capacity	 was	 not	 negative	 (repression,	exclusion,	or	censorship),	but	positive	and	productive.10	‘In	actual	 fact’,	he	wrote,	‘one	of	the	first	effects	of	power	is	that	it	allows	bodies,	gestures,	discourses,	and	desires	to	be	identified	and	constituted	as	individuals.	The	individual[…]	is	one	of	power's	first	effects[…]:	power	passes	through	the	individuals	it	has	constituted’.11	For	 Foucault,	 power	 did	 not	 emanate	 from	 a	 central	 point,	 nor	 was	 there	 a	dichotomy	between	 top	and	bottom,	 rulers	 and	 ruled.	Power	was	 local,	 capillary	and	 unstable;	 it	 was	 everywhere,	 in	 continuous	 circulation,	 passing	 through	apparatuses	 and	 institutions,	 social	 stratifications	 and	 individuals,	without	 being	
																																																								8	Foucault,	Abnormal:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1974-1975	(London,	2003),	p.	52.	9	Foucault,	Dits	et	Écrits,	2,	pp.	222-223.	10	Foucault,	Discipline	and	Punish	(London,	1991),	p.	194.	11	Foucault,	 Society	 Must	 Be	 Defended:	 Lectures	 at	 the	 Collège	 de	 France,	 1975-1976	 (New	 York,	2003),	pp.	29-30.	Translation	modified.		
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localized	 in	 any	 of	 them.	 Power	 existed	 in	 every	 relationship	 (be	 it	 economic,	knowledge-related,	or	sexual)	and	existed	only	within	power	relationships,	where	the	balance	of	 force	was	always	 reversible.12		 Indeed,	 shortly	before	his	death	 in	1984,	Foucault’s	definition	of	power	became	that	of	government:		The	 exercise	 of	 power	 consists	 in	 ‘conducting	 conducts’…	 Power,	 in	 the	 end,	belongs	less	to	the	order	of	confrontation	between	adversaries,	or	engagement	of	one	with	another,	than	to	the	order	of	‘government’…	Government,	in	that	sense,	is	
to	structure	the	possible	field	of	action	of	others.	The	mode	of	relation	that	is	specific	to	power	should	not	be	sought	therefore	on	the	side	of	violence	or	struggle,	or	of	contract	 or	 voluntary	 bond…	 but	 on	 the	 side	 of	 that	 singular	 mode	 of	 action	 –	neither	belligerent	nor	juridical	–	that	is	government.13				In	 his	 later	 years,	 Foucault	 reinterpreted	 his	 entire	 oeuvre	 as	 an	 exploration	 of	subjectivity.	His	theory	of	the	subject	rejected	the	notion	of	a	universal,	ahistorical	individual	or	a	cogito	that	would	stand	for	the	sovereignty	of	consciousness.14	The	subject,	then,	rested	on	its	pure	historicity,	which	is	not	to	say	that	the	subject	was	a	constant	that	had	a	history,	or	that	it	changed	through	time.	Instead,	‘One	must,	in	doing	away	with	the	constituent	subject,	get	rid	of	the	subject	itself,	which	is	to	say	to	arrive	at	an	analysis	that	can	account	 for	the	constitution	of	 the	subject	 in	history’.15	This	was	because	 ‘in	the	course	of	their	history,	men	had	never	ceased	constructing	themselves,	that	is,	to	shift	continuously	the	level	of	their	subjectivity,	
																																																								12	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality,	1	 (New	York,	1978),	pp.	93-98;	Society	Must	Be	Defended,	 pp.	27-34,	44-46.	13 	Foucault,	 Dits	 et	 Écrits,	 1954-1988,	 2	 (Paris,	 1994),	 p.	 237.	 Unless	 otherwise	 stated,	 all	translations	from	sources	in	French	are	my	own.	Emphasis	added.	14	Foucault,	The	Archaeology	of	Knowledge	 (London,	 1997),	 p.	 12.	His	 earlier	 theorization	 on	 ‘the	death	of	man’	can	be	found	in	The	Order	of	Things	(London,	2002),	especially	‘Man	and	his	double’.	For	his	 later	position	see	Dits	et	Écrits,	2,	pp.	37-38,	48-49,	52,	54-57,	75,	169-171,	222-223,	697,	718-719.	15	Ibid.,	3,	p.	147.	
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to	constitute	themselves	in	an	infinite	and	multiple	series	of	different	subjectivities	that	 would	 never	 reach	 an	 end	 and	 would	 never	 place	 us	 in	 the	 presence	 of	something	that	would	be	“man”’.16	In	other	words,	the	subject	‘is	not	a	substance.	It	is	 a	 form,	 and	 this	 form	 is	 not	 always	 identical	 to	 itself’.17	Foucault’s	work,	 then,	should	best	be	understood	as	a	history	of	the	self-production	of	subjectivity.			From	 his	 reflections	 on	 the	 subject,	 Foucault	 also	 derived	 an	 emphasis	 on	historical	discontinuities.	This	resulted	from	the	idea	that	‘Continuous	history	is	the	indispensable	 correlative	 of	 the	 founding	 function	 of	 the	 subject[…].	 Making	historical	 analysis	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 continuous	 and	 making	 human	consciousness	the	original	subject	of	all	historical	development	and	all	action	are	the	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 system	 of	 thought’. 18 	Foucault’s	 method	 sought	intelligibility	 in	 usually	 large-scale	 discontinuities	 that	 alter	 the	 conditions	 of	possibility	of	subjectivity.			The	method	of	decentring	applied	to	the	transcendental	subject	was	applied	to	all	the	 objects	 Foucault	 studied.	 This	 implied	 rejecting	 institutions,	 ideal	 functions,	and	 ‘ready-made	 objects’	 as	 a	 given.	 Instead,	 he	 stressed	 that	 ‘What	 is	important[…]	 is	 not	 institutional	 regularities,	 but	 much	 more	 the	 practical	dispositions	 of	 power,	 the	 characteristic	 networks,	 currents,	 relays,	 points	 of	support,	 and	 differences	 of	 a	 form	 of	 power,	 which	 are,	 I	 think,	 constitutive	 of,	precisely,	both	the	individual	and	the	group’.19		He	also	rejected	studying	the	ideal	functions,	of	 say,	 the	prison,	as	an	opposition	of	what	was	 intended	 to	what	was																																																									16	Foucault,	Remarks	on	Marx	(New	York,	1991),	pp.	123-124.	17	Foucault,	Dits	et	Écrits,	2,	p.	718.	18	Foucault,	Archaeology	of	Knowledge,	p.	12.	19	Foucault,	Psychiatric	Power:	Lectures	at	the	Collège	de	France,	1973-1974	(Basingstoke,	2006),	p.	15.	
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actually	achieved	(the	légal	versus	the	réel).	Instead,	‘the	real	history	of	the	prison	is	undoubtedly	not	governed	by	the	successes	and	failures	of	its	functionality,	but	is	 in	 fact	 inserted	 within	 strategies	 and	 tactics	 that	 find	 support	 even	 in	 these	defects	 themselves’.20	Finally,	 he	 sought	 to	 avoid	 reifying	 any	 object	—madness,	delinquency	 or	 sexuality—	 by	 studying	 it	 not	 as	 something	 given	 but	 rather	 as	something	 constituted	 by	 technologies	 of	 power.	 It	 was	 through	 this	 very	decentring	 from	 institutions	 to	 technologies	 of	 power,	 from	 function	 to	 strategic	analysis,	 from	the	privilege	of	the	object	to	the	 ‘perspective	of	the	constitution	of	field,	 domains,	 and	 objects	 of	 knowledge’,	 that	 governmentality	 applied	 to	 the	state.21			Decentring	also	 implied	moving	away	 from	 the	 causes	 to	 focus	on	effects,	 asking	
how	 rather	 than	why	or	what.	This	was	 a	way	of	 avoiding	 falling	 into	 a	 reifying,	metaphysical	 or	 ontological	 consideration	 of	 the	 object	 of	 study,	which	 becomes	known	tentatively	 through	 its	very	process	of	constitution.22	Foucault’s	emphasis	was	on	making	the	process	intelligible	rather	than	seeking	a	cause	that	may	never	be	 found.23	The	 same	 applied	 to	 power.	 Since	 asking	 ‘who	 has	 power?’	 led	 to	 ‘a	labyrinth	from	which	there	is	no	way	out’,	‘The	goal	was,	on	the	contrary…	to	study	power	by	 looking[…	 at]	 the	 places	where	 it	 implants	 itself	 and	produces	 its	 real	effects’’.24		
																																																								20	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	pp.	117-118.	21	Ibid.,	pp.	117-120.	22	Foucault,	Dits	et	Écrits,	2,	pp.	232-233.	23	Foucault,	Birth	of	Biopolitics:	Lectures	at	 the	Collège	de	France,	1978–79	(Basingstoke,	 2008),	 p.	33.	24	Foucault,	Society	Must	Be	Defended,	p.	28.	
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Foucault’s	 work	 on	 government	 fitted	 squarely	 within	 his	 long-developed	reflections	 on	 truth.	 He	 understood	 governmentality	 as	 a	 ‘history	 of	 truth’,	meaning	the	study	of	regimes	of	truth	or,	to	use	Foucault’s	neologism,	regimes	of	
véridiction.25	‘[A]	 history	 of	 truth	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	reconstruction	of	the	genesis	of	the	true	through	the	elimination	or	rectification	of	errors;	nor	a	history	of	the	true	which	would	constitute	a	historical	succession	of	rationalities	 established	 through	 the	 rectification	 or	 elimination	 of	 ideologies’.26	Rather,	the	government	of	the	self	and	of	others	depended	on	a	series	of	ideas	and	practices	that	could	establish	rules	to	distinguish	true	from	false.		For	example,	liberalism	strategically	made	of	the	market	a	site	of	véridiction.	Good	government,	 according	 to	 the	 économistes,	 was	 no	 longer	 simply	 a	 just	government.	Rather,	 the	 legitimate	 government	was	one	 that	did	not	 govern	 too	much	or	 too	 little.	What	was	distinctive	 to	 liberalism	was	not	 the	 rule	 of	 law	or	market	economy,	since	both	had	existed	in	illiberal	contexts,	but	rather	 ‘a	critical	reflection	on	 the	practice	of	 government’,	 a	 critique	 that	may	 rely	on	 limitations	that	were	external	(economy)	or	internal	(law),	but	that	always	sought	to	address	the	 excesses	 of	 intervention,	 driven	 by	 the	 belief	 that	 ‘one	 always	 governs	 too	much’.27	The	market	established	 truth	 from	outside	government.	Since	governing	too	much	made	things	worse,	as	in	the	case	of	fighting	grain	scarcity,	intervention	had	 to	 be	 limited	 so	 that	 certain	 ‘natural’,	 spontaneous	 mechanisms	 could	 be	allowed	to	function.28	The	state	had	to	respect	those	 ‘natural	processes,	or	at	any	rate	to	take	them	into	account,	get	them	to	work,	or	to	work	with	them[…]	It	will																																																									25	Foucault,	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	pp.	31-37.	26	Ibid.,	p.	35.	27	Ibid.,	pp.	318-322.	28	Ibid.,	pp.	58-61.	
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be	 necessary	 to	 arouse,	 facilitate,	 and	 to	 laissez	 faire,	 in	 other	words,	 to	manage	and	no	longer	to	control	through	rules	and	regulations’.29	These	mechanisms	were	made	 intelligible	by	 the	scientific	knowledge	of	political	economy,	which	became	indispensable	 know-how	 for	 good	 government. 30 	‘Political	 economy	 was	important,	 even	 in	 its	 theoretical	 formulation,	 inasmuch	 as[…]	 it	 pointed	 out	 to	government	 where	 it	 had	 to	 go	 to	 find	 the	 principle	 of	 truth	 of	 its	 own	governmental	practice’.31			This	was	 in	 stark	contrast	 to	 the	 rationality	of	government	of	 the	administrative	monarchy	that	preceded	it.	Instead	of	deriving	truth	from	the	model	of	sovereignty	that	came	before	it	—based	on	law	emanating	from	a	prince	characterized	by	his	singularity,	transcendence	and	exteriority	to	his	principality—	or	on	a	critique	of	government	 such	 as	 liberalism,	 the	 administrative	 monarchy	 was	 based	 on	 a	governmental	 continuum.	 There	 was	 an	 upward	 and	 downward	 continuity	 of	power;	 one	 could	 govern	 a	 family,	 a	 convent	 or	 a	 state.	 Power	 was	 therefore	multiple	 and	 immanent.	 In	 order	 to	 govern	 a	 state,	 the	 prince	 had	 to	 be	 able	 to	govern	himself,	his	family,	household,	lands	and	so	on.	This	upward	continuity	was	guaranteed	by	the	education	of	the	prince,	and	the	downward	continuity	by	‘police’	which	 was	 the	 name	 given	 to	 the	 extension	 through	 ‘policy’	 or	 ‘police	 science’	(Polizeiwissenschaft)	of	the	notions	of	good	management	of	the	market	town	to	the	entire	realm.	While	sovereignty	acted	fundamentally	through	legal-juridical	power	(the	binary	opposition	of	 allowed-prohibited),	 this	new	governmental	 rationality	
																																																								29	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	pp.	352-353	30	Ibid.,	pp.	342-354,	Foucault,	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	p.	61.	31	Ibid.,	p.	32.	
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opened	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 unlimited,	 non-juridical	 regulation	 over	 spaces,	circulation	and	population.32			By	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 the	 criteria	 to	 establish	 truth	 stopped	 being	 that	 of	law,	justice	and	sovereignty,	on	the	one	hand,	and	force,	war	and	conquest	on	the	other.	The	abandonment	of	 imperium	and	sovereignty	and	the	 ‘opening	up	of	 the	field	we	 call	 politics’	 is	 signalled	 in	 the	 phrase	 ‘the	 king	 reigns,	 but	 he	 does	 not	govern’.33	Foucault	 found	 that	 truth	 became	 determined	 within	 the	 relations	 of	government,	in	analogous	forms	to	how	scientific	truth	was	established	by	internal	reference	to	scientific	discourse	itself.	This	‘great	shift	from	juridical	veridiction	to	epistemic	veridiction’,	was	the	birth	of	modern	politics	itself.34		The	 ‘displacement	 of	 the	 site	 of	 legitimation	 of	 power	 towards	 the	 governed	produced	 by	 the	 theories	 of	 contract’	 also	 produced	 a	 change	 in	 the	 way	 the	governed	were	understood.35	As	Pasquale	Pasquino	has	argued,		Insofar	as	it	is	the	obedience	of	the	subjects	which	founds,	produces,	and	renders	visible	the	legitimacy	of	power,	these	same	subjects,	their	bodies	and	the	range	of	ways	 in	 which	 they	 behave	 towards	 themselves	 and	 others	 are	 to	 become,	increasingly,	 the	 site	 of	 a	 new	 production	 of	 knowledge	 and	 the	 point	 of	application	 of	 rules	 governing	 the	 conduct	 of	 life,	 objects	 of	 ‘government’	 or,	 to	adopt	 a	 term	 in	 use	 from	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 onwards,	 problems	 of	 the	state.36	
																																																								32	Foucault,	Security,	Territory,	Population,	pp.	91-95,	339.	33	Ibid.,	p.	76.	34	Quoted	in:	Michel	Senellart,	‘Course	Context’,	in:	Foucault,	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	p.	331.	35	Pasquale	Pasquino,	‘Michel	Foucault	(1926-1984):	The	Will	to	Knowledge’,	Economy	and	Society,	15/1	(1986),	p.	99.	36	Ibid.	
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The	results	of	these	changes	were	not,	however,	limited	to	political	government	as	narrowly	 understood.	 ‘The	 relation	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 collective,	between	the	totality	of	the	social	body	and	its	elementary	fragments’,	and	indeed	even	the	very	notion	of	the	individual	were	transformed	through	the	discovery	of	the	 notion	 of	 population.37	Since	 ‘man	 is	 to	 population	what	 the	 subject	 of	 right	was	 to	 the	sovereign,’	 it	became	possible	 to	 conceive	 the	abstract,	 serialized	and	interchangeable	individual	as	an	economic	or	political	actor.38			As	 a	 ‘singular	 mode	 of	 action’	 that	 was	 neither	 belligerent	 nor	 juridical,	governmentality,	 as	 put	 forward	 by	 Foucault,	 was	 thus	 the	 rationality	 that	 was	immanent	 to	 ‘a	 cluster	 of	 intelligible	 and	 analysable	 relations’	 operating	 at	different	 levels	 of	 analysis,	 going	 from	 ‘the	 rationalization	of	 the	management	of	the	 individual’,	 either	 the	 self	 or	 others,	 to	 ‘the	 rationalization	 of	 governmental	practice	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	 sovereignty’. 39 	The	 aim	 was	 ‘to	 study	government’s	 consciousness	 of	 itself’,	 since	 these	 rationalizations	 were	 explicit	reflections	and	conceptualizations	on	 the	practice,	ends	and	rules	of	government	carried	out	 from	within	or	outside	government.40	For	Colin	Gordon,	 ‘A	rationality	of	government	will[…]	mean	a	way	or	system	of	 thinking	about	the	nature	of	 the	practice	 of	 government	 (who	 can	 govern;	 what	 governing	 is;	 what	 or	 who	 is	governed),	capable	of	making	some	form	of	that	activity	thinkable	and	practicable	both	 to	 its	practitioners	 and	 to	 those	upon	whom	 it	was	practiced’.41	The	notion	that	 governing	must	 be	 in	 some	way	 understandable	 and	 doable	 for	 the	 parties																																																									37	Ibid.,	p.	66.	38	Ibid.,	p.	79.	39	Foucault,	 Birth	 of	 Biopolitics,	 pp.	 2,	 322;	 Dits	 et	 Écrits,	 2,	 pp.	 38,	 237;	 Security,	 Territory,	
Population,	pp.	338;	Senellart,	‘Course	Context’,	in:	Ibid.,	p.	389.	40	Foucault,	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	p.	2.	41	Gordon,	‘Governmental	Rationality’,	p.	3.	
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involved	 has	 greatly	 influenced	 the	 present	 work.	 Changes	 in	 subjectivity	 and	governing	 must	 not	 be	 sought	 in	 the	 works	 of	 key	 philosophers	 alone,	 but	 can	rather	be	documented	through	a	very	vast	range	of	texts	that	tried	to	make	some	form	of	the	wider	governing	intelligible	and	reproducible.	If	the	gap	separating	the	individual	from	the	state	is	breached	and	a	common	governing	emerges,	then	the	distinctness	 of	 different	 domains	 of	 rule	 and	 knowledge	 become	 blurred.	 Thus	 I	have	 found	 in	 childrearing	manuals	 deep	 insights	 into	 the	nature	 of	 the	 state	 or	illustrated	 changes	 in	 interiority	 through	 cold	 bureaucratic	 documents;	 I	 have	made	 theological	 texts	 speak	 of	 mundane	 developments	 or	 derived	 codes	 of	normality	from	the	treatment	of	the	deviant	and	matters	of	self	from	the	managing	of	 the	 crowd.	 In	 summary,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 Foucault’s	 later	 work	 on	 government	made	it	possible	and	necessary	to	study	the	individual	and	the	state	as	a	common	analytical	 object	 rather	 than	 a	 binary	 opposition.	However,	 neither	 Foucault	 nor	his	 followers	 were	 able	 to	 offer	 a	 systematic	 deployment	 of	 these	 findings	 and	either	 neglected	 the	 importance	 of	 personal	 or	 collective	 government.	 In	apprehending	 in	tandem	the	self	and	the	state,	 this	 thesis	will	offer	what	may	be	the	first	systematic	application	of	Foucault’s	notions	of	the	government	of	self	and	others.			
Subjectivity	and	government.		In	 a	 recent	 historiographical	 survey,	 Emmanuel	 Fureix	 has	 argued	 that	 ‘few	historians	 have	 been	 globally	 inclined	 towards	 this	 general	 question	 of	 the	individual	and	individuation	in	the	history	of	the	nineteenth	century’.	It	is	a	history	
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that	 ‘remains	to	be	written’.42	My	work	aims	to	contribute	in	addressing	this	gap.	Although	 my	 focus	 will	 be	 on	 this	 history	 of	 the	 individual,	 the	 history	 of	subjectivity	cannot	be	written	in	isolation	from	that	of	the	modern	state.			The	main	 finding	 that	 structures	 this	 thesis,	 and	 its	 original	 contribution,	 is	 that	two	different	paradigms	of	subjectivity	and	government	emerged	in	the	nineteenth	century	 in	 France.	 I	 have	 called	 the	 first	 psychological,	 and	 the	 second	 the	
sociological.	Both	of	these	paradigms	developed	before	the	scientific	disciplines	we	now	 understand	 these	 two	 terms	 to	 designate	 had	 been	 established	 and	institutionalized	 in	 any	 of	 their	 current	 forms	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	(Théodule	 Ribot	 occupied	 the	 first	 academic	 chair	 in	 psychology	 in	 1888,	 while	Émile	Durkheim	held	the	first	in	sociology	in	1913).43	The	psychological	paradigm	developed	 towards	 1800	 and	 dominated	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 The	sociological	paradigm	emerged	towards	1900	and	characterized	twentieth-century	subjectivity.			I	became	aware	of	the	importance	of	what	contemporaries	termed	‘psychology’	in	reading	 the	 works	 of	 sociologists	 Norbert	 Elias	 and	 Richard	 Sennett,	 historian	Philippe	 Ariès	 and	 Jean-Paul	 Sartre’s	 cryptic	 five-volume	 study	 of	 Gustave	Flaubert.44	Before	it	emerged	as	a	modern	discipline	in	the	1870s,	 ‘psychology’	in	
																																																								42 	Emmanuel	 Fureix,	 ‘Le	 siècle	 des	 identités’,	 in:	 Fureix	 and	 François	 Jarrige,	 La	 modernité	
désenchantée:	Relire	l’histoire	du	XIXe	siècle	français	(Paris,	2015),	pp.	182,	186.	43	Laurent	Mucchielli,	 La	 découverte	 du	 social:	Naissance	 de	 la	 sociologie	 en	 France	 (Paris,	 1998);	Jacqueline	Carroy,	Annick	Ohayon	and	Régine	Plas,	Histoire	de	 la	psychologie	en	France:	XIXe–XXe	
siècles	 (Paris,	 2006);	 Serge	 Nicolas,	 Histoire	 de	 la	 psychologie	 (Paris,	 2016);	 Reuchlin,	 Maurice,	
Histoire	de	la	psychologie	(Paris,	2003);	Jean-François	Braunstein	and	Évelyne	Pewzner,	Histoire	de	
la	psychologie	(Paris,	1999).	44	Norbert	Elias,	Power	and	Civility	(New	York,	1982);	Richard	Sennett,	Authority	 (London,	1993);	
Families	Against	 the	City:	Middle	Class	Homes	of	 Industrial	Chicago,	1872-1890	 (New	 York,	 1970);	
The	 Uses	 of	 Disorder:	 Personal	 Identity	 and	 City	 Life	 (New	 York,	 1970);	 The	 Fall	 of	 Public	 Man	
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the	 eighteenth	 and	 nineteenth	 century	 made	 reference	 to	 the	 theories	 of	 the	modern	philosophers,	from	René	Descartes	to	Immanuel	Kant.	As	will	be	explained	in	the	first	chapter,	these	were	novel	theories	of	human	cognition.	They	presented	the	mind	or	psyche	(hence	the	term	psychology)	as	a	universal	human	experience.	In	 short,	 all	minds	worked	 the	 same.	 This	was	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 belief	 that	 ‘men’	were	equal	and	the	birthplace	of	all	universalisms.	In	the	nineteenth	century,	the	eighteenth-century	 psychology	 was	 heavily	 revised	 and	 served	 as	 the	 basis	 of	liberal	theories	of	government	and	a	theory	of	the	self	or	moi.	The	key	work	on	the	subject	for	France	is	historian	Jan	Goldstein’s	The	Post-Revolutionary	Self.	She	has	documented	how	the	weak	sense	of	self	in	the	eighteenth	century	gave	rise	to	the	unity	 and	 centrality	 of	 the	 modern	 moi	 following	 the	 theories	 of	 French	philosopher	Victor	Cousin	and	others	who	had	ties	to	the	liberal	opposition	to	the	Restoration	and	the	government	under	the	 July	Monarchy.45	Another	key	work	 is	historian	Jerrold	Siegel’s	The	Idea	of	the	Self,	which	explores	subjectivity	from	the	seventeenth	century	until	the	present	in	the	West,	devoting	a	third	of	the	work	to	French	thinkers	who	are	relevant	to	our	period	and	a	chapter	to	Cousin	and	Émile	Durkheim.46		While	eighteenth-century	philosophy	and	political	thought	in	general	is	crucial	to	understand	the	modern	individual	and	the	state,	I	have	approached	this	topic	only	through	 the	 secondary	 literature.	 I	 have	 relied	 mainly	 on	 the	 philosophical	
																																																																																																																																																																		(London,	 1993);	 Philippe	Ariès,	Centuries	of	Childhood:	A	Social	History	of	Family	Life	(New	York,	1962).	45	Jan	Goldstein,	The	Post-Revolutionary	Self:	Politics	and	Psyche	 in	France,	1750-1850	 (Cambridge,	Mass.,	2008).	46	In	six	chapters	Seigel	considers	the	thought	of	Descartes,	Condillac,	Diderot,	Rousseau,	Maine	de	Biran,	Constant,	Cousin,	Fouillé,	Bergson,	 Janet,	 and	Durkheim.	 Jerrold	Seigel,	The	Idea	of	the	Self:	
Thought	and	Experience	in	Western	Europe	since	the	Seventeenth	Century	(Cambridge,	2005).	
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inquiries	of	Cascardi	and	Charles	Taylor,	Giacomo	Marramao’s	political	philosophy,	Lucien	 Jaume’s	 intellectual	 history	 of	 the	 individual	 in	 eighteenth	 and	 early	nineteenth	century	liberal	thought,	and	the	insights	of	Communist	philosopher	and	mystic	Simone	Weil	as	well	as	the	philosopher	and	novelist	Iris	Murdoch,	who	was	a	 very	 lucid	 interpreter	 of	 French	 thought	 and	 literature. 47 	However,	 my	understanding	is	that	the	utility	of	a	purely	intellectual	or	philosophical	approach	to	 the	 individual	 in	 the	nineteenth	century	 is	very	 limited.	After	1789,	notions	of	the	 individual	and	the	state	no	 longer	belonged	to	high	philosophical	debate,	but	rather	became	a	problem	of	policy	that	can	only	be	understood	through	a	historical	approach	to	the	ideas	and	practices	of	government.			The	realization	that	psychology	had	functioned	as	a	paradigm	of	subjectivity	then	made	 me	 reconsider	 the	 1890s,	 the	 Third	 Republic’s	 political	 philosophy	 of	
Solidarisme	 and	 especially	 Durkheim,	 the	 founding	 father	 of	 French	 sociology.	Psychology	 had	 been	 both	 the	main	 target	 of	 Durkheim’s	 bitter	 attacks	 and	 the	constant	point	of	comparison	with	the	newly	born	discipline	of	sociology.	As	well	as	laying	the	groundwork	for	the	study	of	society,	Durkheim	offered	a	new	theory	of	 subjectivity	 and	 cognition,	 as	 Cousin	 had	 done	 before,	 and	 many	 of	 his	contemporaries	 were	 working	 in	 the	 same	 direction.	 In	 effect,	 the	 twentieth	century,	as	had	been	the	case	for	the	nineteenth,	was	born	in	tandem	with	a	new	paradigm	of	the	self	that	re-appropriated	and	re-interpreted	the	previous	one.	The	psychological	came	to	signify	what	it	does	now,	not	the	entirety	of	humanness,	but	
																																																								47	Cascardi,	 Subject	 of	 Modernity;	 Charles	 Taylor,	 The	 Sources	 of	 the	 Self:	 The	 Making	 of	 Modern	
Identity	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1989);	Giacomo	Marramao,	The	Passage	West:	Philosophy	After	the	Age	
of	 the	Nation	 State	 (London,	 2012);	 Lucien	 Jaume,	 L’individu	 effacé	 ou	 le	 paradoxe	du	 libéralisme	
français	 (Paris,	 1997)	;	 Simon	 Weil,	 An	 Anthology	 (London,	 1986);	 Murdoch,	 Existentialists	 and	
Mystics.	Other	works	on	subjectivity	are	listed	in	the	bibliography.		
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an	internal	dimension	of	the	self,	at	one	particular	and	universal.	The	sociological	in	 turn	 spoke	 of	 a	 national	 and	 historical	 external	 reality	 that	 in	 turned	conditioned	and	made	possible	the	self’s	interior.			The	best	study	on	subjectivity	that	focuses	on	what	I	have	termed	the	‘sociological’	paradigm,	 is	 Divided	 Existence	 and	 Complex	 Society	 (Published	 in	 1963	 and	translated	 in	1974)	by	 Jan	Hendrik	van	den	Berg,	a	Dutch	psychiatrist.48	Van	den	Berg	 showed	 how	 the	 structure	 of	 society	 changed	 alongside	 the	 structure	 of	personality,	 in	 particular	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 the	 self	 I	will	 discuss	 in	 the	 third	chapter.	All	 in	all,	van	den	Berg	is	the	best	historian	of	 late-modern	subjectivity	I	have	 encountered.	 Even	 though	 he	 was	 to	 my	 knowledge	 the	 first	 to	 have	approached	 the	 issue	 of	 subjectivity	 historically	 and	was	 quickly	 translated	 into	English,	 he	 has	 been	 undeservedly	 ignored	 by	 scholarship	 on	 the	 topic.49	In	The	
Changing	Nature	of	Man	(published	in	1956	and	translated	in	1961)	he	first	made	the	forceful	claim	that	human	beings	change	through	time,	a	change	that	included	in	particular	 the	concept	of	 the	child.50	In	 the	Old	Regime,	 children	were	 seen	as	little	 adults,	 a	 conclusion	 at	 which	 Ariès	 would	 arrive	 independently	 four	 years	later.51	As	will	 become	 evident	 below,	 I	 am	 indebted	 to	 both	 their	 views	 on	 the	historicity	and	centrality	of	childhood.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 then,	 I	build	on	 the	work	of	Goldstein	 and	 van	 den	 Berg,	 but	 also	 seek	 to	 go	 beyond	 their	 conclusions	 by	
																																																								48 	Jan	 Hendrik	 van	 den	 Berg,	 Divided	 Existence	 and	 Complex	 Society:	 An	 Historical	 Approach	(Pittsburgh,	1974).	49	See	the	journal	issue	devoted	to	him:	Janus	Head,	10	2	(2008).	50	Van	 den	 Berg,	The	Changing	Nature	of	Man:	 Introduction	 to	a	Historical	Psychology	 (New	 York,	1983).	51	Eva-Maria	Simms,	 ‘Literacy	and	the	appearance	of	childhood’,	 Janus	Head,	10/2	(2008),	p.	445	;	Ariès,	Centuries	of	Childhood.	
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bringing	together	discussions	of	subjectivity	with	the	wider	 issue	of	 ‘government	rationalities’.			
Government	of	the	social.		The	‘government	of	the	social’	was	the	focus	of	a	body	of	literature	that,	starting	in	the	1980s,	 sought	 to	develop	 and	apply	Foucault’s	 notions	of	 government	 to	 the	nineteenth	century	and	the	subsequent	rise	of	modern	social	assistance	leading	up	to	the	modern	Welfare	State.	Working	from	different	disciplines,	Jacques	Donzelot,	Giovanna	 Procacci,	 Robert	 Castel,	 François	 Ewald,	 Paul	 Rabinow,	 Mitchell	 Dean	and	others,	found	that	in	the	nineteenth	century	there	was	a	profound	shift	in	the	practice	 and	 theory	 of	 government	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 rulers	 and	 the	ruled.52	At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 shift	 was	 the	 development	 of	 the	 new	 notion	 of	‘society’.	 ‘In	the	course	of	the	nineteenth	century,’	wrote	Rabinow,	‘society	slowly	became	to	be	seen	as	an	object	sui	generis,	with	its	own	laws,	its	own	science,	and	eventually	 its	own	arts	of	 government’.53	This	 focus	on	 society	was	 ‘necessary	 in	order	to	render	governable	a	democratic	society’.54		Donzelot	and	Procacci	have	shown	that	this	shift	in	government	was	a	result	of	the	issues	raised	by	the	so-called	‘social	question’.	The	latter	was	an	umbrella	term	for	the	wide-ranging	anxieties	triggered	by	pauperism,	social	disorder	and	the	general																																																									52	Jacques	 Donzelot,	 L’invention	 du	 social:	 Essai	 sur	 le	 déclin	 des	 passions	 politiques	 (Paris,	 1984);	Giovanna	 Procacci,	 Gouverner	 la	 misère:	 La	 question	 sociale	 en	 France,	 1789-1848	 (Paris,	 1993);	Robert	 Castel,	 Métamorphoses	 de	 la	 question	 sociale:	 Une	 chronique	 du	 salariat	 (Paris,	 1995);	François	 Ewald,	 L'État	 providence	 (Paris,	 1986);	Histoire	 de	 l’État	 providence	 (Paris,	 1996);	 Paul	Rabinow,	 French	 Modern:	 Norms	 and	 Forms	 of	 the	 Social	 Environment	 (Chicago,	 1995);	 Mitchell	Dean,	The	Constitution	of	Poverty:	Toward	a	Genealogy	of	Liberal	Governance	(London,	1991).	53	Rabinow,	French	Modern,	p.	11.	54	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social,	p.13.	
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malaise	 brought	 about	 by	 rapid	 social	 transformations.	 For	 Robert	 Castel,	 ‘The	“social	 question”	 is	 a	 fundamental	 aporia	 over	 which	 a	 society	 experiments	 the	enigma	 of	 its	 cohesion	 and	 attempts	 to	 conjure	 the	 risk	 of	 its	 fracture.	 It	 is	 a	challenge	that	interrogates	and	reassesses	the	capacity	of	a	society	(that	which	in	political	terms	is	called	a	nation)	to	exist	as	an	ensemble	tied	together	by	relations	of	interdependence’.55			The	 ‘social	 question’	 was	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 French	 modernity.	 The	 French	Revolution	altered	the	make-up	of	the	social	body	in	seemingly	irreversible	ways.	Most	 importantly,	 revolutionary	 law	made	 impossible	 the	 survival	 of	 a	 series	 of	intermediary	institutions,	such	as	the	nobility,	the	corporations,	the	guilds,	or	the	Estates,	 that	had	hitherto	structured	society.56	1789	thus	 inaugurated	a	period	of	incessant	debates	on	the	individual	and	the	state,	posing	the	riddle	of	how	the	two	should	relate	and	of	what	should	exist	in	the	gap	left	between	one	and	the	other	in	order	 to	 make	 the	 social	 order	 viable.	 While	 these	 questions	 have	 never	 been	resolved	fully,	the	nineteenth	century	saw	the	rise	of	a	new	domain	of	thought	and	action	which	Donzelot	and	Procacci	have	termed	‘the	social’	(le	social).			Donzelot	 and	Procacci	 have	 shown	 that	 ‘the	 social’	 emerged	 as	 a	distinct	way	of	thinking	and	acting	upon	reality	in	order	to	‘counteract	unsolved	problems	raised	by	 the	 individualistic	 premises	 of	 the	 juridical	 rationality	 concerning	 political	
																																																								55	Castel,	Métamorphoses	de	la	question	social,	p.	18.	56	The	 issue	 of	 intermediary	 bodies	 and	 the	 French	 state	 has	 been	 most	 extensively	 studied	 by	Pierre	Rosanvallon,	The	Demands	of	Liberty:	Civil	Society	in	France	since	the	Revolution	(Cambridge,	MA,	2007).			
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relations,	and	the	market	rationality	concerning	economic	relations’.57	The	tension	between	law	and	market	was	at	the	heart	of	the	revolutionary	experience.		The	Revolution	marked	 the	 end	of	 an	understanding	of	 poverty	 as	 an	 individual	problem	 that	 could	 only	 affect	 society	 in	 the	 form	 of	 public	 order.	 Instead,	 it	became	a	collective	problem,	on	two	levels:	poverty	moved	from	the	sphere	of	the	individual	 fate	 to	 encompass	 the	 collectivity	 of	 the	 poor	 that,	 as	 such,	 posed	 a	problem	 to	 the	nation.	Moreover,	 the	problem	of	poverty	was	 itself	 the	 result	 of	key	failures	in	the	old	social	organization,	through	the	impediments	to	free	labour	or	lack	of	public	assistance	for	the	disabled	poor.	The	liberal	critique	of	the	Ancien	
Régime	 had	 thus	 tied	 the	 faith	 of	 the	 poor	 to	 that	 of	 the	 new	 social	 order	 as	 a	whole.	A	new	rationality	had	arisen,	Procacci	argued,	one	that	 ‘implicated	society	in	 the	 causes	 of	 poverty	 and	 in	 their	 resolution,	 and	which	 tied	 the	 existence	 of	poverty	 to	 the	 destiny	 of	 society	 itself’.58	In	 this	 light,	 the	 inability	 to	 develop	 a	social	policy	became	increasingly	destabilizing.			Post-revolutionary	France	 inherited	 the	challenge	of	wedding	 individual	 juridical	equality	 with	 profound	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 inequality:	 a	 founding	contradiction	that	the	poor	embodied	better	than	no	other.59	It	was	also	necessary	to	 make	 sense	 of	 political	 voluntarism	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 possible	 limits	 to	 be	imposed	 on	 sovereignty.	 Caught	 in	 a	 struggle	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 the	national,	sovereignty	claimed	an	ability	to	transform	reality	through	law	and	cast	social	life	into	the	juridical	mould.	Pauperism	in	turn	symbolized	a	challenge	to	the																																																									57	Procacci,	 ‘Sociology	and	its	poor’,	Politics	and	Society,	17	(1989),	p.	165.	See	Donzelot,	Invention	
du	social,	p.	10.	58	Procacci,	‘Notes	on	the	government	of	the	social’,	History	of	the	Present,	3	(1987),	p.	13.	59	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	16;	‘Notes’,	p.	13.	
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capacities	 of	 the	 market	 to	 organize	 the	 social	 body.	 Confronted	 with	 these	problems,	 French	 thinkers	 gradually	 started	 to	 carve	 out	 a	 distinct	 space	 of	‘society’.	 Political	 thinkers	 established	 a	 distinctive	 interpretation	 of	 political	systems	 whose	 stability	 rested	 not	 on	 constitutional	 checks	 and	 balances	 or	parliamentary	institutions,	but	on	the	existence	within	society	of	forces	such	as	the	aristocracy	 that	 were	 capable	 of	 resisting	 despotism.60	Doctrinaire	 liberals	 put	forward	 an	 interpretation	 of	 democracy	 as	 a	 sociological	 rather	 than	 political	system	.61	French	liberal	economists	in	turn	developed	a	distinct	understanding	of	economy	as	a	‘moral	science’	and	an	interpretation	of	poverty	as	a	fundamentally	moral	problem.62	This	moral	approach	became	generalized	 in	 the	 first	half	of	 the	nineteenth	century.	Misery	was	read	as	immorality	and	‘antisociality,	precisely	so	as	 to	 make	 it	 governable’.63	This	 gave	 the	 debate	 on	 pauperism	 in	 France	 ‘an	original	emphasis	on	its	social,	rather	than	merely	economic	implications’.64		The	social	interpretation	of	poverty	shifted	the	focus	from	the	need	to	change	‘the	material	 conditions	 in	 which	 the	 poor	 lived’,	 to	 ‘the	 social	 conditions	 that	generated	 them’.65	While	 serving	 as	 ‘a	 strategy	of	 depoliticization	of	 inequalities’	and	 thus	 diffusing	 the	 potentially	 threatening	 political	 implications	 of	 poverty,	society	served	to	open	up	a	new	field	of	intervention	beyond	the	political.66	Society	was	 ‘at	 the	 same	 time	 subject	 and	 field	 of	 application	 of	 new	 practices	 of																																																									60	Annelien	de	Dijn,	French	Political	Thought	from	Montesquieu	to	Tocqueville:	Liberty	in	a	Levelled	
Society?	(Cambridge,	2008),	p.	127	and	chapter	6;	Theodore	Zeldin,	‘English	ideals	in	French	politics	during	the	nineteenth	century’,	The	Historical	Journal,	2	1	(1959),	pp.	40-58.		61	Rosanvallon,	‘The	history	of	the	word	“democracy”	in	France’,	Journal	of	Democracy,	6/4	(1995),	pp.	148-149.	62	Nathalie	 Sigot,	 ‘Utility	 and	 justice:	 French	 liberal	 economists	 in	 the	 19th	 century’,	 European	
Journal	of	the	History	of	Economic	Thought,	17	4	(2010),	HAL	version	(hal-00637265),	pp.	4-10.	63	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	24.	64	Procacci,	‘Sociology	and	its	poor’,	Politics	and	Society,	17	(1989),	p.	168.	65	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	318.	66	Ibid.,	pp.	16,	25.	
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government’	that	could	‘neutralize	the	potential	conflicts	caused	by	inequality	in	a	society	founded	on	equality’.67	By	classifying	problems	of	inequality	and	poverty	as	social	rather	than	political	problems,	it	was	possible	to	see	how	the	ability	to	deal	with	those	problems	lay	outside	the	field	of	political	agency.	It	is	not	that	the	social	was	apolitical,	Procacci	argued,	 ‘it	 is	the	political	that	through	the	social	becomes	in	 turn	 governable,	 that	 is	 to	 say	delivered	 from	 the	 yoke	of	 a	 consensus	on	 the	founding	principles	of	the	social	pact’.68		Misery	 was	 targeted	 preferably	 within	 the	 social	 itself,	 at	 a	 calculated	 distance	from	 the	 state	 that	 could	 remain	 passive	 by	 principle	 or	 budgetary	 constraint.	Through	philanthropic	action	it	was	possible	to	dissociate	the	problem	of	poverty	from	labour.	‘Labour	became	therefore	just	one	among	other	means	of	moralizing	and	pedagogic	intervention…	reform	was	not	to	modify	the	industrial	system,	but	rather	to	promote	those	practices	of	citizenship	that	fit	into	it’.69	And	yet,	the	very	social	 role	 of	 the	 poor	was	 still	 defined	 by	 labour	 and	written	 into	 law	 through	highly	 repressive	 institutions.	 ‘Only	 through	 labour	 could	 the	 poor	 return	 to	society	 what	 the	 latter	 had	 given	 them	 in	 terms	 of	 rights’.	 This	 led	 to	 the	politicization	 of	 the	 economy	 that	 erupted	 in	 1848	 as	 a	 demand	 for	 the	 right	 to	work	and	 the	politicization	of	 law	and	 citizenship	 that	 led	 to	 claims	of	universal	(male)	suffrage.70			
																																																								67	Ibid.,	pp.	18,	24.	68	Ibid.,	p.	25.	69	Procacci,	‘Sociology’,	p.	169.	70	Ibid.,	p.	179,	quote	in	175.	In	1833,	the	tailor	Grignon	wrote	‘Let	us	not	forget	that	the	rich	alone	make	the	law,	and	that	we	will	not	free	ourselves	from	the	yoke	of	misery	than	by	exercising,	like	them,	our	rights	as	citizens’.	 In:	Alain	Faure	and	 Jacques	Rancière	(eds),	La	parole	ouvrière,	1830-
1851	(Paris,	1976),	p.	81.	
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Governing	1848.		Having	 demonstrated	 the	 condition	 for	 the	 autonomous	 rise	 of	 social	 discourse,	Procacci’s	study	finishes	in	1848.	Donzelot,	in	turn,	started	his	work	by	analysing	how	 the	 1848	 revolution	 made	 the	 issue	 of	 sovereignty	 highly	 problematic	 by	posing	the	question:	‘how	can	one	give	rights	to	those	who	suffer	an	inferiority	in	their	 civil	 condition	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 political	 condition	 without	 giving	 then	rights	over	 the	state?’71	For	social	and	political	 thinkers	 in	 the	second	half	of	 the	nineteenth	century,	it	was	the	French	Revolution’s	notion	of	sovereignty	that	was	to	blame,	along	with	the	rights-bearing	individual	that	derived	from	it.	The	social	question	had	revealed	a	founding	flaw	in	the	order	established	by	the	Revolution	and	 its	 ‘instrument	par	 excellence:	 the	 language	of	 law’.	The	 revolutionary	 ideal,	what	 Pierre	 Rosanvallon	 has	 termed	 ‘nomophilia’	 (love	 of	 law),	 was	 now	associated	 with	 the	 dangers	 of	 socialism.72	Thus,	 1848	 posed	 the	 problem	 of	‘separating	 poverty	 from	 work	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 dealing	 with	 one	 and	 the	other,	 outside	 of	 the	 register	 of	 subjective	 rights’.73	In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	century,	 following	 especially	 by	 the	work	 of	 sociologists	 from	Auguste	 Comte	 to	Émile	Durkheim,	society	was	conceptualized	as	a	law-giving	force	that	would	avoid	the	 problem	 of	 sovereignty	 by	 relying	 on	 social	 norms.74	Instead	 of	 a	 unified	subject	of	rights,	the	individual	became	fragmented	into	a	myriad	of	social	duties,	thus	avoiding	‘the	direct	confrontation	between	the	individual	and	the	state	which	the	notion	of	right	carried’.75																																																										71	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social,	pp.	13,	21,	40-41,	quote	in	49	and	71.	72	Rosanvallon,	Demands	of	Liberty,	p.	6.	73	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	317.	74	Procacci,	‘Sociology’,	p.	183.		75	Procacci,	‘Notes’,	p.	15.	
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Donzelot	 has	 analysed	 the	 gradual	 ‘invention’	 of	 the	 social	 through	 the	work	 of	sociologists,	economists,	social	reformists,	and	legal	and	political	theorists	from	a	range	of	political	backgrounds	that	converged	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	in	the	creation	 of	 solidarité	 or	 solidarisme.	 As	 a	 French	 alternative	 to	 British	 new-liberalism,	 American	 progressivism,	 and	 similar	 currents	 of	 thought	 elsewhere,	solidarism	rested	on	the	‘discovery’	of	the	‘scientific	fact’	that	society	displayed	the	same	functional	interdependence	and	solidarity	between	the	parts	and	the	whole,	thus	superseding	the	confrontation	between	the	rights-bearing	individual	and	the	state.			Léon	 Bourgeois,	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 political	 figures	 of	 the	 Republican	 camp,	systematized	 solidarism	 into	 a	 doctrine	of	 government	 in	1896,	 shortly	 after	 his	brief	term	as	prime	minister.	Subsequently	claimed	as	the	governmental	doctrine	of	the	Radical	republicans	in	power	from	the	1890s	to	1914,	solidarism	promised	to	 have	 found	 a	 middle	 ground	 between	 socialist	 collectivism	 and	 liberal	individualism,	 which	 enabled	 the	 Republic	 to	 embark	 on	 the	 path	 of	 social	reform.76			The	new	policies	implied	a	new	understanding	of	the	recipient	of	social	assistance	that	 tied	aid	 to	autonomy:	 ‘The	state	should	by	all	means	 intervene	 to	aid	needy	persons,	but	 it	might	do	so	only	to	promote	their	 individual	 initiative.	 In	twenty-
																																																								76	Serge	 Audier,	 Léon	 Bourgeois:	 Fonder	 la	 solidarité	 (Paris,	 2007),	 p.	 8;	 see:	 Léon	 Bourgeois,	
Solidarité	 (Paris,	1902);	Bourgeois	and	Alfred	Croiset	(eds),	Essai	d’une	philosophie	de	la	solidarité	(Paris,	1907);	Marie-Claude	Blais,	La	solidarité:	Histoire	d'une	idée	(Paris,	2007);	 Judith	Stone,	The	
Search	for	Social	Peace:	Reform	Legislation	in	France,	1890-1914	(Albany,	1985).	
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five	 words	 or	 less,	 such	 was	 solidarism’.77	But	 the	 repercussions	 were	 much	greater;	 this	doctrine	signified	a	new	way	of	governing	society.	 ‘If	an	 individual’s	action	 was	 a	 function	 not	 of	 his	 own	 moral	 character,	 as	 liberals	 believed,	 but	rather	of	his	place	within	a	social	whole,	then	it	made	little	sense	to	try	to	reform	the	 individual	 separate	 from	 the	 social	 milieu	 within	 which	 his	 actions	 were	formed	 and	 normed’.78	While	 Foucault	 argued	 that	 frugality	 and	 limitation	were	central	to	the	liberal	art	of	government	that	asked	 ‘how	not	to	govern	too	much’,	Donzelot	has	 shown	 that	 solidarism	sought	 to	govern	 ‘neither	 too	much,	nor	 too	little’.79	Solidarism	 offered	 ‘at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 foundation	 and	 a	 limit	 to	 state	intervention’	 as	 well	 as	 a	 mode	 of	 governing	 that	 would	 operate	 through	 ‘the	regulation	of	the	social	bond	rather	than	[though]	its	fixed	maintenance	or[…]	the	voluntaristic	transformation	of	social	structures’.80			The	 social	 had	 become	 a	 new	 and	 totalizing	 grid	 through	which	 to	 read	 reality,	politics,	 law,	and	the	economy.	 ‘Discursively,	society	no	 longer	had	an	exterior’.81	The	view	of	society	as	a	self-regulating	organism	with	its	own	laws	allowed	for	the	abandonment	 of	 revolutionary	 notions	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 the	 rights-bearing	juridical	subject.	For	Bourgeois,	 ‘In	destroying	the	abstract	and	a	priori	notion	of	the	isolated	man,	the	knowledge	of	the	laws	of	natural	solidarity	destroys	with	the	same	 blow	 the	 equally	 abstract	 notion	 of	 the	 state’.82 	This	 ‘destruction’	 was	effected	by	legal	theorists	at	the	time,	and	in	particular	Léon	Duguit	and	Maurice	
																																																								77	Allan	Mitchell,	The	Divided	Path:	German	Influence	on	Social	Reform	in	France	after	1870	(Chapel	Hill,	1991),	p.	234.	78	Rabinow,	French	Modern,	p.	11.	79	Foucault,	Birth	of	Biopolitics,	pp.	13,	17,	19,	24,	28,	319-320;	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social,	p.	84.	80	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social,	pp.	85,	103.	81	Rabinow,	French	Modern,	p.	12.	82	Bourgeois,	Solidarité,	p.	87.	
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Hauriou.83	In	 his	 introduction	 to	 a	 translation	 of	 Duguit’s	 work,	 British	 pluralist	Harold	 Laski	 explained	 this	 ‘sociological	 interpretation	 of	 the	 state’	 that	 denied	sovereignty	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 both	 the	 state	 and	 individuals	 by	 proposing	 a	transition	 from	 subjective	 rights	 (derived	 from	 the	 person)	 to	 objective	 rights	(derived	 from	 social	 functions).	 ‘Sovereignty	 is	 born	 of	 rights.	 M.	 Duguit,	 in	substance,	denies	all	rights,	and	insists	simply	upon	the	existence	of	duties.	Each	of	us	has	certain	functions	to	perform,	born	of	our	position	in	society.	Our	duty	is	to	perform	these	functions.	Sovereignty	would	mean	the	unlimited	and	irresponsible	will	of	those	who	exercise	it;	but	they	are,	in	strict	fact,	limited	by	the	purpose	it	is	to	serve.	They	have	power	for	their	special	 function,	and	no	more’.	For	the	State,	this	 function	 was	 to	 ‘provide	 for	 certain	 public	 needs’.84	As	 summarized	 by	 the	theorist	of	guild	socialism,	Ramiro	de	Maeztu,	 ‘there	are	no	other	rights	 than	the	rights	 annexed	 to	 the	 social	 functions	 of	 every	 man.	 No	 functions,	 no	 rights!’85	Donzelot	concludes	that	‘From	the	point	of	view	of	Solidarité,	the	individual	is	no	more	than	a	function.	He	has	tasks	to	carry	out	but	in	no	way	rights	that	belong	to	him	on	his	own’.86		Hence,	 the	debates	on	social	problems	and	poverty	were	central	 to	 the	search	to	articulate	modern	practices	of	government	that	could	balance	formal	equality	and	
																																																								83	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social,	p.	89.	84	Harold	 Laski,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in:	 Léon	Duguit,	Law	in	 the	Modern	State	 (London,	 1921),	 pp.	 xvii,	xix-xx.	 Julian	 Wright	 and	 H.S.	 Jones,	 ‘A	 pluralist	 history	 of	 France?’,	 in	 Wright	 and	 Jones	 (eds),	
Pluralism	and	the	Idea	of	the	Republic	in	France	 (Basingstoke,	2012),	pp.	1-22	and	Wright,	 ‘Vision	and	 reality:	 Joseph	 Paul-Boncour	 and	 Third	 Republic	 pluralism’,	 in:	 Ibid.,	 pp.	 179-197;	 Cécile	Laborde,	‘Pluralism,	syndicalism	and	corporatism:	Léon	Duguit	and	the	crisis	of	the	state,	1900-25’,	
History	of	European	Ideas,	22	3	(1996),	pp.	227-244;	Pluralist	Thought	and	the	State	in	Britain	and	
France,	1900-25	(Basingstoke,	2000).	85	Ramiro	de	Maeztu,	Authority,	Liberty	and	Function	in	the	Light	of	the	War	(London,	1916),	p.	189.	Marie-Claire	 Belleau,	 ‘The	 “juristes	 inquiets”:	 Legal	 classicism	 and	 criticism	 in	 early	 twentieth-century	France’,	Utah	Law	Review,	379/2	(1997),	pp.	379-424.	86	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social,	p.	94.	
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actual	inequality	while	warding	off	social,	economic	and	political	disruption.	In	the	nineteenth	 century,	 the	 notion	 of	 society	went	 from	 that	 of	 an	 agglomeration	 of	individuals	doubling	as	citizens	and	rational	economic	actors,	to	that	of	society	as	an	 organic	 totality	 generating	webs	 of	 interdependency.	 This	 shift	 in	 rationality	went	hand	in	hand	with	the	development	of	new	fields	of	knowledge,	technologies	of	intervention	and	new	arts	of	government.			My	 contribution	 to	 this	debate	on	 government	will	 be	 to	bring	 in	 the	 individual.	These	 profound	 and	 wide-ranging	 changes	 in	 governmental	 rationalities,	 I	 will	argue,	necessarily	implied	shifts	in	the	way	the	subject	was	understood,	marking	a	transition	 from	 the	 rights-based	 personhood	 of	 the	 sovereign	 individual	 to	 the	concept	 of	 an	 agent	 who	 was	 fragmented	 into	 interwoven	 social	 duties	 and	functions,	 and	 whose	 self	 was	 coextensive	 with	 its	 social	 obligations	 and	 tasks.	These	are	 the	changes	we	will	 explore.	Historian	Carolyn	Dean	has	carried	out	a	similar	 twofold	 exploration	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 government.	 In	 The	 Frail	 Social	
Body,	 she	 has	 analysed	 in	 tandem	 the	 discourses	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 individual	body	 and	 the	 social	 body	 through	 the	 ‘fantasies’	 of	 pornography	 and	homosexuality	in	interwar	France.	I	have	done	a	similarly	dual	exploration	of	the	individual	 and	 the	 self	 through	 the	 ‘fantasies’	 of	 pauperism	 and	domesticity	 and	the	state	policies	that	sought	to	address	these	questions.87				
																																																								87	Carolyn	Dean,	The	Frail	Social	Body:	Pornography,	Homosexuality,	and	Other	Fantasies	in	Interwar	
France	(Berkeley,	2000).	
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Current	literature	on	the	individual.		Many	of	the	works	of	scholarship	that	have	supported	my	enquiry	were	marginal,	with	 little	 repercussions	 in	mainstream	 social	 history.	 In	 France	 they	 have	 been	overtaken	 by	 a	 more	 recent	 literature	 on	 subjectivity	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	millennium. 88 	Jean-Claude	 Kaufmann,	 Bernard	 Lahire,	 Danilo	 Martuccelli	 and	François	 de	 Singly,	 Christian	 Le	 Bart,	 among	 others,	 have	 been	 prolific	 in	 their	development	of	a	new	 ‘sociology	of	 the	subject’.89	De	Singly	and	Rémi	Lenoir	are	also	 among	 those	 working	 on	 a	 new	 ‘sociology	 of	 the	 family’.90	For	 all	 their	valuable	 insights,	 their	 sociological	 approach	 leads	 to	 one	 inevitable	 conclusion.	Identities	 are	 social	 constructs,	made	exclusively	with	 social	 building	blocks,	 not	private	 dreams	 or	 illusions.	 Our	 agency	 and	 creativity	 is	 limited	 to	 playing	with	these	pre-existing	blocks	and	the	social	norms	that	govern	their	combinations.	‘If	it	is	true	that	the	instruments	of	invention	(images	and	emotions)	are	most	volatile’,	Kaufmann	argues,	 ‘they	are	 inscribed	 in	procedures	 that	are	socially	defined	and	very	precise’.	‘S’inventer	soi-même	ne	s’invente	pas’,	he	concludes,	‘Ego	ne	se	rêve	pas	 n’importe	 comment’.91	In	 short,	 the	 subject	 only	 has	 agency	 in	 the	world,	 so	long	as	it	renounces	agency	over	itself.																																																										88	The	 recent	 French	 work	 on	 the	 topic	 which	 I	 have	 found	 most	 useful	 is	 by	 anthropologist	François	 Laplantine,	 Le	 sujet:	 Essai	 d’anthropologie	 politique	 (Paris,	 2007)	 and	 Le	 social	 et	 le	
sensible:	Introduction	à	une	anthropologie	modale	(Paris,	2005).	89	Jean-Claude	Kaufmann,	Ego:	pour	une	sociologie	de	l’individu	(Paris,	2010)	and	L’invention	de	soi:	
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de	l'individu	 (Paris,	2012);	Martuccelli,	Grammaires	de	l’individu	(Paris,	2002);	Bernard	Lahire,	La	
culture	 de	 l’individu	 (Paris,	 2004)	 and	 L’homme	 pluriel:	 Les	 ressorts	 de	 l’action	 (Paris,	 2011);	Philippe	 Corcuff,	 Christian	 Le	 Bart	 and	 François	 de	 Singly	 (eds)	 L'individu	 aujourd'hui:	 Débats	
sociologiques	 et	 contrepoints	 philosophiques	 (Rennes,	 2010).	 Le	 Bart,	 L’individualisation	 (Paris,	2008);	Xavier	Molénat	(ed.),	L'individu	contemporain:	Regards	sociologiques	(Paris,	2006).	This	list	is	not	exhaustive.	90	De	Singly	has	numerous	works	on	the	family,	see	Le	soi,	le	couple	et	la	famille	(Paris,	1996);	Remi	Lenoir,	Généalogie	de	la	morale	familiale	(Paris,	2003).	91	Kaufmann,	L’invention	desSoi,	p.	291.	
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	My	 findings	 contradict	 those	 of	 Kaufmann	 and	 the	 sociologists	 of	 the	 individual.	Instead	 of	 emphasizing	 the	 fixity	 of	 the	 subject,	 what	 will	 come	 forward	 in	 the	following	pages	is	the	surprising	fluidity	and	continuously	changing	development	of	 the	 individual,	 the	 family	 and	 the	 ideas	 and	 practices	 of	 governing.	 In	 this	shifting	 landscape	 of	 ideas	 and	 practices,	 I	 will	 show	 how	 the	 main	 task	 of	 the	subject	was	precisely	self-fashioning	and	an	active	and	creative	adaptation	to	the	milieu.	 As	 the	 third	 chapter	 will	 show,	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 individual	sustained	 by	 these	 sociologists,	 in	 which	 the	 self	 is	 made	 up	 only	 of	 social	materials,	in	itself	has	its	own	a	history	and	emerged	only	towards	1900	as	a	new	way	of	theorizing	subjectivity.			These	 works	 can	 be	 seen	 within	 the	 overwhelming	 ‘intellectual	 and	 political	backlash’	of	the	1980s	against	the	questioning	of	the	humanist,	liberal	subject	that	characterized	 the	 1968	 movement	 in	 France	 and	 Foucault	 in	 particular.92	This	‘backlash’	represented	a	 fruitful	new	age	 in	French	 liberal	 thought,	which	 is	only	slowly	 receiving	 the	 scholarly	 attention	 it	 deserves.93	But	 this	 new	 tradition	 has	little	new	to	say	about	the	subject,	whose	status	must	remain	the	founding	a	priori	of	 the	 whole	 liberal	 edifice.	 In	 1975	 the	 socialist	 politician	 Jacques	 Delors	 first	theorized	the	present	age	as	characterized	by	change.94	But	together	with	the	1977	study	L’acteur	et	 le	systeme	by	 sociologists	Michel	 Crozier	 and	Erhard	Friedberg,																																																									92	Alexander	Nehamas,	‘Foreword’,	in:	Alain	Renaut,	The	Era	of	the	Individual:	A	Contribution	to	the	
History	of	Subjectivity	(Princeton,	1999),	p.	vii.	93	See,	 for	 example,	 Stephen	 Sawyer	 and	 Iain	 Stewart	 (eds),	 In	 Search	 of	 the	 Liberal	 Moment:	
Democracy,	 Anti-totalitarianism	 and	 Intellectual	 Politics	 in	 France	 since	 1950	 (New	 York,	 2016);	Daniel	Zamora	(ed.),	Critiquer	Foucault:	Les	années	1980	et	la	tentation	néolibérale	(Brussels,	2014);	Michael	 Scott	 Christofferson,	 French	 Intellectuals	Against	 the	Left:	 The	Antitotalitarian	Moment	 of	
the	1970s	(New	York,	2004).	94	Jacques	 Delors,	 Changer	 (Paris,	 1975);	 Eric	 de	 Bodman	 and	 Bertrand	 Richard,	 Changer	 les	
relations	sociales:	La	politique	de	Jacques	Delors	(Paris,	1976).	
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Delors	 understood	 change	 as	 largely	 impeding	 personal	 and	 collective	 agency.95	Change	 happened	 to	 the	 subject	 and	 society.	 As	 part	 of	 this	 ‘backlash’,	 Donzelot	and	 Castel’s	most	 relevant	works	 for	 this	 thesis,	 as	well	 as	 Pierre	 Rosanvallon’s	entire	 œuvre,	 may	 be	 read	 as	 part	 of	 this	 attempt	 to	 narrow	 the	 scope	 of	transformation	 to	which	persons	and	groups	could	aspire.96	By	showing	how	the	modern	individual	was	inseparable	from	self-fashioning	and	active	participation,	I	hope	to	reassess	the	possibilities	of	human	agency	in	nineteenth-century	France.			The	 novelty	 of	 this	 new	 literature	 on	 the	 individual	 has	 been	 human	 rights,	 the	modernized	version	of	eighteenth-	and	nineteenth-century	natural	 law.	As	 in	 the	work	of	Luc	Ferry	and	Alain	Renaut,	human	rights	have	been	mobilized	as	a	way	of	shoring	up	the	liberal	subject.	The	task	is	to	‘preserve	the	most	valuable	aspect	of	modernity,	 the	 idea	of	human	rights,	which	are	shared	by	all	 simply	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	we	are	human,	whatever	our	particular	circumstances’.97	To	question	the	 universally	 human	 subject,	 the	 simple	 fact	 of	 being	 human,	 is	 thus	 to	undermine	if	not	demolish	the	possibility	of	human	rights.			But,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 French	 Republic	 is	 under	 a	 national	 state	 of	emergency.	 As	 liberal	 rights	 and	 judicial	 oversight	 stand	 suspended,	 it	 becomes	plain	that	the	debate	on	modernity	is	not	exhausted	in	the	issue	of	human	rights	or	the	 affirmation	 of	 the	 sacred	 centrality	 of	 the	modern	 individual	 as	 subject	 and	object	of	all	rights.	Equally,	it	becomes	evident	that	the	problem	of	security	and	the	
																																																								95	Michel	Crozier	and	Erhard	Friedberg,	L’acteur	et	le	systeme	(Paris,	1981).	96	See	 the	 last	 chapters	 in	Donzelot,	 Invention	du	 social	 and	 Castel,	Métamorphoses	de	 la	question	
social.	97	Nehamas,	 ‘Foreword’,	 p.	 ix.	 See	 especially	 Luc	 Ferry	 and	 Renaut,	La	pensée	68:	 essai	 sur	 l'anti-
humanisme	contemporain	(Paris,	1985).	
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state	cannot	be	reduced	to	that	of	the	protection	of	individual	rights.	The	fault	lines	of	modernity	run	much	deeper.	Today	it	becomes	ever	more	pertinent	to	 inquire	into	the	historical	origins	of	our	institutions	and	beliefs.	To	do	so	is	to	carry	on	a	conversation	 begun	 by	 the	 generation	 in	 France	 that	 experienced	 the	 previous	state	of	emergency	from	1961	to	1962.			
Freedom	and	repression.		Many	of	 the	typically	Foucauldian	themes	of	marginality	and	deviance	have	been	touched	upon	in	the	main	part	of	my	thesis.	The	notable	exception	is	the	topic	of	incarceration.	This	is	not	because	prisons	were	not	important	in	the	processes	that	concern	 this	 thesis.	 In	 fact,	prisoners	were	 the	 testing	grounds	of	 individualizing	techniques,	 such	 as	 the	 normalizing	 effect	 of	 meditation	 and	 rumination,	 which	required	 isolation	 and	 private	 cells;	 ‘each	 cell	 forms	 a	 separate	 and	 complete	prison,	 where	 the	 detainee	 ignores	 the	 name	 and	 even	 the	 existence	 of	 his	neighbour’.98	A	new	type	of	privatizing	isolation,	the	old	monastic	arrangement	of	the	private	cell	now	served	re-socializing	rather	than	contemplative	ends.	Private	cells	were	 being	 promoted	 in	 the	 1840s,	 particularly	 in	 Belgium	 and	 the	 United	States,	well	before	private	rooms	or	 indeed	private	space	had	become	a	common	practice	in	the	rest	of	society.99	However,	my	aim	has	been	to	focus	on	the	positive	and	 productive	 aspects	 of	 power,	 rather	 than	 on	 its	 negative	 and	 punitive	
																																																								98	Émile	van	Hoorebeke,	De	la	récidive	dans	les	rapports	avec	la	réforme	pénitentiaire	(Ghent,	1846),	p.	196.	99	Michelle	Perrot,	Histoire	de	chambres	(Paris,	2013);	Alain	Corbin,	‘Coulisses’,	in:	Ariès	and	George	Duby	(eds),	Histoire	de	la	vie	privée,	4	(Paris,	1999),	pp.	407-408.	
	 37	
dimensions. 100 	While	 social	 historians	 have	 for	 many	 decades	 explored	 the	government	 of	 deviance	 and	marginality,	my	 concern	 is	with	 the	 government	 of	the	general	population	and	normality.			These	 positive	 aspects	 of	 power	were	 the	 foundation	 of	modern	 governing.	 The	world	that	emerged	in	the	nineteenth	century,	as	Patrick	Joyce	has	shown,	was	to	be	 governed	 through	 freedom.	 This	 focus	 on	 freedom	 as	 the	 technology	 for	government,	 both	 of	 oneself	 and	 of	 society,	 is	what	 Foucauldians	 understand	 as	‘liberalism’.	Liberalism	in	this	thesis	will	 thus	mean	the	theory	behind	the	notion	that	modern	 individuals	 and	 society	must	 be	 government	 through	 freedom.	This	stands	in	contrast	to	Cameralism	or	‘police	sciences’,	an	eighteenth-century	theory	or	 ‘art’	 of	 government	 that	 preceded	 liberalism,	 and	 which	 posited	 the	 state’s	ability	to	know	and	act	upon	transparent	territories	and	inhabitants	with	the	end	of	 subjecting	 all	 domains	 of	 life	 to	 minute	 scrutiny	 and	 control.	 Conversely,	 for	Joyce,		‘liberalism’	ceded	governance	 to	an	unknowable,	and	now	opaque,	object	of	 rule,	that	 of	 the	 liberal	 subject.[…]	 Liberalism	 therefore	 depended	 on	 cultivating	 a	certain	sort	of	self,	one	that	was	reflexive	and	self-watching.	Yet	this	self,	as	it	were,	also	watched	 liberalism,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 liberal	 governmentality	depended,	 and	depends,	 upon	 cultivating	 persons	 who	 could,	 and	 can,	 practice	 freedom	 by	constantly	 questioning	 its	 limits.	 In	 liberalism	 rule	 is	 ceded	 to	 a	 self	 that	 must	
																																																								100	The	 best	 recent	 historical	 work	 on	 justice	 and	 criminology	 is	 that	 of	 Martine	 Kaluszynski,	‘Ordre(s)	 et	 désordre(s)	 en	République:	 Contribution	 à	 une	 socio-histoire	 politique	 de	 l’État,	 des	sciences	de	gouvernement,	du	droit	et	de	la	justice’,	Habilitation	thesis,	Institut	d'Etudes	Politiques	(Grenoble,	 2005);	 La	 République	 à	 l’épreuve	 du	 crime:	 La	 construction	 du	 crime	 comme	 objet	
politique,	1880-1920	(Paris,	2002).	
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constantly	monitor	 the	very	civil	 society	and	political	power	 that	are	at	once	 the	guarantee	of	freedom	and	its	threat.101		Therefore,	instead	on	focusing	on	the	punitive	aspects	of	government,	the	topic	of	welfare	 and	 social	 reform	 will	 serve	 to	 throw	 into	 relief	 the	 discourses	 and	practices	that	governed	the	general	population	through	freedom.		My	 main	 claim	 is	 that	 government	 was	 one	 and	 the	 same	 as	 self-government.	Rather	 than	 emphasising	 institutions	 of	 outside	 constraint,	 I	 argue	 that	 self-government	 was	 inseparable	 from	 the	 liberty	 of	 agents	 that,	 in	 each	 domain	 of	influence	they	had,	acted	out	of	autonomous	choices.	But	 these	choices	would	be	conditioned	and	delimited	from	the	outside.	This	was	largely	the	dream	that	was	born	 in	 1789,	 to	 eliminate	 oppressive	 powers	 to	 leave	 way	 for	 free,	 moral	individuals	 who	 would	 choose	 and	 be	 educated	 to	 choose	 to	 comply	 with	 the	regime.	The	ideal	was	to	govern,	not	through	repressive	laws,	but	rather	gouverner	
les	 mœurs.	 This	 would	 not	 only	 shape	 and	 moralize	 collective	 and	 individual	thinking,	but	also	bring	 into	being	 the	very	experiences	we	call	 common	opinion	and	the	self	as	a	necessary	pre-conditions	for	modern	life.			After	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 the	 apparatuses	 and	 technologies	 used	 to	 govern	subjectivity	were	much	more	refined	and	saturated	than	in	the	period	considered	here.102 	Even	 if	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 would	 seem	 too	 disciplinary	 for	 our	standards,	 there	 was	 nothing	 akin	 to	 the	 precision	 of	 medical,	 psychological,	technological	or	administrative	 interventions	 that	were	 later	developed	 to	 shape																																																									101	Patrick	Joyce,	The	Rule	of	Freedom:	Liberalism	and	the	Modern	City	(London,	2003),	p.	4.		102	Nikolas	Rose,	Governing	the	Soul:	The	Shaping	of	the	Private	Self	 (London,	1989)	and	Powers	of	
Freedom:	Reframing	Political	Thought	(Cambridge,	1999).		
	 39	
individuals.	 In	 comparison,	 the	 grips	 of	 the	 state	 seem	 much	 looser	 in	 the	nineteenth	 century,	 if	 not	 inside	 the	 poorhouse	 or	 prison,	 at	 least	 in	 society	 at	large.	 This	was	 the	 case	 even	 among	 those	who	 encountered	 the	 state	 in	 all	 its	brutal	 severity.	 Vagrants	 were	 among	 those	 who	 faced	 the	 most	 illiberal	disciplining	 policies,	 and	 few	men	 in	 turn	 personified	 the	 vagabond	 better	 than	Victor-Eugène-Adrien	 Estellé.	 The	 son	 of	 an	 accountant,	 he	was	 born	 in	 1827	 in	Morlaix	 (Finistère).	 Locals	only	 remembered	 that	 long	ago	young	Estellé	 and	his	brother	Hercule	 had	 left	 for	 Paris,	where	 they	 each	 squandered	 a	 fortune	worth	12,000	francs.	In	Paris	at	age	26	he	served	1	month,	the	first	of	33	known	prison	sentences,	 for	 the	 crime	of	 ‘port	 illegal	 de	décoration’	 or	unlawfully	displaying	 a	civil	or	military	distinction.	However,	his	long	career	as	a	tramp	was	to	begin	at	age	33	 with	 his	 first	 sentence	 for	 vagabondage.103	The	 day	 his	 last	 prison	 sentence	finished	in	May	1889	in	the	town	of	Chinon	(Indre-et-Loire),	Estellé,	aged	62,	was	completely	 paralyzed	 and	 mentally	 infirm.	 Contravening	 the	 regulation	 on	 the	subject,	 the	 prison	 guards	 carried	 him	 outside	 and	 placed	 him	 on	 the	 pavement	where	 he	 was	 found	 by	 the	 local	 police	 officer,	 who	 transported	 him	 to	 the	municipal	hospice	on	a	wheelbarrow,	 in	 the	midst	of	 the	 town’s	 celebrations	 for	the	Centenary.	No	responsibilities	were	sought.	A	hundred	days	later,	Estellé	died	in	the	hospice	leaving	behind	a	debt	of	126	francs	for	his	hospice	sojourn	and	12	francs	for	his	burial,	which	the	mayor	of	Chinon	and	the	prefect	frantically	tried	to	claim	from	all	the	places	where	Estellé	could	have	had	his	legal	domicile	de	secours	to	no	avail.	The	case	of	Estellé	illustrates	the	limits	of	repression.	His	itinerant	life	spanned	no	fewer	than	29	years,	of	which	he	spend	only	four	and	a	half,	or	fifteen	per	 cent,	 in	 prison.	 In	 a	 fourteen-year	 span	 he	 was	 detained	 only	 once.	 His																																																									103	A[rchives]	D[épartamentales	d’]I[ndre-et-]L[oire].	3X141.		
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sentencing	had	even	been	harsher	than	usual	—the	average	sentence	for	vagrancy	was	 18	 days	 detainment	 in	 nineteenth-century	 Brittany,	 50	 days	 for	 Estellé.104	There	existed	no	unified	approach	to	the	problem,	and	localities	often	just	gave	the	vagabond	a	coin	and	sent	the	nuisance	off	 to	the	next	town.	Since	the	capacity	of	the	state	to	shape	subjectivity	was	still	relatively	weak,	nineteenth-century	France	serves	 as	 a	 case	 study	 that	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 personal	 freedom	and	self-government	in	the	rise	of	modern	subjectivity	and	the	modern	state.			
Medicalization	and	freedom.		The	 focus	 is	 therefore	 on	 freedom,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 work	 focuses	 on	institutions	of	control,	and	in	particular	medicine.	The	second	chapter	shows	that	the	gradual	changes	from	a	moral	to	an	impersonal	and	functional	understanding	of	poverty,	public	 assistance	and	motherhood	were	heavily	mediated	by	medical	discourse.	 Medics	 will	 also	 feature	 prominently	 in	 the	 third	 chapter.	 Medical	discourses	 about	 ‘man’	 necessarily	 changed	 along	 with	 the	 developing	understandings	 of	 ‘man’.	 In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 century,	 health	 was	 poorly	distinguished	from	‘moral	behaviour’	more	broadly,	so	that	wellbeing	affected	and	reflected	the	moral	quality	of	the	moi.	‘[P]hysical	health	results	from	moral	health’,	wrote	Joanny	Perier	in	his	doctoral	thesis	in	medicine.105	In	the	second	part	of	the	century,	we	will	see	how	the	previously	unified	self	gradually	became	fragmented.	There	was	 an	 internal	 and	 an	 external	moi.	 Affecting	 the	 latter	 alone,	 illness	 no	longer	 referred	back	 to	 the	 ‘moral’	 essence	 of	 the	 self,	 but	was	 rather	 one	more	condition	 that	 was	 susceptible	 of	 being	 governed	 from	 the	 social	 outside.	 As																																																									104	Guy	Haudebourg,	Mendiants	et	vagabonds	en	Bretagne	au	XIXe	siècle	(Rennes,	1998),	p.	339.		105	Joanny	Perier,	Aperçu	critique	des	théories	sur	les	idées	et	les	facultés	humains	(Paris,	1836),	p.	iii.	
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poverty,	illness	came	to	be	seen	in	an	impersonal	light.	Instead	of	morality	having	to	spring	from	the	depths	of	the	subject,	the	multiple	facets	of	the	self	could	each	be	 subject	 to	 social	 education	 and	 treatment	 by	 a	 new	 diversity	 of	 experts	 and	authorities.	The	way	of	producing	normative	individuals	thus	changed.	The	heavy	focus	on	disciplining	selves	and	families	of	the	first	half	of	the	century	gave	way	to	the	 faith	 in	 the	 regulating	 faculties	 of	 organized	 sociability.	 Experts	 were	 to	intervene	not	only	in	cases	of	pathology.	In	schools,	for	example,	teachers	were	to	implement	pedagogical	techniques	capable	of	producing	self-governing	individuals	in	ways	that	had	earlier	been	thought	as	belonging	in	the	privacy	of	the	self	or	the	home,	as	we	will	see.		The	 importance	 of	 medicine	 and	 expertise	 is	 a	 recurring	 theme	 in	 Foucauldian	literature.	The	terms	‘medicalization’	or	‘biopower’	commonly	signify	the	existence	of	 hidden	 coercive	 powers	 that	 seek	 to	 shape	 individuals	 from	 above,	 especially	medicine	and	psychiatry.	Foucauldian	works	have	explored	these	themes	through	the	 theory	 of	 social	 control	 (Donzelot,	 Isaac	 Joseph	 and	 Philippe	 Fritsch)	 or	 of	governmentality	 studies	 (Procacci,	 Dean,	 Nikolas	 Rose	 and	 Donzelot).106 	Both	currents	 study	 social	 issues	 mainly	 through	 the	 rationalities,	 knowledge	apparatuses,	 and	 discourses	 that	 make	 them	 possible,	 which	 are	 documented	through	published	books.	These	works	conflict	with	the	most	compelling	archival	research.	Historians	have	shown	that	Foucauldian	‘discipline’,	‘normalization’,	‘the	government	of	the	poor’,	 ‘a	globalizing	and	totalizing	power’,	 ‘bio-politics’,	and	so	on,	at	any	meaningful	scale,	cannot	be	borne	out	by	the	archives	in	our	period.	For																																																									106	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère;	Dean,	Constitution	of	Poverty;	Donzelot,	L’invention	du	social		and	
La	police	des	familles	 (Paris,	1977);	 Isaac	Joseph,	Philippe	Fritsch	and	Alain	Battegay,	Disciplines	à	
domicile	(Fontenay-Sous-Bois,	1977);	Rose,	 Inventing	Our	Selves	(Cambridge,	1996);	Governing	the	
Soul;	and	Powers	of	Freedom.	
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Catherine	 Duprat,	 the	 leading	 authority	 in	 social	 action	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	nineteenth	century,	the	discourses	and	practices	she	has	documented	‘are	often	far	from	 confirming	 those	 interpretative	 hypotheses’	 of	 medicalization.	 It	 would	 be	reading	 too	 much	 into	 the	 weak,	 small,	 often	 archaic	 and	 always	 underfunded	private	 and	public	 initiatives	 of	 the	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 as	well	 as	 into	 the	intentions	 and	 ambitions	 of	 even	 the	 most	 interventionist	 governmental	 and	philanthropic	 elites.107 	L’hygiène	 dans	 la	 République,	 the	 exceptional	 work	 on	hygiene	 and	 health	 by	 Lion	 Murard	 and	 Patrick	 Zylberman,	 closes	 with	 the	question	of	whether	bio-politics	‘resists	empirical	analysis’.	Despite	having	studied	the	period	 from	1870	 to	1918,	when	 state	 spending	and	 interventions	 increased	considerably,	they	have	found	‘no	trace’	of	bio-power,	only	a	long	list	of	frustrated	medical	 utopias.	 Murard	 and	 Zylberman	 tactfully	 avoid	 criticizing	 Foucault,	 and	find	nothing	to	object	to	the	notion	of	bio-power	itself,	‘provided	that	no	positivity	is	attributed	to	it,	no	observational	contents;	in	short,	that	it	be	understood	as	an	idea	 (interpretation	 of	 ends)	 and	 not	 as	 a	 concept	 (explanation	 of	 facts	 by	 their	causes)’.108			It	 seems	 that	 trying	 to	 confront	 ends	 and	 facts,	 or	 the	 discourses	 and	 practices	pertaining	to	the	poor	and	social	government	in	the	long	nineteenth	century	leads	to	an	impasse	in	which	the	former	emerge	as	ambitious	fantasies	and	the	latter	as	lethargic	 realities.	 Consequently,	 the	 connection	 between	 ideas	 and	 actions	becomes	less,	not	more	intelligible.	Historian	Robert	Nye	points	the	way	out	of	this	gridlock	by	focusing	on	the	individualizing	effects	of	medicine.	Nye	has	argued	that		Foucault	placed	his	 focus	 increasingly	on	powers	 that	depended	on	 independent																																																									107	Catherine	Duprat,	Usage	et	pratiques	de	la	philanthropie,	I	(Paris,	1997),	pp.	583-587.		108	Lion	Murard	and	Patrick	Zylberman,	L’hygiène	dans	la	République	(Paris,	1996),	p.	584.	
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subjects	 who	 freely	 ‘embraced	 their	 social	 duties	 as	 individuals’	 rather	 than	tyrannies	 compelling	 them	 by	 force.	 ‘Medicalization’,	 Nye	 argues,	 ‘is	 no	 longer	understood	 as	 a	 nefarious	 collaboration	 of	 experts	 and	 state	 authority	 imposed	from	 above,	 but	 a	 process	 whereby	 medical	 and	 health	 precepts	 have	 been	embodied	in	individuals	who	assume	this	responsibility	for	themselves’.	He	points	out	 the	 irony	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 aim	 of	 ‘a	 perfectly	 healthy	 population’	 that	consisted	 of	 ‘natural’	 and	 ‘unmedicalized’	 bodies,	 could	 ‘only	 be	 achieved	 by	 the	individual	 internalization	 of	 a	 totally	 medicalized	 view	 of	 life’.109	Therefore	 the	dichotomy	 between	 high	 aims	 that	 could	 lead	 straight	 to	 tyranny	 and	disappointing	 results	 that	 threatened	 anarchy	 loses	 sight	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 what	mediated	both	these	extremes	was	a	concern	with	free	and	voluntary	compliance,	not	force;	by	the	very	fact	of	their	contrast,	both	poles	pointed	to	a	programmatic	need	 for	 observant	 subjectivities.	 The	 point	 was	 not	 blind	 obedience,	 but	 the	internalization	of	norms.	Following	 the	work	of	Roddey	Reid,	 I	will	also	read	the	gap	between	grand	discourses	and	limited	practices	as	generating	a	sense	of	lack,	itself	 programmatic,	 productive	 and	 mobilizing	 of	 new	 forms	 of	 agency	 and	subjectivity,	 as	 is	 documented	 throughout	 this	 thesis.110	This	 thesis	 therefore	places	 subjectivity	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 very	 profound	 governmental	 changes	 that	took	place	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.			Rather	than	confronting	ideas	and	practices,	this	thesis	aims	to	tease	out	how	both	the	 narratives	 about	 the	 self	 and	 ‘others’	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 disciplines	 and	charitable	 and	 state	 practices,	 especially	 in	 the	 interrelated	 fields	 of	 beneficence																																																									109	Robert	 Nye,	 ‘The	 evolution	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 medicalization	 in	 the	 late	 twentieth	 century’,	
Journal	of	History	of	the	Behavioral	Sciences,	39/2	(2003),	pp.	117-119.	110	Roddey	Reid,	Families	in	Jeopardy	(Stanford,	1993).	
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and	 schooling,	 spelt	 out	 rationally	 a	 shared	 problem	 of	 governing	 autonomous	selves	and	others.	The	focus	will	be	on	the	ways	in	which	the	individualizing	and	voluntary	 internalization	 and	 embodiment	 of	 a	 greater	 moral	 order	 or	 social	organization	were	made	 thinkable	 and	practicable	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France.	In	other	words,	I	will	explore	the	many	and	shifting	concepts	and	technologies	that	sought	 to	 render	 the	 self-government	 of	 each	 individual	 both	 possible	 and	meaningful.	While	a	polity	of	perfectly	self-governing	subjects	may	have	been	the	utopia	within	all	 the	utopias	of	nineteenth-century	France,	 I	nevertheless	seek	to	shine	an	historical	light	on	the	logics,	tactics	and	pedagogies	for	self-rule	that	were	available	 to	 contemporaries,	 both	 in	 the	 form	 of	 technologies	 of	 the	 self	 and	through	 state	 policy.	 I	 thus	 wish	 to	 show	 how	 the	 ideal	 of	 a	 perfectly	 ordered	society	went	hand	in	hand	with	the	dream	of	faultless	self-command,	while	it	was	in	 the	sharp,	necessary	and	 irreducible	contrast	 that	 separated	both	 from	reality	that	the	modern	need	for	governing	the	self	and	others	was	posed	as	an	historical	problem.	Because	of	my	research	questions	and	sources,	I	have	very	little	to	say	on	how	actual	 individuals	 translated	all	of	 this	 into	 lived	experiences,	 since	 this	has	not	been	my	aim.			
Sources.		I	have	used	both	printed	and	archival	sources	for	this	study.	Since	I	have	sought	to	analyse	 the	 interrelationship	 between	 self-government	 and	 the	 state,	 the	contemporary	authors	selected	are	usually	close	to	the	structures	of	state	power,	and	 more	 specifically	 the	 broad	 family	 of	 liberals	 in	 the	 first	 and	 that	 of	republicans	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	As	will	be	detailed	in	each	
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chapter,	 these	 include	 very	well	 known	 alongside	 obscure	 figures.	 In	 the	 second	chapter	I	balance	these	views	with	those	of	Catholics	and	conservatives	in	order	to	show	how	both	were	 very	 creative	 partners	 in	 an	 on-going	 conversation.	 I	 have	consulted	 very	 large	 bodies	 of	 published	 texts	 for	 the	 period	 studied.	 Gustave	Flaubert	once	 famously	 said	 that	writing	history	was	 like	drinking	an	ocean	and	pissing	 a	 cupful.	 If	 that	 were	 to	 be	 the	 case,	 then	 a	 genealogy	 reduces	 the	researcher’s	yield	to	a	single	drop.	The	Bibliothèque	nationale	de	France	(BnF)	was	an	 invaluable	 source	 for	 printed	 sources.	 Some	 publications	 not	 available	 in	 the	BnF	I	was	able	to	locate	in	collections	in	the	UK	and	Spain	or	in	the	local	libraries	or	archives	of	the	French	cities	I	visited	—the	latter	were	especially	important	in	order	to	document	very	local	debates	on	social	reform	and	obscure	technical	texts.	However,	 the	 main	 source	 of	 texts	 has	 been	 the	 enormous	 digital	 collections	housed	especially	by	Google	Books,	the	BnF’s	Gallica	or	Archive.org,	among	others.	The	ready	availability	of	such	overwhelming	collections	in	the	public	domain	and	their	 keyword-search	 functionalities	 may	 well	 represent	 an	 epistemological	earthquake	 for	 the	student	of	 the	out-of-copyright	past,	and	of	 the	American	and	Western	European	nineteenth	century	in	particular.	Despite	the	many	decades	of	experience	 with	 computers	 and	 databases,	 researchers	 have	 never	 been	confronted	 with	 a	 ready-made,	 immediately	 accessible,	 open-ended	 and	inexhaustible	body	of	sources	for	which	no	categorization	or	indexing	is	possible,	no	hierarchy	of	value	feasible.	The	logic	governing	what	is	digitized	and	what	is	not	remains	 always	 opaque	 and	 elusive	 with	 no	 respect	 for	 boundaries,	 while	 the	collections	themselves	keep	growing	exponentially	with	no	order	or	end	 in	sight.	The	 full	 epistemological	 and	 methodological	 implications	 for	 the	 discipline	 of	history	and	its	understanding	of	‘historical	source’	implied	by	this	shift	still	remain	
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to	 be	 assessed.	 Yannick	 Maignien,	 in	 identifying	 the	 ‘nouvelle	 conception	 de	l'encyclopédisme’	and	a	‘nouvelle	économie	de	l'information’	implied	by	digitizing	projects	back	in	the	mid	1990s,	spoke	of	a	shift	from	the	boundary-policing	‘Ordre	du	 discours’	 that	 Foucault	 found	 to	 be	 integral	 to	 the	 constitution	 of	 scholarly	disciplines,	 to	 an	 ‘ordinateur	 du	 discours’,	 that	 is,	 a	 new	 mechanized	 way	 of	(dis)ordering	 discourse	 itself	 and	 ‘dematerializing’	 thought	 in	 which	 such	disciplinary	limits	were	becoming	blurred.111	Be	it	as	it	may,	it	is	clear	that	without	these	technologies	access	to	the	range	and	volume	of	printed	sources	used	for	this	thesis	would	not	have	been	possible.	The	same	would	be	the	case	of	one	part	of	my	analytical	approach.	Through	advanced	keyword-search	functionalities,	I	was	able	to	 trace	 specific	 ideas	 or	 concepts,	 such	 as	 ‘normal	 criminal’,	 ‘self-mastery’	 or	‘voluntary	discipline’,	from	the	time	when	they	started	to	appear	in	print	in	these	collections	 to	 their	 simultaneous	 development	 across	 disciplines	 or	 genres.	Accounting	for	the	technical	limitations	of	text-recognition	technology	and	having	no	 control	 or	 even	 clear	 knowledge	 of	 what	 is	 included	 and	 omitted	 in	 these	collections,	 I	 found	 myself	 at	 times	 on	 an	 uncertain	 methodological	 and	epistemological	 ground	when	 trying	 to	 date	 the	 rise	 and	demise	 of	 ideas,	 assess	their	currency	and	analyse	how	they	crossed	disciplinary	 lines.	However,	 if	 I	had	relied	only	on	hardcopy	 sources	 in	 the	BnF	as	 earlier	Foucauldian	archaeologies	and	genealogies	had	done,	it	is	unclear	that	this	problem	would	have	been	avoided	altogether.			
																																																								111	Yannick	Maignien,	 ‘La	 constitution	 de	 la	 collection	 numérisée	 de	 la	 Bibliothèque	 nationale	 de	France:	Vers	un	nouvel	encyclopédisme?’,	Literary	and	Linguistic	Computing,	10/1	(1995),	pp.	51-57;	 and	 ‘La	 bibliothèque	 virtuelle	 ou	 de	 l'Ars	 memoria	 à	 Xanadu’,	 Bulletin	 des	 Bibliothèques	 de	
France,	40/2	(1995),	pp.	8-17.	
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For	 my	 archival	 research,	 I	 selected	 archives	 from	 cities	 that	 preferably	 had	towards	a	hundred	thousand	inhabitants	before	the	end	of	the	century,	since	urban	centres	 served	 as	 the	 laboratories	 in	which	 new	 ideas	 of	 social	 assistance	were	explored.	Logistical	reasons,	pertaining	to	time,	 funding	and	online	availability	of	inventories,	 restricted	 my	 selection	 to	 western	 France,	 namely	 to	 Angers,	Bordeaux,	Limoges,	Nantes,	Rennes,	Toulouse	and	Tours.	These	cities	make	up	an	exceptional	 sampling	 of	 the	 social	 reform	 initiatives	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 different	ideological	 traditions	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France.	 Except	 for	 Bordeaux,	 where	the	city’s	archive	was	closed	at	 the	time,	 in	each	city	I	visited	both	the	municipal	and	 the	departmental	 archives,	 and	 through	 the	 latter	was	also	able	 to	 take	 into	account	the	policies	at	play	in	these	departments	as	a	whole	and	in	smaller	cities,	towns	 and	 villages.	 I	 found	 little	 of	 interest	 in	 Toulouse,	 while	 the	 municipal	Archives	de	Paris	and	 the	Archives	nationales	house	only	patchy	 information	 for	public	 assistance	 from	 the	 later	 decades	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 to	 1914.	 The	documentation	consulted	is	listed	at	the	end	of	this	work.			At	these	archives,	I	sought	to	gather	sources	that	would	document	the	full	range	of	nineteenth-century	 local	 initiatives	 that	 contemporaries	 considered	 social	assistance,	and	which	often	overlapped	with	subjects	such	as	schooling,	health	and	repression.	My	original	aim	was	to	uncover	the	underlying	logic	that	led	France	to	shift	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	from	restrictive	and	repressive	approach	to	 social	 problems,	 to	 a	modern	 and	more	 inclusive	 focus	 on	 social	 rights	 in	 the	twentieth	century.			
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For	most	of	my	life	I	have	been	trying	to	find	clear-cut	answers	to	the	problem	of	poverty	and	modernization,	not	just	at	the	material	level,	but	also	more	broadly	as	a	gradual	process	in	which	human	beings	come	to	be	seen	as	valuable	elements	in	society.	In	my	mind,	the	welfare	state	epitomized	this	humane	shift,	so	I	wished	to	uncover	 the	 types	 of	 reasoning	 that	 made	 such	 developments	 possible	 and	desirable.	This	was	not	a	process	that	took	centuries	of	painstaking	maturity	as	the	narratives	of	underdevelopment	suggest,	but	rather	a	shift	that	took	placed	in	the	industrialized	world	in	the	course	of	a	few	decades	around	1900.	I	grew	up	in	the	‘third	world’,	in	what	was	at	the	time	the	sleepy	and	impoverished	first	city	of	the	New	World,	Santo	Domingo,	and	my	first	memories	are	inseparable	from	concerns	about	 development	 and	 social	 betterment.	 This	 was	 therefore	 not	 a	 purely	intellectual	 pursuit.	 In	my	 research,	 I	 sought	 to	 find	 tangible	 and	 programmatic	responses	 to	 the	 denigrating	 destitution	 of	 the	 many,	 the	 real	 suffering	 and	pressing	problems	to	which	I	was	a	privileged	witness.			In	 my	 archival	 sources,	 I	 expected	 to	 find	 a	 clear	 discursive	 thread	 that	 would	enable	me	 to	make	 sense	of	 the	 shift	 in	 logic	 that	 took	place	at	 the	 fin	de	 siècle.	Instead,	 the	 vast	 mosaic	 of	 local	 policies	 and	 institutions	 offered	 little	 overall	coherence,	while	the	administrative	documents	had	little	to	say	or	muse	about	the	measures	 being	 implemented.	 I	 found	 that	 the	 discussions	 in	 municipal	 and	departmental	 bodies	 offered	 a	 very	 necessary	 context	 for	 the	 initiatives	 officials	were	 implementing,	 although	 they	 often	 just	 repeated	 national	 debates.	 In	 Paris	social	issues	were	bitterly	debated	at	length,	but	these	disputes	did	not	pivot	upon	hardship	and	how	to	remedy	it,	but	rather	dealt	with	profound	and	very	abstract	reflections	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 social	 body.	 Social	 problems	
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made	little	sense	without	considering	what	made	them	specifically	social,	and	the	social	 was	 a	 tangled	 mass	 of	 problems	 that	 were	 inseparable	 from	 the	 wider,	lingering	 questions	 of	modernity,	 the	 nation	 and	 the	 responsible	 individual.	 The	straightforward	answers	I	hoped	to	find	in	local	and	palpable	actions	kept	pointing	away	from	themselves	to	ever	more	inclusive	and	elusive	contexts.	This	made	me	rely	 heavily	 on	 printed	 texts.	 Recent	 scholarship	 has	 arrived	 at	 similar	 findings,	concluding	 that	 discourses	 about	 poverty	 reflected	 wider	 concerns	 with	differences	 or	 collective	 lacks,	 as	we	will	 see.	Unable	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 topic	that	 had	 occupied	 me	 for	 many	 years,	 faced	 with	 over	 a	 hundred	 thousand	documents	 of	 opaque	 material	 and	 with	 a	 thesis	 to	 complete,	 I	 ‘discovered’	Foucault	who	offered	me	a	framework	that	would	enable	me	to	make	sense	of	the	process	 that	 I	have	 just	described	and	 link	 local	 initiatives	with	 the	slippery	and	receding	intellectual	and	discursive	structures	that	gave	them	meaning.	In	the	end,	the	 answers	 I	 have	 struggled	 to	 find	 point	 to	 the	 modern	 self,	 as	 a	 site	 of	government	and	the	ultimate	reference	point	of	all	these	debates.			
Methods.		Over	the	years,	I	had	considered	the	state	from	may	different	angles.	In	my	time	in	Durham	I	have	focused	on	the	more	cultural	and	intellectual	angles	of	the	matter.	For	my	doctorate,	 I	 sought	 to	understand	 the	 state	 through	 the	 study	of	welfare	programmes	and	reformist	thought,	and	via	Foucault,	my	research	slipped	into	the	wider	 issue	of	 ‘government’,	 then	 to	 the	 family,	 then	 to	 the	self	 that	 sustains	 the	political	 construction	 that	 is	 the	 modern	 individual,	 which	 in	 turn	 is	 the	 very	foundation	 of	 the	 modern	 state.	 If	 this	 work	 shifts	 frequently	 between	 these	
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objects	of	study,	it	is	ultimately	because	they	are	all,	in	my	mind,	part	of	the	same	question.	 I	 therefore	 adopt	 a	 Foucauldian	 approach	 that	 has	 a	 very	 broad	understanding	of	what	the	state	is.			I	am	a	historian	by	training.	And	I	spent	my	many	years	of	higher	education	within	the	 disciplinary	 boundaries	 of	 history,	 leaning	 towards	 materialist	 and	structuralist	 approaches.	 The	 research	 questions	 that	 drove	 my	 thesis	 forward,	however,	 pushed	me	 far	 from	my	 comfort	 zone.	 The	 level	 of	my	 unease	will	 be	plain	to	any	historian	reading	these	pages.	Having	no	previous	interest	in	Foucault	or	 philosophy,	 I	 was	most	 often	 quite	 out	 of	my	 depth.	 The	 full	 profundity	 and	complexity	of	the	cultural	shifts	that	my	findings	indicate	were	a	challenge	for	the	analytical	 and	 conceptual	 tools	 I	 was	 equipped	 with	 as	 a	 historian.	 In	 order	 to	make	this	complexity	as	understandable	and	expressible	as	possible	both	to	myself	and	other	historians,	when	possible	I	have	chosen	texts	through	which	I	can	draw	out	the	greater	 intricacies	contained	in	the	public	debate	of	an	 issue,	 texts	which	helped	me	throw	into	sharp	relief	the	occurrence	of	an	intellectual	event	in	the	on-going	 process	 of	 defining	 the	meaning	 of	 governing.	 Such	 ‘explication	 de	 textes’	made	more	manageable	 for	me	 the	difficulties	of	 articulating	my	 findings.	 In	 the	Complutense	University	 in	Madrid,	when	 I	 spent	my	 undergraduate	 years	 there,	history	was	taught	with	a	strong	philological	bend	and	revolved	heavily	around	a	dated	 methodology	 of	 ‘text	 commentary’	 known	 as	 l'Explication	 française,	developed	by	French	linguists	 in	the	 late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century.	Imported	and	applied	to	history	during	the	dictatorship,	it	was	a	carefully	layered	analysis	 that	 sought	 to	 extract	 the	 full	 historical	 implications	 from	 one	 textual	fragment,	 drawing	 out	 in	 turn	 the	 internal	 context,	 such	 as	 authorship,	 target	
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readership	 or	 intention,	 and	 the	 external	 context,	 ranging	 from	 its	 local	 and	circumstantial	 to	 its	global	and	epochal	backgrounds.	Two	 lines	 from	a	medieval	manuscript	was	 often	 the	 exam	question	 or	 the	 excuse	 for	 a	 twenty-page	 essay.	From	 this	 experience,	 I	 have	 taken	 an	 inductive	 approach	 in	 which	 a	 key	 and	meaningful	 text	or	author	helped	me	 to	put	 into	words	and	 frame	problems	of	a	more	general	nature.	This	means	of	simplification	made	it	possible	to	express	my	overall	 findings	 in	a	more	manageable	narrative	 form	and	 to	 limit	 the	density	of	each	 section	 topic,	 since	many	of	 these	would	merit	being	 the	 subject	of	distinct	postgraduate	 research.	 Instead,	 I	 have	 focused	on	 only	 a	 few	pivotal	 figures	 and	references	to	simplify	the	topic.	Cousin	and	Guizot	in	the	first	chapter	give	way	to	Durkheim	and	Bourgeois	 in	 the	 third.	These	men	enable	me	 to	document	how	a	new	paradigm	is	imagined	as	being	clearly	thinkable	and	practicable.	The	first	and	third	chapter	then	focus	on	practices	of	the	self	(tracking	the	passage	from	moral	deliberations	to	self-mastery	techniques)	and	techniques	of	 the	state	(the	change	from	educational	emulation	to	personality-developing	pedagogies	in	the	army	and	schools)	through	which	the	theorizations	of	a	model	of	subjectivity	were	meant	to	be	 used	 to	 shape	 reality.	 There	 are	 therefore	 clear	 symmetries	 and	 continuities.	The	second	chapter	equally	 simplified	 the	complex	 issue	of	 social	 assistance	and	the	 family	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 key	 programmes	 related	 to	 abandoned	 children,	through	which	I	document	the	key	changes	in	actual	policy	that	were	taking	place	in	the	shift	from	one	paradigm	to	the	other,	while	the	figure	of	the	mother	will	be	used	 to	 cast	 light	 on	 the	much	broader	 issue	of	 how	 social	 functions	were	 to	be	embodied.	 I	 therefore	 take	 a	 somewhat	 minimalist	 approach	 to	 very	 broad	questions,	 but	 I	 trust	 that	 my	 choices	 will	 serve	 to	 make	 intelligible	 the	 rather	elusive	and	abstract	question	of	how	there	came	to	be	modern	selves	in	France.		
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	To	study	the	state	and	the	 individual	without	reifying	them	has	been	a	challenge	throughout	 my	 research	 on	 this	 topic.	 Historian	 Nicholas	 Green	 offered	 a	 way	forward	 in	 his	 study	 of	 an	 equally	 elusive	 topic:	 the	 understanding	 of	 nature	 in	nineteenth-century	 bourgeois	 culture	 in	 France.	 In	 The	 Spectacle	 of	 Nature,	 his	approach	was	to	focus	not	on	‘a	set	of	objects	and	themes’,	but	rather	on	nature	as	‘a	 structure	 of	 experience’,	 one	 which	 was	 mediated	 through	 ‘a	 shared	 cultural	language’.112	I	 have	 followed	 this	 approach,	meaning	 that	 this	 thesis	will	 explore	many	 disparate	 objects	 and	 themes	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 understand	 the	 underlying	shared	 cultural	 language	 that	 made	 possible	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state	 as	 a	structure	 of	 experience.	 My	 approach	 equally	 owes	 a	 debt	 to	 how	 historian	Christian	Topalov,	through	a	sequence	of	fragmented	cases,	was	able	to	shed	light	on	 the	overall	 logic	and	complexity	of	what	he	called	 la	nébuleuse	réformatrice,	 a	dense	network	of	 thought	and	practices	behind	the	turn-of-the-century	reformist	movement	in	France,	‘a	universe	that	is	finite	but	whose	contours	are	imprecise’.113	I	 intend	 to	 further	 historicize	 the	 individual,	 the	 family	 and	 the	 state	 through	 la	
nébuleuse	of	thoughts	and	practices	that	sustained	them	in	the	nineteenth	century.	Finally,	 in	 organizing	 my	 material,	 I	 have	 been	 influenced	 by	 the	 work	 of	 the	historian	 of	 political	 thought	 Pierre	 Rosanvallon. 114 	After	 having	 attended	Foucault’s	 seminars	 at	 the	Collège	de	France,	 Rosanvallon	was	 able	 to	 adapt	 the	genealogical	 method	 to	 the	 discipline	 of	 history,	 stripping	 it	 of	 Foucault’s																																																									112	Nicholas	Green,	The	Spectacle	of	Nature:	Landscape	and	Bourgeois	Culture	in	Nineteenth-Century	
France	(Manchester,	1990),	p.	184.	113	Christian	 Topalov,	 ‘Les	 “reformateurs”	 et	 leurs	 réseaux:	 Enjeux	 d’un	 objet	 de	 recherche’,	 in:	Topalov	 (ed.)	 Laboratoires	 du	 nouveau	 siecle:	 La	 nebuleuse	 reformatrice	 et	 ses	 reseaux	 en	 France,	
1880-1914	(Paris,	1999),	p.	13.	114	Rosanvallon,	 La	 démocratie	 inachavée:	 Histoire	 de	 la	 souveraineté	 du	 peuple	 en	 France	 (Paris,	2000);	Le	peuple	introuvable:	Histoire	de	la	représentation	démocratique	en	en	France	(Paris,	1992);	
Le	sacre	du	citoyen:	Histoire	intellectuelle	du	suffrage	universel	en	France	(Paris,	1992);	The	Demands	
of	Liberty.	
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characteristic	 flair	 and	 adding	more	 footnotes.	 The	 result	 has	 been	 some	 of	 the	best	historical	studies	of	political	thought	and	‘the	political’	in	nineteenth-century	France.	 Instead	 of	 relying	 on	 key	 political	 thinkers	 alone,	 Rosanvallon	 weaves	together	masses	of	texts	ranging	from	obscure	provincial	pamphleteers,	moralists,	and	experts	in	a	wide	range	of	fields	to	the	important	statesmen	and	philosophers	of	 the	 time.	The	 focus	 is	 on	what	 became	possible	 or	 impossible	within	political	discourse	 at	 a	 given	 time,	 rather	 than	on	 the	question	of	 specific	utterances	 and	their	authorship.	What	emerges	 is	a	dense	 tapestry	 that	 renders	comprehensible	the	very	fabric	of	political	culture.	I	have	attempted	a	similar	kind	of	approach	to	exploring	 the	 rather	 ‘big	 questions’	 of	 the	 individual	 self	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century.115			
Discourse	and	context.		This	 inquiry	developed	 its	own	intellectual	momentum.	 I	only	realized	how	far	 it	had	led	me	when	it	was	completed	and	the	examiners	offered	the	following	remark	regarding	this	thesis:	‘the	underlying	logic	is	that	the	context	is	the	discourse’.	This	is	 a	 very	 intelligent	 observation	 that	 I	 had	 not	 considered,	 but	 one	 problematic	assertion	with	which	I	do	recognize	as	my	own.	It	means	that	I	have	taken	a	much	more	 radically	 historicist	 approach	 than	 Foucault	 himself,	 and	 that	 demands	explanation.	In	the	end,	Foucault	always	referred	back	the	discourses	he	studied	to	an	 external,	 extra-discursive	 context	 or	 reality,	 usually	 capitalism,	 urbanization,	industrialization,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 state,	 proletarianization,	 and	 so	 on.	 While	 he	deconstructed	many	 disciplinary	 claims	 to	 truth,	 he	 kept	 relying	 on	 sociological																																																									115	Lloyd	Kramer,	 ‘Robert	 R.	 Palmer	 and	 the	 history	 of	 big	 questions’,	Historical	Reflections,	37/3	(2011),	pp.	101-122.	
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commonplaces	 derived	 from	 modernization	 theory.	 The	 basic	 premise	 of	modernization	 theory	 is	 that	unrelenting	 social,	 technological,	 economic,	 cultural	and	political	change,	everything	from	railways	and	rural	exodus,	to	the	freeing	up	of	the	press	and	industry,	have	destroyed	and	traditional	and	local	forms	of	life	so	that	 the	national	 level	 emerged	 as	 the	only	 site	 for	meaningful	 belonging,	 action	and	 thought.	 More	 broadly	 than	 mere	 nationalization,	 modernization	 means	concentration	 and	 centralization,	 in	 everything	 from	 finances,	 production	 and	knowledge	to	loyalties	and	desires.	Modernization	theory	is	part	and	parcel	of	the	evolutionary	view	of	modernity	and	the	Western	present	as	the	climax	of	human	development.			Since	 my	 arrival	 at	 Durham	 University,	 I	 have	 specialized	 in	 the	 study	 of	 local	France	 and	 wrote	 my	 M.A.	 dissertation	 on	 the	 centralisation-decentralisation	debate	in	the	nineteenth-century.	The	point	of	departure	of	the	relevant	literature	is	a	critique	of	modernization	theory	as	‘the	inexorable	unification	of	the	nation	—as	 state,	 market,	 and	 cultural	 entity—	 [that]	 subordinated	 local	 to	 national	loyalties’.116	These	 fragmentary	 local	 studies	 typically	 nuance	 tales	 of	 national	concentration	by	pointing	to	the	complicated	nature	of	changes	at	the	 local	 level,	where	modernization	seldom	resembled	theory.	While	it	is	difficult	to	dispute	the	rise	 of	 urbanization	 or	 industrialization	 at	 the	 global	 or	 national	 scale,	 these	changes	 had	 to	 be	 taking	 place	 in	 actual	 localities.	When	 studying	 these	 sites	 of	modernization,	 it	 is	 equally	 difficult	 to	 ignore	 the	 challenges,	 resistances	 and	continuities	posed	at	 the	 local	 level,	where	 the	old	and	 the	new	often	 supported	each	other	 in	unexpected	ways	rather	than	compete.	 In	particular,	recent	studies																																																									116	Stéphane	 Gerson,	 ‘Une	 France	 locale:	 The	 local	 past	 in	 recent	 French	 scholarship’,	 French	
Historical	Studies,	26/3	(2003),	p.	554.	
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had	 interrogated	 the	 inherited	 truths	 of	 the	 ‘industrial	 revolution’.117	In	 1906,	 at	the	 height	 of	 the	 ’second	 industrial	 revolution',	 more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 industrial	workforce	worked	in	small	firms	with	fewer	than	five	employees,	and	only	ten	per	cent	in	factories	occupying	more	than	500	workers.118	For	the	nineteenth	century,	it	seems	clear	that	the	experience	of	a	small	minority	of	French	men	and	women	and	 specifically	 the	 French	 industrial	 workforce	 has	 received	 an	 inordinate	amount	of	attention.	The	numerical	exception	came	to	stand	for	the	whole	socio-economic	 system.	 Modern	 scholars	 have	 not	 created	 this	 distortion,	 but	 rather	inherited	it	intact	from	the	late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	century,	when	the	debate	 on	 industrialism	 occupied	 centre	 stage.	 The	 importance	 that	 industrial	society	held	in	the	works	of	all	the	great	nineteenth-century	French	thinkers	who	either	 defended	 or	 condemned	 the	 new	 system	 derived	 from	 the	 qualitative	changes	 it	 implied	 rather	 than	 the	 quantitative	 effect	 it	 had	 on	 French	men	 and	women.	But	both	dimensions	seemed	to	get	constantly	mixed	up,	 leading	to	very	optimistic	or	pessimistic	readings	of	social	problems.	 Instead	of	seeing	 in	 this	an	overreaction,	 students	of	governmentality	have	argued	 that	 this	debate	was	very	productive,	since	it	gave	rise	to	the	modern	notion	of	the	state,	society	and	politics.	I	 argue	 that	 these	 debates	 should	 also	 be	 explored	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 rise	 of	modern	selfhood.	There	is	a	very	large	gap	between	the	discursive	importance	that	contemporaries	and	modern-day	scholars	have	given	 the	 themes	of	 industry	and	modernization,	and	the	realities	on	the	ground.	The	approach	I	take	in	this	thesis	is	to	exploit	 these	paradoxes	 to	 reveal	 the	positive	and	creative	effects	 they	had	 in	generating	 templates	 for	selfhood	and	governing.	This	 implies	 interrogating	both																																																									117 	For	 a	 historiographic	 review,	 see	 the	 second	 chapter	 in:	 Fureix	 and	 Jarrige,	 Modernité	
désenchantée.	118	Heinz-Gerhard	Haupt,	Histoire	sociale	de	la	France	depuis	1789	(Paris,	1993),	p.	223.	
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discourses	 and	 practices	 to	 uncover	 the	 logics	 and	 rationalities	 producing	 such	generative	effects	that	underpinned	both.	While	this	may	destabilize	the	difference	between	ideas	and	practice,	it	sheds	light	on	the	shared	ideal	that	sustained	both:	in	 this	 case,	 the	 positive,	 normative	 templates	 for	 being	 counted	 as	 a	 worthy	member	of	society.	Having	a	clearer	picture	of	such	an	ideal,	future	research	would	be	 able	 to	 interrogate	 the	 lived	 experiences	 of	 actual	 people	 to	 see	 how	 they	appropriated,	 negotiated	 and	 interacted	 creatively	 with	 these	 programmatic	models.	Such	inquiries	are	not	the	goal	of	this	thesis.	I	 focus	on	the	inner	logic	of	the	 ideal	 as	 it	 was	 presented	 in	 thoughts	 and	 practices	 designed	 to	 make	intelligible	and	practicable	the	governing	of	the	self	and	others.		What	socialist	Louis	Blanc	called	the	 ‘religion	of	 industrialism’	served,	 I	argue,	as	an	 idiom	 signifying	 modernity,	 its	 promises	 and	 failures.119	The	 factory,	 and	 its	superhuman	 productive	 efficiency,	 underscored	 the	 ideals	 and	 frustrations	 of	modern	 peoples	 and	 selves.	 In	 other	 words,	 modernization	 theory	 is	 part	 and	parcel	 of	 the	 evolutionary	 reading	 of	 the	 world	 brought	 about	 by	 Western	modernity	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 which	 has	 also	 become	 the	 foundation	 for	academic	approaches	and	disciplines.	 In	my	eyes,	 industrialism,	 especially	 in	 the	1830s,	 was	 a	 totem,	 a	 fetish,	 a	 symbol,	 a	 discursive	 edifice	 that,	 to	 paraphrase	Murdoch,	offered	a	picture	of	reality	which	reality	endeavoured	to	resemble.	The	factory	 ideal	 of	 pure,	 relentless	 and	 impersonal	 productivity	 and	 efficiency	 at	 a	totalizing	scale	has	proved	very	long-lived.	Everything	would	be	better	if	it	worked	like	 a	 machine,	 it	 seems.	 If	 industrialism	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 ideal,	 idea	 and	ideological	 construct,	 then	 it	a	belief	which	 is	 shared,	 reinforced	and	reproduced																																																									119	Louis	Blanc,	Organisation	du	travail	(Brussels,	1848),	pp.	260-261.	
	 57	
not	 only	 by	 bourgeois	 ideology,	 but	 also	 by	 anarchism,	 Marxism,	 socialism	 and	communism,	and	equally	invigorated	by	the	lamentations	of	the	political	Right.	The	industrial	fantasy	unified	both	sides	of	the	iron	wall.			What	 does	 all	 of	 this	mean?	 That	 there	 are	 no	 viewpoints	 from	where	 to	 know	reality	 that	 are	 placed	 outside	 or	 above	 history.	 That	 what	 we	 may	 define	 as	historical	 context	may	 also	 be	mediated	 by	 human	 interpretation	 and	discourse.	There	are	of	course	historical	facts,	but	in	order	for	a	series	of	events	of	factory	life	in	 Mulhouse	 to	 say	 something	 about	 the	 larger	 process	 of	 industrialization,	 a	discursive	 translation	 needs	 to	 take	 place,	 necessitating	 key	 concepts	 such	 as	society	 or	 market	 that	 are	 themselves	 not	 extra-discursive	 or	 supra-historical.	When	dealing	with	 the	 vast	 abstractions	 of	modernization	 theory,	 the	 context	 is	definitively	 not	 external	 to	 the	 discourse.	 This	 radicalizes	 Foucault,	 who	 placed	universal	 ‘man’	 inside	 history	 but	 somehow	 modernity	 theory	 outside	 of	 it.	Furthermore,	 as	 Seigel	 has	 argued,	 the	 problem	 with	 Foucault’s	 programmatic	view	 of	 selfhood	 was	 that	 it	 proposed	 the	 ideal	 of	 creative	 self-creation	 as	 a	developing	 of	 a	 higher	 form	 of	 aesthetic	 self	 who	 would	 then	 be	 finally	emancipated	 from	 constraints.120	It	 therefore	 reinforced	 the	 ideal	 of	 an	 absolute	and	immediate	outside	from	where	reality	could	be	grasped	unaltered	once	and	for	all,	 further	reinforcing	 the	dream	of	absolute	emancipation	 that	has	been	 floated	since	 Descartes.	 Foucault’s	 same	 insistence	 on	 finding	 a	 limit-experience	 or	absolute	outside	is	typical	of	the	French	and	Anglo-European	generation	of	1968.	In	 its	 most	 radical	 and	 poetic	 expression,	 Lacan	 defined	 the	 real	 as	 that	 which	could	 not	 be	 put	 into	words,	 but	 there	 remained	 a	 longing	 for	 a	 transcendental																																																									120	Seigel,	Idea	of	the	Self,	chapter	18.	
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reality	 placed,	 in	 this	 case,	 beyond	 language,	 rationality	 or	 social	 conditioning,	 a	search	 for	 the	 raw.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 Latin	 American	 generation	 of	 1968,	with	 its	critique	of	the	‘coloniality’	of	power	proposed	by	authors	such	as	Enrique	Dussel,	mixed	the	promises	of	revolutionary	Marxism	with	the	Catholicism	of	the	‘Teología	de	 la	Liberación’	 to	propose	not	an	outside	but	rather	a	way	out	of	modernity	by	rendering	 meaningful	 the	 local	 agency	 of	 persons	 and	 communities.	 To	 Anglo-Europeans,	the	best-known	thinker	of	this	generation	was	Ivan	Illich,	who	exposed	the	 enormous	 contradictions	 between	 the	 rhetoric	 and	 ideals	 that	 legitimate	modern	 institutions	and	 the	 fact	 that	 these	materialize	realities	 that	produce	 the	opposite	 results,	 further	 entrenching	 the	 need	 for	more	 of	 the	 ideal.	 But	 rather	than	a	proposing	an	escape	from	this	by	finding	a	higher	perspective,	he	suggested	simplification,	de-institutionalization,	de-medicalization,	de-schooling	and	so	on,	in	short,	a	devolution	of	agency	to	actual	people	at	the	local	 level.	This	would	mean	not	an	emancipation,	but	rather	a	disenchantment	from	the	faith	in	the	discourses	that	sustain	 the	structures	of	modernity.	The	same	process	whereby	 the	modern	mind	 became	 secularized	 is	 thus	 proposed	 in	 order	 to	 de-modernize	 and	 de-colonialize	it.	What	comes	after	such	a	disenchantment	is	the	realization	that	there	is	an	endless	plurality	of	viewpoints	that	have	inevitably,	always	and	already	been	there	 all	 along.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 nothing	 to	 be	 emancipated	 from,	 nothing	transcendental,	no	New	World	to	reach	and	conquer.			The	fact	that	there	is	no	outside	grounding	an	objective	gaze	and	that	perspectives	are	 inexorably	 plural	 does	 not	 render	 knowing	 impossible,	 and	 I	 hope	 that	 the	many	pages	that	follow	testify	to	this	claim.	It	simply	means	that	my	perspective	is	both	personal	and	conditioned	by	what	culture	and	present-day	scholarship	define	
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as	 possible	 and	 thinkable,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 for	 the	 thinkers	 that	 I	 study.	 It	 does	however	 reframe	 the	 relationship	between	 the	past	and	 the	present,	 and	only	 in	this	 sense	may	 it	 be	 considered	 a	 ‘history	 of	 the	 present’.	 The	 viewpoint	 of	 the	present	would	not	be	a	firm	patch	of	land	outside	or	above	the	past,	whose	truths	and	structures	are	stable	and	given	once	and	for	all.	These	are	also	historical	and	subject	 to	be	changed	by	human	agents.	 I	have	applied	this	a	very	personal	view	throughout	 this	 thesis.	 The	 reader	will	 judge	whether	 it	 is	 reasonable,	 valid	 and	coherent.			
Structure	of	the	thesis.		The	first	and	third	chapter	focus	on	ideas,	or	rather	their	weaving	together	into	a	logical	 fabric	 from	 which	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 self	 and	 government	 could	emerge.	Even	 in	the	cases	when	these	 logics	 informed	state	policy	and	structural	reforms,	these	chapters	have	little	to	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	the	actual	impact	 these	 rationalities	 had	 on	 the	 lives,	 practices	 and	 self-understanding	 of	contemporary	 persons	 and	 collectives.	 The	 second	 chapter	 makes	 a	 limited	attempt	 to	 address	 this	 omission.	 Yet	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 as	 a	 general	 point	 that	there	was	a	 significant	 lag,	often	decades,	between	 the	 idea	and	practices	of	 this	psychological	paradigm,	whose	maturity	seemed	to	coincide	with	its	crisis	towards	the	mid	 century.	 As	we	 shall	 see,	 the	 sociological	 paradigm,	 rooted	 as	 it	 was	 in	specific	kinds	of	collective	and	associative	practices	and	identities,	seemed	to	have	a	much	more	immediate	impact	starting	in	the	1890s.			
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The	discourses	on	poverty	serve	as	a	gateway	to	the	study	of	subjectivity	because	they	highlighted	normality	 by	 signalling	 its	 ‘other’.	 The	 tension	between	 the	 self	and	 the	 ‘other’	will	 be	used	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 framework	of	 experience	of	 the	modern	 individual.	 This	 experience	 was	 centred	 on	 governing	 the	 difference	between	the	self	and	the	‘other’.	The	first	chapter	will	trace	this	process	until	1848	and	will	explore	the	psychological	paradigm	of	the	self	from	its	rise	towards	1800.	The	third	chapter	will	follow	on	until	1914,	and	will	track	the	gradual	development	of	an	alternative	paradigm	of	government	of	the	self	and	others.	Both	chapters	will	develop	a	wide-ranging	discussion	of	philosophical,	sociological	studies,	alongside	more	 detailed	 texts,	 such	 as	 writings	 by	 moralists,	 hygienists,	 philanthropists,	publicists,	 theologians,	 politicians,	 as	well	 as	 some	 literary	 texts.	 These	 establish	broad	lines	of	analysis	across	an	approximate	period	of	130	years,	allowing	us	to	explore	the	complex	nature	of	the	modern	self	as	it	was	thought,	debated	and		—critically—	as	it	was	applied	in	France,	across	a	wide	period.	From	school	practices	or	military	discipline	to	medical	debates	on	the	soul	and	techniques	of	the	self	and	other	detailed	elements,	 these	 two	chapters	merge	 the	 study	of	 ‘high	 ideas’	with	‘social	thought	in	practice’.	They	aim	to	bring	out	the	structure	of	experience	of	the	modern	individual	by	building	on	and	moving	beyond	well-established	arguments	about	 childhood,	 masculinity	 and	 gender.	 The	 nineteenth-century	 discourses	 of	poverty	and	social	reform	will	be	a	lens	for	the	more	subtle	level	of	social	thinking	and	social	reform	in	which	the	experience	of	the	self	was	structured.			While	 the	 discourses	 of	 poverty	 focused	 on	 individuals	 and	 their	 lacks,	 social	assistance	policies	 targeted	 the	 individual	 through	 the	 family	 and	 its	 lacks.	Thus	the	 family	 that	 welfare	 policies	 sought	 to	 promote	 and	 govern	 served	 as	 an	
	 61	
intermediary	platform	between	the	individual	and	the	state.	In	the	second	chapter,	the	domestic	sphere	and	the	assistance	policies	that	sought	to	shape	it	will	point	to	the	 grammar	 of	 power	 underpinning	 the	 fluid	 language	 of	 authority	 and	responsibility	 which	 generated	 and	 maintained	 the	 status	 quo	 between	 the	individual	and	the	state.	The	focus	will	be	on	parenting	and	the	discourses	linking	fatherhood	and	authority,	on	 the	one	hand,	and	motherhood	and	 function	on	 the	other.	 The	 figure	 of	 the	 mother	 will	 serve	 as	 a	 window	 onto	 the	 fin-de-siècle	understanding	of	the	individual	through	its	fragmented	social	functions	and	roles.	As	 in	 the	 other	 two	 chapters,	 the	works	 of	 varied	writers	will	 throw	 into	 sharp	relief	 the	 discourses	 of	 fatherhood	 and	 authority	 that	 underpinned	 the	understanding	of	government	and	the	practices	of	guardianship.	The	confrontation	that	opposed	Catholics	and	liberals	in	the	middle	of	the	century	will	help	us	track	the	 evolution	 of	 these	 discourses	 on	 authority	 and	 practices	 of	 guardianship.	 In	turn,	administrative	sources	from	municipal	and	departmental	archives	in	western	France	will	document	the	rise	of	the	mother	as	a	social	function.			A	particular	focus	of	the	second	chapter	will	be	the	policies	that,	from	the	1830s	to	the	1880s,	targeted	foundlings	and	offered	aid	to	poor	single	mothers	in	exchange	for	not	abandoning	their	children.	These	mothers	became	objects	of	administrative	surveillance	 involving	 one	 of	 the	most	 aggressive	moralization	 initiatives	 of	 the	century.	This	extended	case	study	will	further	deepen	the	discussion	on	authority	and	 guardianship.	 These	 welfare	 policies	 became	 the	 laboratory	 for	 an	understanding	 of	 mothering,	 itself	 broken	 down	 into	 social	 functions	 such	 as	cohabitation,	 intense	care	or	breastfeeding.	Thus	chronologically	and	analytically,	the	second	chapter	will	anchor	the	wider	discussion	on	the	self	throughout	the	thesis.		
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	Liberal	 politics	 in	 France	 was	 inseparable	 from	 philanthropic	 concerns	 and	 the	social	question,	just	as	liberal	economics	was	intimately	tied	to	the	issue	of	labour	and	scarcity.	If	Marx	removed	the	veil	that	separated	the	economy	from	the	state,	the	 Foucauldians	 (Procacci,	 Donzelot,	 Dean,	 Ewald	 and	 others)	 showed	 that	 the	state	 and	 the	 social	 were	 conjoined.	 Rather	 than	 narrowly	 understood	 as	pauperism	or	the	labour	problem,	the	social	was	revealed	to	be	a	whole	domain	of	knowledge-power	engaged	in	the	making	of	a	social	body.	Poverty	was	no	less	the	unintended	consequence	of	liberal	government	than	proletarianizing	was	of	liberal	economics.	 The	 social	 was	 the	 very	 condition,	 object,	 and	 child	 of	 modern	government,	political	or	otherwise.			But	 in	 her	 1934	 ‘Analysis	 of	 Oppression’,	 philosopher	 Simone	 Weil	 launched	 a	strong	criticism	of	Marx,	which	can	also	be	applied	 to	works	on	governmentality	and	social	control.	‘Above	all’,	she	wrote,	‘Marx	omits	to	explain	why	oppression	is	invincible	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 useful	 [or]	 why	 the	 oppressed	 in	 revolt	 have	 never	succeeded	 in	 founding	 a	 non-oppressive	 society’.121	I	 believe	 it	 is	 the	 study	 of	subjectivity	 that	 is	 able	 to	 correct	 this	omission.	 Scholarship	on	governmentality	and	 the	social	never	was	 in	dialogue	with	Foucault’s	work	on	 the	government	of	the	self	that	he	was	developing	in	his	final	years.	This	is	the	gap	I	seek	to	explore,	by	seeing	the	social	as	a	form	of	governing	how	others	govern	themselves,	as	the	site	where	modern	subjectivity	emerged	through	its	constituent	parts:	the	modern	individual	and	the	modern	state.		
																																																								121	Simone	Weil,	An	Anthology	(London,	1986),	p.	150.	
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Chapter	1	
	
The	Politics	of	Interiority:	
The	Psychology	of	Self	and	Other,	1780s-1848.					
Introduction		Happiness,	 argued	 the	 liberal	 philosopher	 Philibert	 Damiron	 in	 1832,	 was	 the	immediate	 consequence	 of	 the	 good,	 understood	 as	 acting	 with	 order.	 For	 this	member	of	the	Victor	Cousin	school,	it	was	but	‘le	sentiment	du	bien’.	Unhappiness	signalled	bad	 judgement,	 inner	struggles	against	 the	good	or,	 in	any	case,	 lack	of	resignation,	for	happiness	was	but	a	modest	and	transitory	pleasure	that	followed	rightful	acts.	‘[T]here	is	no	pure	happiness	for	a	weak,	finite	being,	but	only	for	the	Infinite,	 the	 All-powerful	 [and]	 the	 Eternal.	 If	 therefore	 the	 virtuous	 man	 is	unhappy,	it	is	because	he	is	a	man,	he	has	the	destiny	of	a	man[…],	and	considered	only	in	the	act	of	virtue	he	exercises	is	he	happy,	because	he	has	the	awareness	of	being	strong	and	good’.	If	this	was	no	consolation,	the	alternative	was	to	suffer	the	fate	of	the	bad	and	the	guilty.	These,	tormented	by	fear	and	remorse,	could	never	be	 happy.1	But,	 he	 asked,	 could	 there	 be	 souls	 that	 were	 ‘so	 depraved	 and	 so	
																																																								1	Philibert	Damiron,	Essai	sur	l’histoire	de	la	philosophie	en	France	au	dix-neuvième	siècle	(Bruxelles,	1832),	pp.	424-427.	
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monstrous	 that	 they	 were	 criminals	 without	 remorse	 and	 without	 pain?’	 ‘It	 is	possible’,	he	replied,		but	then	we	must	suppose	that	they	have	lost	the	moral	sense:	because,	if	they	had	conserved	it,	they	would	see	themselves	as	they	are,	and	would	be	deeply	afflicted	by	this.	 If	 they	have	 lost	 it,	 it	 is	quite	simply	that	they	don’t	suffer	because	of	 the	acts	they	commit;	they	don’t	have	the	sentiment.	It’s	as	if	one	is	ill	or	poor	and	didn’t	
know	it:	what	sorrow	would	one	feel?	But	give	these	souls	back	the	conscience	they	do	not	have,	give	them	the	moral	sense	[and]	as	soon	as	vice	shows	itself	to	them,	they	will	perceive	it	as	it	is,	and	will	only	see	it	with	disgust.2		This	short	quotation	takes	us	to	the	crux	of	the	nineteenth-century	social	question	and	 poverty.	 The	 problem	 was	 not	 that	 of	 the	 good	 and	 the	 bad,	 since	 moral	conscience	 as	 a	 set	 of	 internalized	 norms	 was	 able	 to	 pay	 the	 virtuous	 with	happiness	and	the	wicked	with	remorse,	in	the	same	manner	that	merit	distributed	success	 in	 wider	 society.	 Rather,	 the	 difficulty	 was	 posed	 by	 those	 who	 were	unaware,	ignorant	or	oblivious	to	the	whole	question	of	good	and	evil,	at	least	by	liberal	 standards;	 in	 other	words,	 those	who	were	 poor	 and	 vicious	 and	did	 not	know	 it.	 Poverty	 and	 marginality	 thus	 functioned	 first	 and	 foremost	 as	 a	psychological	 discovery,	 a	 self-discovery,	 a	 ‘seeing	 oneself	 as	 one	 is’,	 a	 founding	event	of	conscience	and	consciousness,	one	that	instituted	a	vital	lack,	a	vast	hole	filled	with	self-disgust.	The	march	of	progress	which	our	modern	age	inaugurated	was	 inseparable	 from	 the	 self-awareness	 of	misery,	 backwardness	 or	 ignorance.	Indeed,	 the	 knowledge	 of	 falling	 short	 marked	 the	 passage	 from	 the	 fixed	remoteness	 of	 the	 past	 into	 the	 pregnant	 fluidity	 of	 modernity;	 it	 acted	 as	 the	
																																																								2	Ibid.,	p.	426.	
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simple	piece	of	information	that	‘liberated’	every	remote	community	which	a	new	road	or	railway	had	annexed	to	the	world.	Even	when	material	conditions	stayed	the	same,	with	the	arrival	of	new	awareness,	possibilities	and	identities,	something	had	changed	forever.	The	long	exodus	to	the	future	had	begun.		As	 Philippe	 Sassier	 has	 documented,	 the	 concepts	 of	 poverty	 and	 the	 poor	 are	discontinuous	 through	 time;	 each	 age	 has	 signified	 these	 terms	 differently.	 Of	direct	 relevance	 to	our	discussion	are	 the	 two	different	 concepts	of	poverty	 that	succeeded	 each	other	 in	 the	period	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis,	 one	 towards	1800,	and	the	other	towards	1900.	The	first	concept	acknowledged	poverty	as	‘subjective	and	relative’.3	‘I	do	not	dispute	that	poverty	and	wealth	are	very	relative	things	for	nations	 as	 for	 individuals’,	 argued	 François-Emmanuel	 Fodéré	 in	 1825,	 since	‘everyday	one	sees	men	who	are	happy	and	believe	themselves	to	be	rich	who	only	have	 what	 is	 strictly	 necessary;	 and	 others,	 having	 even	 what	 is	 superfluous	believe	 themselves	 poor	 because	 of	 their	 insatiable	 desires’.4	Writing	 in	 1834,	 le	baron	de	Morogues	found	that	in	his	time		if	there	is	more	wealth	and	more	wealthy	people,	there	are	perhaps	ten	times	more	poor	in	whom	the	sentiment	of	misery	has	multiplied	(décuplé).	I	refer	to	those	in	whom	 the	 sentiment	 of	 misery	 has	 multiplied,	 because	 it	 is	 in	 effect	 rather	 the	sentiment	of	their	misery	and	the	great	and	ever	growing	inequality	of	their	social	
																																																								3	Philippe	 Sassier,	Du	bon	 usage	 des	 pauvres:	Histoire	 d’un	 thème	politique,	 XVIe-XXe	 siècle	 (Paris,	1990),	p.	205.	4	François-Emmanuel	Fodéré,	Essai	historique	et	moral	sur	la	pauverte	des	nations…	(Paris,	1825),	p.	46.	
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position	that	afflicts	the	poor	today,	than	the	lack	of	the	most	indispensable	things	for	their	existence.5		The	 problem	 for	 the	 poor	 then,	 was	 the	 ‘pain	 of	 an	 increasingly	 dependent	situation’	 and	 the	 growing	 gap	 separating	 them	 from	 wealth.6	As	 contemporary	Eugène	Buret	put	it,	misery	‘is	not	distinguished	by	a	greater	degree	of	destitution	in	their	body’,	but	rather	it	was	an	emotional	process	whereby	unmet	needs	were	experienced	 as	 suffering.7	The	 key	 was	 a	 process	 of	 psychological	 reckoning	whereby,	 as	 Sassier	 commented,	 ‘misery	 will	 be	 the	 realization	 (prise	 de	
conscience)	of	poverty,	of	need,	of	 lack’.8	Hence	 the	 importance	of	self-perception	that	 Damiron	 emphasised;	 by	 seeing	 oneself	 as	 destitute,	 a	 twofold	 awareness	would	 emerge:	 first	 the	 pain	 and	 disgust	 of	 being	 poor,	 then	 the	 desire	 for	improvement.	Not	only	was	the	‘passage	from	penury	to	comfort’	and	continuous	expansion	of	needs	and	desire	necessary	 for	 the	new-born	market	 economy,	but	the	 same	 process	 also	 meant	 an	 acceptance	 of	 the	 moral	 framework	 which	regulated	social	participation	and	advancement.9	It	was	necessary	then	to	consider	‘moral	well-being,	or	order,	and	material	well-being,	or	comfort,	as	inseparable’.10	It	 was	 equally	 difficult	 to	 keep	 apart	 individual	 waywardness,	 and	 the	 chaotic	threat	 it	 represented	 for	 the	whole	of	society.	Consequently,	poverty	 in	 the	early	half	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century	was	a	new	way	 to	aggregate	very	disparate	 social	types	 whose	 common	 characteristic	 was	 some	 sort	 of	 disordered	 way	 of	 being,																																																									5	Pierre	Bigot	de	Morogues,	Du	pauperisme,	de	la	mendicité	et	des	moyens	d'en	prévenir	les	funestes	
effets	 (Paris,	 1834),	 p.	 21;	 for	 a	 similar	 argument	 on	 the	 relativity	 of	 poverty,	 see:	 Ambroise	Clément,	Recherches	sur	les	causes	de	l’indigence	(Paris,	1846),	pp.	77-78.	6	Ibid.	7	Quoted	in:	Sassier,	Bon	usage	des	pauvres,	p.	205.	8	Ibid.	9	Giovanna	Procacci,	 ‘Social	 economy	 and	 the	 government	 of	 poverty’,	 in:	 Graham	Burchell,	 Colin	Gordon	and	Peter	Miller	 (eds),	The	Foucault	Effect:	Studies	 in	Governmentality	 (Chicago,	 1991),	 p.	155.	10	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	157.	
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without	 it	 being	 possible	 to	 separate	 the	 voluntary	 from	 the	 involuntary	 or	 the	moral	from	the	material	aspects.	Pauperism	referred	to	‘poverty	intensified	to	the	level	of	social	danger:	the	spectre	of	the	mob’,	‘	a	magma	in	which	are	fused	all	the	dangers	which	beset	the	social	order’.11		As	we	will	 see	 in	 the	 third	 chapter,	 the	 focus	had	 shifted	dramatically	 a	 century	later.	 The	 birth	 of	 modern	 forms	 of	 public	 assistance	 and	 insurance	 in	 the	 last	years	of	the	nineteenth	century	extended	impersonal	state	protection	to	new	social	categories.	After	the	hesitant	experiences	of	the	interwar	years,	social	policy	came	to	encompass	virtually	all	workers	through	full	employment	and	a	mixed	system	of	insurance,	and	nearly	all	categories	of	non-workers	through	a	mosaic	of	assistance	schemes.	 This	 shift	went	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 a	 change	 in	 selfhood.	Discourses	 on	poverty	 tended	 to	 be	 very	 explicit	 on	 what	 was	 expected	 of	 the	 individual	 in	society.	Discussions	about	merit,	 effort	or	 self-interest,	 for	 example,	 offered	very	clear	 behavioural	 guidelines	 that	 changed	 dramatically	 from	 1800	 to	 1900.	 For	instance,	 the	 concept	of	prévoyance	 or	 foresight	 in	 the	1820s	was	understood	as	the	 main	 attribute	 that	 the	 poor	 lacked.	 It	 had	 the	 ability	 of	 explaining	 the	 full	catalogue	 of	 the	 vices	 of	 the	 indigent,	 such	 as	 their	 lack	 of	 responsibility,	temperance,	 thriftiness,	 industriousness,	 discipline,	 cleanliness,	 respectability,	chastity,	 stability	 and	 domesticity,	 together	with	 the	 tendency	 to	 have	 too	many	children	and	abandon	them.	An	idea	that	could	explain	so	much	inevitably	fell	into	grave	contradictions,	and	these	can	be	found	on	every	page	written	on	the	subject.	But	 behind	 the	 apparent	 incoherence,	 there	was	more	 or	 less	 a	 clear	 normative	intention	 that	 drew	up	 a	 positive	model	 of	 selfhood	 in	which	 there	was	 a	 grave																																																									11	Procacci,	‘Social	economy’,	p.	158.	
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concern	for	the	future.	 In	short,	prévoyance	explained	poverty	and	pointed	to	the	only	 way	 out	 of	 it.	 It	 was	 considered	 the	 main	 feature	 identifying	 the	 liberal	individual	 and	 thus	 the	 bedrock	 of	 the	 government	 of	 a	 society	 of	 ‘equals’,	 the	market	 economy,	 the	 family	 and	 the	 self.	 A	 hundred	 years	 later,	 prévoyance	 no	longer	identified	a	lack	of	moral	behaviour;	it	had	become	the	name	of	a	ministry.	A	technocratic	prévoyance	became	the	legitimation	of	the	new	administrative	state.			As	we	will	see	below,	Procacci	understood	pauperism	as	a	wider	condemnation	of	
difference	in	society.	In	turn,	Sassier	concluded	his	study	by	stating	that	‘Ultimately,	the	 gaze	 projected	 onto	 the	 poor	 only	 ever	 lands	 on	 that	 which	 one	 thinks	 the	community	 lacks’.12	By	 emphasizing	 difference	 and	 collective	 lack,	 Procacci	 and	Sassier,	 two	 of	 the	 key	 experts	 in	 the	 French	 discourses	 of	 poverty,	 argue	 that	indigence	simply	pointed	away	 from	itself.	Discourses	about	misery	where	really	about	 something	 else.	 But	 where	 do	 these	 point?	 I	 am	 unsatisfied	 with	 the	responses	 of	 governmentality	 or	 politics,	 which	 remain	 shrouded	 in	 the	 same	mystique	that	was	being	woven	by	the	very	discourses	they	study.	In	other	words,	these	 very	 the	 very	 intentions	 expressed	 by	 contemporaries;	 the	main	 target	 of	discourses	about	poverty	was	to	constitute	multiple	fields	of	government	and	the	political	 sphere,	which	 in	 turn	was	 the	 source	of	 such	discourses.	 So	 the	 inquiry	remains	 immensely	 informative,	 but	 circular,	 deconstructing	misery,	 but	 further	entrenching	government	and	politics.	The	approach	that	can	move	things	forward	is	that	of	subjectivity,	which	moves	beyond	the	opposition	between	the	governors	and	 the	 governed.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 avoid	 this	 circularity	 by	 analysing	 the	
																																																								12	Sassier,	Bon	usage	des	pauvres,	p.	380.	
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importance	 of	 poverty	 —as	 discourses	 and	 policies	 addressing	 undesirable	differences	and	lacks—	within	the	rise	of	the	psychological	subjectivity	in	France.			The	 discourses	 relating	 to	 pauperism	 simplified	 and	 organized	 the	 complex	plurality	 of	 the	 social	 body	 along	 new	 lines,	 namely,	 a	 split	 between	moral	 and	immoral.	Socioeconomic	rank	and	one’s	relation	to	property	and	labour	come	to	be	understood	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 behaviour,	which	 in	 turn	 reflected	 one’s	moral,	intellectual	 and	 personal	 worth.	 In	 other	 words,	 class	 became	 intimately	 linked	with	the	self.	By	embodying	the	lack	of	necessary	self-rule	and	vigilant	discipline,	the	pauper	exemplified	the	strong	ties	established	between	social	advancement	in	a	meritocratic	society	of	‘equals’	and	practices	of	the	self.	The	hierarchy	separating	the	 socially	 marginal	 from	 ideal	 individualities	 was	 equated	 with	 a	 moral	 and	intellectual	grading	found	within	every	subject	and	dependent	on	self-control	as	a	learned	behaviour.	Therefore,	 I	will	 show	how	the	debates	on	social	government	defined	certain	ways	of	being	and	behaving	as	differences	and	lacks	that	needed	to	be	remedied	through	individual	self-government.			An	effect	of	economic	conditions	that	affected	the	lower	classes,	poverty	in	the	Old-Regime	 had	 been	 a	 problem	 to	 be	 addressed	 through	 the	material	 and	 spiritual	relief	of	public	and	private	charity,	much	of	which	centred	on	alleviating	families	in	times	of	hardship	by	interning	non-productive	relatives	in	the	hospice.	The	state	in	the	Old	Regime,	which	Tocqueville	qualified	as	‘prodigiously	active’,	also	addressed	its	 attentions	 to	 the	 destitute.13 	Shelby	 McCloy	 has	 shown	 that	 ‘The	 French	government	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 engaged	 in	 charitable	 activities	 and																																																									13	Alexis	de	Tocqueville,	The	Old	Regime	and	the	Revolution	(New	York,	1856),	p.	iii.	
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administered	a	measure	of	relief	to	almost	every	form	of	human	need’.14	In	the	late	eighteenth	 and	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 traditional	 forms	 of	 charity	 had	 come	under	attack.	It	was	shown	that	by	offering	individuals	undue	assurances	in	times	of	hardship,	beneficence	made	them	dependent,	damaging	their	ability	 to	rely	on	themselves	 in	 the	 future.	 Hence,	 indiscriminate	 welfare	 policies	 aggravated	 the	problem	 they	 sought	 to	 alleviate;	 largesse,	 be	 it	 private	 or	 public,	 bred	personal	irresponsibility	and	consequently	undermined	the	social	order.	The	end	result	was	increased	misery	and	poverty.	In	the	early	nineteenth	century,	pauperism	came	to	signify	a	collective	problem	that	threatened	the	social	order	but	that	originated	in	individual	 immorality,	 irresponsible	habits	 and	 asocial	 relationships.15	In	 a	 letter	to	the	prefects	in	1840,	the	minister	of	the	interior	Charles	de	Rémusat	remarked	this	 ‘transformation	 that	 has	 in	 recent	 years	 taken	 place	 in	 this	 regard	 in	 the	charitable	spirit	in	France’.	‘If	one	examines	the	old	foundations	established	to	aid	the	poor,	one	sees	that	they	hardly	deal	with	other	than	the	material	needs	of	the	indigent’.	After	having	recognized	that	easy	relief	rendered	indigents	incapable	of	work,	 private	 charity	 had	 implemented	 practices	 that	 ‘make	 aid	 conditional	 to	work,	and	their	end	is	less	to	receive	the	poor	permanently,	than	to	help	him	leave	behind	his	state	of	poverty.’16	A	state	no	longer	defined	by	‘material	needs’,	misery	became	inseparable	from	immorality.	Throughout	the	whole	century,	beneficence	required	meditations	on	the	possible	moral	or	psychological	effects	of	any	form	of	aid,	and	even	then,	it	was	to	be	temporary	and	favour	advice	and	supervision	over	material	 relief.	 Poverty	 was	 therefore	 a	 psychological	 problem	 needing																																																									14Shelby	McCloy,	Government	Assistance	in	Eighteenth-Century	France	(Durham,	N.C.,	1946),	p.	447.	15	This	view	can	already	be	found	among	eighteenth-century	philosophers.	For	example,	John	Locke	had	already	attributed	the	lot	of	the	poor	largely	to	the	‘the	relaxation	of	discipline	and	corruption	of	manners’.	Political	Writings	(Indianapolis,	2003),	p.	447.	16	‘Circulaire	du	6	août	1840	sur	le	paupérisme	et	la	charité	légale’,	in:	Adolphe	de	Watteville	(ed.),	
Législation	charitable	(Paris,	1843),	p.	601.	
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psychological	solutions	in	order	to	govern	not	the	subjects	themselves	but	rather	their	subjectivities.	Misery	and	social	disorder	were	mere	effects	whose	causes	had	to	be	 sought	 inside	 the	 self.	On	 the	one	hand,	 this	meant	 that	public	and	private	assistance	and	interpersonal	solidarity	had	to	be	as	restrictive	as	possible	in	order	to	 promote	 self-reliance	 and	 responsibility.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	meant	 that	 by	understanding	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 human	 psyche,	 positive	 habits	 and	relationships	 could	 be	 promoted	 through	 public	 policy.	 In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	century,	the	liberal	reforms	of	the	welfare	system	thus	sought	to	limit	spending	to	the	 minimum	 while	 fostering	 proper	 relationships	 of	 dependence	 organized	around	 the	 nuclear	 family.	 This	 ‘reform	 of	 parent-child	 relations’	 and	 ‘family	mores’	 would	 produce	 adults	 who	 engaged	 in	 the	 labour	 market	 in	 order	 to	exercise	 their	 responsibility	 for	 themselves	 and	 their	 dependants.17	By	 the	 late	1830s,	 minister	 of	 the	 interior	 Tanneguy	 Duchâtel	 argued	 that	 ‘experience	increasingly	shows	that	an	excessively	attentive	charity	towards	certain	indigents	destroys	 familial	sentiments.’	The	 ‘question	of	public	morals’	 thus	posed,	 led	him	to	propose	a	strict	separation	of	indoor	and	outdoor	relief	in	which	families	would	receive	 aid	 in	 the	 latter	 form	whenever	 possible.	 Although	 the	 sharp	 distinction	would	 never	 be	 fully	 applied,	 he	 argued	 that	 besides	 being	more	 economical,	 it	‘would	also	have	the	advantage	of	conserving	the	family	spirit	by	leaving	the	sick,	the	old	and	the	infirm	in	the	care	of	their	relatives’.18	This	new	use	of	outdoor	relief	and	charitable	home	visits	meant	that	 ‘the	family	habitat	becomes	generalized	as	an	instrument	for	assistance’	as	‘as	a	means	to	intensify	the	weak	family	ties	of	the	
																																																								17	Lynch,	Family,	Class,	and	Ideology,	p.	12.	18	‘Circulaire	du	6	août	1839	relative	aux	économats	dans	les	hospices	civils’	and	‘Circulaire	du	31	janvier	1840	portant	 reglaments	pou	 le	 service	 intérieur	des	hospices	et	hôpitaux’,	 in:	Watteville	(ed.),	Législation	charitable,	pp.	516,	532,	536	
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lower	classes’.19	In	turn,	indoor	relief	functioned	precisely	by	severing	family	ties,	and	became	a	mechanism	 that	 could	operate	 to	modify	or	dissolve	 family	bonds	when	 necessary.	 From	 1823,	 families	 could	 not	 reclaim	 children	 they	 had	abandoned	unless	they	were	able	to	provide	evidence	of	their	moral	and	financial	suitability.	 While	 the	 administration	 was	 not	 legally	 able	 to	 deprive	 parents	 of	their	 parental	 rights	 before	 1889,	 in	 practice	 ‘administrative	 practice	 had	 got	ahead	 of	 legislation’,	 since,	 as	 Armand	 Mosse	 noted,	 before	 1889	 ‘the	 Conseil	général	 de	 la	 Seine	 had	 obtained	 from	 the	 parents	 of	 those	 children	 whose	guardianship	 it	 wished	 to	 acquire	 the	 commitment	 [either]	 to	 renounce	 their	parental	authority	or	to	reimburse	the	costs	the	administration	had	incurred’.20		In	practice,	this	meant	there	was	a	very	large	discrepancy	between	the	enormous	visibility	 of	 pauperism	 and	 the	 ‘social	 question’	 in	 public	 debate	 and	 the	increasingly	 restrained	 social	policies	put	 in	place.	 If	much	more	was	 said	 about	poverty	 than	before	while	 less	was	done	 to	 remedy	 it,	 it	was	because	 it	was	not	seen	 as	 an	 objective	 problem.	 Instead,	 these	 narratives	 touched	 upon	 a	 ‘moral	sense’	 that	 constituted	 all	 ‘men’	 as	 normative	 subjects	 within	 the	 social	 order.	Procacci	 has	 written	 that	 the	 ‘moral	 objective’	 of	 the	 philanthropic	 analysis	 of	pauperism,	 ‘ultimately	 consisted	 in	making	 sure	 that	 the	 new	 social	 order	 in	 its	entirety	 be	 lived	 subjectively	 as	 a	 new	 ensemble	 of	moral	 obligations’.21	If	 these	moralizing	narratives	seem	to	have	had	little	impact	among	the	lower	classes,	my	claim	 is	 that	 they	 helped	 provide	 a	 coherent	 view	 of	 the	 world	 to	 the	 almost	exclusive	 consumers	 of	 these	 discourses,	 la	 bourgeoisie.	 The	 fear	 of	 destitution,																																																									19	Pedro	Carasa-Soto,	Historia	de	la	beneficiencia	en	Castilla	y	León	(Valladolid,	1991),	p.	183.	20	Quoted	 in:	 Philippe	Meyer,	 ‘La	 correction	 paternelle	 ou	 l’État,	 domicile	 de	 la	 famille’,	 Critique,	XXXI/343	(1975),	p.	1274.	21	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère	(Paris,	1993),	p.	179.	
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deviance	and	crime,	and	the	love	of	social	betterment,	order	and	charity,	all	served	to	 produce	 an	 experience	 of	 interiority	 that	 was	 highly	 socialized.	 	 As	 Barbara	Cruikshank	 has	 argued,	 ‘The	 ability	 of	 the	 democratic	 citizen	 to	 generate	 a	politically	able	self	depends	upon	technologies	of	subjectivity	which	link	personal	goals	and	desires	to	social	order	and	stability,	which	link	power	and	subjectivity.22		This	 chapter	will	 read	 the	discourses	 about	poverty	 as	 a	window	 into	 the	wider	issues	of	the	self	and	governing	that	framed	and	signified	them.	It	will	thus	explore	the	 intimate	correspondence	between	how	selfhood	posed	problems	of	collective	government,	while	social	problems	came	to	define	the	stakes	of	self-government.	If	the	discourses	about	pauperism	will	now	serve	to	illuminate	the	production	of	the	self,	the	next	chapter	will	consider	actual	social	policy	and	the	family	reform	which	was	 its	 focus	 as	 a	 means	 of	 uncovering	 the	 mechanisms	 whereby	 this	 self	 was	reproduced.	 The	 reform	 of	 self	 and	 family	 will	 thus	 be	 shown	 as	 the	 objects	 of	ideas	and	practices	of	social	assistance.			In	 this	 chapter,	 I	will	 explore	 the	 first	 of	 two	different	paradigms	of	 the	modern	individual	that	existed	in	the	nineteenth	century.	It	will	trace	what	I	have	called	the	‘psychological’	 paradigm	 from	 its	 antecedents	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 to	 its	gradual	development	between	1800	and	the	1830s.	 In	doing	so,	 this	chapter	will	explore	 how	 the	 problem	 of	 government	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 was	inseparable	from	the	production	of	a	normative	self.	This	will	enable	me	to	show	how	the	rise	of	a	 sense	of	moi	was	 inseparable	 from	the	profound	governmental	transformations	taking	place	in	post-revolutionary	France.	In	order	to	do	this,	this																																																									22	Barbara	Cruikshank,	‘Revolutions	within:	Self-government	and	self-esteem’,	Economy	and	Society,	22/3	(1993),	p.	327.	
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chapter	 carries	 out	 a	genealogy	 of	 the	 paradigm	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 government	that	I	have	termed	‘psychological’.	 It	will	adopt	the	approach	and	focus	of	similar	Foucauldian	genealogies	and	accounts	of	governmental	rationalities.	Such	studies	are	most	akin	to	intellectual	histories	or	histories	of	ideas,	but	with	a	focus	on	how	the	very	logics	and	rationalities	through	which	ideas	are	ordered	and	categorized	have	 changed.	 In	 other	 words,	 this	 chapter	 carries	 out	 a	 history	 of	 intellectual	events,	 of	 the	 posing	 of	 problems,	 which	 taken	 together	 make	 it	 possible	 to	envisage	 the	 contours	 of	 a	 complex	 and	 often	 paradoxical	 but	 nonetheless	intelligible	paradigm	for	the	governing	of	individuals	and	groups.			In	 line	with	this	type	of	genealogy,	 the	primary	sources	used	are	published	texts.	This	 chapter	 builds	 upon	 key	writings	 dating	 until	 the	middle	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century	 and	 covering	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 fields	 from	 philosophy	 and	 political	economy,	 medical	 and	 administrative	 texts,	 parliamentary	 debates	 and	 moral	tracts,	to	political	and	pedagogical	thought	and	literary	contests	in	the	style	of	the	old	 donneurs	 d'avis.	 The	 point	 of	 departure	 is	 a	 brief	 consideration	 of	 modern	philosophy,	which	I	take	to	be	the	diverse	European	tradition	spanning	from	René	Descartes	 to	 Immanuel	 Kant,	 that	 is,	 from	 the	 mid	 seventeenth	 to	 the	 late	eighteenth	century,	and	characterized	by	its	focus	on	the	separation	from	the	rest	of	creation	as	the	specificity	of	the	human	individual.	Such	a	discussion	is	central	to	understanding	 the	 logic	of	 emergence	of	 the	modern	self	 and	 the	basic	premises	behind	 a	 ‘psychological’	 understanding	 of	 ‘man’,	 as	 the	 first	 section	 will	 show.	Since	 there	 are	 detailed	 studies	 on	 the	 early-modern	 conceptualization	 of	 the	modern	individual,	I	will	only	focus	on	some	key	aspects	in	order	to	then	explore	
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how	these	theorizations	were	converted	into	technologies	for	the	governing	of	the	self	and	others	from	1800	to	1848.23			While	this	chapter	seems	to	remain	under	the	lingering	shadow	of	both	Descartes	and	Kant,	two	of	the	key	minds	shaping	nineteenth-	and	twentieth-century	French	thought,	 it	 is	 three	 other	 philosophers	 belonging	 to	 the	 tradition	 of	 modern	philosophy	that	will	be	considered	in	greater	detail.	A	posthumous	work	by	Dutch-born	 French	 Huguenot	 Elie	 Luzac	 will	 serve	 to	 elucidate	 the	 workings	 of	 the	‘science	 of	 morality’	 being	 developed	 during	 the	 1790s	 and	 the	 Consulate	 in	France.	 The	 other	 two	 are	 better	 known	 figures.	 Given	 their	 importance	 within	modern	 philosophy,	 their	 clarity	 of	 expression,	 authority	 and,	 more	 specifically,	their	impact	upon	the	early	psychological	understandings	of	self	and	government,	Jean-Jacques	 Rousseau	 and	 Adam	 Smith	will	 recur	 in	 the	 chapter.	 Both	 of	 these	authoritative	 thinkers	 were	 central	 in	 shaping	 the	 notions	 of	 subjectivity	 and	governing	within	two	distinct	but	intertwined	French	political	traditions,	those	of	republicanism	 and	 liberalism.24	Indeed,	 Smith	 was	 not	 alien	 to	 the	 specifically	French	developments	being	considered.	While	in	his	own	work	he	engaged	closely	with	the	thought	of	Jean-Jacques,	the	manner	in	which	his	intellectual	legacy	came	to	 be	 interpreted	 internationally	 after	 his	 death	 owed	 much	 to	 his	 French	translators	 and	 commentators	 of	 the	 early	 1800s,	 and	 especially	 to	 political	
																																																								23	Jean	 Perkins,	 The	 concept	 of	 the	 self	 in	 the	 French	 enlightenment	 (Geneva,	 1969);	 Michael	Moriarty,	Fallen	Nature,	Fallen	Selves:	Early	Modern	French	Thought	II	 (Oxford,	2006);	 Jari	Kaukua	and	Tomas	Ekenberg	(eds),	Subjectivity	and	Selfhood	in	Medieval	and	Early	Modern	Philosophy	(New	York,	 2016);	 Vivien	 Thweatt,	 La	 Rochefoucauld	 and	 the	 Seventeenth-Century	 Concept	 of	 the	 Self	(Geneva,	1980);	Craig	Brush,	From	the	Perspective	of	the	Self:	Montaigne's	Self-portrait	 (New	York,	1994);	 Charly	 Coleman,	 ‘The	 value	 of	 dispossession:	 Rethinking	 discourses	 of	 selfhood	 in	eighteenth-century	France’,	Modern	Intellectual	History,	2/3	(2005),	pp.	299-326.	24 	Andrew	 Jainchill,	 Reimagining	 Politics	 after	 the	 Terror:	 The	 Republican	 Origins	 of	 French	
Liberalism	(Ithaca,	2008).	
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economist	 Jean-Baptiste	 Say. 25 	Intellectually,	 Say	 existed	 somewhere	 in	 the	interstices	between	republicanism	and	liberalism.26	As	the	surge	in	recent	studies	has	shown	with	 increasing	nuance,	besides	being	a	significant	thinker	 in	his	own	right,	he	played	an	 important	role	 in	 interpreting	 the	work	of	both	philosophers,	particularly	 of	 Smith,	 by	 presenting	 himself	 as	 their	 popularizer.	 Say	was	 also	 a	crucial	 figure	 in	 sustaining	 the	 prestige	 of	 his	 discipline	 in	 post-revolutionary	France	by	severing	the	 intellectual	entanglement	political	economy	had	once	had	with	 revolutionary	 republicanism.27	Once	 the	 liberal	 regime	was	 implanted	 after	the	 July	 1830	 Revolution,	 the	 diverse	 group	 of	 liberals	 that	 had	 opposed	 the	Bourbon	 monarchy	 came	 to	 power.	 For	 decades	 they	 had	 been	 redrafting	 the	legacy	of	1789	in	the	light	of	post-revolutionary	experience	in	order	to	strip	it	of	its	most	radical	and	destructive	implications.	As	we	will	see,	they	arrived	to	power	in	1830	with	 an	 elaborate	 project	 of	 a	 pedagogy	 of	 the	 self,	 owing	 to	 the	 work	 of	Victor	 Cousin,	 and	 a	 pedagogy	 of	 ‘democracy’,	 to	 which	 the	 thought	 of	 François																																																									25	There	 has	 been	 a	 recent	 rise	 in	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 intellectual	 cross-fertilization	 between	France	and	the	UK	or	the	English-speaking	world,	see:	Samuel	Hollander,	Jean-Baptiste	Say	and	the	
Classical	Canon	in	Economics:	The	British	Connection	in	French	Classicism	(New	York,	2005);	Rachel	Hammersley,	The	English	Republican	Tradition	and	Eighteenth-century	France:	Between	the	Ancients	
and	 the	 Moderns	 (Manchester,	 2010)	 and	 French	 Revolutionaries	 and	 English	 Republicans:	 The	
Cordeliers	 Club,	 1790–1794	 (Rochester,	 2005);	 Richard	 Whatmore,	 ‘Adam	 Smith's	 Role	 in	 the	French	Revolution’,	Past	&	Present,	175	(2002),	pp.	65-89;	Emmanuelle	De	Champs,	Enlightenment	
and	Utility:	Bentham	in	French,	Bentham	in	France	(Cambridge,	2015);	Evelyn	Forget,	 ‘J.-B.	Say	and	Adam	 Smith:	 An	 essay	 in	 the	 transmission	 of	 ideas’,	 The	 Canadian	 Journal	 of	 Economics,	 26/1	(1993),	 pp.	 121-133;	Gilbert	 Faccarello	 and	Philippe	 Steiner,	 ‘The	 diffusion	 of	 the	work	 of	Adam	Smith	in	the	French	language:	An	outline	history’,	in:	K.	Tribe	(ed.),	A	Critical	Bibliography	of	Adam	
Smith	(London,	2002),	pp.	61-119;	André	Tiran,	'De	l’Angleterre	et	des	Anglais:	L’expertise	de	Jean-Baptiste	 Say	 de	 l’industrie	 anglaise’,	 Innovations,	 45/3	 (2014),	 pp.	 77-96;	 Pierre	 Force,	 ‘First	principles	in	translation:	The	axiom	of	self-interest	from	Adam	Smith	to	Jean-Baptiste	Say’,	History	
of	Political	Economy,	38/2	(2006),	pp.	319-338	and	Self-Interest	before	Adam	Smith:	A	Genealogy	of	
Economic	Science	(Cambridge,	2003).	26	R.R.	 Palmer	 has	 highlighted	 Say’s	 liberal	 and	 utilitarian	 leanings	 in	 J.-B.	 Say,	 An	 Economist	 in	
Troubled	 Times	 (Princeton,	 1997),	 while	 Whatmore	 has	 focused	 on	 his	 republicanism	 in:	
Republicanism	 and	 the	 French	 Revolution:	 An	 Intellectual	 History	 of	 Jean-	 Baptiste	 Say's	 Political	
Economy	(Oxford,	2000).	27	Many	 important	 studies	on	Say	have	appeared	 recently,	 other	 than	 the	ones	mentioned	above,	see:	 Forget,	The	 Social	Economics	 of	 Jean-Baptiste	 Say:	Markets	 and	Virtue	 (London,	 1999);	 Evert	Schoorl,	 Jean-Baptiste	 Say:	 Revolutionary,	 Entrepreneur,	 Economist	 (London,	 2003);	 Jean-Pierre	Potier	 and	 Tiran	 (eds),	 Jean-Baptiste	 Say:	 Nouveaux	 regards	 sur	 son	 oeuvre	 (Paris,	 2003);	 Tiran	(ed.),	Jean-Baptiste	Say:	Influences,	critiques	et	postérité	(Paris,	2010).	
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Guizot	was	 instrumental.	 They	were	 among	 the	most	 notable	 figures	 of	 the	 new	elite	 that	 sought	 to	 use	 the	 state	 in	 order	 to	 implement	 a	 new	 paradigm	 of	subjectivity	and	government.	The	case	study	of	foundling	policy	in	chapter	two	will	in	 turn	 explore	 the	 implementation	of	 this	new	governmental	 shift.	 This	 chapter	will	 present	 the	 basic	 blueprint	 of	 their	 architectural	 project	 of	 reform.	 Jan	Goldstein	has	explored	Cousin’s	theory	of	the	moi	 in	great	detail.28	Since	Cousin’s	texts	tend	to	be	densely	philosophical	and	technical,	I	have	outlined	his	theory	of	the	moi	 through	 the	work	 of	 some	 fellow	 philosophers,	 significant	 in	 their	 own	right	 and	 well	 placed	 in	 the	 academies	 of	 the	 July	 Monarchy,	 who	 were	 close	collaborators	of	Cousin	and	popularizers	of	his	new	moi,	namely	Philibert	Damiron	and	 Théodore	 Jouffroy.	 Their	 texts	 are	 also	 more	 explicit	 than	 I	 found	 Cousin	himself	to	be	about	the	yet	unstudied	governmental	implications	of	his	moi.	Guizot,	as	 we	 will	 see,	 was	 central	 in	 linking	 the	 new	 moi	 and	 the	 new	 liberal	governmentality,	an	aspect	of	his	work	that	remains	to	be	explored.29		Other	 authors	 considered,	 such	 as	 Tocqueville,	 economist	 Frédéric	 Bastiat	 or	lesser-known	 figures,	 shared	 the	 same	 broad	 ideological	 lineage	 of	 those	 above.	Consequently,	 this	 chapter	 limits	 its	 scope	 to	 the	 consideration	of	 the	broad	and	plural	 political	 ‘families’	 of	 republicanism	 and	 liberalism,	 putting	 much	 more	weight	on	the	 later.	Or	better	yet,	 I	am	considering	 ‘liberalism’	as	a	rationality	of	government	 characterized	 by	 the	 rule	 through	 freedom,	 which	 political	 liberals	shared	 with	 republicans,	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 with	 the	 militant	 working	 classes.																																																									28	Jan	 Goldstein,	 The	 Post-Revolutionary	 Self	 (Cambridge,	 Mass.,	 2008);	 W.M.	 Simon,	 ‘The	 “two	cultures”	in	nineteenth-century	France:	Victor	Cousin	and	Auguste	Comte’,	Journal	of	the	History	of	
Ideas,	26/1	(1965),	pp.	45-58,	Patrice	Vermeren,	Victor	Cousin:	Le	jeu	de	la	philosophie	et	de	l'État	(Paris,	1995),	and	Seigel,	Idea	of	the	Self,	chapter	14.	29	For	a	study	that	engages	fully	with	the	complexity	and	contradictions	of	Guizot’s	contributions	to	liberal	governing,	see:	Pierre	Rosanvallon,	Le	moment	Guizot	(Paris,	1985).	
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Even	 if	 the	work	of	 Jacques	Rancière	has	made	 clear	 that	 the	new	opportunities	and	 challenges	 of	 the	 modern	 self	 were	 personified	 and	 thought	 of	 in	 radically	empowering	and	creative	ways	among	workers,	le	monde	ouvrier	also	falls	beyond	the	scope	of	this	chapter.30	Since	my	aim	is	to	link	the	conditions	of	development	of	subjectivity	with	wide-ranging	governmental	changes	being	applied	from	the	top,	most	 of	 the	 thinkers	 I	 discuss	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 indeed	 never	 far	 from	 the	infrastructures	 of	 state	 power.	 I	 am	 therefore	 also	 leaving	 aside	 the	 geniuses,	literary	 figures	 and	 intellectual	 mavericks	 that	 have	 so	 much	 to	 add	 to	 our	knowledge	 of	 the	 nineteenth-century	 self.31	Equally,	 I	 have	 omitted	 the	 complex	universe	 of	 royalists,	 Catholics	 and	 conservatives,	 and	 therefore	 some	 of	 the	sharpest	minds	of	 the	time	to	conceptualize	self	and	government.	These	currents	are	taken	into	account	in	chapter	two.	As	will	be	seen	then,	they	struggled	to	find	a	coherent	 model	 to	 oppose	 to	 political	 liberalism	 and	 the	 broader	 governmental	model	of	 ‘liberalism’.	This	was	not	a	matter	of	intellectual	weakness.	One	finds	in	the	 work	 of	 the	 legitimist	 sociologist	 vicomte	 de	 Bonald	 a	 total	 and	 vigorous	
																																																								30	See	 especially	 Jacques	 Rancière,	 Proletarian	Nights:	 The	Workers’	 Dream	 in	Nineteenth-Century	
France	(London,	2012)	and	Staging	the	People:	The	Proletarian	and	his	Double	(London,	2011).	31	Gordon	Shenton,	The	Fictions	of	the	Self:	The	Early	Works	of	Maurice	Barrès	 (Chapel	Hill,	1979);	Hilary	 Nias,	 The	 Artificial	 Self:	 The	 Psychology	 of	 Hippolyte	 Taine	 (Oxford,	 1999).	 There	 are	numerous	studies	of	 the	self	 in	nineteenth	century	French	 literature,	see:	P.	Bray,	The	Novel	Map:	
Space	and	Subjectivity	in	Nineteenth-Century	French	Fiction 	(Evanston,	2013),	I.	Pitteloud,	‘Stendhal,	Balzac,	Flaubert:	la	théorie	romanesque	des	émotions’,	Ph.D.	thesis,	University	of	Geneva	(Geneva,	2012);	 S.	Thornton,	Advertising,	Subjectivity	and	the	Nineteenth-Century	Novel :	 :	ertising,	Subjectivity	
anguage	of	 the	Walls	  (Basingstoke,	 2009);	M.	 Lucey,	Never	Say	 I :	  :	 er	Say	 Iand	 the	First	Person	 in	
Colette,	 Gide,	 and	 Proust 	 (Durham,	 N.C.,	 2006);	  D.	 Zanone	 and D.	 Zanone	 and,	 2006);	 Le	 moi,	
l'histoire ,	 ,	moi,	l' 	 	 	moi,	l'histoire;	  P.	Gifford P.	Giffordfforire	(eds),	Subject	Matters :	 :	ject	Matterslf	in	
French	Literature	from	Descartes	to	the	Present 	(Amsterdam,	2000);	G.	Schultz,	The	Gendered	Lyric :		
Gendered	 LyricDifference	 in	 Nineteenth-century	 French	 Poetry 	 (West	 Lafayette,	 1999);	  L.	 Blair,	
George	 Sand's	 Nouvelles:	 Reflections,	 Perceptions,	 and	 the	 Self	 (New	 York,	 1999);	 D.	 Moutote,	 Le	
Journal	de	Gide	et	les	problèmes	du	moi,	1889-1925	(Geneva,	1998);	  J.	Lawler,	Rimbaud's	Theatre	of	
the	Self 	(Cambridge,	1992);	E.	Howe,	Stages	of	Self:	Dramatic	Monologues	of	Laforgue,	Mallarme	and	
Valery	 (Athens,	 Ohio,	 1990). 	 See	 also	 D.J.	 Denby,	 Sentimental	 Narrative	 and	 the	 Social	 Order	 in	
France,	1760-1820	Cambridge,	1994)	and	N.	White,	The	Family	in	Crisis	in	Late	Nineteenth-Century	
French	Fiction 	(Cambridge,	1999). 	
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counter-model	 to	 liberal	 individualism.32	Steven	 Kale	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 depth	and	 originality	 of	 legitimist	 thought	 continued	well	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Bonald	 in	1840.33	Equally,	the	conservative	sociologist	Frédéric	Le	Play,	a	paramount	figure	of	the	Second	Empire,	would	also	have	a	lot	to	say	about	what	concerns	this	thesis,	for	Le	Play	was	among	the	very	few	thinkers	in	nineteenth-century	France	to	have	devised	 a	 completely	 ex	 novo	 and	 radically	 alternative	 model	 of	 society,	 a	
familiocracy	 of	 sorts,	 in	 which	 all	 social	 governing	 could	 be	 delegated	 to	 and	absorbed	 by	 strategically	 neo-authoritarian	 extended	 families.34	The	 substantial	contributions	of	 these	authors	 to	 the	 field	of	 thinking	 the	governing	 the	 self	 and	others	have	yet	to	receive	scholarly	treatment.	Unfortunately,	since	I	have	tried	to	link	 as	 much	 as	 possible	 intellectual	 developments	 to	 implementations	 of	governmental	policies,	I	have	not	been	able	to	give	these	thinkers	and	models	the	attention	they	deserve.			In	any	case,	and	despite	the	intellectual	stature	of	their	thinkers,	I	have	found	that	conservatives	 were	 unable	 to	 resist	 the	 advancing	 logic	 of	 an	 individual,	 self-conflicted	self,	one	which	I	would	argue	was	internalized,	not	only	through	things	such	 as	 travelling,	 writing	 autobiographies	 and	 diaries	 or	 reading	 novels,	 but																																																									32	David	Klinck,	The	French	Counterrevolutionary	Theorist,	Louis	de	Bonald,	1754-1840	 (New	York,	1996);	Flavien	Bertran	de	Balanda,	Bonald:	La	réaction	en	action	(Aix-en-Provence,	2010);	Giorgio	Barberis,	 Louis	 de	 Bonald:	 Ordre	 et	 pouvoir	 entre	 subversion	 et	 providence	 (Paris,	 2016);	 Michel	Toda,	Louis	de	Bonald:	Théoricien	de	la	contre-révolution	(Paris,	1997).	33	Steven	Kale,	Legitimism	and	the	Reconstruction	of	French	Society	(Baton	Rouge,	1992).	34	On	 the	 family	 see:	 Alan	 Pitt,	 ‘Frédéric	 Le	 Play	 and	 the	 family:	 Paternalism	 and	 freedom	 in	 the	French	 debates	 of	 the	 1870's’,	 French	 History,	 12/1	 (1998),	 pp.	 67–89.	 Although	 much	 work	remains	to	be	done	on	Le	Play,	see	the	following	works.	Laetitia	Guerlain,	‘Droit	et	société	au	XIXe	siècle:	Les	leplaysiens	et	 les	sources	du	droit,	1881-1914’,	Ph.D.	thesis,	Université	de	Bordeaux	IV	(Bordeaux,	 2011);	 J.I.	 Garrigós	 Monerris,	 Frédéric	 Le	 Play:	 Biografía	 intelectual,	 metodología	 e	
investigaciones	sociológicas	 (Madrid,	 2003);	Robert	Beum,	 ‘Ultra-Royalism	 revisited’,	Modern	Age,	39/3	 (1997),	 pp.	 290–322;	Antoine	 Savoye,	 ‘Les	 continuateurs	 de	 Le	Play	 au	 tournant	 du	 siècle’,	
Revue	française	de	sociologie,	22	(1981),	pp.	315-344;	Michael	Brooke,	Le	Play,	Engineer	and	Social	
Scientist:	The	Life	and	Work	of	Frederic	Le	Play	 (Harlow,	1970);	 S.	H.	Beaver,	 ‘The	Le	Play	 society	and	 field	 work,’	 Geography,	 47/3	 (1962),	 pp.	 225–240;	 Mary	 Healy,	 ‘Le	 Play's	 contribution	 to	sociology:	His	method’,	The	American	Catholic	Sociological	Review,	8/2	(1947),	pp.	97–110.	
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through	specifically	governmental	techniques.35	As	this	chapter	will	show,	isolated	techniques	such	as	emulation	in	schools	or	moral	self-analysis	over	lunch	fostered	a	certain	type	of	ethical	and	social	form	of	self.	These	techniques	gradually	came	to	form	 a	 complex	 technological	 apparatus,	 promoted	 by	 state	 elites	 particularly	between	1830	and	1848,	which	 tied	 together	 the	problems	of	 governing	 the	 self	and	 others	 so	 as	 to	 carve	 out	 the	 space	 for	 the	 modern	 state	 and	 the	 modern	individual	to	emerge	in	tandem.	Since,	ideally,	these	technologies	were	to	function	independently	 of	 personal	 will,	 as	 a	 series	 of	 logics	 that	 were	 internal	 to	 social	existence,	 they	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 value	 of	 philosophical	 argument	 or	 the	commitment	 to	 ideological	 positions.	 In	 fact,	 conservatives	 did	 not	 tire	 in	 their	efforts	to	demonstrate	that	the	philosophy,	 logics	and	policies	of	their	opponents	led	 to	 contradictory	 conclusions	 and	paradoxical	 results,	 as	well	 as	 a	 number	 of	lingering	 and	 unsolvable	 dilemmas	 opposing	 freedom	 and	 security,	 liberty	 and	equality,	 public	 and	 private,	 right	 and	 duty,	 wealth	 and	 misery,	 and	 so	 on.	However,	 the	 strength	 of	 liberalism	 as	 a	 system	 of	 governing	 through	 freedom	depended	 precisely,	 I	 argue,	 on	 these	 systemic	 incongruences,	 which	 the	psychological	framework	of	the	modern	self	assumed	and	internalized	in	the	form	of	 an	 inner,	 governmentalized	 conflict	 between	 self	 and	 other.	 Conservatives	seemed	 to	 be	 at	 a	 loss	 before	 these	 changes	 in	 post-revolutionary	 France.	 They	however	played	a	significant	intellectual	role	in	the	long	crisis	of	the	psychological	paradigm	 that	 started	 towards	 1848.	 As	 the	 next	 chapters	 will	 elucidate,	 and	despite	 their	 political	 confrontation,	 the	 half-century	 leading	 up	 to	 1900	 saw	 a	gradual	 blurring	 of	 the	 trenches	 that	 had	 opposed	 liberals	 and	 republicans	 to																																																									35	Roy	Porter	(ed.),	Rewriting	the	Self:	Histories	from	the	Renaissance	to	the	Present	(London,	1997);	Peter	Heehs,	Writing	the	Self:	Diaries,	Memoirs,	and	the	History	of	the	Self	(New	York,	2013);	Arianne	Baggerman,	 Rudolf	 Dekker	 and	 Michael	 Mascuch	 (eds),	 Controlling	 Time	 and	 Shaping	 the	 Self:	
Developments	in	Autobiographical	Writing	since	the	Sixteenth	Century	(Leiden,	2011).	
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Catholics	 and	 conservatives,	 as	 both	 traditions	 converged	 by	 coming	 to	 share	 a	new	 paradigm	 of	 sociological	 governing	 of	 the	 self	 and	 others	 as	 the	 old,	revolutionary	 paradigm	 of	 psychological	 subjectivity	 and	 government	 that	 had	confronted	these	factions,	so	to	speak,	‘came	into	port’.			
Defining	and	governing	the	psyche	of	‘man’.			Psychology	 was	 the	 founding	 framework	 of	 modern	 subjectivity.	 Modern	philosophy,	 from	René	Descartes	to	Immanuel	Kant,	rested	on	the	premise	of	the	specificity	 of	 ‘man’,	 which	 had	 to	 be	 understood	 in	 his	 own	 terms	 rather	 than	explained	 through	 the	 common	 laws	 or	 divine	will	 governing	 the	 cosmos.	What	made	humans	exceptional	in	creation	was	their	consciousness	or	the	psyche,	hence	the	psychological	nature	of	their	approach.	All	human	psyches	were	understood	to	function	in	the	same	manner.	This	consciousness	which	was	seen	as	quintessential	to	 humanness	 was	 both	 the	 distinct	 ability	 to	 think	 and	 reason	 and	 the	 whole	interplay	 and	 taxonomy	 of	 sensations,	 emotions	 and	 passions	 that	 constituted	specifically	human	drives	and	repulsions.	Equally,	consciousness	also	necessitated	self-consciousness,	 since	 the	 perception	 of	 an	 object	 implied	 the	 reflexive	awareness	of	a	 subject	 that	perceived	 the	object.36	Consciousness	 thus	generated	and	indissolubly	linked	an	object	and	a	subject,	but	the	link	was	an	imperfect	one.	There	was	understood	to	be	a	strict	separation	between	the	inner	and	outer	world,	between	 human	 consciousness	 and	 the	 cosmos.	 The	 mind’s	 knowledge	 of	 the	world	 could	 never	 be	 immediate	 and	 direct.	 Within	 this	 understanding	 of	 the	psyche,	 humans	 only	 knew	 the	 world	 through	 the	 psychological	 impressions,																																																									36	Klaus	Brinkmann,	‘Consciousness,	self-consciousness,	and	the	modern	self’,	History	of	the	Human	
Sciences,	18/4	(2005),	pp.	31-36.	
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perceptions	 or	 representations	 derived	 from	 either	 sensations	 or	 ideas	 that	 the	external	reality	caused	upon	us.	Consciousness	was	thus	explained	within	a	‘theory	of	 representation’	 of	 the	world	 in	which	 the	mind	 emerged	 as	 the	more	 or	 less	reliable	intermediary	between	‘man’	and	the	world.		This	was	a	rejection	of	the	complex	and	fluid	image	of	human	experience	offered	by	 those,	 who	 as	 Michel	 de	 Montaigne	 and	 Blaise	 Pascal,	 built	 on	 the	 biblical	tradition	of	an	irreconcilable	and	volatile	dual	nature	of	 ‘man’,	one	part	temporal	and	 earthly,	 one	 part	 spiritual	 and	 tied	 to	 the	 divine	 Logos.	 Instead,	 Descartes	modernized	this	split	along	the	Earth-bound	lines	of	the	body	and	the	mind.	And	it	was	 the	mind	 that	 characterized	us	as	a	 species.	He	sought	 to	 ‘define	 the	human	body	and	the	physical	world	in	such	a	way	that	the	body	becomes	identical	to	the	physical	 world	 and	 no	 longer	 contains	 anything	 human,	 so	 that	 both	 may	 be	equally	 accessible	 to	 the	 physical	 science’.37 	The	 rest	 of	 us	 belonged	 to	 our	immaterial	dimension.	 ‘The	 soul	 thinks,	dreams,	 feels,	 desires,	wants,	hopes,	 and	fears.	All	these	spiritual	activities	can	be	joined	together,	at	least	in	the	framework	of	Descartes’	philosophy,	under	the	term:	thinking,	Penser’.38	The	old	notion	of	the	soul	 as	 the	 animating	 and	 constituting	 element	 of	 the	 person	 thus	 became	indistinct	from	the	mind,	whose	irreducible	essence	was	thought.	As	any	essence,	this	 one	 could	 never	 be	 absent.	 Thus	 Descartes	 postulated	 that	 the	mind	 never	stopped	thinking,	even	before	birth	 in	 the	womb,	even	 in	the	unconsciousness	of	sleep.	 L’ame	 pense	 toujours;	 mind	 never	 stopped,	 and	 precisely	 because	 of	 its	
																																																								37	J.H.	 van	 den	 Berg,	 Divided	 Existence	 and	 Complex	 Society:	 An	 Historical	 Approach	 (Pittsburgh,	1974),	p.	6.	38	Ibid.	
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abundance	of	activity	it	was	not	possible	to	recall	and	remember	all	thinking,	but	indubitably	it	always	existed.39		A	 rudimentary	 sense	of	 self	 emerged	along	 the	 lines	of	 the	mind-body	 split.	 The	thinker	was	also	inevitably	the	witness	of	his	or	her	thinking.	Klaus	Brinkmann	has	argued	 that	 this	 ‘adds	 a	 typically	 modern	 nuance	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 self-consciousness.	 As	 a	witness	 of	my	 thoughts,	 I	 am	 not	 just	 aware	 of	 them	 as	my	own.	 I	 am	 also	 viewing	 them	 like	 a	 critical	 observer’.40	It	 was	 this	 capacity	 to	observe	 oneself	 that	 grounded	 the	 notion	 of	 moral	 responsibility	 over	 one’s	thoughts,	 beliefs	 and	 actions,	 but	 equally	 the	 ownership	 of	 the	 less	 rational	 and	calculated	 aspects	 of	 experience.	 By	 1740	 and	 increasingly	 as	 the	 eighteenth	century	progressed,	the	mind	came	to	mediate	emotions;	no	longer	an	enveloping	surge	 of	 affects,	 feelings	 became	 susceptible	 to	 the	 radical	 novelty	 of	 being	observed,	 named,	 verbalized,	 described	 and	 commented	 upon	 even	 as	 they	occurred.	 ‘[T]he	 sentiments	 disintegrate	 and	 become	 subject	 to	 a	 sentimental	
analysis’.41	It	was	 this	 capacity	 for	 self-analysis	—of	 reflexive	mental	 rumination	tied	to	an	objectifying	gaze—	served	as	the	foundation	for	a	nascent	sense	of	self.			However,	 Kant	 introduced	 a	 significant	 fracture	 between	 consciousness	 and	knowledge,	 between	 empirical	 perception	 and	 transcendental	 reason.	 In	 his	
Critique	of	Pure	Reason,	first	published	in	1781,	he	wrote	that	‘I	have	no	knowledge	of	myself	as	I	am	but	merely	as	I	appear	to	myself.	The	consciousness	of	self	is	thus	
																																																								39	Ibid.	40	Brinkmann,	‘Consciousness’,	p.	39.	41	Ibid.,	pp.	140-145.	On	this	point,	van	den	Berg	analyses	especially	Pamela,	or	Virtue	Rewarded,	the	‘first	novel	of	sentimental	analysis’,	written	in	1740	by	one	Samuel	Richardson.	
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very	 far	 from	 being	 a	 knowledge	 of	 the	 self’.42	The	 previous	 unity	 of	 human	consciousness	 was	 thus	 split	 between	 the	 empirical	 and	 the	 transcendental,	appearances	and	knowledge.	 It	was	 in	 this	opaque	gap	 that	 that	 then	opened	up	within	consciousness	at	the	time	that	the	modern	subject	seems	to	have	emerged.	Foucault	situated	the	shift	from	a	‘theory	of	representation’	to	an	‘anthropological’	model	at	the	turn	of	the	eighteenth	to	the	nineteenth	century,	and	argued	that	only	then	 did	 our	 present	 understanding	 of	 ‘man’	 become	 possible.	 Or	 put	 more	forcefully,	it	was	then	that	‘man	enters	in	his	turn,	and	for	the	first	time,	the	field	of	Western	 knowledge’.43 	As	 Jan	 Goldstein	 has	 shown	 for	 France,	 this	 was	 the	historical	 juncture	 at	 which	 the	modern	 experience	 of	 self	 or	 the	moi	 gradually	emerged,	 while	 only	 a	 ‘pallid	 and	 passive’	 sense	 of	 self	 could	 be	 found	 in	 the	eighteenth	century.44		In	 1789,	 problem	 of	 individuality	 and	 consciousness	 ceased	 to	 be	 the	 exclusive	domain	of	philosophical	dispute.	The	French	Revolution	quite	dramatically	posed	the	 question	 of	 how	 to	 derive	 a	 form	 of	 government	 from	 these	 theories	 of	 the	individual.	It	is	on	the	responses	to	these	challenges,	which	emerged	around	1800	and	occupy	the	whole	nineteenth	century,	that	my	work	focuses.			My	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 individual	 that	occurred	 around	1800	 opened	up	 two	 seemingly	 contradictory	 avenues	 through	which	to	render	societies	governable,	both	of	which	will	be	analysed	in	turn.	The	first	sought	to	find	hierarchical	differences	within	the	universal	category	of	 ‘man’																																																									42	Immanuel	Kant,	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	(Basingstoke,	2007),	p.	169.	43	Foucault,	The	Order	of	Things	(London,	2005),	p.	xxv.	44	Jan	Goldstein,	The	Post-Revolutionary	Self	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	2008),	p.	11.	
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by	 identifying	 increasingly	 nuanced	 evolutionary	 stages	 separating	 bare	awareness	from	transcendental	reason.	This	explained	and	justified	the	inequality	of	fact	within	formally	equal	societies.	The	second	derived	techniques	of	governing	from	the	understanding	that	all	minds	responded	the	same	to	given	psychological	stimuli,	such	as	shame,	prestige	or	desire.	In	its	most	radical	utilitarian	reduction,	this	 meant	 simply	 that	 everyone	 sought	 out	 pleasure	 and	 avoided	 pain.	 The	behaviour	 of	 individuals	 in	 society	 could	 thus	 be	 predicted	 and	 conducted	indirectly	 towards	 desired	 ends	 by	 generating	 the	 necessary	 psychological	conditions.		The	 lingering	 and	burning	question	 the	 French	Revolution	 imposed	on	posterity	was	how	to	harmonize	and	render	governable	the	enormous	gap	between	formal	equality	and	actual	inequality	among	‘men’.	The	serial,	interchangeable	psyches	of	‘men’	needed	 to	be	anchored	 in	a	wider	human	order	 that	governed	 them.	From	the	 early	 nineteenth	 century,	 psychology	 became	 integrated	 into	 a	 wider	framework	 of	 what	 Foucault	 termed	 ‘an	 “anthropology”’. 45 	With	 this	 shift,	eighteenth-century	notions	of	mental	‘representation’	gave	way	to	a	more	complex	focus	 on	 human	 experiences	 beyond	 ‘the	 sovereignty	 of	 the	 “I	 think”’.	 Thus	 ‘the	pre-critical	 analysis	 of	 what	 man	 is	 in	 his	 essence	 becomes	 the	 analytic	 of	everything	that	can,	in	general,	be	presented	to	man’s	experience’.46	The	cognitive	or	psychological	essence	of	 ‘man’	was	not	abandoned,	but	 the	 focus	shifted	 from	mind	 to	 experience,	 and	 thus	 to	 how	 ‘man’	 existed	 in	 the	 world.	 The	 way	 I	understand	 this	 is	 that	 the	 theory	 of	 representation	 focused	 on	 cognition	 as	 the	
																																																								45	Foucault,	Order	of	Things,	p.	xxv.	46	Ibid.,	p.	371-2.	
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condition	of	being.	The	anthropology	that	substituted	it	turned	this	around.	It	was	being	that	determined	cognition.	Being,	in	turn,	was	determined	by	an	essentially	
social	order,	an	order	reflecting	the	hierarchy	separating	mere	consciousness	from	knowledge.	Thus,	the	inequality	of	intelligences	(as	the	basis	of	all	social	and	actual	inequality)	was	 legitimated,	without	undermining	the	universal	assumptions	that	underpinned	 the	modern	 individual.	 The	 first	 took	 us	 to	 Descartes’	 Cogito,	 ergo	
sum,	the	second,	to	its	reversal,	which	would	remain	unstated	until	Nietzsche:	Sum,	
ergo	cogito.47			It	was	 therefore	within	 the	modern	 individual	 that	all	 inequality	and	hierarchies	had	 to	 be	 grounded.	 The	 finite	 and	 serial	 universal	 individual,	 then,	 started	 to	house	 the	multiplicity	of	 its	 own	variations.	The	horizon	of	 full	 humanness,	 now	identified	with	knowledge	and	reason	rather	than	cognition	and	perception,	kept	receding	 from	 the	 immediacy	 of	 its	 own	 experience,	 as	 it	 made	 way	 for	 ‘an	anthropology	dealing	with	a	man	rendered	alien	to	himself’.48		While	many	scientific	disciplines	were	inseparable	from	the	process	of	emergence	of	 a	 new	modern	 subject	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 there	was	 one	 that	 brought	home	 like	no	other	 the	 intimate	experience	of	 the	new	 individual:	medicine.	The	reason	 for	 this,	 as	 Foucault’s	 early	work	 showed,	was	 that	medicine	 grounded	 a	distinctively	anthropological	view	of	man,	in	other	words,	the	medical	gaze	had	as	its	 object	 the	 individual	 as	 such.	 In	 order	 to	 diagnose	 a	 patient,	 a	 calculus	 was	needed	 that	 could	 both	 account	 for	 and	 distinguish,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 personal,																																																									47	Aphorism	276	in	The	Gay	Science.	Jonas	Mont,	‘Sum,	Ergo	Cogito:		Nietzsche	Re-orders	Descartes’,	
Aporia,	25/2	(2015),	p.	13.	48	Foucault,	Order	of	Things,	p.	245.	
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local	 symptoms	and	situations	and,	on	 the	other,	 the	global	 truths	 to	which	 they	pointed.	For	such	an	operation	 to	be	 feasible,	an	a	priori	belief	was	necessary	 in	the	radical	equality	and	 interchangeability	of	men,	at	 least	 in	 their	biologies.	The	materiality	of	‘man’	in	the	abstract	could	thus	be	known	and	plotted	in	taxonomies,	so	 as	 to	 deduce	 causes	 and	 effects	 operating	 on	 particular	 men.	 Medicine	 was	consequently	 able	 to	 grasp	 the	 individual	 at	 once	 in	 its	 duality	 of	 personal	uniqueness	and	embodied	generality.49		In	the	first	years	of	the	nineteenth	century,	owing	to	the	work	of	doctors	such	as	Jean-Noël	Hallé,	Napoleon	Bonaparte’s	physician,	the	age-old	theme	of	‘the	ages	of	man’	was	 recast	 as	 a	 set	 of	 scientific	 categories	measured	 precisely	 in	 years.	 In	each	of	the	stages	—early	infancy,	late	infancy,	adolescence,	virility	and	old	age—	‘man	 has	 a	 special	 physical	 and	 moral	 physiognomy,	 his	 own	 health	 and	illnesses’.50	This	made	it	possible	to	fragment	the	category	of	man	into	subsets	of	distinctness	 without	 rupturing	 the	 individual’s	 universal	 unity.	 Child	 and	 adult	were	 at	 once	 the	 same	and	different.	 The	key	 to	 solving	 the	problem	of	 locating	hierarchical	 diversity	 within	 sameness,	 then,	 was	 found	 within	 the	 endless	repetition	of	biological	time,	always	tiered,	serial	and	impersonal.			While	 human	biology	 became	 in	 the	 1800s	 the	 anchor	 for	 unity-in-diversity,	 the	theme	had	been	central	to	the	Enlightenment	as	well,	albeit	in	a	more	rudimentary	form,	 finding	 its	most	typical	expression	 in	the	opposition	between	savagery	and	civilization.	When	contrasting	l’homme	sauvage,	or	the	natural	state,	with	l'homme	
																																																								49	Foucault,	The	Birth	of	the	Clinic	(London,	1986).	50	Nicolas-Philibert	Adelon,	Physiologie	de	l'homme,	4	(Paris,	1824),	p.	521.	
	 88	
policé,	the	common	Old-Regime	term	for	the	civilized,	Rousseau	and	his	‘attentive	Reader	 cannot	 but	 be	 struck	 by	 the	 immense	 distance	 that	 separates	 these	 two	states’.	For	 ‘what	constitutes	the	supreme	happiness	of	the	one	would	reduce	the	other	to	despair’.	The	first	‘wants	only	to	live	and	to	remain	idle’;	the	other	‘works	to	the	death’.	In	short,	‘the	Mankind	of	one	age	is	not	the	Mankind	of	another	age’.51	And	an	irresoluble	difference	thus	emerged,	but	only	a	relative	one,	for	they	were	only	 two	 ages	 of	 the	 same	 ‘Mankind’;	 thus,	 there	 remained	 a	 single	 humanity	simultaneously	 united	 and	 separated	 by	 different	 states	 or	 stages.	 Therefore,	 as	soon	 as	 the	 category	 of	 ‘man’	 was	 imaged	 as	 universal,	 applying	 to	 all	 humans	everywhere,	 regardless	 of	 particularities	 and	 history,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 were	differences	 sought	 within	 ‘man’.	 Evolutionary	 stages	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 unite,	organize	 and	 explain	 all	 human	 differences	 as	 differences	 in	 time.	 In	 the	 1800s,	biological	 time	 offered	 a	 more	 nuanced	 state-by-stage	 model	 through	 which	 to	read	all	evolutionary	differences	as	levels	of	maturity.					However,	 not	 only	 did	 the	 universality	 of	 the	 mind	 remain	 unchallenged	 and	revered	in	the	first	half	of	the	century,	but	it	also	became	central	to	the	functioning	of	governing.	Psychology	grounded	an	epistemological	assumption	that	may	strike	the	modern	 reader	as	decisively	 subjectivist.	 Since	 things	 could	not	be	known	 in	themselves,	 but	 only	 through	 the	 patterns	 of	 mental	 representations	 which	 the	mind	 created	 of	 them,	 and	 since	 all	 human	minds	 functioned	 the	 same	 in	 every	place	 and	 time,	 then	 the	 best	way	 of	 knowing	 the	world	was	 through	 the	 study	one’s	own	mind,	 that	 is,	by	 looking	within.	This	method,	 followed	by	the	modern	
																																																								51	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	Rousseau:	'The	Discourses'	and	Other	Early	Political	Writings	(Cambridge,	1997),	pp.	186-187.	
	 89	
philosophers,	remained	common	in	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	As	one	American	 commentator	 on	 the	 French	 psychological	 theories	 in	 the	 early	nineteenth	century	pointed	out,	 ‘ontology	must	have	 its	root	 in	psychology,	since	we	must	 attain	 to	 the	 reality	 existing	out	of	us,	 by	 a	 careful	 analysis	 of	 the	 facts	which	exist	within	us'.52	Therefore,	things	could	not	be	apprehended	as	what	they	were	 in	 themselves	 (ontology),	but	 rather	 in	how	 they	were	perceived	 from	and	represented	 within	 the	 one	 universal	 perspective	 of	 the	 human	 psyche	(psychology).	Psychology	was	thus	a	scientific	and	philosophical	method	of	inquiry	that	made	it	possible	to	know	the	world	based	on	methodical	observations	carried	out	 on	 oneself.	 These	would	 also	 become	 a	 crucial	 tool	 for	modern	 socialization	and	 self-government	 in	 a	 shifting	 social	 world;	 if	 all	 minds	 followed	 the	 same	patterns	 of	 drives	 and	 repulsions,	 then	 those	who	were	 familiar	 the	 laws	 of	 the	psyche	 could	 adapt	 their	 own	 conduct	 while	 predicting	 and	 anticipating	 the	motivations,	judgements	and	action	of	other	social	actors,	so	as	to	gain	advantages	over	 them	 in	 society.	 The	 effects	 would	 have	 been	 akin	 to	 what	 Norbert	 Elias	termed	 ‘a	 “civilizing”	 change	 of	 behaviour’,	 which	 included	 the	 ‘moderation	 of	spontaneous	 emotions,	 the	 tempering	 of	 affects,	 the	 extension	 of	 mental	 space	beyond	the	moment	into	the	past	and	future,	[and]	the	habit	of	connecting	events	in	terms	of	chains	of	causes	and	effect’.53			This	 imagined	 sameness	 in	 the	workings	 of	 all	 psyches	 necessitated	 an	 equally	universal	 social	 order,	 placed	 above	 the	 particularities	 of	 time	 and	 space.	 In	January	 1848,	 as	 this	 belief	 entered	 an	 irreversible	 crisis,	 political	 economist																																																									52	Anonymous,	 ‘Eclecticism-ontology	 [Review	 of	 Victor	 Cousin’s	 1818	 Cours]’,	 Boston	 Quarterly	
Review,	2	(1839),	p.	169.	53	Norbert	Elias,	Power	and	Civility	(New	York,	1982),	p.	236.	
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Frédéric	Bastiat	launched	a	desperate	plea	in	favour	of	‘the	current	social	order,	in	which	 humanity	 has	 lived	 and	 developed	 from	 its	 origin	 until	 the	 present’.	 To	question	 the	 status	 quo	 would	 be	 like	 telling	 one’s	 fellow	 men	 that	 ‘After	 five	thousand	 years	 [the	 reputed	 age	 of	 the	 planet	 at	 the	 time]	 there	 has	 been	 a	misunderstanding	between	God	and	humanity;	from	Adam	until	today,	the	human	species	 has	 been	 on	 the	wrong	 track’.	 It	meant	 ‘rejecting	 the	 social	 organization	that	God	 gave’	 humanity.	 Any	modification	 of	 the	 social	 order	would	 amount	 no	less	 than	 to	 ‘change	 the	 mode	 of	 work,	 exchange,	 [and]	 domestic,	 civil,	 and	religious	 relations,	 in	 one	 word,	 to	 alter	 the	 physical	 and	 moral	 constitution	 of	
man’.54	The	constitutional	monarchy	was	one	and	the	same	as	the	very	the	physical	and	moral	constitution	of	its	citizens.			Only	a	 few	days	 later,	with	the	start	of	 the	revolutionary	cycle	 in	February	1848,	the	 innocence	 of	 Bastiat’s	 view	 would	 be	 relegated	 to	 history.	 But	 it	 was	nonetheless	 a	 remarkably	 coherent	 view.	 This	 can	 be	 appraised	 in	 the	 1839	parliamentary	 commission	 on	 the	 abolition	 of	 slavery	 in	 the	 French	 colonies,	 a	measure	 that	was	 not	 passed	 until	 April	 1848.	 After	 discussions	with	 plantation	owners,	 the	 commission	 reached	 unanimous	 conclusions	 contained	 in	 a	 report	penned	 by	 Alexis	 de	 Tocqueville.	 It	 was	 widely	 accepted	 that	 Negroes	 were	somehow	 inferior,	and	yet	 the	 ‘fact’	of	 their	 ‘indifference	and	natural	apathy’	did	not	mean	that	their	psychology	and	governing	was	to	be	any	different	from	that	of	Europeans.	A	twofold	approach	emerged	from	the	discussions.	First,	there	were	to	be	 structural	 reforms	whereby	 the	 personal	 bonds	 between	masters	 and	 slaves	
																																																								54	Quoted	 in:	 Ramón	 de	 la	 Sagra,	 ‘Examen	 des	 doctrines	 économiques’,	 La	 Phalange,	 XVII/VII	(1848),	pp.	186,	188.	
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would	 be	 broken.	 The	 French	 state	would	mediate	 impersonally	 between	 them,	guaranteeing	the	collaboration	and	dependence	of	both	parties	by	means	of	 ‘new	maxims	of	government,	a	new	police,	new	civil	servants,	[and]	new	laws.	As	these	laws	apply	 to	everyone,	nobody	 feels	particularly	hurt	or	resists’.55	As	a	result	of	this	 change,	 the	 hope	 was	 that	 the	 Negro	 ‘no	 longer	 sees	 in	 the	 magistrate	 a	master,	but	a	guide	and	liberator.	This	is	when	it	is	easiest	for	the	Government	to	found	its	control	over	the	mind	and	habits	of	the	Black	population,	and	to	acquire	the	 salutary	 influence	 which	 it	 will	 need	 in	 order	 to	 direct	 them	 towards	 a	complete	 liberty’. 56 	The	 governing	 through	 freedom,	 then,	 applied	 in	 both	metropolis	and	colonies,	 since	 ‘only	 the	experience	of	 liberty,	a	 liberty	 for	a	 long	time	contained	and	directed	by	an	energetic	and	moderate	power,	can	suggest	and	give	men	the	opinions,	virtues,	and	habits	that	are	convenient	for	a	citizen	of	a	free	country’.57	The	 key	 to	 this	 freedom,	 exactly	 as	 in	 France,	 was	 the	 ‘freedom’	 to	work.58	‘The	metropolis	must[…]	 act	 upon	 the	 slave	 through	 a	 firm	 and	 prudent	legislation	 which	 first	 familiarizes	 and	 then	 subjects	 him,	 if	 need	 be,	 to	 the	laborious	 and	 virile	 habitudes	 of	 freedom’.59	The	 disincentives	 for	 work	 were	carefully	considered.	The	tropics	were	a	land	of	easy	living,	for	‘in	these	countries,	the	exterior	circumstances	will	not	force	these	men	to	work.	One	has	no	need	for	clothes	 or	 housing,	 nearly	 any	 for	 food.	 One	 may,	 as	 it	 were,	 live	 without	working’.60	But	 that	 was	 easily	 solved,	 as	 in	 Europe,	 by	 coercive	 labour	 and	
																																																								55	Alexis	 de	 Tocqueville,	 Rapport…	 relative	 aux	 esclaves	 des	 colonies	 (Paris,	 1839),	 p.	 12.	 The	document	includes	committee	proceedings	and	has	typos	in	pagination	which	I	have	corrected.	56	Ibid.,	p.	49.	57	Ibid.,	p.	6.	58	See:	Robert	Castel,	Métamorphoses	de	la	question	sociale	(Paris,	1995).	59	Ibid.,	p.	27.	60	Ibid.,	p.	72.	
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vagrancy	 laws,	 restricting	 land	 ownership	 and	 self-employment	 opportunities	 to	below	survival	levels,	and	high	taxes	on	foodstuffs.			Secondly,	 former	slaves	were	 to	be	governed	 through	 their	psychology,	which	as	with	all	men,	rested	squarely	on	desire.	In	order	‘to	initiate	the	emancipated	slave	into	 liberty,	 fashion	 him	 for	 social	 life,	 teach	 him	 how	 he	 must	 satisfy,	 through	work,	 the	needs	of	 civilized	man’,	 the	 same	 triad	 that	was	used	 to	discipline	 the	European	poor	would	‘vanquish	the	natural	sloth	and	apathy	of	the	Negro.	One	will	only	 overcome	 these	 obstacles	 by	 creating	new	needs,	 the	 formation	 of	 families,	and	moralization’.61	New	needs	and	desires	were	key,	as	an	impatient	vicomte	de	Panat	demanded	to	know:		Is	it	true	or	false	that	the	slave	would	be	content,	without	any	desire,	to	lie	on	the	ground	and	eat	whatever	he	can	find?	Or	does	he	rather	have	other	desires?	Does	he	desire	to	obtain	any	pleasure?	In	short,	the	slave,	is	he	a	brute	beast	that	does	not	desire	to	improve	his	lot?	Or	does	he	rather	have	desires,	tastes	for	spending,	needs?62	The	commission	was	assured	that	‘They	have	a	penchant	for	luxury.	There	is	hope	here.	If	these	people	could	have	luxurious	needs,	that	would	be	the	best	guarantee	for	 work;	 if	 they	 wanted	 beautiful	 clothes,	 they	 would	 feel	 the	 need	 to	 work’.63	Indeed,	 ‘negresses	 are	 almost	 always	 well	 dressed’.	 ‘I	 have	 seen’,	 Tocqueville	added,	 ‘in	almost	all	Negroes	a	 childish,	but	very	 lively	 taste	 for	 clothing,	 luxury,	[and]	 jewellery.	 I	 have	 seen	 slaves	 with	 very	 expensive	 clothing’.	 Charles	 de	Rémusat	opined	that	'Blacks	may	spend	whatever	little	they	earn,	but	the	taste	for	
																																																								61	Ibid.,	pp.	62,	74.	62	Ibid.,	p.	86.	63	Ibid.,	p.	77.	
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spending	 is	 an	equally	powerful	 stimulant	 than	saving.	One	cannot	 say	 then	 that	they	are	foreign	to	all	need	to	earn,	to	procure	themselves	pleasures'.64			Family,	morality,	the	penchant	for	vanity	and	luxury,	and	the	tendency	to	emulate	and	 imitate	each	other,	was	 for	 the	 former	slave	as	 for	 the	French	 lower	classes,	the	 best	 guarantee	 of	 an	 eventual	 arrival	 into	 civilization.	 In	 1839,	 Whites	 and	Blacks	 shared	 the	 same	 cognitive	 and	 mental	 predispositions	 as	 all	 humans.	 A	century	 later,	 this	 assertion	 would	 have	 been	 much	 more	 problematic.	 The	infamous	 1911	 Encyclopaedia	 Britannica	 entry	 on	 the	 Negro,	 for	 example,	emphasized	 the	 environmental,	 ‘psychological	 and	 cultural	 differences’	distinguishing	‘the	dark	races’.65	Racial	and	societal	differences	had	become	much	more	determining	than	any	underlying	universal	substrate	likening	all	‘men’.	Thus,	when	modern	forms	of	social	assistance	were	implemented	in	metropolitan	France	in	the	late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	centuries,	the	colonies,	and	particularly	Algeria,	 were	 excluded	 from	 any	 modern	 welfare	 policy.	 In	 fact,	 from	 the	 late	nineteenth	 century,	 at	 the	 time	 when	 child	 saving	 campaigns	 were	 at	 their	pinnacle	 in	 l'Hexagone	 (metropolitan	 France),	 when	 women	 and	 children	 were	being	excluded	from	the	labour	market,	and	the	division	of	labour	within	the	home	was	 being	 promoted	 through	 a	 vast	 network	 of	 policies	 in	 the	 metropolis,	 the	French	 colonial	 authorities,	 much	 like	 their	 British	 counterparts,	 were	implementing	more	demanding	taxation,	in	cash	and	kind,	whose	impact	drew	an	unprecedented	number	of	colonial	women	and	children	into	the	labour	market.	In	her	 study	 of	 interwar	 Cameroun,	 Jane	 Guyer	 found	 that	 this	 had	 ‘profound	
																																																								64	Ibid.,	p.	83.	65	Thomas	Athol	Joyce,	‘Negro’,	Encyclopedia	Britannica,	XIX	(Cambridge,	1911),	p.	344.	
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implications	 for	 the	 internal	 organization	 of	 the	 family.	 The	 overwhelming	impression	given	by	the	documents	of	this	period	is	that	women	and	children	were	drawn	into	the	colonial	economy	to	a	much	greater	extent	than	previously,	both	in	the	domestic	cash	economy	and	in	unpaid	work	for	the	government’.66			In	 the	 first	half	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century,	 then,	 racialized	and	gendered	 colonial	subjects	 or	 the	 French	 working	 classes	 were	 imagined	 as	 sharing	 the	 same	psychological	makeup,	drives	and	disgusts	as	the	normative	and	elitist	category	of	universal	‘man’.	While	the	universal	workings	of	the	human	mind	were	believed	to	equalize	all	individuals,	it	was	also	able	to	accommodate	within	this	universality	a	hierarchical	plurality	of	different	categories	of	persons.	Individuals	were	identified	with	 one	 of	 the	multiple	 evolutionary	 stages	 separating	 nature	 from	 civilization,	perception	from	reason	or	infancy	from	mature	age.	A	century	later,	as	we	shall	see	in	 the	 third	 chapter,	 sameness	 and	 difference	 came	 to	 be	 organized	 along	 very	different	 lines.	 The	 universality	 of	 ‘man’	 as	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 governing	would	collapse	 by	 1900,	 giving	 way	 to	 an	 increasingly	 socialized	 definition	 of	 the	individual.	 Blacks	 and	 Whites	 were	 no	 longer	 imagined	 to	 share	 their	 psyches	because	 evolutionary	 stages	 and	 timelines	 came	 to	 define	 the	 hierarchy	 of	societies,	‘races’	or	peoples	rather	than	that	of	individuals	alone.	The	new	‘essence’	of	‘man’	in	1900	rested	with	institutionalized	imagined	collectives.		This	section	has	underscored	that	with	the	belief	in	the	universality	of	‘man’	across	time	and	 space	 there	 emerged	 the	paradoxical	 categorization	of	persons	 as	both	
																																																								66	Jane	 Guyer,	 ‘Head	 tax,	 social	 structure	 and	 rural	 incomes	 in	 Cameroun,	 1922-1937’,	 Cahiers	
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equal	 and	 unequal,	 a	 dualism	 that	 has	 proved	 long	 lived.	 But	 rather	 than	 as	 a	paradox,	equality-inequality	can	be	read	as	a	mutually	supportive	pair,	since,	after	all,	 rankings	 and	 categorizations	 require	 an	 ontological	 sameness	 on	 which	 to	ground	comparability.	The	rise	of	the	modern	self	can	be	situated	at	the	historical	juncture	in	the	late	eighteenth	century	at	which	philosophers	proclaimed	both	the	psychological	 equality	 and	 intellectual	 inequality	 of	 ‘man’.	 As	 a	 problem	 of	government	 this	 opposition	 found	 its	 best	 expression	 in	 the	 legal-symbolic	equality	and	the	socio-economic	inequality	of	citizens.	In	the	ideal	of	a	meritocratic	society,	 intellectual	 hierarchies	 would	 coincide	 exactly	 with	 the	 hierarchy	 of	wealth,	 serving	as	a	giant	 taxonomy	plotting	 the	possible	pluralities	contained	 in	‘man’	along	a	single	vertical	axis.	Therefore,	those	at	the	bottom	of	the	ranking,	the	problem	of	 the	poor	and	downtrodden	which	social	assistance	policies	sought	 to	address,	played	a	structural	role	within	the	emergence	of	modern	subjectivity,	as	this	thesis	shows.	As	the	next	section	will	explore,	the	poor	in	France	did	not	serve	as	the	‘other’	standing	opposite	the	ideally	male,	bourgeois	and	imperial	notion	of	the	 universal	 ‘man’,	 as	 some	 grotesquely	 deformed	 mirror	 image.	 Instead,	 the	whole	 panoply	 of	 non-normative	 subjectivities	 came	 to	 populate	 and	 be	 located	
within	the	very	concept	and	experience	of	the	modern	self,	thus	posing	an	internal	problem	 of	 government	 and	 disciplining	 of	 the	 self	 that	 mirrored	 the	 broader	societal	conflicts.			
‘The	child	is	the	father	of	the	man’:	Civilization	and	its	‘other’.		From	 the	 philosophy	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 centuries	was	 inherited	the	 concept	 of	 the	 modern	 individual	 as	 a	 solitary	 entity.	 As	 philosopher	 Iris	
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Murdoch	pointed	out,	 ‘this	 individual	 is	 seen	as	alone[…],	 that	 is:	not	 confronted	with	 real	 dis-similar	 others’.67	Indeed,	 the	 problem	 of	 the	 ‘other’,	 the	 ease	 with	which	human	beings	may	be	reduced	to	simple	objects	or	means,	remains	one	of	the	 key	 questions	 in	 modern	 thought	 and	 the	 source	 of	 the	 darkest	 pages	 in	modern	history.	When	difference	occurs,	it	becomes	an	ontological	difference	that	virtualizes	and	reduces	the	‘other’	to	a	seemingly	un-real,	non-human	status.	At	the	collective	level,	this	takes	us	back	to	an	understanding	of	difference	that	has	much	recurred	since	the	French	Revolution.	As	Eugen	Weber	has	argued,	Diversity	 had	 not	 bothered	 earlier	 centuries	 very	 much.	 It	 seemed	 part	 of	 the	nature	 of	 things,	 whether	 from	 place	 to	 place	 or	 between	 one	 social	 group	 and	another.	But	the	Revolution	had	brought	with	it	the	concept	of	national	unity	as	an	integral	and	integrating	ideal	at	all	levels,	and	the	ideal	of	oneness	stirred	concern	about	 its	 shortcomings.	 Diversity	 became	 imperfection,	 injustice,	 failure,	something	to	be	noted	and	to	be	remedied.68			Difference	 thus	 posed	 a	 conceptual	 problem	 in	 the	 way	 of	 imagining	 both	 the	individual	and	the	collective.	If	indeed	the	abstract,	universal	individual	had	been	thought	 of	 as	 ‘solitary’	 following	Murdoch,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 collective	bodies	made	up	of	 such	 individuals	were	also	 imagined	as	being	 ‘alone’	 and	 ‘not	confronted	with	 real	 dis-similar	 others’.	 In	 commenting	 the	work	of	 philosopher	Karl	Jaspers,	philosopher	Giacomo	Marramao	noted	that:	the	 European	 exception	 lies	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 while	 most	 other	 civilizations	characterise	 themselves	 as	 ‘the	 centre	 of	 the	 world’,	 Europe	 constitutes	 itself	
																																																								67	Iris	Murdoch,	‘Against	dryness:	A	polemical	sketch’,	Encounter	(January	1961),	p.	16.	68	Eugen	Weber,	Peasants	into	Frenchmen	(Stanford,	1976),	p.	9.	
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through	 ‘an	 inner	 polarity	 of	 Orient	 and	 Occident’.[…]	 It	 is	 a	 typical	 Western	dualism	that	is	not	met	with	in	other	cultures.69	For	 Jaspers,	 it	 was	 the	 internalized	 battle	 between	 ‘us’	 and	 ‘them’	 that	characterized	the	very	emergence	of	the	West.	He	saw	‘the	antithesis	of	West	and	East	 as	 an	 eternal	 antithesis	 that	 is	 for	 ever	 reappearing	 in	 fresh	 shapes’.	Historically,	the	West	only	became	intelligible	through	this	separation,	but	it	was	a	separation	 that	 turned	 the	 Orient	 into	 a	 ‘mythical	 principle’	 whose	 conflictive	presence	could	always	be	 felt	within.	Despite	all	of	 the	West’s	achievements	and	self-claimed	superiority,	 Jaspers	saw	a	profound	sense	of	 lack,	 ‘an	 incompleteness	and	deficiency	 in	 the	West’,	 a	 persistent	 doubt	 as	 to	 on	which	 side	 of	 the	 divide	universality	was	 truly	 to	be	 found,	a	 fear	of	being	reabsorbed	 into	 the	 ‘matrix	of	Asia’,	thus	begging	the	question:	‘What	is	the	cost	of	our	paramountcy?’.70	In	other	words,	dissimilarity	could	be	recast	as	ontological	‘solitude’	only	if	the	‘other’	could	be	assimilated	within	the	self.		Through	his	reading	of	difference	as	an	 internalized	tog	of	war,	 Jaspers	captured	something	that	may	apply,	writ	large,	to	the	characteristically	Western	experience	of	 a	 self	 that	 is	 confronted	 with	 a	 ‘mythical’	 and	 ‘unreal’	 other,	 that	 ‘eternal	antithesis	that	is	for	ever	reappearing	in	fresh	shapes’.	Inner	polarities	then,	that,	as	 such,	 were	 embodied	 contradictions,	 contained	 and	 located	 within	 the	 self,	which	was	thus	left	to	waver	between	paramountcy	and	incompleteness,	a	longing	for	 separation	and	merger,	 a	 supremacy	 that	had	 to	 subdue	and	dominate	and	a	deficiency	 that	 yearned	 for	 the	 purity,	 innocence	 or	 naturalness	 imagined	 in	 the																																																									69	Giacomo	 Marramao,	 The	 Passage	 West:	 Philosophy	 After	 the	 Age	 of	 the	 Nation	 State	 (London,	2012),	pp.	50-51.	70	Karl	Jaspers,	The	Origin	and	Goal	of	History	(New	Haven,	1965),	pp.	67-70.	
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‘other’.	 In	 short,	 ‘otherness’	 could	be	understood	as	 the	 characteristic	 process	of	internalizing	 the	 ‘other’.	 It	 was	 consequently	 not	 the	 unbridgeable	 distance	 but	rather	the	unsettling	proximity	between	self	and	‘other’	which	accounted	for	how	dissimilarity	 came	 to	 be	mobilized	 historically	within	modernity	 as	 the	 constant	presence	of	a	persistent	threat,	the	fear	of	the	alien	within,	disturbing	much	more	because	of	its	familiarity	than	because	of	its	difference.71		The	evolutionary	stages	we	encountered	in	the	previous	section,	between	savagery	and	 civilization	 or	 infancy	 and	maturity,	were	 crucial	 in	 this	 pattern	 of	 negating	difference	by	internalizing	it.	While	critiquing	Max	Weber’s	‘idea	of	rationalisation	and	 disenchantment	 of	 the	 world[…]	 as	 an	 unstoppable	 process	 dissolving	traditional	 forms	 of	 life’,	 particularly	 in	 non-Western	 cultures,	 Marramao	 has	written	 that	 ‘Weber	 is	 able	 to	 understand	 tradition	 only	 as	 the	 antecedent	 to	Modernity,	 not	 as	 its	 counterpoint’. 72 	In	 other	 words,	 when	 the	 category	 of	‘tradition’	 was	 applied	 to	 any	 culture	 or	 way-of-being	 branded	 as	 ‘other’	 it	conceptually	 became	 reduced	 to	 something	 that	 simply	 came	 before	 Western	modernity,	that	is,	to	a	developmental	stage	of	Western	history	itself,	to	something	
internal	to	the	West,	instead	of	standing	for	something	actually	outside	or	different	from	it.	Thus	the	distance	between	self	and	‘other’	could	be	read	as	chronology,	as	the	 same	 separated	 through	 time,	 as	 different	 chapters	 of	 a	 unified	 historical	development.	Reduced	to	‘the	past’,	‘our	past’,	dissimilarities	collapsed	into	time.	In	this	 way,	 the	 ideology	 of	 progress	 was	 able	 to	 account	 for	 and	 annul	 ‘real’	differences	 by	 plotting	 them	 in	 time,	 in	 a	 single	 universal	 timeline	 of	 human																																																									71	See:	Harvie	 Ferguson,	Modernity	and	Subjectivity:	Body,	Soul,	Spirit	 (Charlottesville,	 2000),	who	places	‘alterity’	at	the	heart	of	modern	subjectivity.	72	Marramao,	Passage	West,	p.	58.	
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evolution,	 whose	 avant-garde	 the	 West	 represented,	 serving	 as	 the	 end	 point	toward	which	all	differences	would	eventually	converge	and	become	neutralized.	At	 best,	 the	 ‘other’	 stood	 for	 a	 remote,	 recalcitrant	 or	 vestigial	 origin	 that	 was	doomed	 to	 yield	 before	 the	 relentless	 passage	 of	 time;	 at	 worst,	 dissimilarity	became	 the	 very	 obstacle	 impeding	 such	 historical	 advancement.	 ‘Otherness’	therefore	remained	so	mobilizing	and	destructive	because	it	relied	on	an	 internal	struggle	that	doubled	as	a	conflict	between	past	and	present,	 the	stakes	of	which	were	 ‘progress’	 at	 the	 collective	 and	 the	 ‘perfectibility	 of	man’	 at	 the	 individual	level.		If	we	now	consider	the	many	‘others’	that	were	dreamt	up	for	the	modern	self	from	Descartes	 to	 1848,	 and	 beyond,	 we	 will	 find	 that	 they	 pivoted	 around	 a	 very	familiar	 category	 that	 confirms	 our	 broader	 reflections	 about	 the	 unsettling	proximity	 of	 difference	 in	 Western	 modernity.	 For	 indeed	 my	 argument	 is	 that	defining	and	primary	 ‘other’	 confronting	 the	modern	subject	was	 the	category	of	the	child,	the	universal	antecedent	of	every	individual	self.	While	the	soul	had	once	been	understood	as	grounding	and	unifying	human	existence	on	Earth	and	beyond,	modern	philosophy’s	own	‘discovery’	of	childhood	relied	on	the	premise	that	there	existed	 a	 more	 or	 less	 essential	 discontinuity	 between	 the	 child	 and	 adult.73	As	human	 distinctness	 came	 to	 rely	 increasingly	 on	 reason,	 on	 self-sufficient	 and	autonomous	bodies	and	minds,	 the	contrast	between	manhood	and	infancy	came	
																																																								73	Philippe	Ariès	famously	argued	that	there	was	a	very	gradual	discovery	or	invention	of	childhood	from	 the	 seventeenth	 to	 the	 eighteenth	 century:	Centuries	of	Childhood:	A	Social	History	of	 family	
Life	(New	York,	1962).	I	largely	agree	with	Ariès,	but	will	specifically		explore	this	process	as	one	of	conceptual	 discovery	 within	 the	 broad	 conceptualization	 of	 ‘man’	 in	 modern	 philosophy	 and	thought.	 In	 doing	 so	 I	 follow	 David	 Kennedy	who	 understood	 the	 ‘invention	 of	 childhood’	 in	 its	conceptual	 radicalism	as	 ‘the	 reification	of	 the	child	as	a	 special	 life-form	separated	 from	adults’.	David	Kennedy,	‘The	hermeneutics	of	childhood’,	Philosophy	Today	35/4	(1992),	p.	45.	
	 100	
to	stand	for	the	very	‘antithesis	between	man	and	beast,	reason	and	instinct’,	self-reliance	 and	 shameful	 dependency.74	‘We	 are	 born	 weak’,	 Rousseau	 wrote,	 ‘we	need	strength;	we	are	born	 totally	unprovided,	we	need	aid;	we	are	born	stupid,	we	need	judgment’.75	The	intellectual	project	of	modern	philosophy	that	elevated	reasonable,	 self-sufficient	 ‘man’	 to	 new	 heights,	 was	 therefore	 inseparable	 from	the	denigration	to	new	lows	of	the	category	of	the	child.	 ‘The	growing	perception	of	this	vulnerability	of	the	child’	 in	the	early	eighteenth	Century,	Richard	Sennett	has	argued,	united	the	savage	and	the	civilized,	since	it	‘produced	a	more	concrete,	experiential	idea	of	what	a	state	of	nature	consisted	of.	It	was	not	a	hypothesis.	It	was	a	fact	in	every	human	life’.76	Every	civilized	‘man’	had	started	off	as	a	savage.			But	 these	 discussions	 placed	 infancy	 and	 manhood	 within	 a	 symbolic	 and	conceptual	domain	that	no	longer	mapped	on	to	actual	personal	biography.	Instead	of	 being	 dictated	 by	 time	 and	 ‘nature’,	 the	 moment	 of	 ‘coming	 of	 age’	 for	 the	abstract	 ‘man’	 became	 a	 permanent	 struggle	 that	 came	 to	 ground	 modern	government	 as	 an	 ongoing	 problem;	 for	 the	modern	 individual,	 self-government	stood	 for	 the	 policing	 of	 the	 never-ending	 slippages	 between	 these	 competing	inner	 categories.	 ‘The	 long	 and	 helpless	 infancy	 of	 man’,	 as	 David	 Hume	 put	 it,	represented	 the	 diametrical	 opposite	 of	 how	 ‘man’	 was	 understood,	 and	 one	became	a	‘man’	only	insofar	one	excluded	the	child	within,	and	managed	to	avoid	relapse	 into	 childish	 behaviours.77	The	 drive	 to	 govern	 one’s	 thoughts,	 emotions	and	impulses	was	often	represented	as	a	struggle	between	an	inner	adult	and	an	inner	 child,	 across	 time	 and	 space.	 Philosopher	David	Kennedy	 has	 underscored																																																									74	C.A.	Rhys	Davids,	‘Introduction’,	in:	Kant,	On	Education	(Boston,	1900),	p.	xiii.	75	Rousseau,	Emile	(New	York,	1979).	p.	38.	76	Richard	Sennett,	The	Fall	of	Public	Man	(London,	1993),	p.	95.	77	David	Hume,	The	Essential	David	Hume	(New	York,	1969),	p.	183.	
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the	 importance	 of	 this	 opposition	 of	 ages	 for	 ‘the	 development	 of	 ideas	 about	selfhood,	 about	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 human	 life	 cycle,	 and	 about	 human	 forms	 of	knowledge’.	He	wrote	that:	the	adult-child	economy	is	a	central,	continuously	shifting	balance	in	the	ecology	of	the	self,	and	of	primary	importance	to	any	model	of	self-construction	in	which	our	maturity	is	always	in	question,	and	never	there	as	a	matter	of	course,	or	fixed	once	and	for	all	as	an	end-point.78		So	central	was	the	divide	between	infant	and	‘man’,	he	argued,	that	to	speak	of	the	so-called	 ‘invention	 of	 childhood’	must	 also	 imply	 the	 ‘invention	 of	 adulthood’.79	Indeed,	 in	 the	 writings	 of	 early	 nineteenth	 century	 experts	 on	 the	 self,	 such	 as	Jouffroy,	who	was	one	of	the	leading	‘official’	philosophers	of	the	Cousin	school	of	the	July	monarchy,	selfhood	was	constructed	in	explicit	terms	as	a	productive	and	unstable	struggle	between	 the	mutually	constitutive	couple	of	adult	and	child.	 In	1835,	Jouffroy	explained	that	while	humans	had	a	primitive	compulsion	to	act,	not	all	action	implied	the	use	of	one’s	will.	[N]ot	 only	 do	we	 not	 govern	 our	 faculties	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 life,	 but	we	 often	cease	to	govern	them	at	all	ages:	it	can	happen	and	it	often	happens	in	the	formed	man	that	no	intermediary	is	placed	between	the	passionate	part	of	our	nature,	or	the	motive,	and	the	part	of	our	nature	that	executes,	or	the	faculties,	so	as	that	the	first	acts	immediately	and	without	intermediary	upon	the	second.80		This	was	the	case	especially	when	the	will	was	swept	away	by	strong	passions	or	when	 ‘our	 will,	 tired	 of	 governing,	 rests,	 and	 momentarily	 suspends	 the	surveillance	 it	exercises	over	 them.	The	will	 is	 thus	an	 intermittent	power,	while	
																																																								78	Kennedy,	‘Hermeneutics’,	p.	44.	79	Ibid.	80	Jouffroy,	Cours	de	droit	naturel,	pp.	72-73.	
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the	faculties	act	incessantly	with	different	degrees	of	energy	or	weakness’.81	Thus,	the	state	of	inner	struggle	between	‘the	formed	man’	and	the	child	necessitated	an	incessantly	governing	‘intermediary’,	the	self,	just	like	modern	philosophers	since	Thomas	Hobbes	had	posited	the	need	 for	 the	state	and	the	 law	as	a	result	of	 the	natural	warring	tendency	among	equals.	The	main	task	of	this	intermediary	was	to	ceaselessly	tame	the	‘continuous	and	infinite	mobility’	of	children,	evident	in	their	determinations,	passions,	‘in	their	traits,	movements	[and]	ideas’.82	But	this	was	a	task	 that	at	best	was	carried	out	 intermittently,	 such	 that	 the	governing	self	was	both	a	need	and	a	lack.	In	other	words,	the	self	emerged	as	a	response	to	a	problem	of	 self-government,	 one	 that	 required	 the	 constant	 effort	 of	 sustaining	 an	intermediary	who	could	promise	to	neutralize	unacceptable	inner	diversity.	And	if	such	an	emergence	is	to	be	found	somewhere	crystalized	into	an	event,	then	it	is	to	the	 French	 Revolution	 we	 must	 look,	 as	 the	 historical	 eruption	 of	 the	 belief	 in	‘unity	as	an	integral	and	integrating	ideal’.	For,	I	argue,	it	was	the	problematization	
of	diversity	 served	 as	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 government	 of	 both	 society	 and	 the	self.	Consequently,	each	individual	became	‘a	miniature	of	the	larger	self-governing	society’.83	Or	as	Elias	expressed	it	more	explicitly:	‘The	controlling	agency	forming	itself	 as	 part	 of	 the	 individual’s	 personality	 structure	 corresponds	 to	 the	controlling	 agency	 forming	 itself	 in	 society	 at	 large’.	 Both	 served	 to	 regulate	behaviour	and	emotional	fluctuations.84		
																																																								81	Ibid.	82	Ibid.,	p.	74.	83	Mary	Poovey,	Making	a	Social	Body:	British	Cultural	Formation,	1830-1864	(Chicago,	1995),	p.	33.	84	Elias,	Power	and	Civility,	p.	240.	
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But	since	the	concept	of	childhood	had	been	depreciated	as	‘nature’,	unreason	and	helplessness,	 it	paved	the	way	for	a	vast	range	of	equally	vilified	categories	to	be	internalized.	 Thus	 beyond	 the	 danger	 of	 childhood,	 ‘man’	 faced	more	 numerous	enemies,	 as	 Jean-Baptiste	 Say,	 France’s	 most	 important	 political	 economist,	showed	in	his	small	volume	on	morals.	The	line	between	animals	and	humans	was	feeble.	 ‘One	would	 say	 that	 the	monkey	was	made	 to	humiliate	man	and	 remind	him	that	between	him	and	the	animals	there	are	but	nuances’.85	And	so	were	the	distances	between	the	genders.	 ‘Men	have	illusions	when	they	are	young;	women	have	 them	 at	 all	 ages;	 and	 everybody	 has	 them	 in	 the	 times	 of	 factions’.86	Age,	gender	and	 class	 could	 serve	 to	name	and	map	out	 the	 spaces	between	 illusions	and	proper	thinking.	‘As	intelligence	grows,	the	considerations	relative	to	persons	taken	individually	are	 less	 important,	while	generalities	are	more.	A	child,	a	 little	cultivated	 mind	 as	 one	 finds	 among	 the	 beautiful	 sex,	 only	 pay	 attention	 to	individuals’.87	What	 Say	 was	 spelling	 out	 was	 an	 entire	 pedagogy	 of	 normative	selfhood,	 and	 one	 that	 required	 categories	 to	 be	 very	 porous	 and	 ‘others’	 very	proximate,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	following	discussion	of	madmen.	The	best	treatment	for	the	insane	and	the	best	education	for	children	are	based	on	the	same	principles.	Children,	as	madmen,	do	not	have	access	 to	all	 their	reason;	they	need	to	be	made	to	feel	the	need	to	be	conducted	and	that	one	does	not	wish	to	be	a	victim	of	their	insanity.	If	they	want	to	be	emancipated	from	this,	they	need	to	know	that	it	will	only	happen	when	they	learn	to	reason,	that	is,	to	link	causes	with	 their	 effects,	 to	 know	 where	 a	 fact	 comes	 from	 and	 what	 will	 be	 its	consequences.	To	 treat	madness	 is	 to	remake	an	education.	To	educate	 is	 to	give																																																									85	Jean-Baptiste	 Say,	 Petit	 volume	 contenant	 quelques	 aperçus	 des	 hommes	 et	 de	 la	 société	 (Paris,	1839),	pp.	28-29.	86	Ibid.,	p.	90.	87	Ibid.,	p.	11.	
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reason	to	the	senseless.	The	latter	task	is	easier,	because	the	weakness	of	infancy	render	us	masters	more	easily.88		These	slippery	analogies	 that	generate	 ‘others’	 through	a	parallel	with	childhood	could	also	be	found	in	administrative	texts,	such	as	when	the	prefect	of	La	Corrèze	in	1869	cast	old	age	as	an	‘other’	in	saying:	‘The	start	of	life	is,	like	its	end,	marked	by	weakness,	and	in	more	than	one	way	the	madmen	and	the	elderly	resemble	the	child’.89		At	 the	 time	 when	 the	 categories	 of	 animal,	 gender,	 mental	 health	 or	 childhood	seemed	more	fixed	and	‘incommensurable’	than	they	had	ever	been,	the	possibility	and	risk	of	analogical	slippage	grew	exponentially	for	the	self.	 It	was	because	the	process	of	mapping	and	setting	boundaries	of	concepts	could	very	readily,	as	in	the	case	of	Say,	be	tied	to	a	normative	behaviour	on	which	those	symbolic	borderlines	relied.	 To	 have	 illusions	 or	 pay	 attention	 to	 individuals	 at	 the	 expense	 of	generalities	could	be	discursively	constructed	as	a	boundary	crossing,	in	this	case,	away	 from	normative	male	 conduct.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 these	 pervasive	 analogies	between	the	self	and	the	child,	animal,	woman	or	madman	meant	the	contour	and	boundaries	 of	 the	 self	 always	 remained	 open	 to	 challenge,	 discontinuities	 and	slippages.	 ‘Otherness’	 loomed	as	a	permanent	and	necessary	 threat,	 since	 it	were	precisely	such	dangers	posed	by	inner	multiplicities	that	made	necessarily	the	rise	and	 endurance	 of	 an	 intermediary,	 governing	 agency	 which	 came	 to	 be	experienced	as	a	self.	 	On	the	other	hand,	while	 these	quotes	generated	a	 lack	or	anxiety,	 they	 simultaneously	 pointed	 to	 the	 answer:	 not	 having	 illusions,	 a	generalizing	intellect	or	an	understanding	of	the	world	through	efficient	causality.																																																									88	Ibid.,	p.	44-45.	89	Conseil	Général	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1869	(Tulle,	1869),	p.	203.	
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Thus,	 the	 ‘other’	 as	 a	 reference	point	 for	behaviour	and	being	had	a	pedagogical	
function,	or	at	least	tried	to	point	to	the	problem	and	solution	in	the	same	breath.	The	 danger	 of	 being	 like	 a	 woman	 or	 the	 poor	 could	 be	 exorcized	 through	 the	deliberate	 steering	 of	 one’s	 behaviour	 away	 from	 that	 of	 such	 fictionalized	collectives.	In	this	regard,	the	issue	of	right	reasoning	and	thoroughly	questioning	one’s	 thinking	 was	 consistently	 emphasised:	 ‘The	 vulgar,	 meaning	 almost	everyone,	receive	their	ideas	ready-made.[…]	We	are	still	living	largely	off	opinions	fashioned	 in	 the	 times	 of	 barbarism;	 we	 use	 them	 to	 a	 certain	 point’.90 	As	important	 as	 proper	 thinking	 was	 having	 the	 dominion	 over	 one’s	 will.	 For	philosopher	Paul	Janet,		The	 savage	 and	 primitive	 races,	 as	 well	 as	 children,	 hardly	 obey	 other	 than	instinct:	 their	 instincts	 are	 sometimes	 generous,	 sometimes	 barbaric;	 but	 both	command	them	in	a	imperious	and	absolute	manner;	it	is	not	that	they	do	not	have	free	will;	but	they	only	exercise	it	in	a	very	restrained	sphere,	as	do	children.91	In	 short,	 to	 be	 a	 ‘man’	 was	 to	 act	 and	 reason	 like	 a	 ‘man’,	 which	 required	 a	complete	self-control	over	the	mind	and	body	in	order	to	repress	alternative	ways	of	behaving	and	thinking	that	were	explicitly	branded	as	 ‘other’,	and	imagined	to	be	 embodied	 by	 specific	 social	 categories	 of	 people.	 Consequently,	 that	 social	mindscape	populated	by	a	growing	number	of	‘others’	and	minorities,	such	as	was	depicted	by	Say	and	with	much	more	grace	by	contemporary	literary	figures,	taken	together	served	as	a	roadmap	of	normative	behaviour.		However,	 two	 registers	 were	 possible	 when	 speaking	 about	 these	 ‘others’.	 The	prefect	of	La	Corrèze	in	1853,	for	whom	mental	health	services	were	but	a	subset																																																									90	Say,	Petit	volume,	pp.	90-91.	91	Paul	Janet,	Lectures	variées	de	littérature	et	de	morale	(Paris,	1890),	p.	255.	
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of	 child	 services,	 said	 that	 ‘as	 the	 child,	 the	 madman	 is	 incapable	 of	 work	 and	discernment;	 as	 the	 child,	 he	 needs	 a	 refuge,	 he	 needs	 to	 be	 protected	 from	himself;	 but	 it	 is	 also	 necessary	 to	 protect	 society	 against	 the	 madman’.92	In	ascribing	 them	 a	 helpless	 inferiority,	 the	 child,	 the	 animal,	 the	 woman,	 the	madman	 or	 the	 vulgar	 could	 inspire	 a	 certain	 patronizing	 benevolence	 or	guardianship.	 But	 they	 could	 also	 ‘victimize’	 others	 with	 their	 ‘insanity’	 and	endanger	the	social	order.			Although	contemporaries	never	consistently	distinguished	both,	Foucault	made	a	useful	 analytical	distinction	between	 the	 images	of	 the	 savage	and	 the	barbarian	making	 up	 the	 ‘natural	 man’	 that	 jurists,	 theorists	 of	 right	 and	 economists	‘dreamed	 up’	 as	 the	 man	 who	 lived	 before	 society	 and	 history.	 The	 savage,	 he	argued,	 was	 ‘always	 the	 noble	 savage’.	 He	 was	 the	 one	 who	 led	 the	 way	 to	civilization	 by	 engaging	 in	 exchange.	 Exchanging	 rights,	 he	 founded	 society,	sovereignty	and	law,	exchanging	goods,	the	economic	body.	But	the	barbarian	was	his	antithesis,	since	he	could	only	exist	outside	and	at	war	with	civilization.	Instead	of	 exchange,	 the	 barbarian	 represented	 domination.	 His	 freedom	 was	 never	surrendered	and	only	exercised	 through	plunder	and	conquest	at	 the	expense	of	others.93			The	spectre	of	barbarism	was	put	 to	many	uses	 in	 the	nineteenth	century.	While	the	savage	or	the	helpless	other	were	the	photographic	negative	of	the	appropriate	use	of	reason	and	will,	the	barbarian	resisted	authority,	refusing	the	discipline	and	
																																																								92	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1853	(Tulle,	1853),	p.	138.	93	Foucault,	Society	Must	Be	Defended	(London,	2003),	pp.	195-196.	
	 107	
loss	 of	 liberty	 needed	 for	 social	 and	 economic	 life.	 The	 barbarian	 was	 also	naturalized	 in	 the	modern	 child	who,	 attributed	 an	 innate	 taste	 for	 domination,	was	 in	 relentless	need	of	 being	disciplined.	 ‘The	hand	 is	 the	 sceptre	of	 this	 little	tyrant’,	said	writer	Jules	Champfleury,	‘he	believes	that	everything	belongs	to	him,	that	 a	 desire	 is	 an	 order[…]	 One	 refuses	 him	 anything,	 he	 revolts,	 a	 mutiny	escalates	and	objects	are	thrown	with	rage’.94	Adam	Smith	also	depicted	children	in	 terms	 of	 angry	 attackers.	 ‘A	 very	 young	 child[…]	 endeavours	 always,	 by	 the	violence	of	its	outcries,	to	alarm,	as	much	as	it	can,	the	attention	of	its	nurse,	or	of	its	parents.[…	I]ts	anger	is	the	first	and,	perhaps,	the	only	passion	which	it	is	taught	to	moderate[…]	and	the	passion	which	incites	it	to	attack,	is	restrained’.95			But	 the	 nineteenth-century	 barbarians	 par	 excellence	 were	 the	 lower	 classes.	When	Jeremy	Bentham	framed	social	assistance	 in	terms	of	 	 ‘persons	maintained	without	property	by	the	labour	of	others’,	a	notion	that	became	popular	 in	France	and	in	liberal	orthodoxy,	he	provided	a	definition	that	could	apply	just	as	well	to	a	beggar	or	a	thief,	a	poor	widow	or	a	prisoner.96	By	a	sleight	of	hand,	he	had	united	the	lethargy	of	the	savage	and	the	plunder	of	the	barbarian	in	the	figure	of	urban	poor.	Any	refusal	to	participate	in	the	market	economy	could	then	be	cast	as	laying	claim	 on	 the	 property	 of	 others	 and	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 social	 order.	 The	 intense	moral	 panic	 surrounding	 the	 classes	 dangereuses	 in	 the	 1840s	 came	 from	 the	joining	of	 this	discursive	blurring	of	 the	 lines	between	crime	and	poverty	with	a	theory	of	moral	 contagion	whereby	habit	and	milieu	determined	behaviour.	 Such	ecological	theories	of	behaviour	went	hand	in	hand	with	the	belief	in	pedagogy	and																																																									94	Jules	Champfleury,	Les	enfants	(Paris,	1872),	p.	16.	95	Smith,	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	p.	167.	96	Quoted	in:	Mitchell	Dean,	‘A	genealogy	of	the	government	of	poverty’,	Economy	and	Society,	21/3	(1992),	p.	239.	
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of	 childhood	 as	 a	 blank	 slate.	 The	 writings	 of	 administrators,	 journalists,	 social	reformers,	and	novelists,	very	especially	Eugène	Sue’s	wildly	popular	Les	mystères	
de	 Paris,	 magnified,	 sensationalized	 and	 popularized	 the	 dire	 conditions	 of	 la	
racaille	or	‘urban	residue’	and	their	infamous	habitats.	Potentially,	the	whole	of	the	working	classes	were	indigents-criminals.		The	problematic	poor	were	then	born	as	a	new	category	of	 ‘otherness’.	While	the	Old	Regime	had	considered	that	moral	 leprosy	had	to	be	veiled	away	at	all	costs,	now	its	visibility	was	granted	a	pedagogical	value.	Say	argued	that	‘the	perversity	of	men’	should	not	be	hidden	from	children.	Witnessing	social	vices	had	a	salutary	effect,	while	to	hide	them	was	just	to	dupe	them.		I’m	not	telling	you	to	teach	them	the	vices,	but	don’t	dissimulate	them.	Presented	in	this	manner,	vices	are	a	salutary	spectacle,	which	shows	the	deformities	side	by	side	 with	 the	 appeal,	 and	 the	 deplorable	 consequences	 next	 to	 the	 enticing	preliminaries.97		There	was	appeal	and	enticement	in	vice.	Thus	the	vicious	and	the	poor	were	not	an	 alien,	 incommensurable	 ‘other’,	 but	 responded	 to	 the	 same	 human	 chain	 of	drives	and	 impulses	as	 the	 rest	of	 their	more	honourable	 counterparts.	The	wall	separating	 good	 society	 and	 the	 infested	 garnis	 of	 Paris,	 the	 bourgeois	 and	 the	
chiffonnier,	was	 reduced	 to	a	 simple	 choice	between	what	one	 should	 and	 should	
not	do,	that	is,	a	moral	determination.	The	social	boundaries	between	the	correct	and	deviant	were	thus	drawn	within	the	choosing	self.	Social	difference	could	then	become	seen	as	a	simple	matter	of	behaviour	and	its	consequences.	With	it,	a	new	
																																																								97	Say,	Petit	volume,	pp.	49-50.	
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domain	opened	to	the	risk	of	what	could	go	wrong	if	 ‘our	will,	tired	of	governing,	rests,	and	momentarily	suspends	the	surveillance	it	exercises	over’	us.			Indeed,	 the	poor	were	 the	 living	and	visible	catalogue	of	 inacceptable	behaviour.	The	purpose	of	 the	discourse	on	pauperism,	as	Procacci	has	shown,	was	 ‘not	 the	elimination	 of	 inequality,	 but	 of	 difference’,	 itself	 imagined	 as	 incompatible	with	the	 social	 order.	What	 the	 concept	of	pauperism	 threw	 into	 sharp	 relief	was	 the	existence	 of	 ‘a	 series	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 conduct,	 namely	 those	 which	 are	 not	amenable	to	the	project	of	socialization	which	is	being	elaborated:	“Indigence	is	a	set	 of	 physical	 and	moral	 habits”’.	 Procacci	 argued	 that	 the	 pauper	 represented	difference	 on	 four	 accounts.	 The	 first	was	mobility.	 Pauperism	was	 the	world	 of	vagabond	and	nomadic	ways	 that	were	 ‘impossible	either	 to	control	or	utilize’,	 a	shifting	and	promiscuous	universe	 that	 favoured	 ‘spontaneous	 solidarities	which	elude	“legal”	or	“contractual”	definition’.	The	second	was	independence.	Pauperism	meant	 the	 refusal	 of	 restraints,	 ‘organic	 ties	 of	 subordination’,	market	 contracts,	and	 the	 needs	 and	 desire	 on	 which	 the	 new	 social	 system	 was	 being	 erected;	fostering	 instead	 reliance	 in	 the	 old	 systems	 of	 alliances,	 refusing	 ‘to	 relinquish	control	of	the	organization	of	their	survival’.	The	third	was	both	improvidence	and	
frugality.	 Pauperism	 was	 a	 refusal	 to	 sacrifice	 the	 present	 to	 the	 future	 and	 to	expand	 one’s	 needs.	 The	 fourth	 was	 ignorance	 and	 insubordination.	 As	 one	contemporary	put	it,	it	was	above	all	‘ignorance	of	duty	and	its	usefulness’,	which	‘deserves	 to	 occupy	 the	 foremost	 place	 among	 the	 causes	 of	 indigence,	 since	 it	leads	 to	 idleness,	 immorality,	 uncleanliness,	 improvidence,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 many	
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diseases	 and	 infirmities’.98	In	 short,	 on	 all	 these	 fronts,	 the	 poor	 symbolized	 and	embodied	the	unacceptability	of	differences	that	called	to	be	eradicated.			And	 yet,	 the	 discourses	 and	 policies	 pertaining	 to	 pauperism	 were	 remarkably	unsuccessful	in	‘eliminating’	the	four	forms	of	difference	Procacci	has	identified;	if	anything,	 they	 publicized	 and	 multiplied	 the	 awareness	 of	 deviance	 as	 never	before.	 If	 we	 were	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 effects	 rather	 than	 the	 purposes	 of	 these	narratives	and	practices,	a	new	light	could	be	cast	on	their	agency.	The	debate	on	pauperism	 conceptualized,	 named	 and	 identified	 difference,	 but	 also	 gave	individuals	the	tools	to	understand	and	judge	these	aberrations	independently,	in	themselves	 and	 others.	 If	 the	 psychological	 subject	 had	 the	 keys	 to	 identify	 and	predict	the	 ‘physical	and	moral	habits’	of	other	normative	psychological	subjects,	the	 same	was	 true	 of	 the	 actions	 and	motives	 of	monstrous	 ‘others’,	 since	 both	sprung	 from	 the	 same	 sources.	 Rather	 than	 the	 socialized	 egotism	 of	 modern	selves,	what	 characterized	 paupers	 or	 savages	was	 their	asocial	 egotism,	 that	 is,	they	 inflicted	 a	 voluntary	 or	 involuntary	 damage	 on	 society	 by	 shunning	 the	productive	 and	 reproductive	 responsibilities	 and	 duties	 that	 they	 owed	 to	 the	order	 of	 things.	 The	 discourses	 on	 pauperism	 thus	 educated	 the	 public	 that	consumed	 them	 in	 the	 psychological	 differentiation	 and	 understanding	 of	 same	and	different,	self	and	‘other’.	And	this	was	not	only	the	case	for	the	wealthy.	The	pauper	 was	 perhaps	 even	 more	 crucial	 for	 the	 self-definition	 of	 the	 militant	working	 class,	 only	 that	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 used	 a	 term	 for	 them	 of	 their	 own	invention	dating	 from	the	1830s:	 the	 lumpenproletariat.	These	were	a	despicable	lot,	consisting	of																																																										98	Procacci,	‘Social	economy’,	pp.	160-162.	
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vagabonds,	 discharged	 soldiers,	 discharged	 convicts,	 runaway	 galley	 slaves,	swindlers,	 charlatans,	 lazzaroni,	 pickpockets,	 tricksters,	 gamblers,	 procurers	[pimps],	 brothel	 keepers,	 porters,	 literati,	 organ	 grinders,	 rag-pickers,	 knife-grinders,	 tinkers,	 beggars:	 in	 short,	 the	 whole	 indefinite,	 disintegrated	 mass,	thrown	hither	and	thither,	which	the	French	call	la	bohème.99	Between	 1848	 and	 2	 December	 1852,	 this	 view	 would	 become	 commonplace	among	workers.100		While	 the	 phenomena	 of	 pauperism	 has	 been	 depicted	 through	 the	 lens	 of	disciplining	 of	 the	 poor,	 such	 a	 characterization	 left	 out	 the	 primary	 objects	 of	discipline	 in	 the	nineteenth	century.	Foucault	argued	 that,	 in	writing	a	history	of	sexuality,	 one	 could	 imagine	 that	 ‘sexual	 controls	 were	 the	 more	 intense	 and	meticulous	as	they	were	directed	at	the	poorer	classes’,	but	this	was	not	the	case.	‘On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 most	 rigorous	 techniques	 were	 formed	 and,	 more	particularly,	 applied	 first,	 with	 the	 greatest	 intensity,	 in	 the	 economically	privileged	and	politically	dominant	classes’.	They	only	became	disseminated	much	later	 in	 a	 simplified	 form.	 ‘What	was	 formed	was	 a	 political	 ordering	 of	 life,	 not	through	 an	 enslavement	 of	 others,	 but	 through	 an	 affirmation	 of	 self’.101	Indeed,	the	common	experience	well-off	men	in	nineteenth-century	France	shared	was	of	never	having	been	unsupervised	until	marriage;	and	after	that	point,	if	they	were	anything	like	their	counterparts	in	the	Chicago	of	the	1860s	that	Sennett	studied,	they	had	a	marked	preference	for	domestic	isolation.102	Discipline	was	understood																																																									99	Quoted	in:	Robert	Bussard,	‘The	“dangerous	class”	of	Marx	and	Engels:	The	rise	of	the	idea	of	the	
lumpenproletariat’,	History	of	European	Ideas,	8/6	(1987),	pp.	685-686.		100 	See:	 Raymond	 Huard,	 ‘Marx	 et	 Engels	 devant	 la	 marginalité:	 La	 découverte	 du	lumpenproletariat’,	Romantisme,	18/59	(1988),	pp.	5-17.	101	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality,	Volume	I:	The	Will	to	Know	(New	York,	1978),	pp.	120-122.	102	Sennett,	Families	Against	the	City	(New	York,	1970).	
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as	an	unrelenting	supervision,	to	which	punishment	was	but	a	means.	At	the	heart	of	 the	 early-modern	 family	 stood	 a	 ‘harsh	 parental	 discipline’	 aimed	 at	 ‘the	crushing	 of	 the	 supposedly	 sinful	 will	 by	 brute	 force	 at	 an	 early	 age’.103	It	 was	especially	marked	among	the	higher	classes,	who	needed	to	 learn	to	obey	before	commanding.	 This	 patterned	 continued	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 and	 largely	 in	 the	 first	half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 even	 when	 the	 concern	 with	 self-interest	 and	reason	 substituted	 that	 of	 sin.	 Towards	 1715,	 the	marquise	 de	 Lambert	 insisted	with	a	 severe	 tone	on	 the	need	 to	 root	out	 in	 children	 ‘the	 right	 they	 think	 they	have	of	doing	what	they	wish’.		It	 is	 necessary	 to	 break	 children’s	wills,	 to	 render	 them	 ductile,	 and	make	 them	yield	 under	 the	 authority	 of	 reason,	 teaching	 them	 not	 to	 give	 in	 to	 their	desires.[…]	One	must	distinguish	in	them	the	natural	needs	from	those	of	fantasy,	and	only	allow	them	to	ask	for	their	true	needs.[…]	When	one	is	not	accustomed	to	submit	one’s	will	to	the	reason	of	others	in	youth,	one	will	have	many	difficulties	to	listen	to	the	council	of	one’s	own.104	In	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 authors	 such	 as	 the	 marquise	 de	 Lambert	 were	considered	to	be	excessively	harsh.	But	the	difference	in	tone	may	well	escape	the	modern	 reader	 of	 the	 following	 lines	 written	 by	 Inéis	 Monmarson	 in	 1851:	‘Absolute	 and	 in	 some	 way	 blind	 submission	 must	 become	 the	 habitude	 of	childhood’,	one	that	was	arrived	at	through	repression.105	What	 repulses	 children	 the	most	 are	 pressure,	 discomfort,	 [and]	 constraint;	 it	 is	therefore	 through	 these	 that	one	arrives	at	discipline	and	habitudes	 that	make	 it	possible	 to	 expect	 the	development	of	 reason	and	 judgment.	 Children,	 having	no	
																																																								103	Lawrence	Stone,	The	Family,	Sex,	and	Marriage	in	England	1500-1800	(London,	1979),	p.	653.	104	Marquise	de	Lambert,	Œuvres	complètes	(Paris,	1808),	p.	357.	105	Inéis	 Monmarson,	 De	 l'éducation	 et	 de	 l'instruction	 des	 enfants	 par	 la	 mère	 de	 famille	 (Paris,	1851),	p.	118.	
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personal	 reason,	 only	 have	 as	 guides	 the	 reason	 and	 foresight	 of	 others	 and	 as	fireguards,	very	precise	good	habits.106		In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 century,	 as	we	 shall	 see,	 totalizing	 discipline	 gradually	gave	 way	 to	 more	 discerning	 means	 of	 governing,	 namely	 the	 concepts	 of	normality	 and	 abnormality,	 which	 were	 non	 the	 less	 equally	 founded	 upon	 the	vilification	of	childhood.	In	the	most	rushed	of	his	Les	anormaux	lectures,	Foucault	offered	 a	 sketch	 of	 how	 childhood	 became	 a	 ‘the	 central	 and	 constant	 point	 of	reference	for	psychiatry’	between	1850	and	1870.	He	defined	an	abnormal	person	‘as	an	individual	who	can	be	psychiatrized’,	while	it	was	the	‘immobilization	of	life,	conduct,	 and	 performance	 around	 childhood	 that	 essentially	 makes	psychiatrization	possible’.107	‘Childhood	as	a	historical	stage	of	development	and	a	general	 form	of	behaviour	becomes	 the	principal	 instrument	of	psychiatrization’.	Foucault	 argued	 that	 it	 was	 ‘through	 childhood	 that	 psychiatry	 succeeded	 in	getting	hold	of	the	adult	and	the	totality	of	the	adult’.108	The	result	was	a	‘trap’	for	adults;	the	naming	of	behaviour	as	childish	and	childhood	as	pathology	meant	that	‘Any	 kind	 of	 disorder,	 indiscipline,	 agitation,	 disobedience,	 recalcitrance,	 lack	 of	affection,	and	so	forth	can	now	be	psychiatrized’.109		By	1899,	the	denigration	of	the	child	had	not	ended,	but	perhaps	only	acquired	a	more	modern	ring.	Children	needed	to	be	taught	that	‘our	importance	is	measured	by	the	usefulness	of	the	actions	we	exercise’.	
																																																								106	Ibid.,	pp.	74-75.	107	Foucault,	Abnormal	(London,	2003),	pp.	292,	301,	304.	108	Ibid.,	p.	304.	109	Ibid.,	p.	161.	
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If	[the	child]	well	occupies	the	first	place	in	the	hearts	and	thoughts	of	his	parents,	he	is	bound	to	settle	for	the	second	place	in	family	life	proper.	Everything	imposes	this	on	him,	his	age,	inexperience,	the	need	for	a	hierarchy,	and	also	the	fact	that,	having	no	 responsibility,	 he	 can	have	no	ambition	 to	dominate;	his	opinions	 and	ideas,	 not	 having	matured,	 have	 no	 practical	 value.[…]	But	 parents	 are	 bound	 to	bring	them	to	the	just	appreciation	of	everything	they	lack	in	order	to	be	someone	(pour	être	quelqu’un).110		The	 reading	 of	 childhood	 as	 negativity,	 as	 the	 lack	 and	 emptiness	 from	 where	being	had	to	emerge,	therefore	proved	long	lived.	This	section	has	shown	how	the	split	between	child	and	adult,	this	inner	parental	axis	that	served	as	the	wellspring	of	internalized	‘otherness’,	was	crucial	in	posing	the	problem	of	self-government	to	which	the	modern	self	was	a	response.	The	self	emerged	as	an	intermediary	in	an	internal	 struggle	 that	 took	 on	 the	many	 guises	 of	 disowned	 social	 diversity,	 and	that	in	so	doing	tended	to	internalize	broader	social	conflicts.	Despite	the	violence	of	the	modern	age,	Elias	showed	that	the	degree	of	aggression	in	society	has	been	consistently	 diminishing	 since	 the	 Middle	 Ages.	 And	 he	 argued	 that	 this	 social	conflict	did	not	disappear,	but	was	internalized	in	the	individual,	the	‘battlefield	is,	in	 a	 sense,	moved	within’.	 Thus	 the	 old	 ‘struggle	 of	man	 and	man,	must	 now	be	worked	 out	within	 the	 human	 being’	 through	 a	 intermediary	 self	 that	 sought	 to	‘control,	transform	or	supress	his	affects	in	keeping	with	the	social	structure’.111		Instead	 of	 merely	 privatizing	 societal	 conflicts,	 the	 process	 of	 individuation	internalized	and	confirmed	the	very	historical	 teleology	of	Western	modernity.	 If																																																									110	Thérèse	Bentzon,	Causeries	de	morale	pratique	(Paris,	1913),	p.	20.	111	Elias,	Power	and	Civility,	p.	242.	
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the	 path	 from	 childhood	 to	maturity	 retraced	 in	 each	 human	 being	 the	 passage	from	 savagery	 to	 civilization,	 then	 it	 contained	 within	 it	 the	 very	 promise	 of	emancipation	that	civilization	had	to	offer;	 from	the	slavery	of	childhood	and	the	many	 ‘others’	 it	 housed,	 would	 emerge	 the	 liberty	 of	 manhood	 as	 positive	historicity.	In	his	analysis	of	slavery,	German	philosopher	Georg	Hegel	articulated	this	process	with	great	clarity.	In	writing	beyond	the	1800	paradigm	shift	explored	in	this	chapter,	whereby	the	self	was	socialized	and	collective	predicaments	were	personalized,	 he	was	 no	 longer	 able	 to	 disentangle	 the	 problem	of	 personal	 and	collective	 government.	 Hegel	 wrote	 that	 ‘It	 was	 not	 so	 much	 from	 slavery	 as	
through	slavery	that	humanity	was	emancipated’.112	The	very	‘basis	of	slavery’	was	‘that	man	has	not	yet	acquired	an	awareness	of	his	freedom	and	hence	is	degraded	to	 an	 object,	 a	 valueless	 thing'.113	The	 self-realization	 of	 freedom	 meant	 both	‘liberation	 from	 outward	 control’	 and	 ‘emancipation	 from	 the	 inward	 slavery	 of	lust	and	passion’.114	Freedom	could	not	be	granted	from	above;	it	had	to	be	earned	by	each	individual.	It	had	to	be	won	by	the	self	and	from	the	self	against	its	innate	worthlessness	and	thingness.	And	only	inner	conflict	could	break	those	chains.	The	emancipation	 of	 humanity	 therefore	 required	 and	 was	 inseparable	 from	individuation,	from	the	construction	of	human	subjects	as	modern	selves,	from	the	successful	transition	of	each	individual	from	child	to	‘man’,	‘nature’	to	civilization,	slavery	to	emancipation.			
																																																								112	Georg	Hegel,	The	Philosophy	of	History	(Kitchener,	2001),	p.	426.	113	Quoted	in:	Maria	Mies,	‘New	reproductive	technologies:	Sexist	and	racist	implications’,	in:	David	Inglis,	 John	 Bone	 and	 Rhoda	 Wilkie	 (eds),	 Nature:	 Reconfiguring	 the	 Social/Natural	 Interface	(London,	2005),	p.	95.	114	J.	Sibree	‘Translator’s	Introduction’,	in:	Hegel,	Philosophy	of	History,	p.	10.	
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Every	 human	 lifecycle	 therefore	 contained	 a	 chasm,	 and	 one	 upon	which	 a	 new	emancipatory	 model	 of	 society	 and	 subject	 could	 be	 built.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	conceptualization	of	childhood	thus	throws	into	sharp	relief	how	the	government	of	 the	 self	 and	 of	 others	 came	 to	 be	 framed	 as	 a	 problem	 towards	 1800.	 In	 the	previous	 model	 of	 a	 society	 that	 had	 organized	 dissimilarities	 by	 means	 of	 an	aristocracy,	 birth	 had	 served	 as	 the	 very	wellspring	 of	 privilege	 and	 of	 ordered	difference.	The	beginning	of	human	life	in	this	Old	Regime	was	thus	saturated	with	meaning	 and	 quality;	 it	 offered	 the	 raw	 materials	 out	 of	 which	 a	 sense	 of	individuality	was	to	be	forged	throughout	a	lifetime.	Birth	had	been	the	key	source	and	legitimation	of	inequality	and	social	diversity.	In	turn,	in	the	new	readings	of	childhood	that	were	slowly	gestated	in	the	century	and	a	half	before	they	erupted	onto	 the	 historical	 stage	 in	 1789,	 humans	were	 born	 into	 a	 blank	 slate,	 into	 the	void	of	‘otherness’.	Birth	now	made	all	persons	equal	and	interchangeable	in	their	crucially	universal	equality	of	lack	and	potential.	With	innate	‘nature’	degraded	to	the	tabula	rasa	of	animal	instinct,	humanness	came	to	depend	on	‘nurture’.	In	the	radical	 simplicity	 of	 Kant’s	 words,	 this	 meant	 that	 ‘Man	 is	 nothing	 but	 what	education	makes	of	him’.115	The	more	human	birth	could	be	identified	with	a	blank	slate,	 the	 more	 education	 became	 a	 problem	 of	 government	 and	 the	 more	governing	became	the	perusal	of	an	ideal.	As	philosopher	Paolo	Virno	has	argued,	such	a	view	of	infancy	has	led	revolutionaries	and	reformists	since	the	eighteenth	century	 to	 focus	 on	pedagogy,	 ‘the	 attempt,	 that	 is,	 to	make	 the	 infant's	 training	conform	to	 the	 ideal	of	a	more	 just	society’.116	Born	 into	a	state	of	undetermined	nothingness,	 the	 very	 existence	 of	 ‘man’	 could	 only	 but	 pose	 the	 problem	 of	educating,	fashioning	and	governing	the	self	and	others.																																																										115	Ibid.	116	Paolo	Virno,	‘Childhood	and	critical	thought’,	Grey	Room,	21	(2005),	p.	7.	
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	In	 summary,	 the	 individual	 could	 continue	 to	 avoid	 being	 confronted	 by	 real,	dissimilar	others	so	long	as	it	managed	to	internalize	difference	and	then	struggled	to	neutralize	it	within.	In	turn,	this	inner	struggle	made	of	individuality	a	universal,	psychological	 experience.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 modern	 individuality	would	not	have	been	possible	without	‘otherness’.	And	‘otherness’	would	not	have	been	possible	if	childhood	had	not	been	conceptualized	as	a	humiliating	but	well-deserved	 deficit	 of	 power	 (meaning	 an	 incapacity	 for	 self-awareness,	 self-preservation	and	desire	satisfaction),	shared	by	everyone,	and	to	which,	if	careless,	one	could	at	any	moment	relapse.	Faced	with	a	constant	danger,	that	very	hyper-vigilance	that	was	necessary	in	the	internal	relationships	of	the	psychological	self	would	also	come	to	structure	inter-personal	and	social	relating,	as	we	will	see	next.			
Vanitas	vanitatum	omnia	vanitas:	The	motives	of	human	action.		While	 the	 previous	 sections	 have	 explored	 the	 broad	 foundations	 of	 a	psychological	 understanding	 of	 governing	 the	 self	 and	 others,	 this	 section	 will	focus	on	how	such	understandings	came	to	be	translated	into	specific	behavioural	habits	 capable	 of	 generating	 the	 type	 of	 experiences	 that	 made	 up	 the	psychological	 self.	 Such	 a	 process	 of	 translation	 will	 be	 gauged	 through	 the	discussions	on	human	 ‘nature’	 that	 focused	 specifically	on	 the	question	of	which	where	the	most	primary	and	dominant	drives	and	motives	that	led	humans	to	act.	The	section	will	especially	consider	two	authors,	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau	and	Adam	Smith,	 who	were	 key	 participants	 in	 such	 contemporary	 discussions	 and	whose	
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normative-descriptive	observations	of	human	conduct	had	considerable	long-term	influence	in	shaping	the	psychological	understanding	of	the	self.			Both	 Smith	 and	 Rousseau	 opposed	 the	 notion	 that	 self-interest	 was	 the	 first	principle	of	human	behaviour.	 Instead,	 they	postulated	 that	 two	essential	drives,	one	 selfish	 and	 the	 other	 altruistic,	 drove	 our	 actions.	 Thus	 Rousseau	 spoke	 of	
amour	de	soi	 (love	 of	 oneself)	 and	pity,	while	 for	 Smith,	who	 followed	Rousseau	closely	in	key	presuppositions,	self-love	and	sympathy	were	the	first	principles	of	our	 conduct.	 These	were	 the	wellsprings	 of	 the	 actions	 of	 universal	 ‘man’	 in	 the	abstract,	 unaffected	 by	 time	 and	 space.	 However,	 both	 authors	 immediately	qualified	 such	 a	 view	 of	 human	 nature	 by	 historicizing	 it,	 without	 seemingly	contradicting	 the	 universality	 of	 ‘man’.	 As	we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 two	 sections,	evolutionary	stages	were	used	to	introduce	difference	within	abstract	sameness	—thus	taking	‘man’	out	of	history,	while	putting	the	cleavages	of	history	inside	‘man’.	Their	argument	was	simple:	the	two	timeless	sources	of	human	conduct	had	been	affected	 by	 the	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 civilization.	 Following	 the	 division	 of	labour	in	modern	commercial	societies,	natural	drives	had	changed.		Men	were	no	longer	driven	by	the	satisfaction	of	their	needs,	domination	or	pleasure,	but	by	‘the	desire	 of	 bettering	 our	 condition’,	 in	 other	words,	 by	 vanity	 or	amour-propre.117	For	 Rousseau,	 savages	 responded	 only	 to	 ‘present	 and	 perceptible	 interest’;	‘foresight	meant	 nothing	 to	 them,	 and	 far	 from	 being	 concerned	 about	 a	 distant	future,	 they	 did	 not	 even	 give	 thought	 to	 the	 next	 day’.118	The	 savage	 was	 a	creature	of	 leisure,	while	 the	citizen	toiled	until	his	death,	which	would	not	have																																																									117	Pierre	 Force,	 Self-Interest	 before	 Adam	 Smith:	 A	 Genealogy	 of	 Economic	 Science	 (Cambridge,	2003),	pp.	44-47.	118	Rousseau,	'The	Discourses',	p.	163.	
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made	sense	unless	‘power	and	reputation’	had	‘some	meaning	in	his	mind’.119	And	the	thirst	for	approval	in	civilized	man,	as	Rousseau	saw	it,	was	the	very	wellspring	of	 civilization.	 ‘We	 seek	 to	 know	 only	 because	we	 desire	 to	 enjoy;	 and	 it	 is	 not	possible	 to	 conceive	why	 one	who	 had	 neither	 desires	 nor	 fears	would	 take	 the	trouble	to	reason’.120	Reason,	as	an	awareness	of	cause-effect,	meant	that	civilized	‘man’	 was	 always	 calculating	 his	 interests	 so	 as	 to	 postpone	 satisfaction	 in	 the	present	 in	 order	 to	 attain	 grater	 pleasures	 in	 the	 future.	 The	 ‘interested	 man’,	argued	 Jean-Jacques,	 ‘thinks	 less	 of	 enjoying	 than	 of	multiplying	 for	 himself	 the	instruments	 of	 enjoyment’.121	Thus,	 saving	 rather	 than	 consumption,	 sacrifice	rather	than	pleasure,	in	other	words,	the	accumulation	of	wealth	became	a	crucial	means	of	attaining	the	respect	of	others.	‘In	that	sense,	rational	calculation	is	what	gives	 all	 its	 content	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 self-interest’.122	Unfortunately,	 as	 historian	Pierre	Force	has	argued,	within	such	a	view:	gratification	never	comes,	because	the	object	of	desire	is	no	longer	the	satisfaction	of	 physical	 needs,	 but	 rather	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 one’s	 vanity.	 We	 want	 to	 be	admired	and	esteemed	by	others.	Since	the	source	of	happiness	is	now	outside	of	ourselves,	we	are	engaged	in	a	quest	without	end.123		For	Rousseau,	it	was	to	‘this	ardour	to	be	talked	about’	and	‘this	frenzy	to	achieve	distinction’	 that	could	be	attributed	 ‘what	 is	best	and	what	 is	worst	among	men’.	He	therefore	held	a	neutral	view	of	vanity,	even	if	he	often	emphasized	its	negative	
																																																								119	Ibid.,	p.	187.	120	Ibid.,	p.	142.		121	Quoted	in:	Force,	Self-Interest,	p.	245.	122	Ibid.,	p.	134.	123	Ibid.,	p.	124.	
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aspects.124	Smith,	 in	turn,	saw	vanity	in	a	positive	light.	He	saw	that	in	explaining	modern	man	‘almost	everything	can	be	reduced	to	vanity	alone’,	but	he	grounded	vanity	 in	 reason	 and	 reflection.125	He	 argued	 that	 all	 the	 toil	 and	 sacrifice	 in	 the	modern	world	 could	 not	 be	 justified	 by	 the	 need	 for	 survival.	 ‘The	wages	 of	 the	meanest	labourer’,	he	wrote,	‘afford	him	food	and	clothing,	the	comfort	of	a	house,	and	of	a	family’.126	He	could	even	indulge	in	superfluities.	Material	needs	were	very	easily	satisfied.	Rather,	the	purpose	of	toil	was	simply	the	esteem	of	others,	or	the	need	 ‘To	 be	 observed,	 to	 be	 attended	 to,	 to	 be	 taken	 notice	 of	 with	 sympathy,	complacency,	and	approbation’.	This	was	the	strongest	of	human	desires.	In	other	words,	‘It	is	the	vanity,	not	the	ease,	or	the	pleasure,	which	interests	us’.127		Rousseau	claimed	that	vanity,	‘a	sentiment	which	originates	in	comparisons’,	could	not	 exist	 in	 ‘the	 genuine	 state	 of	 nature’.	 In	 such	 a	 condition	 everyone	 ‘views	himself	as	the	sole	Spectator	to	observe	him,	as	the	only	being	in	the	universe	to	take	 any	 interest	 in	 him,	 as	 the	 only	 judge	 of	 his	 own	 merit’.128	In	 Rousseau,	therefore,	the	historical	emergence	of	vanity	implied	the	multiplication	of	points	of	view,	spectators	and	judges,	while	this	process	of	internalizing	external	viewpoints	itself	marked	the	birth	of	the	modern	self,	and	indeed	of	civilization.	‘[T]he	savage	lives	within	himself;	 sociable	man,	 always	outside	himself,	 cannot	 live	but	 in	 the	opinions	 of	 others,	 and	 it	 is,	 if	 I	 may	 say	 so,	 from	 their	 judgment	 alone	 that	 he																																																									124	While	 there	 is	 no	 consensus	 on	 this	 neutrality	 claim	 in	Rousseau	 scholarship,	 it	 has	 been	 the	source	 of	 a	 revisionist	 view	 following	 the	 work	 of	 N.J.H.	 Dent,	 Rousseau:	 An	 Introduction	 to	 his	
Psychological,	Social	and	Political	Theory	 (New	York,	1988).	See:	Michael	McLendon,	 ‘The	 limits	of	amour-propre:	 Rousseau	 and	 the	 minimal	 self’,	 conference	 paper	 (2012),	 Available	 Online	 at:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=2141419.	125	Force,	Self-Interest,	pp.	45,	122,	246.	126	Smith,	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	p.	61.	127	Ibid.	128 	Rousseau,	 'The	 Discourses',	 p.	 218.	 I	 changed	 ‘only	 Spectator’	 for	 ‘sole	 Spectator’	 (seul	
spectateur).		
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derives	 the	 sentiment	 of	 his	 own	 existence’.129 	Thus	 in	 ‘the	 man	 of	 society’	Rousseau	found	a	tight	correspondence	between	his	inner	knowing	or	cognizance	(connaissance)	and	his	external	acknowledgement	or	recognition	(reconnaissance).		However,	 it	was	Smith	who	would	further	expand	on	the	 issue	of	 judgement	and	develop	it	into	a	theory	of	conscience.	What	he	called	the	‘moral	looking-glass’	or	the	 ‘impartial	 spectator’	 explained	 how	 vanity	 and	 self-comparison	 served	 to	internalize	 the	 self-‘other’	 split	 and	build	a	 sense	of	 self	 as	an	entity	 tasked	with	governing	inner	diversity.	Going	beyond	the	Rousseauian	criticism	of	the	excessive	weight	 of	 public	 opinion	 upon	 the	 civilized,	 Smith’s	 innovation	was	 to	 place	 the	judgements	of	others	at	the	centre	of	the	relationship	with	oneself.	He	built	on	the	figure	of	the	 ‘impartial	spectator’	 that	philosophers	Francis	Hutcheson	and	David	Hume	had	developed.	As	philosopher	David	D.	Raphael	has	shown,	while	his	 two	fellow	 Scotsmen	 had	 deployed	 a	 spectator	 theory	 to	 assess	 the	 past	 actions	 of	others,	 Smith	used	 it	 to	 ‘explain	 the	 judgements	of	 conscience	made	by	an	agent	about	his	own	actions’	as	well	to	decide	on	future	behaviour.130			Smith	 proposed	 that	 individuals	 were	 spectators	 and	 judges	 of	 the	 actions	 of	others	 and	 were	 in	 turn	 judged	 by	 such	 observers.	 Eventually	 one	 gained	awareness	of	being	judged	by	them	and	became	able	to	judge	one’s	own	actions	by	imagining	whether	an	external	observer	would	approve	or	disapprove	of	them.131	‘This	is	the	only	looking-glass	by	which	we	can,	in	some	measure,	with	the	eyes	of	other	people,	scrutinize	the	propriety	of	our	own	conduct’.	This	was	a	form	of	self-																																																								129	Rousseau,	'The	Discourses',	p.	187.	130	D.D.	Raphael,	The	Impartial	Spectator:	Adam	Smith’s	Moral	Philosophy	(Oxford,	2007),	p.	31.	131	Ibid.,	pp.	34-35.	
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knowledge	that	relied	on	comparison	with	others;	to	examine	one’s	‘own	passions	and	conduct’,	Smith	argued,	was	inseparable	of	imagining	how	others	would	judge	these.132	This	was	not	an	interpersonal	process	between	isolated	persons,	but	one	that	would	be	impossible	‘If	we	had	no	connexion	with	society’.133	In	other	words,	it	was	a	social	process	because	it	relied	on	the	knowledge	of	collective,	impersonal	standards	of	conduct,	which	one	could	have	used	to	anticipate	the	 judgements	of	others,	or	at	least	imagine	that	these	could	be	foreseen.		Through	 this	 operation	 of	 the	 imagination,	 the	 other	 became	 internalized	 and	incorporated	 as	 a	 split	 within	 the	 self.	 In	 order	 to	 assess	 one’s	 own	 behaviour,	Smith	 argued,	 ‘I	 divide	 myself,	 as	 it	 were,	 into	 two	 persons’.	 One	 ‘I’	 was	 ‘the	examiner	and	judge’	or	‘the	spectator’;	the	other	‘I’	was	‘the	person	whose	conduct	is	 examined	 into	 and	 judged	 of’	 or	 ‘the	 agent’.	 Once	 established,	 the	 division	somehow	became	absolute:	 ‘that	 the	 judge	 should,	 in	every	 respect,	be	 the	 same	with	 the	 person	 judged	 of,	 is	 as	 impossible	 as	 that	 the	 cause	 should,	 in	 every	respect,	 be	 the	 same	 with	 the	 effect’.134	The	 hierarchy	 between	 self	 and	 ‘other’	could	 thus	not	be	breached,	 since	 it	was	but	 the	 internalization	of	 a	pre-existing	hierarchical	 relationship.	 Initially,	 the	 agent	 of	 behaviour	 required	 an	 actual,	external	 spectator.	 Children	 and	 men	 of	 weak	 character	 only	 controlled	 their	emotions	 in	 the	 physical	 presence	 of	 others,	 thus	 self-government	was	 imposed	from	the	outside.	Those	with	a	constant	and	firm	character,	 in	turn,	permanently	placed	 themselves	 under	 the	 gaze	 of	 an	 imaginary	 observer.135	Men	 of	 character	were	 able	 to	 fully	 internalize	 and	 police	 the	 boundary	 between	 self	 and	 ‘other’,																																																									132	Smith,	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	p.	131.	133	Ibid.,	p.	130.		134	Ibid.,	p.	131.	135	Raphael,	Impartial	Spectator,	p.	40.	
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agent	and	spectator,	while	externalizing	in	what	they	imagined	‘public	opinion’	to	be	 the	 measure	 of	 their	 own	 approval	 and	 disapproval.	 Philosopher	 Gilbert	Harman	has	pointed	out	that	in	proposing	a	system	of	morality	that	devalued	the	agent	in	favour	of	the	spectator,	Smith	reduced	the	morality	of	the	agent,	his	or	her	desire	 to	 do	 what	 is	 right,	 to	 little	 more	 than	 pleasing	 spectators.136	Such	 a	decentring	and	externalizing	would	also	come	to	govern	the	self’s	relationship	to	itself.	 ‘Self-command’	 in	 Smith,	 as	 Raphael	 has	 argued,	 ‘is	 essentially	 to	 feel	 for	ourselves	only	what	we	see	others	can	 feel	 for	us’.137	Only	this	 internal	spectator	using	imagined	external	standards	could	dictate	when	the	self	was	‘To	be	amiable	and	 to	 be	meritorious;	 that	 is,	 to	 deserve	 love	 and	 to	 deserve	 reward’	 or	 ‘to	 be	odious	and	punishable’.138	But	favouring	the	viewpoint	of	the	spectator	over	that	of	the	agent	was	crucial,	Smith	sustained,	in	order	to	gain	an	objective	understanding	of	the	correct	proportion	of	things.	In	this	way,	a	man	would	come	to	understand	that	 an	 earthquake	 in	 China	 was	 a	 greater	 calamity	 than	 the	 loss	 of	 one	 of	 his	fingers.139	Such	impartiality	was	indispensable	for	social	life.			Smith’s	 imaginary	 judge	was	 a	 simple	 bystander,	 an	 unbiased	 and	 disinterested	stranger,	 ‘an	 impartial	 spectator	 who	 considers	 our	 conduct	 with	 the	 same	indifference	 with	 which	 we	 regard	 that	 of	 other	 people’.140	This	 meant	 that	 we	could	 see	ourselves	objectively	 ‘in	 the	 light	 in	which	others	 see	us’	 or	 rather,	 he	added,	how	‘they	would	see	us	if	they	knew	all’.141	We	were	to	be	judged,	that	is,	as	
																																																								136	Gilbert	Harman,	Moral	Agent	and	Impartial	Spectator	(Lawrence,	1986),	p.	4.	137	Raphael,	Impartial	Spectator,	p.	34.	138	Smith,	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	p.	132.	139	Ibid.,	p.	157.	140	Ibid.,	p.	152.	141	Quoted	in:	Raphael,	Impartial	Spectator,	p.	34.	
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‘if	the	whole	circumstances	of	our	conduct	were	known’.142	This	was	thus	a	judge	more	 implacable	 and	 infallible	 than	 any	 in	 the	 flesh,	 since	 we	 were	 fully	transparent	 to	 this	 privileged	 and	 callous	 spectator	 who	 had	 access	 to	 all	 our	internal	 and	external	 experience.	 Incapable	of	deceiving	or	misleading	 this	 frigid	and	 perfectly	 informed	magistrate,	 agents	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 prevent	 ‘seeing	themselves	 in	that	despicable	point	of	view	in	which	their	own	consciences	must	tell	them	that	they	appear	to	every	body,	if	the	real	truth	should	ever	come	to	be	known’.143	Smith	 referred	 to	his	 impartial	 spectator	as	 ‘this	 inmate	of	 the	breast,	this	 abstract	man,	 the	 representative	 of	mankind,	 and	 substitute	 of	 the	 Deity’,	 a	proxy,	that	is,	for	a	God	he	often	referred	to	as	‘the	all-seeing	Judge	of	the	world’.144	A	new	technology	for	the	government	of	self	and	others	fuelled	by	vanity,	Smith’s	notion	 of	 conscience	 relied	 on	 a	 hyper-reflexive	 but	 decentred	 relationship	with	oneself	 which	 was	 an	 odd	 secular	 caricature	 of	 the	 Christian	 notion	 of	 an	omniscient	God	 and	 the	 ethical	 reversibility	 of	 subject	 and	 object	 exemplified	 in	Luke	6:37	(‘Judge	not,	and	ye	shall	not	be	judged:	condemn	not,	and	ye	shall	not	be	condemned:	 forgive,	 and	 ye	 shall	 be	 forgiven’).	 But	 this	 conscience	 and	 its	‘despicable	 point	 of	 view’	 were	 not	 effective	 because	 they	 were	 accurate.	‘Unfortunately’,	 Smith	 added,	 ‘this	moral	 looking-glass	 is	 not	 always	 a	 very	 good	one’.145	The	impartial	spectator	had	its	limits.	But	even	when	the	‘demigod	within	the	breast’	could	be	error-prone	and	unreliable,	the	enlisting	of	the	imagination	as	an	 instrument	 of	 self-judgment,	 behaviour	 comparison,	 inner	 division	 and	internalizing	 of	 ‘otherness’	 established	 a	 type	 of	 ethical	 relation	with	 oneself	 on	which	a	new	society	of	free,	self-governing	individuals	could	be	built.																																																										142	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	35.	143	Smith,	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	p.	134.	144	Ibid.,	pp.	152-153.	145	Ibid.,	p.	131.	
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	In	 Rousseau	 and	 Smith,	 there	 was	 a	 correspondence	 between	 individual	 and	collective	government.	While	the	self	depended	on	external	standards	with	which	to	distinguish	right	from	wrong	behaviour,	so	did	political	governors	depend	on	an	exterior	—‘public	 opinion’,	 the	 ‘Collective	Will’	 or	 an	 ‘invisible	 hand’	mechanism	situated	beyond	the	will	and	agency	of	statesmen—	that	defined	the	correct	course	of	action	and	could	only	be	ignored	at	their	peril.	The	key	for	a	free	society	was	not	a	political	will	 that	 imagined	 itself	capable	of	moulding	social	reality	 through	the	action	of	legislation	or	any	voluntarism	laying	claim	to	the	good.	Rather	than	given	and	ready-made	answers,	 the	good	involved	an	always	tentative	and	error-prone	process	 of	 comparing	 an	 interior	 and	 an	 exterior,	 feeling	 and	 knowledge,	immediate	 facts	 and	 transcendental	 reference-points.	 This	 required	 a	 freely	 self-governing	intermediary	—whether	the	self	or	the	state—	capable	of	translating	the	contradictory	pushes	and	pulls	of	the	interior	and	exterior	into	a	deliberate	course	of	action	for	which	it	was	accountable.			The	liberal	and	republican	traditions,	whose	views	Rousseau	and	Smith	expressed,	refuted	 the	 competing	 view	 of	 governing	 espoused	 by	 utilitarianism,	 a	 parallel	current	of	thought	within	the	French	Enlightenment.	France	has	its	own	tradition	of	utility	that	predated	that	of	Bentham	and	the	English	tradition	by	a	quarter	of	a	century.	Philosopher	Isaiah	Berlin’s	remark	that	‘Bentham	was	a	complete	disciple	of	 [French	 philosopher	 Claude-Adrien]	 Helvétius’	 had	 been	 acknowledged	 by	philosopher	Henry	Sidgwick	in	1877,	who	asserted	that	‘the	premises	of	Bentham	
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are	 all	 clearly	 given	 by	 Helvetius’. 146 	While	 utilitarians	 equally	 proposed	 a	correspondence	 between	 individual	 and	 collective	 governing,	 they	 understood	both	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 self-interest,	 a	 force	 as	 inescapable	 as	 their	 opponents	claimed	 vanity	 to	 be.	 Self-interest	 was	 self-evident,	 rational	 and	 already	 there,	everywhere	and	in	everyone.	If	an	individual	inevitably	judged	things	and	persons	depending	 on	 how	 they	 promoted	 his	 or	 her	 self-interest,	 so	 did	 the	 public	 call	virtue	only	 the	behaviour	 that	was	useful	 to	collective	self-interest.147	If	all	 ‘men’	were	 presumed	 capable	 of	 making	 rational	 choices,	 it	 was	 only	 because	 the	essence	of	 rational	 behaviour	had	been	 reduced	 to	 a	mechanical	 or	behaviourist	understanding	 of	 human	 drives	 and	 conduct:	 self-interest	 meant	 seeking	 the	pleasurable	and	avoiding	discomfort.	The	function	of	those	in	political	power	was	to	use	this	understanding	of	human	nature	to	bring	about	a	virtuous	society.	Meant	to	 directly	 govern	 human	 nature,	 law	 ought	 to	 make	 pleasurable	 the	 good	 and	bothersome	 the	 bad.	 ‘Moralists	 ought	 to	 know’,	 Helvetius	 argued,	 ‘that	 as	 the	sculptor	fashions	the	trunk	of	a	tree	into	a	god	or	a	stool,	so	the	legislator	makes	heroes,	geniuses,	virtuous	men,	as	he	wills’.	With	proper	laws,	‘none	but	madmen	would	 be	 vicious’.148	The	 totalitarian	 dangers	 of	 this	 political	 dream	 were	 fully	played	out	 during	 the	 French	Revolution.	 In	 this	 utilitarian	 ideal	 there	was	 little	room	 for	 selfhood,	without	which	a	 society	governed	 through	 freedom	could	not	exist.	In	order	to	emerge,	the	self	required	enough	uncertainty	and	conflict	in	order	to	 generate	 the	 need	 for	 an	 intermediary	 entity	 tasked	 with	 neutralizing	 and	synthesizing	 the	 inherent	uncertainties	and	conflicts	of	 the	overall	system,	as	we	shall	see	next.																																																										146	Quoted	 in:	De	Champs,	Enlightenment	and	Utility,	p.	8;	Henry	Sidgwick,	Miscellaneous	 (London,	1904),	p.	151.	147	Sidgwick,	Ibid.	148	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	152.	
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	In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 utilitarianism,	 liberalism	 and	republicanism	were	drawn	 together	by	 the	horror	of	 the	 revolutionary	excesses.	This	 led	to	personal	syntheses;	 Jean-Baptiste	Say	belonged	to	all	 three	traditions.	In	 thought,	 it	 now	 seemed,	 self-interest	 and	 vanity	 did	 not	 necessarily	 conflict.	After	all,	did	not	public	disapproval	cause	pain	and	public	approval	pleasure?	The	power	 of	 law	 and	 state	 institutions	 could	 also	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 establishing	mechanisms	 that	 could	 govern	 through	 vanity,	 by	 linking	 the	 psychological	standards	 of	 right	 and	 wrong	 behaviour	 to	 principles	 defined	 by	 centralized	authorities	—an	example	of	which	we	will	encounter	in	the	sections	on	emulation.			But	 the	key	to	a	society	governed	 through	 freedom	remained	the	 freely	choosing	individual,	who	could	not	be	crafted	out	of	 legislative	will.	Laws	established	only	the	boundaries	of	 freedom,	demarking	a	 territory	within	which	 subjects	were	 to	determine	 their	 own	 path.	 These	 subjects	were	 to	 be	 personally	 responsible	 for	their	 conduct,	which	meant	 that	 they	were	 imagined	 as	 acting	 only	 after	 having	undertaken	 a	 self-reflexive	 deliberation	 about	 their	 behaviour	 and	 how	 a	 third	person	would	judge	it.	The	shared	ideal	that	emerged	for	such	a	 judging	self	was	that	of	somehow	finding	a	point	of	equilibrium	at	which	thoughtful	actions	could	at	once	 serve	 and	 defend	 without	 contradiction	 both	 individual	 and	 collective	interests.	This	ideal	was	expressed	in	the	term	intérêt	bien	entendu,	which	served	as	 an	 ideological	 point	 of	 convergence	 for	 various	 post-revolutionary	 political	traditions.	It	can	hesitantly	be	translated	as	 ‘self-interest	properly	understood’	or	
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‘enlightened	self-interest’.149	The	expression	is	well	known	given	the	importance	it	is	awarded	 in	1835	 in	 the	 first	volume	of	Tocqueville’s	Democracy	in	America.	 In	the	later	eighteenth	century	it	already	had	the	meaning	Tocqueville	gave	it,	that	is,	a	position	capable	of	upholding	at	the	same	time	particular	or	immediate	interests	and	 the	 general	 or	 transcendental	 interest,	 be	 it	 out	 of	 duty	 or	 utility.150	Of	 this	enlightened	self-interest,	Say	wrote:	When	 virtue	 prescribes	 to	 us	 the	 sacrifice	 of	 a	 minor	 to	 a	 major	 interest,	 the	sacrifice	of	a	momentary	 for	a	durable	 interest,	of	a	precarious	and	doubtful	to	an	interest	assured	and	exempt	of	trouble,	 it	 is	but	another	word	for	our	 intérêt	bien	
entendu.151	For	 the	 self,	 virtue	 demanded	 the	 balancing	 out	 deep,	 structural	 contradictions.	But	what	exactly	did	 that	mean?	How	did	one	 identify	 interests	 that	were	major,	durable	and	assured?	The	next	section	will	draw	out	the	subjectifying	implications	of	 the	 types	 of	 mental	 operations	 required	 to	 make	 such	 distinctions.	 We	 will	explore	in	what	ways	mœurs	were	imagined	as	helping	identify	virtues	from	vices	by	analysing	the	‘science	of	morality’	in	its	inception	towards	1800.	This	discipline	studied	 the	 mental	 war	 that	 broke	 out	 between	 self	 and	 ‘other’	 in	 order	 to	harmonize	polarized	inner	drives	with	increasingly	unclear	social	norms.	‘Thus	the	terrain	of	moral	determinations’,	 argued	philosopher	Théodore	 Jouffroy	 in	1835,	‘is	 a	 battlefield	 where	 eternal	 combats	 are	 fought.	 These	 combats	 are	 life	 itself,	
																																																								149	Arthur	 Goldhammer	 discusses	 in	 some	 length	 the	 difficulty	 of	 translating	 this	 term,	 see:	‘Translating	 Tocqueville:	 The	 constraints	 of	 classicism’,	 in:	 Cheryl	 Welch	 (ed.),	 The	 Cambridge	
Companion	to	Tocqueville	(Cambridge,	2006),	pp.	144-151.	150	Cyrille	 Ferraton,	 ‘L’idée	 d’association,	 1830-1928’,	 Ph.D.	 thesis,	 University	 of	 Lyon	 2	 (Lyon,	2002),	p.	180;	De	Champs,	Enlightenment,	chapter	15.	151	Say,	Mélanges	et	correspondance	d'économie	Politique	(Paris,	1833),	p.	429.	
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with	 its	 varied	 pains	 and	 its	 great	 and	 fundamental	 pain:	 the	 struggle	 of	 man	against	that	which	is	not	him’.152		
Le	sens	moral:	A	conscience	for	troubled	times.		While	correct	behaviour	in	the	Old	Regime	was	dictated	by	a	wealth	of	repressive	regulations	 ranging	 from	 tradition,	 public	 law	 and	 revealed	 religion	 to	 local,	community	 and	 corporate	 regulation,	 the	 French	 Revolution	 and	 the	 structural	changes	 that	 accompanied	 it	 weakened	 traditional	 sources	 of	 coercion	 and	separated	 law	 from	 morality.	 We	 have	 seen	 that	 for	 Rousseau,	 the	 law	 was	‘psychologically	 ineffective’	 in	producing	a	virtuous	society,	 since	 it	only	affected	external	 conduct.153	The	 limitations	 of	 law	 were	 further	 emphasised	 in	 post-revolutionary	 France.	 The	 vicomte	 de	 Villeneuve-Bergemont	 was	 a	 Catholic	economist	 and	 staunch	opponent	of	 the	new	of	 the	modern	economy	or	 ‘English	system’,	whose	devastating	effects	 in	France	he	was	among	the	first	to	document	after	 having	 served	 as	 the	 prefect	 of	 the	 heavily	 industrialized	 and	 pauperized	department	of	 the	Nord.	 In	 this	region,	 the	 factory	system	generated	 ‘excessively	corrupted’	mores.	Unheard	 of	 disorders	 are	 revealed	 every	 day.	 Marriages	 are	 precocious	 and	illegitimate	 unions	 very	 numerous.	 A	 large	 part	 of	 the	 population	 engages	 in	contraband.	 Mendicancy	 is	 exercised	 publicly	 by	 numerous	 bands	 who	 alarm	isolated	property	owners.	No	repression	exists	against	this	scourge.	It	is,	in	effect,	impossible	not	to	tolerate	it	where	there	is	no	work	and	adequate	salaries	for	the	valid	indigent,	or	relief	and	asylums	for	those	who	are	unable	to	work.154																																																										152	Théodore	Jouffroy,	Cours	de	Droit	Naturel,	I	(Paris,	1835),	p.	83.	153	Shklar,	Men	and	Citizens,	p.	156.	154	Vicomte	de	Villeneuve-Bergemont,	Économie	politique	chrétienne	(Paris,	1837),	p.	221.	
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Coercion	was	useless,	while	handing	out	 these	needed	benefits	was	problematic.	The	 new	 economic	 understanding	 of	 population	 introduced	 by	 Thomas	Malthus	created	 a	 strong	 fear	 that	 public	 assistance	 very	 dangerously	 worsened	 the	problems	 it	 sought	 to	 address	 and	 provided	 profound	 arguments	 against	 living	wages	and	employment	policies.155	This	doubt	about	welfare	became	widespread	in	 France,	 even	 among	 supporters	 of	 Christian	 charity	 such	 as	 Villeneuve-Bergemont,	who	wrote:	‘One	will	easily	appreciate	that,	powerless	to	alleviate	such	a	 profound	 and	 ingrained	 misery,	 most	 beneficent	 administrations	 dare	 not	embark	 on	 any	 attempt	 of	 new	 ameliorations	 in	 the	 fear	 of	 indisposing,	 by	unsuccessful	innovations,	a	multitude	to	fall	pray	of	all	the	horrors	of	need’.156	The	effect	 on	 government	 was	 paralyzing.	 Laws	 and	 policies	 were	 ineffective,	 if	 not	counterproductive.	 Collective	 improvement	 depended	 on	 the	 slow-changing	domain	 of	 mores	 and	 custom.	 Within	 this	 aggregate	 of	 individual	 moralities,	national	betterment	relied	on	each	moral	subject	who,	rather	than	see	the	straw	in	his	 brother's	 eye,	 was	 to	 engage	 in	 responsible	 self-reform.	 Towards	 1800,	 this	became	the	subject	matter	of	a	new	scientific	domain.		One	 of	 the	 earliest	 treatises	 on	 the	 ‘moral	 sciences’	was	written	 in	 1796	 by	 the	Dutch-born	 Huguenot	 philosopher	 Elie	 Luzac,	 who	 in	 the	 previous	 decades	 had	been	 well	 known	 in	 France	 as	 a	 staunch	 critic	 of	 Rousseau	 and	 promoter	 of	Montesquieu.157	Part	 of	 a	 larger,	 unfinished	 project,	 his	Du	 droit	 naturel,	 civil	 et																																																									155	According	to	Yves	Breton	and	Gérard	Klotz,	‘Malthusianism	was	exceptionally	popular	in	France	in	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century’.	Especially	from	the	late	1820s	until	the	mid	1860s,	this	was	 the	 case	 across	 much	 of	 the	 political	 and	 ideological	 spectrum.	 ‘Jules	 Dupuit,	 Société	d'économie	politique	de	Paris	and	the	issue	of	population	in	France,	1850–66’,	European	Journal	of	
the	History	of	Economic	Thought,	13/3	(2006),	p.	339.	156	Villeneuve-Bergemont,	Économie,	p.	220.	157	See:	Wyger	Velema,	Enlightenment	and	Conservatism	in	the	Dutch	Republic:	The	Political	Thought	
of	Elie	Luzac,	1721-1796	(Assen,	1993).	
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politique	was	written	only	a	year	after	the	‘moral	sciences’	were	first	invented	and	institutionalized	 in	 France	 through	 the	 Académie	 des	 sciences	 morales	 et	politiques,	which	was	part	of	the	Institut	national.158	Hence	he	wrote	in	French	for	the	French	audience.	Published	only	posthumously	in	1802	due	to	the	state	of	war,	his	work	 dealt	with	 ‘la	 Science	des	Mœurs,	 or	 in	 other	words,	 la	Morale,	 Natural	Law,	 and	 all	 parts	 of	 our	 knowledge	 relative	 to	 the	 duties	 and	 rights	 of	men’.159	Structured	 as	 a	 dialogue	 in	 three	 volumes	 between	 a	 teacher,	 L’Oiseau,	 and	 his	student	Maurice,	the	book	covers	a	surprising	range	of	topics,	from	human	needs,	education,	cognition,	conduct,	sociability	or	marriage,	to	contract	law	and	political	economy.	 But	 all	 topics	 were	 covered	 from	 the	 distinct	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 new	‘science’,	which	was	entirely	devoted	to	engendering	a	self.			His	first	premise	was	that	‘the	true	does	not	depend	at	all	on	the	judgement	of	men,	and	 that	 their	 actions	 are	 [either]	 good	 or	 bad	 in	 themselves,	 whatever	 the	character	men	 attribute	 to	 them’.160	Relieved	 to	 hear	 this,	Maurice,	who	 ‘float[s]	amidst	continuous	doubts’,	asked	about	 the	French	Revolution	and	the	execution	of	 the	 king,	 demanding	 clarity	 in	 ‘untangling	 this	 chaos’.161	L’Oiseau	 repeats	 that	the	objects	of	our	knowledge	‘are	always	certain	and	invariable;	regardless	of	how	a	being	endowed	with	reason	sees	it,	truth	is	immutable,	regardless	of	the	idea	one	has	of	 it:	and	despite	 the	diversity	of	opinion,	 it	will	always	be	 true	or	 false,	 that	those	who	in	France	rose	up	against	the	Royalty	and	who	put	their	King	to	death	on	the	scaffold,	either	had	or	did	not	have	the	right:	either	acted	well	or	badly’.162																																																									158	See:	Leterrier,	L’institution	des	sciences	morales.	159	Elie	Luzac,	Du	droit	naturel,	civil	et	politique,	I	(Amsterdam,	1802),	p.	7.	160	Ibid.,	p.	2.	161	Ibid.,	pp.	3,	6.	162	Ibid.,	p.	7.	
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But	then	he	admits	that	no	verdict	is	possible,	and	that	opinions	would	inevitably	remain	divided.			A	 confused	Maurice	 then	 learns	 that	morality	 does	 not	 offer	 answers	 about	 the	world,	 since	 our	 understanding	 is	 too	 limited,	 but	 rather	 ‘the	main	 point	 of	 our	science	must	be	to	know	oneself'.163	‘It	interests	you	with	respect	to	yourself,	and	independently	of	the	opinion	of	all	other	men,	to	know	that	which	is	good	or	bad,	
just	or	unjust,	true	or	false’,	for	the	health	of	the	soul	depended	on	it.164	This	was	a	personal	 undertaking	 in	 one’s	 own	 interest,	 a	 private	matter.	 But	 the	 aggregate	effect	 of	 large	 numbers	 of	 individuals	 failing	 to	 know	 themselves	 was	 public	disorder.		‘[I]t	is	very	rare	to	see	men	occupied	with	the	knowledge	of	their	Being	and	 its	 faculties:	 hence	 the	 vices,	 the	 errors	 and	 the	 amorality	 in	 life.	 If	 man	observed	himself	in	order	to	learn	what	he	is,	surely	he	would	not	abandon	himself	to	 debauchery,	 which	 alters	 his	 health	 and	 destroy	 his	 wellbeing’.165	In	 over	 a	thousand	pages,	an	 increasingly	bewildered	Maurice	 learned	about	 the	uncertain	art	 of	 incessant	 individual	 self-analysis,	 the	 opposite	 of	 which	 was	 collective	immorality,	crime,	vice	and	debauchery.			While	since	Hobbes	the	good	and	the	bad	had	been	reduced	to	a	matter	of	personal	preference	 or	 desires,	 Luzac	 put	 them	 to	 the	 service	 of	 an	 endless	 project	 of	betterment:	the	good	was	that	which	tended	to	perfection,	while	the	bad	was	the	rest.	What	tended	to	perfection	was	undivided;	it	implied	all	elements	or	faculties	(body	and	mind)	working	towards	the	same	end,	and	the	personal	motives	(final																																																									163	Ibid.,	II,	p.	64.	164	Ibid.,	I,	pp.	10-11.	165	Ibid.,	II,	p.	65	
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reason)	coinciding	with	the	‘natural’	reasons.	The	example	he	gave	is	telling:	‘if	you	eat	and	drink	to	conserve	your	life,	your	action	is	determined	by	the	same	final	and	natural	reasons,	namely	digestion,	in	this	case	it	is	good,	you	will	do	a	good	action;	but	if	you	eat	and	drink	for	the	pleasure	of	eating	and	drinking,	you	will	do	a	bad	action,	because	it	will	be	determined	by	final	reasons	[pleasure]	different	from	the	natural	 ones	 [digestion]’,	 and	 this	 ‘should	 inspire	 repugnance	 [and]	aversion’.166Morality	 then,	was	 an	 excruciating	 process	 of	 permanently	weighing	one’s	motives,	which	meant	‘in	Morals	and	in	Jurisprudence	the	quality	of	a	fact’.167	It	was	a	matter	of	examining	all	one’s	actions	and	weeding	out	those	which	were	not	 deliberate	 and	 conscious.	 Indeed,	 while	 morality	 was	 subjectively	 an	impenetrable	 and	 messy	 process	 of	 inner	 negotiation,	 its	 target	 was	 to	 govern	one’s	 behaviour.	 In	 its	 objectivity,	 morality	 was	 hence	 reduced	 to	 conduct.	 One	Catholic	 author	 wrote	 ‘le	 moral	 (that	 which	 is	 moral)	 must	 manifest	 itself	 in	actions,	 as	 life	manifest	 itself	 in	 functions’.168	Murdoch	was	more	 explicit	 on	 this	point.		Since	 inner	 acts	 of	 the	 mind	 only	 have	 identity	 through	 their	 conventional	connection	with	 outer	 acts,	we	may	 say	 that	morally	 speaking	 a	man	 is	what	 he	observably	 does.	 As	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Kant,	 we	 turn	 away	 from	 the	 chaos	 of	empirical	 inwardness	 to	 the	 clarity	 of	 overt	 action.	 What	 a	 man	 ‘feels’	 is	 of	 no	interest	 to	us,	 and	even	what	he	believes	 is	 of	no	 interest	 except	 in	 so	 far	 as	his	beliefs	are	defined	by	his	actions.169	
																																																								166	Ibid.,	pp.	81,	83.	167	Ibid.,	p.	91.	168	L.-F.	Jéhan,	Dictionnaire	d’anthropologie	(Paris,	1853),	p.	944.	169	Murdoch,	Existentialists	and	Mystics,	p.	268.	
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The	 mental	 interiority	 of	 the	 psychological,	 self-steering	 subject	 therefore	translated	unproblematically	into	external	behaviour	and	could	only	be	known	and	assessed	from	the	outside	by	means	of	these	actions.			Repugnance,	aversion	and	disgust	were	a	key	way	of	embodying	intellect,	instinct	and	emotions	into	a	unified	and	visceral	learned	response.	A	well-developed	moral	sense	 thus	 implied	 the	 gradual	programming	of	 attraction	and	 repulsion,	 totems	and	 taboos,	 into	 the	 mind,	 body	 and	 emotions.	 When	 moral	 choices	 became	integrated	 and	embodied	 as	 a	 second	nature,	 then	one’s	 instinctive	 leanings	 and	consequently	 one’s	 behaviour	 would	 be	 automatically	 moral.	 If,	 as	 the	 result	 of	self-government,	morality	could	be	made	to	arise	from	a	place	that	was	anterior	to	beliefs,	 feelings	and	choices,	 then	the	 individual	could	be	seen	as	responsible	not	only	for	his	or	her	actions,	but	also	for	the	basic	drives	that	originated	conduct.	The	moral	sense	was	thus	how	the	modern	subject	 freely	constructed	his	or	her	very	own	 structure	 of	 desiring.	 Bad	 behaviour	 spoke	 of	 uncontrolled	 desires,	 which	evidenced	an	immoral	self.			The	 way	 to	 achieve	 the	 ideal	 of	 a	 moral	 body-mind	 was	 through	 constant	 self-analysis	 and	 comparison	 against	 external	 standards.	 One	 was	 to	 constantly	measure	up	one’s	ignorance	and	the	possible	validity	of	one’s	ideas,	for	‘if	one	must	avoid	to	carry	out	actions	which	suppose	knowledge	we	do	not	have,	no	less	one	must	 avoid	 acting	 upon	 false	 ideas’.170 	This	 constant	 search	 for	 ‘rectitude	 of	actions’	 through	self-knowledge,	however,	was	not	only	the	way	of	avoiding	vice,	but	also	the	only	way	of	claiming	any	agency.	‘Ignorance,	being	a	simple	privation,																																																									170	Ibid.,	p.	101.	
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cannot	then	produce	any	action,	or	act’.	The	more	this	self-exploration	was	carried	out,	 the	greater	one’s	claims	 to	 truth,	however	 limited,	 since	 ‘a	man	whose	mind	has	not	been	cultivated	cannot	be	as	sure	of	what	is	true	or	false	in	certain	cases,	as	would	another	who	has	applied	himself	to	perfect	his	Understanding’.171	While	the	self’s	inner	motives	were	largely	uncertain	and	required	constant	exploration,	they	remained	obscure	and	undecipherable	without	external	knowledge.	The	individual	relied	 on	 the	 outside	 for	 self-understanding.	 Elias	 found	 that	 the	 individual	was	subjected	to	social	compulsion	and	pressure	mainly	‘through	the	medium	of	his	or	her	own	reflection’,	a	habit	that	typically	took	root	in	childhood.172		While	the	chapter	on	‘De	la	moralité	des	actions	humaines’	stated,	as	we	have	seen,	how	 any	 thoughtless	 snack	 may	 violate	 morality,	 natural	 law	 and	 the	 order	 of	things,	 the	 following	chapter	was	a	painful	analysis	of	 the	 inescapability	of	error.	‘Je	 n’ai	 donc	 pas	 besoin,	 mon	 cher	 Maurice,	 de	 vous	 dire,	 que	 nous	 sommes	continuellement	exposés	à	errer,	et	à	commettre	des	erreurs’,	either	because	of	the	body	or	the	mind.173	The	modern	subject	was	thus	simultaneously	defined	by	the	ideal	 of	 perfect	 self-knowledge,	 on	 which	 social	 progress	 depended,	 and	 the	inescapable	fact	of	self-deceit.	Faced	with	such	an	anxiety-producing	contradiction,	the	 possibility	 of	 change	 did	 not	 point	 to	 revolutionary	 transformations	 of	 the	body	politic,	but	rather	to	the	growing	entrenchment	of	the	mobilized	and	engaged	
																																																								171	Ibid.,	pp.	86-88.	172	Elias,	Power	and	Civility,	p.	239.	173	Ibid.,	 p.	 85.	 The	 last	 text	 Foucault	 wrote	 echoed	 the	 same	message.	 He	 reinterpreted	 human	knowledge	 precisely	 through	 an	 appraisal	 of	 error	 (errer	 in	 French	meaning	 both	 to	 err	 and	 to	stray),	concluding	that	‘life	is	what	is	capable	of	error’,	man	is	‘dedicated	to	“error”	and	destined,	in	the	 end,	 to	 “error”’,	 while	 ‘error	 is	 at	 the	 root	 of	 what	 makes	 human	 thought	 and	 its	 history’.	Foucault,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in:	 Georges	 Canguilhem,	 The	 Normal	 and	 the	 Pathological	 (New	 York,	1991),	p.	22.	
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self	 as	 a	 new	 type	 of	 subjectivity	 that	 internalized	 and	 neutralized	 systemic	contradictions.		In	morality,	the	psychological	self	was	imagined	as	being	completely	isolated	and	separate	 from	 others	 and	 the	 broader	 society.	 Choices	 and	 actions	 implied	resisting	or	contesting	the	exterior	world	in	order	to	affirm	the	unity	and	centrality	of	the	self-contained	and	self-referential	 individual	who	served	as	his	or	her	own	primary	cause.	But	the	knowledge	needed	to	carry	out	and	assess	these	operations	had	to	come	from	outside	the	self.	This	exterior	was	not	populated	with	the	actual	people	with	whom	one	interacted.	Such	real	others	were	all	the	more	opaque	the	greater	 their	 socioeconomic	 distance	 from	 the	 self.	 Thus	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	exercise	 charity	 and	 help	 others,	 since	 one	 could	 never	 be	 sure	 of	 their	 true	situation,	and	thus	of	not	aggravating	it.174	Difference	was	unknowable.	The	truth	of	 the	 condition	 of	 each	 person	 could	 only	 be	 deduced	 through	 internal	 moral	analysis,	 while	 the	 knowledge	 needed	 to	 analyse	 and	 govern	 the	 self	 had	 to	 be	drawn	 from	 the	 broader,	 abstract	 and	 social	 domain	 of	 ‘public	 opinion’,	 whose	essence	 moral	 scientists	 such	 as	 Luzac	 were	 starting	 to	 synthesize	 and	institutionalize.	The	more	contained	the	self	became	in	its	 interiority,	the	more	it	relied	on	the	exterior.		A	 further	 paradox	 arose	 in	making	moral	 determinations	 or	 distinguishing	 good	from	bad.	Modern	philosophy	 ceased	 to	 think	of	 the	world	 as	 being	deliberately	signified	and	organized	by	a	divine	creator.	The	meaning	and	value	of	each	fact	or	thing	 could	 no	 longer	 be	 determined	 through	 reference	 to	 the	 cosmic	 order.																																																									174	Luzac,	Droit	Naturel,	pp.	14-20,	71.	
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‘Science	in	effect	assumes	the	authority,	previously	held	by	the	divine	Logos,	over	both	human	thought	and	human	life’.175	Science	and	reason	became	‘the	arbiter	of	what	 counts	 as	 true	 or	 proper’.176	However,	 neither	 science	 nor	 reason	 could	establish	what	was	morally	right	or	wrong.	‘For	modern	thought’,	as	Foucault	put	it,	 ‘no	morality	 is	 possible’.177	While	 Hobbes	 and	Helvetius	made	 right	 or	wrong	relative	 and	 dependent	 on	 the	 sovereign’s	 rather	 than	 God’s	 will,	 later	 thinkers	placed	the	individual	in	the	place	of	both.	Liberal	theorist	and	statesman	Francois	Guizot	 argued	 in	 1812	 that	 ‘man	 has	 nothing	 in	 him	 that	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 the	benefit	 of	 good	 and	 evil:	 everything	 depends	 on	 the	 principles	 on	 which	 he	 is	accustomed	to	act	and	judge’.178Acts	and	things	in	themselves	no	longer	had	a	fixed	value,	but	rather	depended	on	the	intention	of	the	subject.	The	reference	point	was	the	psychology	of	a	specific	person	rather	than	a	godly	or	natural	order.	Morality	was	therefore	not	only	subjective	but	essentially	subjectifying:	behind	every	right	or	wrong	there	was	a	self	that	had	constructed	itself	as	such,	as	Kant	argued:	Man	 himself	 must	make	 or	 have	made	 himself	 into	 whatever,	 in	 a	moral	 sense,	whether	good	or	evil,	he	is	or	is	to	become.	Either	condition	must	be	an	effect	of	his	free	 choice;	 for	 otherwise	 he	 could	 not	 be	 held	 responsible	 for	 it	 and	 could	therefore	be	morally	neither	good	nor	evil.179	Jerome	 Schneewind	 has	 shown	 that	 Kant	 postulated	 ‘a	 truly	 revolutionary	rethinking	 of	 morality’.	 Individuals	 were	 sovereign	 and	 independent	 beings.	 ‘By	this	he	meant	 that	we	ourselves	 legislate	 the	moral	 law.	 It	 is	only	because	of	 the	legislative	action	of	our	own	will	that	we	are	under	moral	law’.	This	marked	a	shift																																																									175	Holmes,	Fact,	Value,	and	God,	p.	88.	176	Kenneth	Clatterbaugh,	The	Causation	Debate	in	Modern	Philosophy,	1637-1739	(New	York,	1999),	p.	208.	177	Foucault,	Order	of	Things,	p.	357.	178	François	Guizot,	Méditations	et	études	morales	(Paris,	1852),	pp.	290-291	179	Quoted	 in:	 John	Silber,	 ‘Kant's	 conception	of	 the	highest	good	as	 immanent	and	 transcendent’,	
The	Philosophical	Review,	68/4	(1959),	p.	477.	
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from	 ‘morality	 as	 obedience’	 to	 ‘morality	 as	 self-government’. 180 	Therefore	morality	was	entirely	 relative	and	subjective.	And	yet	Kant	postulated	 that	 there	was	 a	 higher	 or	 transcendental	 good	 that	 was	 ‘the	 necessary	material	 object	 of	moral	volition’.	The	absolute	moral	goal,	this	higher	good	was	‘at	the	same	time	a	practical	 idea’	that	needed	to	be	embodied	by	the	will	and	used	as	a	guide	for	its	perfection.181	But	 it	 could	 be	 found	 nowhere	 stated.	 Simultaneously	 utopian	 and	real,	 the	 higher	 good	 was	 objectively	 unknowable	 and	 necessary	 as	 a	 moral	standard.	 Therefore,	 there	was	 a	 structural	 inability	 to	 establish	 objective	moral	values	and	an	individual	need	to	act	and	judge	according	to	an	indecipherable	but	real	higher	good,	a	contradiction	that	was	thrown	back	upon	the	self	as	a	 lack	of	moral	will.	Such	a	lack	would	have	motivated	the	need	for	the	moral	deliberations	Luzac	proposed.		Sennett	has	identified	a	similar	process	in	the	functioning	of	the	market	economy	in	the	nineteenth	century.	The	new	economy	‘made	the	concepts	of	community	and	individual	 ambivalent,	 and	 ambivalent	 in	 a	 peculiar	 way.	 No	 human	 being,	 no	human	agent,	 could	be	held	accountable	 for	 the	disturbances	 in	 these	 realms’.182	Positions	 of	 dependence	were	 rendered	 unstable,	 subject	 to	 continuous	 ups	 and	downs.	 For	 Sennet,	 this	 had	 a	 powerful	 ideological	 effect:	 ‘people	 began	 to	 feel	personally	 responsible	 for	 their	 place	 in	 the	world;	 they	 viewed	 their	 success	 of	failure	 in	 struggling	 for	 existence	 as	 a	matter	 of	 personal	 strength	or	weakness’.	The	contradiction	was	that	participants	were	aware	‘that	they	were	in	the	grip	of	impersonal	 forces	 they	 could	 not	 control’,	 and	 yet	 tended	 to	 internalize	 the																																																									180 	Jerome	 Schneewind,	 The	 Invention	 of	 Autonomy:	 A	 History	 of	 Modern	 Moral	 Philosophy	(Cambridge,	1998),	pp.	4,	6.	181	Silber,	‘Kant's	conception’,	pp.	469-470.	182	Sennett,	Authority	(London,	1993),	p.	44.	
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problem	of	 the	economy	 in	a	specific	way,	 taking	 ‘their	misfortunes	as	signs	 that	they	 had	 not	 been	 strong	 enough	 to	 cope’.183		 A	 ‘free’	 society	 was	 one	 where	traditional	 constraints	 had	 given	way	 to	 the	 emancipating	 forces	 of	merit.	 But	 if	merit	explained	the	rise	of	all	talent,	then	so	did	demerit	account	for	all	hardship.	In	other	words,	the	French	Revolution	abolished	privilege	and	established	formal	equality,	giving	rise	to	a	meritocratic	society.	In	such	a	system,	individual’s	social	position	 was	 both	 structurally	 unfixed	 and	 shifting	 and	 emotionally	 attached	 to	their	self-worth.			The	 same	claim	could	be	made	about	knowledge.	The	notions	of	 ‘public	opinion’	and	 reason	 hid	 the	 profound	 plurality	 of	 views	 they	 contained.	With	 the	 rise	 of	hypothetical	 methodologies	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 even	 the	 knowledge	 hat	enjoyed	 the	 consensus	 of	 scientists	 was	 but	 tentative	 and	 ephemeral,	 while	 the	fragmentation	 of	 disciplines	 and	 rise	 in	 the	 volume	 of	 available	 data	 made	everyone	more	and	more	relatively	unlearned.	This	partitioning	of	the	reasonable	into	an	array	of	conflicting	views	contrasted	with	 the	claims	to	natural	 laws	or	a	single	and	absolute	truth	on	which	the	political,	economic,	social	and	state	systems	depended.	 By	 making	 of	 reason	 the	 goal	 and	 measure	 of	 humanness,	 the	 self	interiorized	 as	 shameful	 ignorance	 this	 contradiction	 between	 competing	 truths	and	 a	 single	 but	 ultimately	 unintelligible	 universal	 truth.	 The	modern	 individual	was	 free.	 But	 the	 price	 paid	 was	 unprecedented	 uncertainty	 in	 moral	 issues,	 in	assessing	self-worth	and	social	station,	in	knowing	what	to	do,	be,	or	believe	in.			
																																																								183	Ibid.,	p.	46-47.	
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The	 fact	 that	moral	behaviour	 is	not	 really	 free,	 that	 the	modern	socio-economic	mechanism	 is	 rigged	 in	 favour	 of	 some	 groups,	 or	 that	 the	 great	 apparatuses	 of	knowledge-power	have	an	undeniable	effect	 in	 structuring	our	experience	of	 the	world	must	be	recognized	and	acknowledged.	But	such	facts,	by	uncovering	hidden	powers	from	which	we	need	to	be	emancipated,	fail	to	critically	engage	the	liberal	utopia	 from	outside	 its	own	rationality.	The	 foundation	of	 that	 ideal	 is,	as	Claude	Lefort	wrote,	that	‘the	place	of	power	is	empty’;	‘the	very	principle	of	democracy’,	according	to	Alain	Renaut,	 ‘is	 that	power	belongs	 to	no	one’.184	To	argue	that	 the	place	 of	 power	 is	 not	 really	 empty	 is	 to	 fall	 into	 a	 trap.	 As	 Étienne	 Balibar	 has	argued,	 ‘To	 confront	 the	 hegemonic	 structure	 by	 denouncing	 the	 gap	 or	contradiction	 between	 its	 official	 values	 and	 its	 actual	 practice[…]	 is	 the	 most	effective	way	of	 enforcing	 its	universality’.185	In	other	words,	 if	 the	 critique	does	not	step	outside	the	problem	of	power,	which	must	necessarily	be	located	within	the	master-slave	 or	 ruler-ruled	 dichotomy,	 then	 the	 liberal	 utopia	 is	 only	 being	validated	—the	necessary	conclusion	will	be	that	if	only	moral,	socio-economic	and	intellectual	powers	withered	away,	 if	only	 the	place	of	power	were	really	 empty,	
then	we	would	be	free.	It	would	be	much	more	productive	and	informative	to	map	out	this	utopic	world	in	which	the	sovereign’s	throne	was	imagined	to	be	vacant,	and	in	thus	doing	further	locate	the	self-governing	individual	at	the	heart	of	liberal	rationality.			But	 what	 did	 a	 society	 in	which	 ‘power	 belongs	 to	 no	 one’	 look	 like?	 The	most	obvious	response	is	the	dream	of	the	free	market.	While	the	principles	of	economic	
																																																								184	Both	quotes	in:	Alain	Renaut,	La	fin	de	l’autorité	(Paris,	2004),	p.	54.	185	Étienne	Balibar,	Politics	and	the	Other	Scene	(London,	2002),	p.	162.	
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liberalism	 had	 some	 currency	 in	 France	 in	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 the	 eighteenth	century,	it	was	to	Jean-Baptiste	Say	that	political	economy	owed	its	establishment	as	a	scientific	pursuit.186	Say	was	also	who	articulated	for	the	first	time	in	France	the	 dream	 that	 the	market	 itself	 can	produce	 a	 harmonious	 society,	what	 Pierre	Rosanvallon	has	termed	 le	capitalisme	utopique	of	 la	société	de	marché.187	Say	did	so	in	writing	a	literal	utopia,	Olbie,	submitted	to	the	Institut	National	in	1799	for	a	competition	 on	 the	 topic	 ‘What	 are	 the	 most	 adequate	 institutions	 in	 which	 to	found	 the	morality	 of	 a	 people?’	 According	 to	 Jean-Paul	 Frick,	 in	 this	work:	 ‘Say	emptied	 la	morale	 of	 any	metaphysical	 and	 abstract	 problem’.	 Instead,	 morality	had	to	be	derived	from	a	study	of	human	nature	that	did	not	depend	on	the	will.		The	 implementation	 of	morals	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 the	 capacity	 to	 create	 in	men	virtuous	 habits	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	 evidence	 of	 the	 ‘Enlightenment’,	 education,	legislation	or	any	other	means	of	reforming	customs	(the	organization	of	fêtes	and	exercises	 destined	 to	 educate	 the	 hearts	 of	 children	 or	 men,	 for	 example).	 It	essentially	depended	on	the	 implementation	of	an	objective	order	that	possessed	its	own	logic	and	that	pushed	men,	so	to	speak,	to	do	what	is	morally	good,	without	having	 their	 actions	 depend	 on	 their	 will	 alone	 or	 an	 institution	 guiding	 that	will.188		This	was	a	moral	‘invisible	hand’	that	depended	on	the	wills	of	neither	governors	nor	governed.	In	1817,	Say	wrote	that	any	morality	that	did	not	take	into	account	‘the	nature	of	men	and	things’	was	 ‘stupid,	 imperfect,	 [and]	 insufficient’.	God	had	‘given	 man	 an	 incurable	 vanity;	 it	 is	 a	 moral	 fact,	 as	 the	 need	 to	 breathe	 is	 a	
																																																								186	See:	 Steiner	 Philippe,	 ‘La	 Science	 de	 l'économie	 politique	 et	 les	 sciences	 sociales	 en	 France,	1750-1830’,	Revue	d'histoire	des	sciences	humaines,	2/15	(2006),	p.	15-42.	187	Pierre	Rosanvallon,	Le	capitalisme	utopique	(Paris,	1999).	188	Jean-Paul	 Frick,	 ‘Philosophie	 et	 économie	politique	 chez	 J.-B.	 Say:	Remarques	 sur	 les	 rapports	entre	 un	 texte	 oublié	 de	 J.-B.	 Say	 et	 son	 œuvre	 économique’,	 Histoire,	 économie	 et	 société,	 6/1	(1987),	p.	54	
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physical	 fact	 against	which	we	 can	do	nothing’.	Vanity	 could	never	be	destroyed	and	would	only	resurface,	even	in	the	‘austerity	of	monks’.	But	if	the	moralist	arranges	 things	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 one	 uses	 [vanity]	 to	 properly	 fulfil	 [man’s]	duties	 to	 his	 fellow	 citizens	 and	 family;	 to	 give	 a	 useful	 end	 to	 all	 his	works,	 to	scrupulously	uphold	his	commitments,	to	not	spend	more	than	one	has,	to	keep	his	person	clean,	 [and]	 to	give	a	pleasant	and	careful	 aspect	 to	his	home,	what	good	would	be	done	for	the	country!	Herein	lies	the	true	moral	science.189	In	 its	 purest	 form,	 this	 was	 the	 utopia	 of	 a	 society	 without	 power.	 Here	 was	 a	governmental	 order	 that	 promised	 to	 deliver	 dutiful,	 hard-working,	 dependable,	thrifty,	 clean,	 domestic	 and	 responsible	 citizens	 without	 enthroning	 absolute	dogmas	 or	 rulers,	 the	 will	 of	 one	 or	 the	many.	 Public	 and	 private	 virtue	 would	result	 from	 carefully	 managing	 the	 psychological	 levers	 of	 modern	 ‘man’,	 from	‘arranging	 things	 in	 such	 a	 way’	 as	 to	 govern	 through	 vanity.	 If	 the	 subjective	energies	 of	 psychological	 ‘nature’	 could	 be	 directed,	 then	 power	 became	 vacant	and	redundant.	The	goal	was	to	structure	the	possible	field	of	action	of	the	will	and	its	desires,	 the	options	and	 incentives	 that	presented	 themselves	 to	 the	choosing	subject.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 aim	was	 to	 conduct	 the	 conducting	 of	 conduct.	 The	new	 liberal	 order	 generated	 structural	 insecurities	 in	 moral,	 intellectual	 or	socioeconomic	positions,	while	its	paradoxical	logics	translated	these	uncertainties	into	 individual	 lacks	 in	worth	that	had	to	be	remedied	through	ever-greater	self-steering	in	accordance	with	external	standards.	By	pointing	to	individual	solutions,	these	 instabilities	 and	 lacks	 turned	 the	 person	 into	 a	 problem,	 a	 problem	 of	government	from	where	the	modern	self	sprang.			
																																																								189	Say,	Petit	volume,	pp.	27-28.	
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Much	 of	 the	 proselytism	 for	 economic	 ‘liberty’	 and	 the	 market	 met	 with	 harsh	criticism	 in	 France.	 Self-interest,	 competition,	 and	 the	 shameless	 focus	 on	 the	material	over	the	moral,	offended	enlightened	opinion	and	cast	serious	doubts	on	the	economy’s	ability	to	generate	the	kinds	of	social	and	spiritual	bonds	that	could	sustain	 a	 post-revolutionary	 polity	 together.	 But	 the	 key	 to	 Say’s	 vision	was	 not	competition,	production	or	 the	economy,	but	 rather	 the	agentless	and	powerless	mass	production	of	 a	 new	 subject,	 dutiful,	 useful	 and	 tidy.	And	 this	 dream	of	 an	‘objective	 order’,	 a	moralizing	 domain	 beyond	 power	 and	 faith,	 remained	 highly	seductive	in	nineteenth	century	France	beyond	narrow	liberal	circles.	We	will	next	consider	 the	 use	 of	 what	 was	 called	 ‘educational	 emulation’	 as	 a	 governmental	technology	used	to	create	the	type	of	impersonal	mechanisms	behind	Say’s	utopia.		
Émulation:	Governing	through	vanity.		In	 1800,	 a	 year	 after	 Say’s	 utopia	was	 submitted,	 the	 Institut	 national	 opened	 a	new	 contest,	 this	 time	 on	 a	 topic	 as	 seemingly	 obscure	 as	 it	 was	 bland:	 ‘Is	emulation	 a	 good	means	 of	 education?’	 L’émulation	 had	 no	 conceptual	 status	 in	France	at	the	time,	beyond	the	ambiguous	sense	of	imitation	the	term	implies.	But	the	 entries	 to	 the	 contest	 opened	 up	 a	whole	 new	 domain	 from	where	 to	 think	social	 relations	 and	 government	 precisely	 by	 bringing	 about	 a	 new	 ‘objective	order’	that	promised	to	rule	the	affections.			The	 prize-winning	 entries	 responded	 the	 question	 in	 the	 affirmative	 and	 shared	the	same	premises.	Firstly,	emulation	was	not	the	same	as	imitation.	Imitation	was	common	to	all	men,	while	emulation	‘excites	only	those	souls	capable	of	elevation’;	
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noble	and	pure,	 it	was	 ‘an	energetic	and	elevated	sentiment	that	only	has	hold	in	well-born	souls’.	Imitation	‘is	always	a	calculation	of	personal	interest,	and	its	end	can	lie	with	objects	of	all	sorts;	but	emulation	can	only	ever	have	a	moral	goal,	and	can	 only	 be	 a	 speculation	 of	 self-love’	 that	 took	 as	 its	 target	 always	 someone	superior	 to	us.	Before	 the	 ‘spectacle’	 of	 seeing	 another	 receiving	praise,	 the	 soul	became	‘inflamed’	by	‘a	movement	of	self-love	excited	by	the	success	of	another’.	A	resulting	désir	de	supériorité	and	the	loi	de	l’honneur	made	one	try	harder	and	aim	for	 success.	 In	 the	 generalized	model	 of	 Newtonian	 physics,	 emulation	was	 ‘the	sting	 capable	 to	 get	 things	moving	 and	vanquishing	 at	 every	 instant	 the	 force	of	inertia,	common	to	all	beings’.190			Secondly,	 while	 pride	 and	 vanity	 were	 tied	 to	 particularity,	 and	 ‘will	 eternally	impede	 us	 from	 setting	 down	 the	 true	 rules	 of	 reason	 and	 taste	 and	 from	determining	that	just	measure,	that	proportion,	that	in	every	thing	constitutes	the	true	good’,	emulation	was	essentially	social.191	The	‘system	of	human	relations	that	grants	 such	empire	 to	 the	 judgement	of	his	 fellows	generates	a	 first	need	within	him	of	their	esteem.	It	is	because	man	is	created	for	man,	it	is	because	everything	is	common	 among	 the	 members	 of	 the	 human	 family,	 that	 each	 of	 them	 feels	subordinated	to	the	opinion	of	his	equals	in	whom	he	sees	his	natural	judges’.	For	‘everything	attaches	man	to	his	fellows,	that	he	cannot	become	independent	from	them,	that	nature	has	placed	within	him	the	smallest	part	of	his	existence,	and	that	it	is	only	in	others	where	the	plenitude	of	his	being	is	located’.192																																																										190	George-Marie	Raymond,	Essai	sur	l’émulation	dans	l’ordre	social…	(Geneva,	1802),	pp.	7-8,	10,	31,	40.	191	Ibid.,	p.	74-76.	192	Ibid.,	p.	61-62.	
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The	 first	prize	went	 to	L.-F.	Feuillet,	one	of	 the	 librarians	 in	 the	 Institut	National.	For	Feuillet	and	his	competitors,	the	staring	point	was	the	same.	‘Man	is	born	in	a	state	 of	 dependence	 derived	 from	 the	 near	 invalidity	 of	 his	 instinct	 and	 the	 late	development	of	his	faculties,	and	consequently	of	the	need	he	has	for	a	longer	and	more	 complete	 education’.193	This	made	 the	 family	 necessary.	 ‘This	 dependence’,	Feuillet	 argued,	 humbled	 the	 ‘self-love’	 of	 ‘the	 human	 self’	 (moi	 humain)	 by	establishing	the	primary	social	bond	that	upheld	society.	It	bends	and	accustoms	the	man	who	starts	to	live,	to	want,	for	his	own	good,	that	which	is	suitable	to	the	reason	of	those	who	have	lived;	it	creates	an	interest	in	him	to	conform	to	the	will	of	those	who	govern	him,	 it	puts	him	in	reach	of	collecting	promptly	 the	 fruits	of	 their	experience	and	renders	him	proper	 to	continue	 their	work.	But	this	modification	of	the	moi	humain	leads	straight	to	emulation;	because,	from	the	moment	we	are	dependant,	we	feel	our	interest	tied	to	the	will	of	others,	we	experience	the	desire	to	become	masters	of	that	will,	by	any	means	possible,	to	determine	 it	 in	 our	 favour,	 and	 this	 desire	 must	 be	 shared	 by	 all	 who	 find	themselves	in	our	position.194		This	was	a	fact	of	‘human	nature’.	But	as	with	all	discussions	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	 century	 of	 things	 considered	 ‘natural’,	 the	 approach	 was	 at	 once	descriptive	 (outlining	 a	 universal	 fact)	 and	 programmatic	 (‘nature’	 needs	 to	 be	made	 to	 resemble	 itself,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 governed).	 Thus	 Feuillet	 found	 that	 any	inconveniences	 this	 instinctive	 tendency	 had	 could	 be	 dispelled	 if	 everyone	adopted	it;	‘we	have	found	that	all	the	secret	lies	in	making	it	general,	and	because	of	 this,	maintained	by	all	possible	means,	 this	natural	action	of	all	over	each	that	
																																																								193	L.-F.	Feuillet,	Mémoire	[sur	l’émulation]	couronné	par	l'Institut	national…	(Paris,	1801),	p.	146.	194	Ibid.,	p.	146-147.	
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obliges	 each	 to	 consult	 the	 interest	 and	 subject	 himself	 to	 the	will	 of	 all:	 this	 is	what	constitutes	civil	liberty’.195			George-Marie	Raymond,	a	Swiss	teacher	of	mathematics	and	history	who	received	an	honourable	mention	 in	 the	contest,	concurred	with	Feuillet.	The	 ‘sentiment	of	emulation	is	a	law	of	human	nature,	impressed	upon	the	heart	of	man	by	the	same	hand	that	shaped	him,	and	that	in	effect,	this	sentiment	has	become	the	main	motif	behind	 human	 actions’.	 More	 specifically,	 Raymond	 considered	 that	 two	 things	were	 capable	 of	moving	men:	 the	 search	 for	 self-love	 and	 that	 of	 the	 esteem	 of	others.	 The	 first	 was	 reserved	 only	 for	 the	 sages,	 who	 could	 understand	 its	complex	 import	 and	 not	 give	 in	 to	 pride.	 Public	 appreciation,	 in	 turn,	 ‘has	 a	stronger	empire	over	the	common	man’	and,	by	appealing	to	vanity	alone,	was	the	‘best	 means	 to	 develop	 the	 common	 passion	 and	 ordinary	 penchants	 of	 social	man’.196	Indeed,	it	was	‘the	basis	of	all	moral	order	in	human	society’.197	He	asked,	‘Where	is	the	man	who	attaches	no	importance	to	the	esteem	of	the	good	(gens	de	
bien)?’.198	In	 this	 tendency	 to	 mutual	 dependency,	 he	 claimed	 to	 have	 found	 ‘a	universal	philanthropy,	a	mutual	commerce	of	sentiments	and	succours,	a	mutual	exchange	 of	 affections	 and	 esteem’	 capable	 of	 leading	 ‘men	 to	 perfect	 and	 help	themselves	mutually’.199	If	the	individual	‘has	ceaselessly	come	to	take	the	opinion	of	others	as	the	regulator	of	his	actions’,	 ‘then	here	you	will	see	the	sentiment	of	
																																																								195	Ibid.,	p.	149.	196	Raymond,	Essai	sur	l’émulation,	p.	14.	197	Ibid.,	p.	277.	198	Ibid.,	p.	44.	199	Ibid.,	p.	272.	
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emulation	 necessarily	 become	 generalized	 and	 powerful	 in	 society,	 spread	 in	 all	classes,	and	become	the	most	powerful	goad	of	human	actions’.200			Raymond	was	very	critical	of	the	free	market,	that	‘system	of	incoherence’	leading	to	 ‘the	 violent	 state	 of	 a	 daily	 and	 cruel	 struggle!’201	And	 yet	 emulation	 was	 a	completely	different	 form	of	 competition.	Antagonism,	 jealousy,	vanity,	 ambition,	and	other	 ‘vices	are	the	 fruit	not	of	emulation	 itself,	but	of	 the	bad	direction	 it	 is	given	 and	 the	 disorderly	 applications	 it	 receives’.202	Therefore,	 the	 presence	 of	authority,	whether	 in	the	classroom	or	society,	was	what	made	the	system	work.	For	 	 ‘one	 can	 conceive	 of	 a	 system	 of	 useful	 emulation	 founded	 upon	 a	 wise	opinion,	that	only	grants	its	sensible	suffrage	to	those	who	merit	 it’.203	Emulation	was	both	natural	 and	 the	main	driver	of	human	action.	But	what	determined	 its	outcome	and	direction?	‘[W]hat	will	be	the	character	of	the	results	it	will	produce?	This	 character	 will	 vary	 with	 the	 regulating	 opinion	 (l’opinion	 régulatrice)’.204	Understood	as	 ‘wise’	or	 ‘regulating	opinion’,	authority	seemed	rather	diffuse	and	divided	into	three	tiers.	One	was	born	out	of	internal	comparison.	Happiness	and	contentment	become	conditional	on	one’s	attainment	of	what	one	believed	 to	be	one’s	absolute	perfection:	‘penetrated	by	his	own	grandeur,	he	will	not	be	satisfied	of	 himself	 until	 the	 moment	 when	 we	 will	 have	 acquired	 all	 the	 improvement	(perfectionnement)	 that	 his	 faculties	 seem	 to	 promise	 him’.205	Another	 depended	on	authority	figures:	‘his	satisfaction	will	not	be	complete	until	he	has	acquired	the	
																																																								200	Ibid.,	p.	83-84.	201	Ibid.,	p.	274.	202	Ibid.,	p.	282.	203	Ibid.,	p.	280.	204	Ibid.,	p.	84.	205	Ibid.,	p.	33.	
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approbation	of	 the	masters	of	his	 art,	who	are	 like	 the	 custodians	of	 the	general	opinion	 in	 this	 regard	 and	 of	 the	 proper	 rules	 to	 determine	 the	 true	 merit	 of	productions’.206	And	 a	 further	 one	 extended	 to	 one’s	 equals:	 ‘man	 cannot	 be	completely	 satisfied	 of	 his	 opinion	 unless	 it	 is	 confirmed	 by	 that	 of	 the	 greatest	number,	 thus	 the	 sage	must	 necessarily	 desire	 the	 suffrage	 of	 common	 opinion,	and	that	his	esteem	will	not	seem	founded	and	whole	unless	the	opinions	of	other	sages	has	granted	him	the	proof	of	the	justness	of	his	own’.207	But	what	ultimately	gave	meaning	 to	 these	 three	 forms	 of	 judgement	 and	made	 them	 come	 together	fruitfully	was	the	presence	of	authoritative	superiors,	providing	clear	rules	for	the	contest	among	equals	and	a	 final	verdict.	 ‘The	happy	writer	who	has	enlightened	judges	 has	 just	 received	 the	 highest	 award	 only	 experiences	 a	 joy	 that	 is	subordinate	 to	 the	 esteem	 received:	 it	 is	 in	 the	 superiority	 of	 his	 judges	 that	 he	seeks	 above	 all	 everything	 that	 in	 his	 success	 flatters	 him;	 it	 is	 then	 in	 the	 very	merit	 of	his	 competitors	 that	he	 finds	 the	proof	of	his	 glory,	 because	 there	 is	no	honour	in	triumphing	over	idiots’.208		Regarding	 education,	 since	 emulation	 was	 in	 human	 nature,	 it	 could	 not	 be	excluded	from	schools:	‘despite	efforts,	precautions,	and	selected	circumstances,	it	will	 re-establish	 itself	 alone’. 209 	Yet	 Raymond	 dismissed	 existing	 pedagogical	approaches:	 ‘directed	 liberty,	 the	 student’s	 personal	 interest,	 a	 felt	 utility,	 direct	advantage	 resulting	 from	 things,	 etc’.210	None	 of	 these	 worked.	 Any	 attempt	 to	awaken	 ‘the	gradual	curiosity	of	the	student,	practices	that	suppose	an	unlimited																																																									206	Ibid.,	p.	37.	207	Ibid.,	p.	271.	208	Ibid.,	p.	11.	209	Ibid.,	p.	278.	210	Ibid.,	p.	279.	
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amount	 of	 time,	 circumstances,	 means	 of	 all	 kinds’,	 went	 down	 a	 dangerous	path.211	Civilization	could	not	endure	if	every	man	had	to	discover	the	world	anew.	This	 was	 ‘a	 practice	 that	 in	 each	 man	 would	 make	 the	 sciences	 and	 arts	 slip	backwards	 into	 their	 infancy’,	 one	 ‘that	would	 thus	 restart	 in	 each	 individual[…]	the	long	institution	of	the	species’,	actions	that	would	inevitably	‘arrest	all	progress	and	all	discovery’.212	In	 turn,	and	among	both	men	and	nations,	 ‘Emulation	 is	 the	only	fuel	for	the	flames	of	reason	and	genius;	only	it	can	perpetuate	the	reign	of	the	arts	and	letters,	and	it	is	the	only	means	we	have	left	to	conserve,	in	the	midst	of	universal	corruption,	any	trace	of	virtue	among	men’.213		‘In	providing	always	a	model	 for	 itself,	emulation	only	seeks	out	 those	who	have	merit’.214	But	how	did	one	discern	merit?	What	were	the	conditions	of	its	legibility?	Raymond	 considered	 that	 no	 merit	 is	 absolute;	 ‘we	 only	 perceive	 it	 through	comparison’.215	Thus,	comparison,	as	the	gap	between	one	and	the	other,	between	the	real	and	the	ideal,	was	not	only	the	mechanism	of	emulation,	but	became	the	grid	through	which	we	made	sense	of	reality.	 ‘We	only	 judge	what	 is	beautiful	 in	nature	 because	 we	 find	 imperfections	 there;	 we	 only	 know	 merit	 by	 the	 lacks	(défaut)	 that	 have	 preceded	 it,	 or	 that	 can	 follow	 it’.216	These	 ‘lacks	 are	 more	sensible	when	 the	 absent	qualities	 are	more	numerous’.217	Equally,	 the	 contrasts	are	more	readily	apparent	when	the	sample	of	individuals	under	consideration	is	greater,	 since	 ‘it	 is	 only	by	 comparing	many	 individuals	of	 the	 same	 species	 that																																																									211	Ibid.,	p.	280-281.	212	Ibid.,	p.	281.	213	Ibid.,	p.	287.	214	Ibid.,	p.	12.	215	Ibid.,	p.	16.	216	Ibid.,	p.	17.	217	Ibid.	
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what	 can	 discern	 he	 who	 surpasses	 the	 others	 in	merit’.218	Indeed,	 in	 Raymond	comparison	 becomes	 the	 very	 theoretical	 key	 to	 human	 cognition	 in	 general.	‘Everything	 is	 comparison	 in	 our	 judgments;	 everything	 in	 our	 knowledge	 is	 the	fruit	 of	 comparison’.219	This	 is	 especially	 the	 case	 among	 the	 unlearned,	 since	‘contrast	renders	comparison	easier	and	brings	it	to	the	level	of	understanding	of	the	 vulgar’.220	But	 comparison	 was	 also	 the	 only	 way	 to	 validate	 knowledge	 by	comparing	it	with	the	‘collective	reason	that	seems	to	dominate	all	the	individuals’.	‘The	 identity	 in	organization,	 conformation,	nature	 [and]	 the	 intimate	bonds	 that	bring	 together	 all	men	make	 them	appreciate	 the	 exterior	 judgment	 as	 a	 sort	 of	complement	to	his	own,	as	the	proof	of	its	accuracy’.221		Comparison,	 turned	 into	 never-ending	 computing,	 was	 also	 the	 basic	 duty	 and	inescapable	 fate	 of	 the	 civilized.	 ‘The	 social	man	 thus	must	 carry	 out	 a	 study	 to	know	himself	 and	 to	become	aware	of	 all	 the	 consequences	 that,	 in	 the	order	of	society,	 derive	 from	 the	 primitive	 laws	 of	 nature;	 and	 if	 he	wants	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	clear	 account	 of	 the	 place	 he	 occupies,	 of	 that	which	 he	 has	 to	 do	 in	 society,	 he	must	cast	his	eyes	towards	his	equals	and	measure	himself	up	against	them’.222		As	Raymond’s	verbose	prose	unravel,	it	becomes	clear	that	‘the	measure	of	merit’	was	in	fact	a	series	of	simple	mathematical	and	measuring	operations.223	Thus	‘one	can	 only	 determine	 a	 degree	 of	merit	 by	 adding	up	 the	degrees	 that	 it	 has	 been	
																																																								218	Ibid.,	p.	24.	Emphasis	added.		219	Ibid.,	p.	18.	220	Ibid.	221	Ibid.,	p.	36.	222	Ibid.,	p.	27.	223	Ibid.,	p.	24.	
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necessary	to	transverse	to	get	there,	or	by	its	distance	to	perfection,	or,	better	yet,	by	both	simultaneously’.224	In	other	words,	‘in	order	to	judge	properly	the	merit	of	each	thing,	it	is	necessary	that	we	have	presented	the	mind	with	the	common	sum	of	 qualities	 that	 are	 suitable	 to	 its	 nature	 and	 purpose;	 we	 have	 to	 tally	 (nous	
rendions	 une	 sorte	 de	 compte)	 those	 qualities	 that	 are	 missing,	 those	 that	 are	present	 compared	 to	 what	 it	 could	 be’.225Adding	 and	 subtracting	 were	 thus	possible	because	the	yardstick	of	perfection	was	so	readily	at	hand.	There	was	 ‘a	sort	of	scale	(échelle),	a	total	sum	of	merit,	which	taken	together	is	the	result	of	the	common	measure	 of	 human	 forces;	 and	 it	 is	 upon	 this	 scale	 that	 each	man	will	appreciate	his	 own	merit’.226	Each	person’s	position,	 although	 constantly	 shifting	in	this	scale,	going	up	or	down	depending	on	good	or	bad	actions,	could	be	located	precisely.	The	gap	between	the	actual	and	the	ideal	was	thus	spatialized.	It	became	a	template	that	could	be	projected	and	mapped	onto	social	reality,	now	converted,	thanks	 to	 the	 prodigy	 of	 calculus,	 into	 an	 unmediated	 two-dimensional	 space	where	 the	 exact	 coordinates	 of	 every	 individual’s	 position	 in	 the	 scale	 of	 power,	reason,	and	merit	could	be	determined	with	precision.		In	 Raymond’s	 time,	 this	 odd	 application	 of	 mathematics	 had	 been	 common	 for	more	 than	 a	 century,	 when	 ‘assumptions	 about	 the	 stability	 and	 uniformity	 of	natural	 causes	were	 controversially	 extended	 to	 the	moral	 realm’.227	As	Lorraine	Daston	has	shown,	‘Almost	from	the	inception	of	mathematical	probability	[at	the	dawn	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century],	 the	 classical	 probabilists	 had	 hoped	 that	 their	
																																																								224	Ibid.,	p.	16.	225	Ibid.,	p.	23.	226	Ibid.,	pp.	25-26.	227	Lorraine	Daston,	Classical	Probability	in	the	Enlightenment	(Princeton,	1988),	p.	296.	
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calculus	 would	 mathematize	 what	 were	 then	 called	 the	 moral	 sciences:	jurisprudence,	political	economy,	and	other	studies	of	social	relations’.228	Based	on	the	 idea	 that	 ‘every	 individual	 possessed	 a	 certain	 amount	 of	 lumières	 that	determined	the	accuracy	of	his	judgement	on	each	and	every	occasion’,	the	use	of	calculus	 in	what	the	marquis	de	Condorcet	would	 later	term	‘social	mathematics’	could	 thus	 rationalize	 and	 objectify	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 previously	 incoherent	phenomena.	 One	 notorious	 application	 sought	 to	 determine	 the	 statistical	probabilities	 of	 accurate	 testimony	 and	 of	 just	 judgments	 in	 the	 courtroom.229	However,	 by	 the	 1840s,	 those	 looking	 back	 at	 the	 probabilists’	 work,	 were	‘shocked	 by	 the	 insouciance	 with	 which	 their	 predecessors	 had	 quantified	 the	unquantifiable:	 veracity,	 credulity,	 enlightenment,	 perspicacity	were	 all	 assigned	numerical	values’.230	Although	the	mathematical	methods	and	assumptions	of	men	like	Raymond	were	challenged	by	 the	 following	generation,	 the	same	was	not	 so	with	the	conclusions	that	had	been	arrived	at	through	these.	In	particular,	the	use	of	mathematics	for	the	unproblematic	ranking	and	grading	of	merit,	morality	and	performance	in	the	classroom	remained	unchallenged.			One	 anonymous	 entry	 had	 responded	 the	 Institut’s	 question	 with	 a	 resounding	‘no’.	The	author	decried	that	‘through	emulation	we	habituate	the	minority	of	the	students	to	surpass	the	rest,	to	think	of	themselves	as	their	superiors;	and,	in	turn,	the	large	majority	to	seeing	themselves	surpassed	and	seeing	themselves	in	some	way	 is	 inferior!.231 	It	 also	 disqualified	 the	 student	 in	 another	 way	 ‘when	 in	
																																																								228	Ibid.	229	Ibid.,	pp.	296-298.	230	Ibid.,	p.	305.	231	Anonymous,	Mémoire	contre	l’émulation	([s.l.],	[1800?]),	pp.	104-105.	
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education	 youth	 is	 accustomed	 to	 bend	 continuously	 its	 opinions,	 tastes,	 [and]	reason	before	books,	that	is,	before	the	written	authority’.232	At	best,	it	was	simply	unnecessary.	 ‘Do	animals	have	emulation?	No:	yet	 they	all	have	activity,	self-love	and	 carry	 themselves	 with	 ardour	 together	 or	 separately	 towards	 what	 brings	them	 pleasure.	 Man,	 like	 animals,	 could	 thus,	 without	 emulation,	 exercise	 his	activity,	self-love,	and	embrace	what	he	desires’.233	The	educative	task,	even	within	a	new	economy	of	punishment	and	reward,	could	perfectly	be	imagined	without	it.		On	 the	 contrary,	 offer	 rewards	 to	 everyone	 who	 behaves	 well,	 and	 who	 has	acquired	a	certain	sum	of	knowledge:	in	order	to	arrive	at	the	desired	reward,	he	will	 not	 have	 to	 compare	 his	 conduct	 or	 knowledge	 to	 those	 of	 others,	 and	 be	superior	 to	 them;	but	 rather	only	acquire	 the	demanded	knowledge	and	conduct	himself	well.234	Everyone’s	 activity	 could	 thus	 be	 directed	 ‘without	 comparison	 to	 others’,	 since	success	no	longer	depended	on	competition.		But	 emulation	 also	 had	 profound	 political	 consequences,	 the	 anonymous	 author	argued.	Emulation	was	 ‘in	a	ceaseless	and	open	war	against	any	idea	of	equality’.	This	 meant	 that	 its	 exercise	 would	 ‘ceaselessly	 attack	 and	 undermine’	 the	 very	‘constitutional	basis	of	Government’.235	But	the	solution	offered	by	the	author	also	depended	on	a	mathematics	of	social	bliss.	The	alternative	‘organization	of	things	and	persons’	he	proposed	would	rest	on	examinations,	which	would	signal	out	the	social	 elites	 in	 each	 field:	 those	 with	 best	 marks.	 Having	 thus	 identified	 the	indisputably	talented,	these	would	be	carried	to	the	vacancies	reserved	for	them	in																																																									232	Ibid.,	p.	104.		233	Ibid.,	p.	108.	234	Ibid.,	p.	112.	235	Ibid.,	pp.	105-106.	
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‘marches	triomphales’,	‘marches	at	least	as	glorious,	political,	and	useful	as	those	of	the	victorious	ancient	athletes’.	The	five	best	in	each	professional	category	(twelve	in	total)	would	be	appointed	to	the	senate.236	‘As	far	as	the	students	that	were	not	chosen,	they	will	feel	that	knowledge	and	merit	alone	give	right	to	rewards.	From	then	on,	 the	desire	 to	work,	do	good,	 [and]	conduct	 themselves	well	will	become	the	 dominant	 desires	 since	 they	 will	 be	 the	 only	 ones	 prone	 to	 lead	 to	 the	applauses,	 praise,	 and	 honours	 of	 the	 triumphs	 sought’.237	These	 wishes	 ‘will	substitute	advantageously	 the	desire	 to	surpass	one’s	equals,	 source	of	vices	and	public	unhappiness’.238		The	 men	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 literary	 competition	 opened	 by	 the	 Institut	national	in	1800	defined	the	basic	premises	of	a	new	pedagogy	of	competition	that	would	 remain	 unchanged	 into	 the	 next	 century.	 It	 was	 devised	 as	 a	 technology	capable	 of	 instilling	 in	 individuals	 the	 new	 ethics,	 logics	 and	 techniques	 of	psychological	 government	 of	 the	 self	 and	 others.	 While	 this	 discussion	 of	emulation	had	no	immediate	impact,	it	would	be	revisited	by	the	next	generation.	Among	 them	was	Guizot,	who	would	 place	 emulation	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 French	educational	 system	 he	 designed,	 a	 centrality	 that	 went	 unchallenged	 until	 the	1890s,	when	the	rise	of	a	new	type	of	self	required	new	pedagogical	technologies.					
																																																								236	Ibid.,	p.	113-116.	237	Ibid.,	pp.	116-117.	238	Ibid.,	p.	117.	
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The	effort	of	vanity.		The	government	of	merit	through	emulation	developed	along	two	different	paths	in	nineteenth-century	France.	The	first,	which	Oliver	Ihl	has	analysed	for	the	Third	Republic,	concerned	the	production	of	social	role	models	for	others	to	emulate.	It	responded	to	the	need,	felt	throughout	the	century,	to	generate	a	new	aristocracy	that	would	remain	compatible	with	a	democratic	society.	The	means	to	do	this	was	through	 prizes	 and	 honorary	 distinctions	 in	 all	 fields	 of	 school,	 social,	 economic	and	 political	 life.	 Awarded	 by	 state	 institutions	 or	 private	 bodies	 alike,	 it	encompassed	from	the	Légion	d'Honneur	and	the	panoply	of	official	and	academic	accolades	available	to	statesmen	or	diligent	rural	wet-nurses,	to	the	vast	network	of	provincial	sociétés	d’émulation	recognizing	the	merit	of	the	most	loyal	servants	and	 workers.	 It	 marked	 the	 transition	 from	 the	 Old-Regime	 sense	 of	 honour,	derived	 from	 blood,	 body,	 and	 lineage,	 to	 the	 modern	 obsession	 with	 public	
honours	 and	 distinctions	 as	 proof	 of	 merit.	 ‘Émulation	 honorifique’,	 ‘émulation	premiale’,	 or	 ‘déférance	 démocratique’,	 this	 was	 a	 vast	 project	 of	 social	stratification	 and	 impersonal	 disciplining	 that	 operated	 through	 the	institutionalization	 and	 socialization	 of	 the	 state-sanctioned	means	 of	merit	 and	superiority	 that	become	tied	 to	public	utility.239	Distinguished	men	showcased	as	role	 models	 were	 the	 necessary	 representation	 and	 embodiment	 of	 a	 formally	equal	society	founded	on	unequal	merit.	 ‘The	highest	level	of	human	wisdom	and	science	is	not	for	all	to	attain’;	Raymond	asserted,	‘but	it	is	important	nonetheless	for	 it	 to	be	before	everyone’s	eyes,	either	to	encourage	those	who	think	they	can	arrive,	 or	 to	 offer	 the	measure	 of	 his	 own	 success	 to	 he	 who	 can	 only	 advance																																																									239	Olivier	 Ihl,	Le	mérite	et	 la	République:	Essai	 sur	 la	 société	des	émules	(Paris,	 2007);	 ‘Emulation	through	decoration:	A	science	of	government?’,	in:	Sudhir	Hazareesingh	(ed.),	The	Jacobin	legacy	in	
Modern	France	(Oxford,	2002),	pp.	158-182.	
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towards	it’.240	When	great	men	were	displayed	in	public,	it	could	awaken	the	latent	potential	within	some.	‘A	young	soldier	of	the	Patrie,	destined	to	shock	the	world,	carries	within	him	the	seed	of	all	human	greatness;	he	glances	upon	the	heroes	and	the	great	men	who	have	 lived,	he	sizes	up	the	whole	carrier	of	glory,	and	breaks	through	 to	 it	with	 audacity’.241	The	 rest	 of	 society	 found	 in	 exceptional	men	 the	proof	of	 their	 inferiority	 and	 the	 justification	 to	 accept	 and	 resign	 themselves	 to	their	situation.			The	 second	 form	 of	 emulation,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 was	characterized	precisely	by	the	absence	of	any	permanent	marker	of	merit,	the	lack	of	any	fixed	positions,	and	the	inability	to	possess	distinction.	It	belonged	to	a	new	day-to-day	 tallying	 of	 individual	 worth	 whose	 efficacy	 derived	 precisely	 from	
changeability.	Today’s	merit	being	no	guarantee	of	future	value,	this	practical	form	of	emulation	allocated	social	worth	as	a	stock	market,	its	ups	and	downs	meaning	that	no-one	could	rest	on	his	or	her	laurels,	that	no	position	was	permanent.			One	 of	 Bentham’s	 works	 to	 be	 originally	 published	 in	 French	 was	 Théorie	 des	
Récompenses,	edited	in	1811	by	Etienne	Dumont	on	the	basis	of	manuscripts	from	the	1770s	and	1780s.	This	work	outlined	 the	 issue	of	punishments	 and	 rewards	that	was	so	central	for	Bentham’s	thought.	For	Bentham,	individuals	were	always	driven	 by	 egotistical	 calculations	 to	 maximize	 their	 benefit,	 which	 often	 came	down	to	running	from	pain	and	towards	pleasure.	But	the	pain	of	loss	was	always	greater	than	the	joy	of	gain,	and	to	lose	honour	or	feel	lesser	that	one’s	peers	was	
																																																								240	Raymond,	Essai	sur	l’émulation,	p.	26.	241	Ibid.,	p.	10.	
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as	painful	as	monetary	 loss.	For	civil	servants	 in	particular,	 the	text	explored	the	issue	 of	 how	 to	 govern	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 reputation	 through	 an	 ‘economy	 of	emulation’.	 This	was	 an	 ‘economy’	 because	 it	 had	 to	 take	 carefully	 consider	 the	right	balance	between	individual	pleasure	and	pain	needed	to	generate	the	desired	behaviour,	and	the	allocation	of	scarce	rewards	among	competitors.	The	point	was	to	mobilize	hope,	 ‘the	most	precious	of	all	goods’,	to	generate	competition	for	the	limited	 reward	 of	 gains	 in	 reputation.242	He	 compared	 it	 to	 a	 lottery,	 in	which	 a	limited	 and	 inexpensive	 reward	 was	 able	 to	 generate	 a	 huge	 volume	 of	expectations.	Hope	was	greater	and	more	durable	than	the	prize	of	the	winner,	as	was	 the	 benefit	 of	 increased	 production.	 In	 turn,	 the	 painful	 frustration	 of	 loss	could	be	avoided	by	continuous	competition,	so	that	there	was	always	more	hope	ahead.	‘Emulation	also	involves	the	management	of	the	opposed	motive	of	fear	or	“uneasiness”	(inquiétude)’.243	Under	fear	alone,	the	person	would	carry	out	the	task	as	 needed,	 but	 would	 only	 aspire	 to	 finish	 it.	 Instead,	 by	managing	 the	 hope	 of	reward	 and	 the	 fear	 of	 not	 getting	 it,	 emulation	 could	 sustain	 continuous	 effort.	The	 prize	 could	 not	 be	 fixed	 honours	 and	 distinctions,	 but	 rather	 the	 shifting	benefit	 of	 reputation,	 implying	 a	 mobile	 and	 continuous	 competition	 for	 the	rewards	 allocated	 by	 the	 ‘Tribunal	 of	 Public	 Opinion’,	 consisting	 of	 ‘appropriate	sentiments	of	love	and	respect’	as	well	as	in	‘the	special	good	will,	good	offices,	and	services,	 in	whatever	 shape,	 tangible	 or	 intangible,	 naturally	 flowing	 from	 these	sentiments’.244	This	 created	 a	 system	 in	which	 behaviour	 approved	 of	 by	 ‘public	
																																																								242	Quoted	 in:	 Marco	 E.	 L.	 Guidi,	 ‘Bentham’s	 economics	 of	 emulation’,	 conference	 paper	 (1999)	(available	at:	www.academia.edu/208499),	p.	11.	243	Ibid.,	p.	13.	244	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	24.	
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opinion’,	 received	 a	 reward	 that	 was	 always	 ‘strictly	 proportioned	 to	 the	 merit	attributed	to	each	individual’.245		In	 an	 essay	 on	 ‘the	 means	 of	 emulation’,	 Guizot,	 who	 as	 Rosanvallon	 has	 so	brilliantly	 shown	was	 the	 architect	 of	 the	new	 liberal	 statehood	 that	 emerged	 in	1830,	 took	 up	 the	 theme	 of	 educational	 emulation	 in	 1812,	 just	 a	 year	 after	Bentham’s	 work	 was	 published.246	He	 picked	 up	 the	 same	 threads	 of	 the	 1800	debate,	but	already	presented	them	in	the	form	they	would	retain	during	the	rest	of	the	century.	At	the	time,	it	was	clear	that	the	term	emulation	did	not	yet	stand	on	its	own	conceptually.	Guizot	wished	to	go	beyond	its	narrow	sense	of	‘that	type	of	 envy	 that	 excites	 to	 equal	 or	 surpass	 someone	 in	 something	 that	 is	 laudable’,	instead		I	will	take	the	liberty	to	take	the	word	émulation	in	a	larger	sense,	and	understand	by	means	of	 emulation	 all	 the	means	 that	 one	 can	 employ	 in	 order	 to	 excite	 the	activity	 of	 children	 and	 hasten	 their	 progress;	 means	 among	 which	 one	 finds	emulation	 itself,	 that	 is	 the	 rivalry	 among	 students.	 This	meaning,	 I	 know,	 is	 not	exactly	in	agreement	with	etymology	or	usage;	but	it	is	easy	to	grasp,	and	I	know	of	no	other	word	with	this	sense	that	can	comfortably	replace	it.247	While	not	mentioning	Bentham	or	including	references,	he	theorized	rewards	and	motivation	along	the	same	lines.	 ‘[U]ntil	he	can	love	it	 for	itself,	 independently	of	its	results’,	rewarding	the	child’s	accomplishment	of	duty	had	a	positive	effect	on	virtue,	 for	 it	 linked	 in	 the	child’s	mind	happiness	and	duty,	with	 the	 latter	as	 the	cause	 of	 the	 former.	 This	 established	 duty	 as	 a	 habit	 rather	 than	 derive	 it	 from	
																																																								245	Ibid.,	p.	24.	246	Rosanvallon,	Moment	Guizot.	247	Guizot,	Méditations,	pp.	281-282.	
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interest.	 To	 promise	 a	 reward	 or	 pleasure	 to	 a	 child	 killed	 the	 idea	 of	 duty	 by	fostering	self-interest.	For		the	task	may	be	well	performed,	but	he	will	not	have	learned	to	do	well;	the	efforts	of	 his	 will	 are	 to	 be	 only	 fleeting,	 and	 tomorrow,	 if	 you	 do	 not	 propose	 a	 new	pleasure,	you	will	run	the	risk	of	seeing	him	work	very	badly.		Instead	 it	was	necessary	 to	 teach	 the	 child	 that	 all	 happiness	depended	on	duty.	This	would	make	dutiful	conduct	 ‘the	object	of	 free	and	sustained	efforts	of	 their	will’,	their	‘single	end,	the	object	of	the	student’s	desire’.	The	aim	was	‘to	inspire	in	the	child	that	good-will	that	drives	him	to	do	himself,	constantly	and	with	zeal,	the	efforts	necessary	 to	 succeed	and	advance	 in	his	 studies’.248	The	means	 to	do	 this	was	 by	managing	 the	 child’s	 sense	 of	 self-worth	 and	 vanity	 ‘without	 dispute	 the	most	powerful’	motive	to	human	action.249	Guizot	wanted	to	harness	for	schooling	the	energy	and	‘disposition	that	works	so	naturally	for	the	benefit	of	their	play’.250	By	 attaching	 approval	 to	 a	 certain	 way	 of	 acting	 towards	 certain	 ends,	 amour-
propre	 ‘gives	 his	 efforts	 that	 spontaneity,	 that	 concentration	 of	 forces	 without	which	his	progress	will	never	be	big,	or	sure,	or	quick.	Shaken	in	all	his	being	by	a	naturally	active	and	restless	sentiment,	he	moves	by	his	own	impulse,	and	deploys	all	he	possesses	in	liberty	and	power	in	order	to	satisfy	it’.251	Parents	and	teachers	were	 to	 abstain	 from	 repressing	 the	 child’s	 vanity,	 since	 children	 had	 an	 even	greater	need	for	it	than	adults.	Since	children	were	‘devoid	of	opinions,	often	even	of	ideas	on	the	merit	and	value	of	what	they	do	and	see’,	they	relied	entirely	on	the	exterior.	 So,	 ‘it	 is	 to	 the	outside	 that	 they	ask	what	 they	 should	 think	and	do’.252	
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This	dependence	on	parental	approval	 ‘so	well	 in	accord	with	their	situation	and	ignorance’,	 had	 to	 become	 the	 instrument	 for	 their	 direction	 and	 to	 encourage	them	‘to	do	and	love	all	that	is	good’.253	But	for	that	it	was	necessary	to	know	when	to	applaud	them.	Adults	‘should	never	praise	them	for	what	has	not	depended	on	their	will,	what	has	not	cost	 them	effort	or	sacrifice’,	 for	what	was	not	sustained	and	more	or	less	difficult,	even	if	it	was	virtuous.	Men,	after	all,	needed	to	learn	to	find	 their	 own	motivation	 for	 the	 ‘fruit	 of	 fatigues’	 requiring	work	 and	 sacrifice.	Therefore,	 no	 complements	were	 to	 be	 given	 for	 spontaneous	movements,	 good	sentiments,	 surges	of	 the	heart,	 natural	disposition,	 and	 talents.	These	had	 to	be	devalued,	 for	 ‘they	need	 to	know	 that	 there	 is	no	merit	other	 than	 in	what	 costs	something’;	praise	could	only	be	bought	at	the	price	of	effort.254	Instead,	it	was	best	to	 teach	 children	 to	 see	 their	 natural	 attributes	 as	 ‘a	 portion	 of	 themselves’.	 His	examples	 were	 a	 girl	 with	 a	 good	 heart	 and	 a	 generous	 soul	 or	 a	 boy	 with	intelligence.	Rather	than	celebrate	the	latter’s	intellect,	it	should	be	used	to	govern	him,	by	saying	‘a	child	who	has	intelligence	should	do	this	or	that’.255			As	a	preparation	 for	a	productive	adult	 life,	school	was	meant	 to	be	a	 training	 in	exertion.	 ‘The	work	of	 learning	costs	 the	child’,	 and	he	was	not	 to	be	praised	 for	natural	superiority,	progress,	or	success	in	schooling,	but	only	for	 ‘his	efforts	and	hard	work’.256	This	would	make	 the	child	 focus	on	 ‘his	 superiors’	 rather	 than	his	peers;	 ‘he	 expects	 only	 from	 them	 the	 reward	 he	 ambitions;	 and	 it	 is	 a	 good	sentiment	to	desire	the	esteem	and	praise	of	his	superiors’.	Children	‘feel	that	their	
																																																								253	Ibid.,	p.	295.	254	Ibid.,	p.	299.	255	Ibid.,	p.	297.	256	Ibid.,	p.	300.	
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parents	and	teachers	are	still	well	above	them	in	reason	and	knowledge	(savoir);	in	seeking	their	approval,	it	is	to	this	superiority	that	they	pay	homage’.257			In	fact,	their	amour-propre	had	to	be	directed	towards	seeking	approval	from	their	betters.	 With	 one’s	 inferiors,	 success	 was	 too	 easy;	 with	 one’s	 equals	 it	degenerated	 in	 competition;	 ‘with	 our	 superiors,	 we	 tend	 to	 constantly	 elevate	ourselves,	and	this	 is	always	a	noble	tendency’.	Since	the	latter	case	required	the	awareness	and	recognition	of	the	other’s	superiority,	pride	and	vanity	were	kept	in	check.	 Guizot	 thus	 very	 clearly	 rejected	 an	 emulation	 among	 equals	 that	 was	nothing	but	rivalry.	Instead,	emulation	should	be	the	desire	to	compete	with	others	and	oneself	 in	effort	 in	order	 to	gain	 the	approval	of	 those	at	 the	 top.	 If	 the	eyes	were	on	the	reward,	then	the	goal	could	not	be	to	vanquish	another,	‘but	to	attain	rewards	and	honours	offered	equally	to	all,	 towards	which	they	all	march	on	the	same	path,	and	which	excite	vividly	enough	their	desires	to	absorb	their	attention’.	If	 their	 attention	was	 on	 the	 prize,	 it	 could	 be	 stopped	 ‘from	 fixing	 itself	 on	 the	obstacles	that	 the	superiority	of	 the	strongest	opposes	to	the	success	of	 the	 least	advanced’.	 In	other	words,	by	 fixating	on	 the	reward	being	offered	 to	all	equally,	competitors	would	be	distracted	from	the	fact	that	it	was	not	a	fair	game,	since	the	naturally	 strong	 would	 always	 have	 an	 advantage.	 Only	 the	 participant’s	recognition	 of	 the	 superiority	 of	 the	 reward-allocator	 gave	meaning	 to	 this	 new	model	 of	 competition	 among	 equals	 that	 generated	 an	 actual	 experience	 of	equality,	 but	 in	 the	 end	 only	 validated	 and	 magnified	 pre-existing	 inequalities,	further	 reinforcing	 superiority.	 Authority	was	 the	 starting	 and	 finishing	 point	 of	the	 system	 designed	 to	 reproduce	 it	 in	 a	 very	 specific	 hierarchical	 fashion.	 ‘The																																																									257	Ibid.,	p.	301.	
	 162	
motive	of	all	these	exercises	is	the	classification	of	students	by	degrees	[or	levels],	a	classification	that	nothing	can	replace	and	that	is	the	very	essence	of	the	system.	Not	only	must	 the	 students	be	 ranked	 [by	 level],	 but	 they	 should	 also	be	 among	themselves’.258	Each	 student	 occupied	 a	 numerical	 place	 in	 the	 class,	 and	would	lose	or	gain	places	depending	on	behaviour	or	performance.	One	education	manual	read:	 Here	are	the	penalties	to	inflict:	1. The	 student	 who	 works	 without	 attention,	 who	 responds	 absentmindedly,	descends	one	place.	2. The	insubordinate	student	is	placed	at	the	queue	of	his	division.259	In	a	way,	all	but	the	last-ranked	participant	gained	a	victory	over	someone	in	the	competition.	‘Édouard	is	forced	to	cede	the	first	place	to	Alphonse,	but	he	obtained	the	second	place	over	Henri,	he	the	third	over	Auguste,	and	so	on;	each	feels	he	still	needs	 to	 advance,	 and	 nobody	 is	 humiliated,	 because	 nobody	 is	 entirely	 on	 the	ground,	if	not	for	the	last	one,	who	is	not	the	one	it	matters	to	be	concerned	about	most’.260	All	 were	 assigned	 a	 place	 and	 a	 value	 within	 the	 hierarchy,	 and	 the	exclusion	of	the	last	one	guaranteed	a	victory	over	someone	for	the	rest.		Named	 after	 the	 then	 education	 minister	 and	 based	 on	 Cousin’s	 reports	 on	Prussian	schooling,	the	1833	Guizot	law	made	France	the	second	country	to	boast	a	modern	education	system.	 It	was	also	 the	 first	 liberal	welfare	 law	 in	France;	 it	recognized	a	right	to	free	schooling	for	indigent	families.	For	the	fifty	years	the	law	
																																																								258	A.	 de	 Rambures,	 ‘Mémoire	 sur	 l’enseignement	 populaire	 et	 simultané	 de	 la	 lecture	 par	 la	musique	et	réciproquement',	Mémoires	de	la	Société	d'émulation	d'Abbeville,	6	(1849),	p.	280.	259	L.	Lamotte,	Manuel	des	aspirants	aux	brevets	de	capacité…	(Paris,	1837),	pp.	374-375.	260	Guizot,	Méditations,	p.	304.	
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was	in	force	and	beyond,	emulation	would	feature	prominently	in	the	educational	horizon	of	the	nineteenth	century.		
The	emulation	of	all.		Shortly	after	Guizot’s	text	and	immediately	after	the	regime	change	in	1815,	there	emerged	 a	 bitter	 antagonism	 between	 two	 different	 pedagogical	 systems.	 Both	methods	 were	 designed	 for	 large	 groups	 of	 students	 subjected	 to	 constant	competition	and	military	organization	and	discipline.	The	 ‘simultaneous	method’	was	based	on	the	methods	that	saint	 Jean-Baptiste	de	La	Salle	had	created	in	the	late	 seventeenth	 century	 and	 was	 applied	 in	 the	 schools	 of	 some	 Catholic	congregations.	 What	 was	 characteristic	 of	 this	 system	 was	 that	 it	 introduced	schooling	as	we	know	it	today:	one	class	of	students	receiving	lessons	in	common,	simultaneously	 from	one	 teacher.	 Its	 rival	became	 the	 ‘mutual	method’,	 invented	simultaneously	by	Englishmen	Andrew	Bell	 and	 Joseph	Lancaster	 towards	1800.	Promoted	 by	 the	 Société	 pour	 l’instruction	 élémentaire,	 it	 became	 a	 rallying	banner	 for	 French	 political	 liberalism	 under	 the	 Restoration.	 It	 used	 a	 complex	system	of	pupils	acting	as	monitors	to	teach	and	supervise	their	peers.			Thus	 the	 political	 confrontations	 of	 the	 time	where	 channelled	 into	 a	 proxy	war	over	pedagogy.	The	political	 triumph	of	 the	 liberal	 Party	 in	1830	gave	 a	 fleeting	advantage	 to	 the	mutual	model	 before	 the	 government’s	 sympathy	 turned	 to	 its	rival	 in	 1832.	 From	 then	 ‘the	 two	 methods	 tend	 to	 converge,	 get	 confused,	 in	unequal	 proportions,	 into	 a	mixed	 system,	 the	 result	 of	 a	 long	 emulation	 and	 of	
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experience’.261 	Both	 systems	 would	 end	 up	 merging	 towards	 the	 mid	 1840s,	constituting	 the	 basis	 of	 modern	 French	 pedagogy.	 While	 the	 partisans	 of	 both	methods	fought	each	other	with	the	zealot	vehemence	of	any	factional	dispute	of	the	time,	they	constituted	a	united	front	in	their	defence	of	educational	emulation	and	against	all	other	pedagogical	approaches.	This	 included	a	rejection	of	foreign	models	and	a	vigorous	attack	on	the	two	alternative	French	pedagogical	traditions:	first,	schools	following	the	‘individual	method’	and,	second,	the	use	private	tutors	in	the	home.			The	notion	of	enseignement	individuel	was	only	coined	as	an	umbrella	term	during	the	 mutual-simultaneous	 debate	 in	 order	 to	 condemn	 every	 other	 method	 of	education	 in	 existence	 in	 France	 and	 later	 became	 an	 official	 term	as	 a	 result	 of	administrative	statistics	and	reports.	‘Individual	teaching	is	that	which	is	practiced	today	 [1837]	 in	 most	 of	 the	 French	 primary	 schools’.262	As	 it	 was	 depicted,	 the	‘individual’	 system	 involved	 a	 teacher	 receiving	 any	 number	 of	 students	 in	 a	classroom,	but	giving	no	lessons	in	common	to	all.	Instead,	the	teacher	called	to	his	desk	 one	 student	 at	 a	 time,	 assessing	 progress,	 correcting	mistakes,	 and	 setting	further	 work.	 Afterwards,	 the	 student	 would	 spend	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 time	 on	 the	assigned	tasks.	This	could	happen	some	six	times	during	the	school	day,	depending	on	 the	 number	 of	 subjects	 imparted	 and	 the	 length	 of	 the	 school	 day.	 The	 key	advantage	was	being	able	to	work	with	a	heterogeneous	group	of	levels	and	ages,	often	ages	three	to	seventeen,	in	the	same	class.	Each	student	could	learn	at	his	or	her	own	pace,	at	their	own	level,	taking	in	whatever	knowledge	they	could,	when																																																									261	Cayx,	 ‘Exposé	 de	 la	 situation	 de	 l’enseignement	 por	 l’année	 scolaire	 1850-1851…’,	 Journal	
général	de	l'instruction	publique	et	des	cultes,	21/26	(1852),	p.	194.	262	Baron	de	Gérando,	 ‘Enseignement	mutuel’,	Encyclopédie	des	gens	du	monde,	 9	 (Paris,	 1837),	p.	564.	
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they	 could	 attend	 and	 for	 however	 long	 before	 their	 parents	 required	 them	 to	work.	The	system	was	most	compatible	with	 the	real	differences	of	 the	students.	But	opponents	depicted	this	system	as	a	rural	archaism	and	a	waste	of	time.	In	his	textbook	 for	 schoolteachers,	 L.	 Lamotte,	 a	 primary	 school	 inspector	 in	 the	department	of	la	Seine,	estimated	that	in	an	average	class	following	the	individual	method,	each	student	received	no	more	than	nine	minutes	of	contact	time	with	the	teacher.	263	Another	 textbook	 calculated	 it	 was	 no	 more	 than	 two	 minutes	 per	day.264	And	that	was	in	the	optimistic	scenario	that	no	time	was	lost	to	discipline	problems.	Opponents	said	these	problems	were	common	since	the	rest	of	the	six-hour	school	day	was	spent	sitting	still	carrying	out	the	work	assigned,	which	most	interpreted	to	be	unsupervised	idleness.	The	baron	de	Gérando,	the	leading	French	theorist	 of	 beneficence	 from	 1820	 until	 his	 death	 in	 1842,	 agreed	 on	 this	 point,	stating	 that	 ‘each	 student,	 for	 a	 rather	 long	 time,	 remains	 abandoned	 to	himself;	deprived	of	all	direction	as	well	as	of	all	surveillance’.265	One	estimate	stated	that	students	‘are	left	to	idle	away	at	least	two-thirds	of	their	time,	under	the	name	of	preparing	 their	 lessons’.266	Besides	 idleness	 and	 lack	of	 supervision,	 this	method	lacked	the	advantages	of	emulation,	in	which	‘Each	child	observes	his	equals,	and	is	observed	by	them:	at	every	instant	he	deploys	every	effort	of	which	he	is	capable;	he	raises,	descends,	 climbs	back	up	again	 incessantly	at	 the	 level	of	his	merit’.267	The	1833	Guizot	law	would	ban	‘individual’	schooling.		
																																																								263	Lamotte,	Manuel	des	aspirants,	pp.	367-368.	264	M.	Matter,	Nouveau	manuel	des	écoles	primaires,	moyennes	et	normales	(Paris,	1836),	p.	71.	265	Gérando,	‘Enseignement	mutuel’,	p.	565.	266	Robert	Sullivan,	Lectures	and	Letters	on	Popular	Education	(Dublin,	1842),	p.	54.	267	Gérando,	‘Enseignement	mutuel’,	p.	565.	
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The	 supporters	 of	 mutual	 and	 simultaneous	 education	 equally	 attacked	 stay-at-home	 students.	 At	 home	 there	 was	 no	 emulation.	 Guizot	 argued	 that	 home	education	‘will	not	have	the	movement,	variety	or	uncertainties	of	the	emulation	in	the	 colléges’.	 Domestic	 emulation	 was	 either	 impossible	 because	 of	 physical	differences	among	siblings,	or	dangerous.	‘Parents	should	thus	be	very	careful	not	to	establish	habits	of	comparison	among	their	children,	and	especially	make	none	themselves’,	 since	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 bitter	 enmity.	 If	 competition	was	healthy	 at	school,	 it	was	because	 ‘rivalry	gets	 lost	 in	 the	number	of	competitors’.268	Then,	 it	was	 argued	 that	 only	 men	 with	mediocre	minds,	 no	 ambition,	 and	 incapable	 of	anything	else	could	take	on	the	position	of	private	tutor.	Men	of	any	talent	would	get	 bored	 and	 be	 unable	 to	 supervise	 and	 inspire	 the	 child	 properly.	 But	 more	importantly,	it	would	cripple	the	child’s	ability	for	social	life.	At	home,	‘One	sees	a	narrow	horizon	that	shrinks	ideas,	leaving	for	the	rest	of	one’s	life	the	fear	of	men	and	the	disgust	of	society’.269	As	Legitimist	baron	de	Bonald	argued,	Even	in	the	most	distinguished	domestic	education	the	child	sees	everyone	taking	care	of	him;	a	tutor	to	follow	him	around,	domestics	to	serve	him,	sometimes	the	neighbour’s	 children	 to	 amuse	 him,	 a	mum	 to	 caress	 him,	 an	 aunt	 to	 excuse	 his	faults.	 He	 will	 have	 experienced	 resistances	 on	 the	 part	 of	 his	 superiors,	 or	baseness	from	his	inferiors,	but	he	will	not	have	endured	contradiction	on	the	part	of	his	equals,	and	because	he	never	endured	it,	he	will	be	unable	to	suffer	it.270	The	emotional	habitat	of	the	home	was	as	necessary	as	it	was	insufficient	for	the	upbringing	 of	 the	 citizen.	 Interacting	 with	 more	 than	 a	 hundred	 people	 at	 the	
collége,	the	child	would	learn	‘not	to	fear	the	crowd’.	But	while	domestic	education																																																									268	Guizot,	Méditations,	pp.	304-305.	269	Henri	Gras,	Famille	et	collége:	Leur	role	dans	l’éducation	(Paris,	1861),	p.	154.	This	parragraph	is	based	on	the	fourth	chapter	of	the	abbé	Gras’	work.		270	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	148.	
	 167	
was	insufficient	to	form	the	public	man,	‘it	is	also	dangerous’.271	Indeed,	the	home	was	no	place	for	a	child.	Domestic	 education	 is	 dangerous	 because	 children	 learn	 or	 become	 there	everything	that	they	should	ignore;	because	it	places	a	child	in	the	midst	of	women	and	servants;	if	he	learns	to	greet	with	grace,	he	builds	the	habit	of	thinking	with	small-mindedness;	 he	 is	 taught	 to	 eat	 properly,	 and	 an	 unjustified	 vanity,	 a	curiosity	without	 object,	 humour,	 bad-mouthing,	 devoting	 great	 interest	 to	 small	things	[and]	grave	discourses	on	nothingness.[…]	He	gets	used	to	talking	to	valets,	gossips	with	maids,	all	the	things	that	make	morality	shrink	to	a	point	no-one	can	say.272		While	family	life	was	appropriate	for	small	children,	soon	it	became	‘too	sweet	and	too	 indulgent’.	 In	 the	 midst	 of	 tenderness,	 the	 child	 would	 not	 learn	 suffering,	which	 was	 ‘a	 law	 of	 humanity’.	 Therefore,	 while	 the	 family	 offered	 ‘peaceful	virtues’,	it	could	not	initiate	the	child	in	‘manly	and	strong	virtues’.273	School	taught	pain,	suffering	and	privation,	in	particular	'the	pain	of	separation	[from	his	family],	and	 the	 courage	 to	make	 and	 effort	 to	 render	 useful	 that	 sacrifice’.	 The	 private	tutor	and	family	were	too	close	to	the	child	at	all	 times	and	grew	insensitive	and	indulgent	 to	 faults	 and	 weaknesses;	 while	 at	 school	 ‘By	 measuring	 himself	everyday,	a	child	 learns	 to	know	his	 forces	and	weaknesses’.	There	 ‘all	made	 it	a	necessity	 to	 combat	 soft	 penchants	 and	 vanquish	 effeminate	 tastes.	 A	 happy	necessity	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 his	 life!’274	The	 bishop	 of	 Orléans,	 Félix	 Dupanloup,	concurred	 with	 these	 views	 and	 considered	 that	 school	 was	 necessary	 to	 learn	unconditional	obedience	to	a	certain	kind	of	impersonal	authority.																																																										271	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	163.	272	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	pp.	165-166.	273	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	pp.	168-168.	274	Ibid.,	pp.	157,	168-169.	
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A	bell	rings,	two	hundred	children	march.[…]	They	cannot	get	irritated	at	the	bell:	it	rung	for	all.	There	is	no	revolt;	no	answering	back	or	reaction	is	possible	here.	All	line	 up,	 off	 to	 work	 and	 silence.	 Nothing	 hurts	 the	 child’s	 self-love;	 nothing	 is	odious.	 It	 is	 justice,	 the	general	rule,	public	order;	nobody	retorts,	no	comebacks,	for	that	would	be	senseless,	unthinkable	even.275		Philippe	Ariès	has	 shown	how	 the	modern	 family	 and	 the	modern	 school	 (‘or	 at	least	 as	 the	 general	 habit	 of	 educating	 children	 at	 school’)	 were	 born	simultaneously	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century. 276 	The	 family	 would	 become	 a	protective	and	hyper-emotional	domain	closed	off	 from	the	rest	of	society;	while	the	 school	 would	 evolve	 into	 a	 domain	 of	 impersonal	 order	 and	 disciplined	socialization.	 But	 since	 the	 seventeenth	 century,	 long	 before	 any	 of	 these	institutions	 resembled	 their	 own	 ideal,	 the	 argument	 has	 been	 the	 same:	 the	defects	 of	 one	necessitated	 the	 other.	 To	promote	 schooling,	 the	 family	 has	 long	been	 attacked	 for	 being	 too	 neglectful,	 sentimental	 and	 narrow.	 To	 promote	 the	nuclear	 family,	 the	 school	 has	 been	 depicted	 as	 being	 too	 neglectful,	 cold	 and	harsh.	Neither	on	its	own	was	imagined	as	being	able	to	produce	the	required	ideal	of	 the	 citizen.	 This	 remains	 the	 case.	 Since	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 until	 the	present,	 the	 debate	 on	 childrearing	 remains	 locked	 in	 the	 opposition	 of	 either	school	 or	 home,	 a	 dichotomy	 that	 is	 irresolvable,	 since	 neither	 institution	 is	imaginable	on	its	own	but	rather	have	always	sustained	each	other	mutually.			But	the	meaning	of	childrearing	changes	through	time,	and	by	the	1830s	schooling	became	the	privileged	means	of	deploying	the	ideal	of	social	management	through																																																									275	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	153.	276	Ariès,	Centuries	of	Childhood,	p.	370.	
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emulation.	 It	 socialized	 children	 into	 a	 very	 strict	 social	 ranking	 meant	 to	legitimize	a	hierarchical	society,	acquainted	them	with	authority-mediated	rivalry	among	equals	and	the	new	forms	of	impersonal	authority.	This	use	of	education	to	buttress	social	inequality	was	a	recent	development.	Schooling	only	became	elitist	in	 the	 moment	 it	 became	 seen	 as	 the	 key	 for	 human	 perfection	 and	 thus	 the	solution	to	individual	and	social	problems.	In	his	study	of	education	in	Enlightened	thought,	 Harvey	 Chisick	 concluded	 that	 ‘the	 enlightened	 community’	 never	proposed	that	more	than	basic	literacy	and	counting	skills	be	taught	to	the	poor	as	a	way	of	promoting	economic	utility	and	social	stability.	In	contrast	to	their	claims	of	human	equality,	‘members	of	the	enlightened	community	looked	upon	people	as	fundamentally	different	from	themselves	in	function	and	social	standing’.277		Drawing	on	Ariès,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 rather	 than	 the	 ‘enlightened	community’	being	 contradictory	 in	 both	 universalizing	 and	 restricting	 access	 to	 education,	what	was	 characteristic	 of	 this	 process	was	 precisely	 that	 schooling	 came	 to	 be	organized	 for	 the	 first	 time	 around	 class	 boundaries.	 Ariès	 showed	 how	 social	classes	and	ages	mingled	in	the	Ancien-Régime	school.	‘In	the	seventeenth	century,	schooling	did	not	necessarily	go	with	good	birth’	and	‘was	not	yet	the	monopoly	of	one	class’.278	‘On	the	one	hand,	there	was	the	school	population,	on	the	other	there	were	those	who,	in	accordance	with	immemorial	custom,	went	straight	into	adult	life	as	soon	as	they	could	walk	and	talk.	This	division	did	not	correspond	to	social	conditions’.	Although	the	benefit	of	one	gender,	educational	 institutions	were	not	class	or	age	exclusive,	and	‘until	the	eighteenth	century,	the	ancient	regime	knew																																																									277	Harvey	Chisick,	The	Limits	of	Reform	in	the	Enlightenment:	Attitudes	toward	the	Education	of	the	
Lower	Classes	in	Eighteenth-Century	France	(Princeton,	1981),	p.	278.	278	Ariès,	Centuries	of	Childhood,	p.	331.	
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only	one	school.[…]	This	may	seem	surprising	when	one	considers	the	rigidity	and	diversity	 of	 the	 social	 hierarchy	 under	 the	 ancient	 regime:	 educational	 practice	differed	less	according	to	rank	than	according	to	function’.279			My	 argument	 is	 that	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 schooling	 became	 the	 most	representative	 template	 for	 society:	 that	 of	 a	 single	 standard	 against	 which	 all	could	be	located	and	ranked.	It	responded	to	the	social	dream	of	each	having	a	very	clear	and	 indisputable	place	 in	 the	social	hierarchy.	As	we	will	see,	 this	model	of	schooling	and	emulation	would	collapse	shorty	before	the	end	of	the	century.	But	now	 we	 will	 focus	 on	 Cousin’s	 moi,	 the	 most	 coherent	 theorization	 of	 the	psychological	 paradigm	 in	 France.	 This	moi	 was	 a	 subject	 that	 would	 not	 only	encounter	 hierarchy	 and	 emulation	 in	 the	 school,	 but	 that	 had	 internalized	 as	 a	psychic	structure	the	same	type	of	school	ranking	we	have	seen.			
Moi		From	1830,	Guizot	and	Cousin	would	develop	and	implement	a	common	project	in	subjectivity,	social	education	and	government	whose	basis	can	be	found	in	Guizot’s	1812	text	discussed	above.	Guizot	tied	together	the	mathematical	ranking	of	merit	in	the	classroom	with	the	subjective	hierarchy	Kant	had	introduced.	In	so	doing,	he	offered	 a	 way	 of	 grounding	 social	 inequality	 and	 the	 class	 system	 in	 the	 very	structure	of	the	moi.	Kant,	whom	Cousin	followed	closely,	had	been	able	to	wed	the	motion	of	a	universal	 individual	with	 inequality	by	redefining	social	hierarchy	as	an	 internal	 attribute	 of	 selfhood.	 Starting	 from	 the	 premise	 that	 ‘people	 are																																																									279	Ibid.,	pp.	334-335.	
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morally	 good	 or	 bad	 by	 virtue	 of	 the	maxims	 governing	 their	 actions’,	 Kant	was	able	 to	 identify	 ‘Three	 dispositions	 in	 human	 nature’:	 First,	 ‘a	 disposition	 to	animality,	as	a	living	being	with	needs	and	inclinations’;	second,	‘to	humanity,	as	a	rational	being	able	to	exercise	prudence	in	regard	to	those	needs	and	inclinations’;	and	third,	 ‘a	moral	being	aware	of	obligation	and	accountability	before	the	moral	law’. 280 	This	 Kantian	 three-stage	 hierarchy	 of	 the	 self	 would	 be	 central	 in	nineteenth	century	France,	while	the	same	scale	updated	by	Sigmund	Freud	as	the	id,	ego	and	super-ego	would	be	very	influential	in	the	twentieth	century	as	well.			Guizot	followed	the	same	tripartite	model	setting	out	a	scale	consisting	of	the	need	to	 act,	 personal	 interest	 and	 the	 sentiment	 of	 duty.	 The	 first	was	 the	 domain	 of	children,	‘idiots,	inept	people	and	those	without	foresight’	and	consisted	on	natural	impulses	 and	 instinct.	 ‘More	 reasonable	men	 examine	 that	 which	 is	 convenient,	they	 foresee,	plan,	 calculate	and	govern	 themselves	according	 to	 that	which	 they	think	 is	 their	 interest’.	 This	 satisfied	 reason,	 but	 not	 morality.	 ‘Then	 come	 the	virtuous	men	who	consult	above	all	their	conscience	and	take	it	for	guide	in	all	the	occasions	 in	 which	 it	 speaks’.	 Guizot	 equally	 understood	 that	 children	 develop	through	 each	 of	 these	 successive	 stages.281	The	 study	 of	 how	 to	 govern	 these	motives	and	stages	in	children	was	indistinct	from	a	wider	attempt	to	understand	human	motivation	and	social	government.			In	 the	hands	of	Guizot	 and	 the	Doctrinaires,	 this	 threefold	hierarchy	of	 selfhood,	which	Cousin	would	start	developing	 in	1818	 into	his	 theory	of	 the	moi,	 became	
																																																								280	Holmes,	Fact,	Value,	and	God,	p.	128.	281	Guizot,	Méditations,	p.	284.	
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the	basis	of	society,	education	and	politics.	Kant	intriguingly	said	that	‘animals	are	like	potatoes’;	and	the	same	worth	came	to	be	attached	to	those	who	stood	at	the	base	of	the	social	pyramid	because	they	were	dominated	by	blind	instincts.282	The	middle	classes	were	those	governed	by	the	rationality	and	egotism	of	self-interest.	At	the	summit	of	society	stood	the	 ‘disinterested	interests’	of	the	capacités,	 those	who	had	 achieved	 a	 level	 of	 spiritual	 development	 such	 that	 they	had	overcome	themselves	 and	were	 driven	 by	 reason,	 duty	 and	morality	 alone.	 Only	 the	 latter	were	 universal	 beings	 because	 they	 could	 embody	 Kant’s	 1785	 categorical	imperative	of	universalizability:	 ‘act	only	according	 to	 that	maxim	 through	which	you	 can	 at	 the	 same	 time	 will	 that	 it	 become	 a	 universal	 law’.283	It	 was	 to	 this	handful	of	elite	men,	imagined	as	devoted	to	the	good	of	all,	that	the	right	to	vote	was	granted	prior	to	1848.	They	were	the	natural	guardians	of	the	collective	and	of	the	 blindness	 and	 infantilism	 of	 those	 who	 refused	 to	 shake	 off	 the	 shackles	 of	their	own	ignorance,	unawareness	and	particularity.	Once	this	 inner	hierarchy	of	the	universal	self	was	established,	education	was	for	the	first	time	organized	into	the	 three-tier	 system	 –primary,	 secondary,	 and	 superior,	 corresponding	 to	animality,	 egotism	 and	 dutifulness–	 as	 a	 means	 of	 organizing	 stabilizing	 these	three	modalities	of	self	in	society.	By	making	it	all	rest	upon	each	person’s	journey	of	 self-perfection,	 the	universality	of	man	was	guaranteed	at	 the	 same	 time	as	 it	was	 internally	 split	 into	 the	 infra-human,	 human	 and	 super-human.	 As	 in	 the	classroom	arithmetic	of	merit,	there	was	a	common	and	clearly	laid-out	standard	of	distinction	for	all	against	which	each	person’s	numeric	worth	in	the	world	and	
																																																								282	Quoted	in:	François	Laplantine,	Le	sujet:	essai	d’anthropologie	politique	(Paris,	2007),	p.	89.	283	Immanuel	Kant,	Groundwork	of	the	Metaphysics	of	Morals	(Cambridge,	2011),	p.	71.	
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position	 in	 the	 ladder	 of	 excellence	 could	 be	 determined	 impersonally	 in	 each	moment.	The	society	of	classes	had	been	born.			Freedom	was	a	necessity	for	liberal	government,	since	individuals	were	personally	responsible	 because	 (and	 only	 if)	 they	 were	 free.	 Cousin	 defined	 liberty	 as	 the	abstract	essence	of	man,	as	what	characterized	humanity.	Agency	was	couched	in	vague	universal	assumptions	rather	than	in	actual	doing.	Thus,	the	assessment	of	personal	actions	did	not	need	to	account	for	actual	freedom,	deliberate	choices	and	contextual	circumstances	as	the	cause	of	actions.	Liberty	was	neutralized	as	an	a-priori	given	derived	from	the	theory	of	the	moi:	‘will	alone	belongs	to	man,	only	it	constitutes	personality.[…]	It	is	the	very	essence	of	my	will	to	be	free’.284			Instead,	 what	 set	 men	 apart,	 what	 determined	 their	 level	 of	 emancipation,	 was	their	closeness	to	impersonal	reason,	and	through	it	to	the	good,	the	moral	and	the	dutiful.	Unlike	the	will,	reason	was	not	free,	since	it	did	not	belong	to	the	person.	It	 is	not	the	 individual	that	constitutes	his	conceptions.	 In	other	words,	reason	in	itself	is	not	individual,	but	universal	and	absolute,	and	it	is	as	such	that	it	obliges	all	individuals.	 Ideas	 are	 conceptions	 of	 this	 universal	 reason	 that	 appears	 in	 us[…]	although	it	is	not	we,	and	in	no	case	can	be	confused	with	our	personality.285	In	the	individual,	universal	reason	‘fell’	and	became	fallible.	Therefore	‘truth’	could	only	ever	exist	outside	 the	 individual.	Reason,	 in	 ‘its	 impersonal	and	 truly	divine	character’,	was	‘superior	in	itself	to	all	laws	and	rules,	comprises	all	duties,	duties	of	devotion	as	well	as	justice;	therefore	all	morality	that	raises	from	reason,	but	of	reason	 decongested	 of	 its	 forms	 and	 considered	 in	 its	 essence,	 is	 a	 complete																																																									284	Charles	Berton,	‘Raison’,	Dictionnaire	du	parallèle	(Petit-Montrouge,	1858),	p,	p.	1106.	285	Ibid.	
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morality’.	 It	 was	 only	 available	 to	 the	 elevated	 few,	 recognized	 by	 ‘a	 kind	 of	spontaneous	 instinct,	 without	 rules,	 without	 precise	 formulas,	 that	 is	 in	 morals	what	genius	is	 in	the	arts.	 It	 is	the	reason	of	the	few,	a	reason	superior	to	that	of	the	 common	reason	of	men,	 a	pure	 reason’.286	‘According	 to	 the	members	of	 this	same	natural	 aristocracy’,	 Francis	Dupuis-Déri	 	 has	 argued,	 ‘only	 they	possessed	the	 competences	 to	 identify,	 defend	 and	 promote	 the	 common	 good,	 while	 the	lesser	folk	are	only	motivated	by	their	personal	and	immediate	interest’.287			Indeed,	the	sinister	elitism	of	this	project	of	social	hegemony	is	indisputable.	But	if	seen	 from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 subjectivity,	 a	 different	 image	 emerges.	 For	 this	threefold	 social	 hierarchy	 —instinct	 (absence	 of	 reason),	 rational	 faculties	(personal	reason)	and	morality	(universal	reason)—	was	located	within	the	moi.			In	 ‘the	primitive	state	of	man,	 that	of	 the	child’,	argued	 Jouffroy,	one	of	 the	great	popularizers	 and	developers	of	Cousin’s	moi,	 there	was	no	 liberty	because	 there	was	 no	 awareness,	 only	 raw	 passions.288	All	 humans	 started	 their	 life	 ranked	among	 the	 beasts.	 Instead	 of	 the	 source	 of	 privilege	 and	nobility,	 birth	 had	 thus	become	the	greatest	equalizer	in	history.	Then,		starting	at	 the	age	of	reason,	 the	 life	of	man	 is	a	perpetual	alternative	among	the	three	moral	states,	depending	on	whether	passion,	egotism	or	the	moral	law	take	hold	 in	us,	 turns	upon	our	will	 and	preside	 its	 determinations.	No	 life	 is	 exempt	from	 these	 alternatives.	 What	 distinguishes	 men	 is	 the	 nature	 or	 motive	 that	
																																																								286	E.	Vacherot,	‘Avertissement’,	in:	Victor	Cousin,	Oeuvres,	IV	(Brussels,	1845),	p.	139.	287	Francis	 Dupuis-Déri,	 ‘L’esprit	 antidémocratique	 des	 fondateurs	 de	 la	 “démocratie”	 moderne’,	
Agone:	Philosophie,	critique	&lLittérature,	22	(1999),	p.	98.	288	Jouffroy,	Cours	de	droit	naturel,	p.	36.	
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triumphs	the	most	often.[…]	Nobody	obeys	exclusively	and	constantly	a	single	one	of	these	three	motives.289	Only	 this	 inner	 struggle	 could	 awaken	 the	moi,	 for	 said	moi	 simply	 constituted	itself	as	the	intermediary	between	the	warring	parties,	always	under	the	conviction	that	 by	 applying	 will	 and	 logic,	 it	 could	 achieve	 the	 desires	 results.	 ‘Liberty	supposes	 reason	 and	 only	 comes	 with	 it;	 when	 these	 two	 principles	 introduce	themselves	 as	 intermediaries	 between	 the	 instinctive	 movements	 of	 our	 nature	and	 the	 faculties,	 then	 the	situation	 in	which	we	are	changes	completely’.290	This	was	 a	 position	 of	 absolute	 centrality.	 ‘Cousin	 did	 not	 cease	 repeating	 that	 the	entirety	of	man	could	be	found	in	all	phenomena	of	which	he	was	the	theatre,	the	cause	and	the	spectator’.291	Indeed,	the	birth	of	the	self	as	central	intermediary	of	all	phenomena	marked	one’s	status	as	a	modern	individual,	but	the	battle	raged	on	nonetheless.	Regardless	of	which	motive	we	followed	‘we	always	find	between	our	end	and	ourselves	obstacles	which	we	will	not	be	able	to	overcome	completely	in	this	 life.	 Hence,	 in	 all	 possible	 cases,	 [there	 is]	 a	 perpetual	 and	 fundamental	struggle	between	our	nature	and	the	situation	in	which	it	has	been	placed,	which	is	as	 the	background	of	 the	human	condition	 in	 this	world’.292	The	 self	 embodied	a	war	between	‘nature’	and	reality.	Thus	elite	status,	or	indeed	any	basic	worth	as	a	person	 in	 society,	 could	 only	 be	 claimed	 in	 the	 battlefield	 of	 a	 daily,	 internal	struggle	in	which	there	would	be	no	definitive	victory.			‘But	independently	of	this	fundamental	struggle	which	is	reproduced	in	all	possible	moral	 situations’,	 Jouffroy	 wrote,	 ‘each	 moral	 situation	 contains	 in	 its	 core	 a																																																									289	Ibid.,	pp.	60-61.	290	Ibid.,	p.	73.	291	Jules	Simon,	Victor	Cousin	(Paris,	1887),	p.	31.	292	Jouffroy,	Cours	de	droit	naturel,	pp.	82-83.	
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different	 internal	 struggle	 which	 is	 characteristic	 to	 it’.293	In	 the	 primitive	 state,	this	 conflict	 took	place	 among	 the	different	 passions.	At	 the	next	 stage,	 passions	were	all	at	war	in	turn	against	enlightened	self-interest.	‘Because	we	only	conduct	ourselves	according	to	the	rules	of	l’intérêt	bien	entendu	under	this	one	condition:	that	we	contain	and	 repress	 the	natural	 action	of	our	different	passions.	At	each	instant	we	sacrifice	the	stronger	passion	for	the	weaker	one,	the	present	passion	to	the	future	one’.	All	these	struggles	carry	on	to	the	higher	state,	where	our	passions	and	self-interest	in	turn	waged	war	against	duty	and	the	good.	In	other	words,	fully	formed	 individuals	 were	 to	 live	 in	 a	 permanent	 state	 of	 conflict	 with	 no	 end	 in	sight	between	a	primitive	will	to	dominate,	the	calculation	to	gain	advantage	over	another	 at	 the	 lowest	 cost	 and	 the	 high	 demands	 of	 duty	 and	 morality.	 What	determined	 the	 character	 of	 a	man	was	 the	 strength	 of	 will	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	battle	so	as	 to	control	himself	 in	order	 to	 take	sides	with	one	motive	or	another.	This	intervening	force	was	the	moi,	whose	genesis	tale	paralleled	that	of	the	state	as	the	pacification	of	 the	primitive	war	of	 ‘man’	against	 ‘man’.	 In	any	case,	 it	was	impossible	 to	 escape	 remorse	 or	 regret,	 Jouffroy	 indicated,	 and	 no	 victory	 was	lasting;	the	danger	of	relapsing	into	the	primitive	state	could	never	be	exorcised.294	‘At	 the	bottom	of	all	 these	struggles,	 there	 is	one	more	 fundamental,	 that	of	man	against	nature;	without	 it	 the	others	would	not	exist,	but	 it	exists	by	 the	 force	of	things,	and	from	its	fecund	womb	emanate	all	the	others’.295			The	way	of	climbing	up	the	hierarchy	of	the	moi	was	then	not	education,	but	rather	the	personal	capacity	to	subject	the	body	to	the	will,	the	will	to	the	mind	and	the																																																									293	Ibid.,	p.	83.	294	Ibid.,	p.	44.	295	Ibid.,	p.	83.	
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mind	 to	 impersonal	 reason	 and	morality.	 It	was	 that	 triumph	over	 the	primitive	nature	within,	however	reversible	the	victory,	that	qualified	a	person	to	tame	the	primitive	impulses	and	exercise	leadership	in	society	at	large.	It	was	not	what	one	knew,	but	how	one	thought	that	was	key,	for	there	were	two	types	of	reason:	one	personal	 and	 one	 impersonal,	 one	 fallible	 and	 one	 infallible.	 But	 both	 shared	 a	distinct	capacity	for	abstraction.	‘Reason,	in	its	simplest	definition,	is	the	faculty	to	understand	(comprendre),	which	should	not	be	confused	with	the	faculty	to	know	(connaître)’.	Animals	know,	but	do	not	comprehend.296	Comprehension	demanded	relinquishing	a	 first-person	perspective	 for	 the	universal,	 third-person	viewpoint	that	 alone	 could	 objectify	 our	 sense	 of	 self	 and	 our	 understanding	 of	 our	 own	behaviour.		There	is	an	age	in	the	life	of	man,	and	this	period	may	prolong	itself	for	a	quite	long	time,	in	which	there	is	no	sort	of	governmental	power,	so	to	speak,	that	is,	a	period	in	which	there	still	does	not	exist	in	us	the	fact	of	being	able	to	direct	our	faculties	ourselves,	which	is	liberty.		In	childhood	and	 in	many	other	moments	 in	 life,	 this	ability	 for	self-steering	was	absent.	While	the	‘executive	faculties’	of	the	will	were	present,	‘they	act	without	us,	or,	what	is	the	same,	without	our	will	imprinting	it	with	a	direction,	and	under	the	only	impulse	of	our	tendencies.297		Translated	 into	 morality,	 knowing	 and	 comprehending	 equated	 the	 distinction	between	what	was	good	in	one	instance,	which	most	could	muster,	and	what	was	always	good.	‘If	it	is	true	that	reason	shows	itself	in	good	enough	time	in	man,	no	one	would	 dare	 argue	 that	 it	 rises	 immediately	 to	 that	 high	 conception	 of	 order																																																									296	Ibid.,	p.	38.	297	Ibid.,	pp.	71-72.	
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that	 is	 the	moral	 law’.	 ‘Most	men	only	have	a	 confused	 idea	of	morality,	 a	moral	conscience,	 instinct	 or	 sense,	which	 tries	 its	 best	 to	 distinguish	 good	 and	bad	 in	particular	cases,	but	cannot	derive	its	judgement	from	the	moral	law	as	such	and	a	high	conception	of	duty’.	Most	men	never	reached	that	state.	‘It	would	be	necessary	to	conclude	that	there	is	no	morality	in	man	until	a	certain	age	and	that	there	never	is	 any	 among	 the	 largest	 number	 of	 men’. 298 	Morality	 and	 reason	 involved	overcoming	 as	 much	 as	 one’s	 particularities	 as	 possible.	 Reason	 introduced	 the	idea	of	an	‘absolute	good’,	meaning	order.	It	was	the	very	impersonality	of	reason	that	made	it	obligatory,		because	 that	which	 is	 personal,	 not	 being	 superior	 to	 the	 person,	 can	 in	 no	way	obligate	 him.	 The	 idea	 of	 law	 implies	 something	 exterior	 and	 superior	 to	 the	person,	something	universal,	that	comprises	and	dominates	the	particular.		Only	 in	 the	 impersonality	 of	 reason	 could	 private	 interest	 be	 abandoned	 for	 a	broader	aim	capable	of	apprehending	without	contradiction	what	was	best	for	all.	Then	morality	 is	possible	 in	man;	the	condition	of	all	morality,	which	 is	 to	act	on	behalf	of	 an	 impersonal	motive	or	 idea,	on	behalf	of	 a	 law,	 is	 satisfied;	 it	did	not	exist	before.299	One	 had	 to	 completely	 give	 oneself	 over	 to	moral	 law-abidingness.	 ‘There	 is	 no	morality	in	human	nature	unless	man	is	free	and	subjected	to	a	mandatory	law’,	or	the	 law	of	duty.	300The	rare	and	exceptional	 few	who	 lived	by	this	high	 law	were	rewarded	 with	 their	 privileged	 status	 as	 social	 elites,	 but	 also	 their	 full	 human	potential,	 including	 happiness.	 For	 ‘it	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 by	 experience	 and	
																																																								298	Ibid.,	pp.	58-59.	299	Ibid.,	pp.	81-82.	300	Ibid.,	p.	66.	
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reason	that	the	best	way	to	be	happy	is	to	remain,	in	all	possible	cases,	faithful	to	the	laws	of	duty’.301		In	1848,	 the	 July	monarchy	collapsed,	and	with	 it	 the	understanding	of	a	unique,	universal	 order	 that	 the	 regime	 had	 sustained,	 tumbled.	 From	 all	 quarters,	 the	previous	 understanding	 of	 duty	 was	 condemned.	 Duty	 could	 no	 longer	 be	 the	attainment	of	 the	 few	and	 the	only	source	of	modern	privilege,	as	we	saw	 in	 the	first	chapter;	the	search	began	for	a	system	founded	on	the	sacred	duty	of	each	and	all,	rather	than	on	sovereign	rights	against	the	state	and	each	other.	But	the	result	of	this	change	was	a	new	source	of	alienation	from	the	self.	As	Procacci	has	argued:	In	the	light	of	a	network	of	duties,	the	individual	appeared	fragmented	into	a	series	of	experiences,	 rather	 than	unified	as	 the	subject	of	 juridical	 rights.	 In	each	duty,	each	 is	 but	 the	 individual	 counterpart	 of	 a	 collective	 experience,	 the	meaning	 of	which	 surpasses	 him	 constantly:	 the	 entire	 space	 of	 individual	 experience	 is	fragmented	into	as	many	parcels	as	there	are	duties	assigned	to	the	individual.302		In	 the	 third	 chapter	 we	 will	 explore	 how	 this	 passage	 from	 the	 transcendental	unity	of	duty	 to	 its	 fragmentation	also	 implied	 the	splintering	and	multiplicity	of	the	modern	individual.		
Conclusion.	
	In	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 equality	 of	 ‘men’	 was	inseparable	from	a	new	understanding	of	social	order	that	rested	precisely	on	this	equality.	Because	individuals	were	the	same	in	their	psyches	and	interchangeable																																																									301	Ibid.,	p.	85.	302	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	305.	
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in	society,	the	approval	and	validation	of	others	became	crucial.	Vanity	came	to	be	seen	 as	 the	 primary	 drive	 behind	 of	 human	 actions.	 Towards	 1800,	 there	was	 a	search	 for	 a	 new	 technique	 of	 governing	 through	 vanity.	Morality	 emerged	 as	 a	technique	 of	 self-government	 that,	 while	 offering	 no	 certainty	 at	 all,	 required	comparing	 one’s	 motives	 and	 behaviour	 with	 that	 of	 others	 and	 the	 dictates	 of	universal	 reason	 or	 duty.	 The	 establishment	 of	 emulation	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 the	educational	 system	 in	 the	 1830s	 institutionalized	 this	 process	 of	 constant	comparison	as	a	new	model	promising	to	socialize	children	for	public	life	in	ways	the	family	never	could.	The	fetish	of	a	universal	and	divinized	reason	equally	tied	human	thought	to	the	social	order	by	transferring	the	possibility	of	knowing	‘truth’	from	 the	 individual	 to	 the	 state	 and	 academic	 institutions.	 Comprehension	required	 comparing	 one’s	 ideas	 to	 those	 of	 the	 elite	 men,	 who	 alone	 could	approach	reason.	This	profound	inequality	in	intelligences	became	the	bedrock	of	a	highly	hierarchical	and	exclusive	political	regime.			The	 separation	 of	 law	 and	morality	 that	 took	 place	 after	 1789	 delegated	 to	 the	individual	 the	burden	of	determining	what	was	 right	 or	wrong	 in	daily	 life.	This	was	 to	 be	 carried	 out	 through	 the	 cumbersome	 application	 of	 a	 ‘moral	 looking-glass’	whereby	one	could	assess	and	objectify	one’s	motives	from	the	‘outside’	and	against	the	backdrop	of	what	was	universally	moral	according	to	social	elites.	An	ambiguous,	painstaking	and	error-prone	operation,	moral	determinations	became	highly	 subjective.	However,	 the	assumption	 that	each	person	carefully	 calculated	his	 or	 her	 actions	based	on	 interest	 and	morality	made	 it	 possible	 to	 objectify	 a	person’s	 moral	 worth	 by	 means	 of	 their	 behaviour.	 Thus	 conduct	 became	 the	objectified	 measure	 of	 morality.	 It	 then	 becomes	 easy	 to	 understand	 why	 any	
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departure	 from	behaviour	deemed	normative	 could	be	 cast	 as	 immoral	 and	why	the	 majority	 of	 the	 French	 population	 came	 to	 be	 imagined	 as	 corrupt	 and	debauched	 in	 the	 1830s	 and	 1840s.	 Official	 and	 scholarly	 publications	 widely	publicised	 the	rampant	extent	of	 immorality.	 Indeed,	 this	was	 the	 task	of	 the	so-called	‘moral	sciences’,	which	Ian	Hacking	aptly	described	as	‘above	all	the	science	that	 studied,	 empirically	 and	 en	masse,	 immoral	 behaviour’.303	At	 the	 same	 time	that	 the	 state	 and	 social	 elites	 drew	 attention	 to	 immorality,	 they	 declared	 the	helplessness	 of	 the	 law,	 repression	 and	 welfare	 to	 alleviate	 and	 correct	 these	problems	 (as	 had	 been	 the	 case	 in	 the	 Old	 Regime),	 while	 personal	 charity	 and	alms	 could	 only	 make	 things	 worse.	 Expectations	 of	 collective	 change	 were	frustrated	the	moment	they	were	created.	The	option	that	remained	for	the	aware	individual	was	self-reform	in	daily	and	domestic	life	through	more	meticulous	self-steering	in	order	to	bring	inner	life	in	line	with	social	norms.		In	 other	 words,	 a	 wedge	 was	 driven	 between	what	 one	must	 and	must	 not	 do,	determined	 now	 by	 positive,	 state	 law	 alone,	 and	 between	what	 one	 ought	 and	ought	not	to	do,	which	belonged	to	the	domain	of	morality.	Formally	unregulated,	moral	 behaviour	 came	 to	 depend	 on	 personal	 assessment,	 which	 required	evaluating	 and	 choosing	 among	 the	 many	 competing	 standards	 of	 conduct	 that	became	 available	 in	 an	 increasingly	 plural	 public	 sphere.	 In	 turn,	 the	 stakes	 for	such	 preferences	were	 raised.	 In	 a	meritocratic	 society	 of	 free,	 autonomous	 and	accountable	moral	subjects,	the	standing	and	worth	of	a	person	became	tied	to	his	or	 her	 comportment,	 tastes	 and	 habits.	 The	 weight	 of	 behaviour	 became	 more	decisive	 at	 the	 same	 time	 that	 the	 standards	 for	 conduct	 became	 fragmented,																																																									303	Ian	Hacking,	‘How	should	we	do	the	history	of	statistics?’,	in:	Graham	Burchell,	Colin	Gordon	and	Peter	Miller	(eds),	The	Foucault	Effect:	Studies	in	Governmentality	(Chicago,	1991),	p.	182.	
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unclear	 and	 subjective.	 There	 remained	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 absoluteness	 of	 good	 and	evil,	but	it	was	up	to	a	lonely,	interpreting	and	choosing	self	to	discover	where	the	good	 and	 the	 bad	 was	 to	 be	 found.	 On	 the	 correct	 deciphering	 of	 these	 moral	values,	in	turn,	would	depend	his	or	her	social	worth.	In	this	way,	the	separation	of	law	 and	 morality	 in	 ‘free'	 societies	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	necessitated	 a	 self-reflective	 agent	 tasked	with	 continuous	 comparison	 and	 self-analysis	in	order	to	arrive	at	independent	moral	determinations.	I	would	argue	this	had	the	effect	of	encouraging	individual	reliance	on	external	values	and	non-local	viewpoints,	which	in	turn	converged	in	a	limited	plurality	of	large	and	increasingly	homogeneous,	institutionalized	and	nationalized	communities	of	opinion.		This	chapter	has	equally	shown	the	crucial	part	 ‘otherness’	played	 in	configuring	the	 ‘structure	 of	 experience’	 of	 the	 individual	 in	 eighteenth-century	 modern	philosophy	and	in	the	rise	of	the	self	in	the	nineteenth	century.	The	belief	that	all	‘men’	were	equal	led	to	the	search	of	new	categories	through	which	to	legitimate	and	explain	the	actual	differences	among	persons.	The	key	category	that	allowed	this	 operation	 was	 the	 novel	 specificity	 of	 childhood	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	eighteenth	century.	While	birth	had	been	 the	 foundation	of	Old-Regime	privilege	and	 social	 rank,	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 infancy	 became	 the	 great	 equalizer.	Everyone	 was	 born	 in	 a	 state	 of	 helplessness,	 unreason	 and	 uncontrolled	behaviour.	 But	 childhood	 was	 more	 than	 a	 temporary	 stage	 of	 life,	 its	 brutish	tendencies	 re-emerged	 in	 the	 case	 of	 inattentiveness	 of	 the	 controlling	 and	intermediary	 entity	 of	 the	 self.	 	 The	 passage	 from	 savagery	 to	 civilization	 now	became	a	path	each	individual	had	to	take	in	the	form	of	an	inner	battle	between	the	acceptable	self	and	the	intolerable	‘other’.	It	was	through	the	figure	of	the	child	
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that	 the	self	 internalized	social	 ‘otherness’.	The	early	nineteenth	century	became	populated	by	a	numerous	cast	of	‘others’,	which	became	the	object	of	wide-ranging	public	debate.	The	increased	visibility	of	deviance	served	to	increase	the	stakes	of	diverting	 from	 normative	 behaviour	 thus	 establishing	 narrow	 but	 uncertain	boundaries	for	self-steering	and	self-government.	The	next	chapter	will	explore	in	more	depth	this	process	of	public	debate	and	will	expand	on	the	uses	of	childhood	within	the	logics	of	social	and	family	government.			While	welfare	programmes	were	eminently	coercive,	their	focus	on	thriftiness	and	the	fear	that	assistance	could	aggravate	moral	deviance	in	specific	individuals	and	reproductively	irresponsible	populations	led	to	austere	policies	that	reached	only	few	groups	for	a	limited	time	with	as	little	expense	as	possible.	The	failure	in	the	moralizing	aims	of	these	private	and	public	programmes	often	only	confirmed	the	need	for	more	austerity.	While	actual	aid	was	very	restricted,	welfare	policies	were	however	crucial	 in	naming	and	identifying	 ‘the	social’	as	a	threatening	domain	of	widespread	 immorality	 over	 which	 law	 and	 political	 power	 could	 do	 little.	 As	social	 and	 administrative	 experts	 discovered,	 documented	 and	 publicized	 the	extent	 of	 deviance	 and	 pauperism,	 the	 public	 debates	 and	 moral	 panics	 that	followed	the	technical	and	scientific	studies	of	these	men	emphasized	the	existence	of	collective	moral	lacks	endangering	the	social	order	together	with	the	lacks	and	limitations	 of	 the	 state	 to	 solve	 these	 problems.	 While	 this	 process	 generated	awareness	 of	 social	 problems	 that	 did	 not	 have	 social	 solutions,	 it	 provided	 a	catalogue	of	guilty	‘others’	and	their	dysfunctional	subjectivities,	which	established	a	link	between	behaviour,	self-worth	and	socio-economic	ranking.	Poorly	governed	selves	were	thus	cast	as	the	cause	of	the	poverty	and	immorality	that	threatened	
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the	 body	 politic.	 By	 defining	 a	 catalogue	 of	 subjective	 lacks,	 the	 discourses	 and	policies	 relating	 to	 poverty	 and	 welfare	 pointed	 to	 the	 opposing	 conducts	 that,	from	 the	 exercise	 of	 foresight	 to	 the	 proper	 moral	 deliberations	 of	 the	 moi,	outlined	 a	 programmatic	 view	 of	 a	 normative	 self.	 Pervasive	 analogies	 between	‘others’	 and	 the	 blank-slate	 of	 childhood	 as	 generating	 permanent	 deficit	 in	selfhood,	governing	and	knowledge,	served	to	internalize	structural	contradictions	and	 the	 broader	 complexities	 of	 social	 government.	 By	 pointing	 to	 subjective	inadequacies,	 the	 awareness	 of	 social	 lacks	would	 serve	 to	 highlight	 deficiencies	inside	 the	 self,	which	was	 understood	 as	 deriving	 from	 a	 universal	 set	 of	 drives	within	 the	psyche.	 I	have	 therefore	argued	 that	 the	widely-debated	difficulties	 in	social	 government	 posed	 individual	 self-government	 as	 a	 problem,	 which	 could	only	 be	 solved	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 disciplining	 intermediary	 experienced	 as	 a	psychological	self.	By	generating	awareness	of	social	problems	that	did	not	seem	to	have	social	solutions,	the	awareness	of	collective	lacks	mobilized	the	individual	to	act	and	take	a	stand	as	the	subject	of	action.		Thus,	 there	 developed	 an	 indissoluble	 link	 between	 inner	 life	 and	 social	 norms.	The	 theorists	 of	 emulation	 envisioned	 the	 school	 and	 indeed	 society	 itself	 as	capable	 of	 allocating	 rank	 on	 account	 of	 a	mathematically-precise	 assessment	 of	merit.	This	 implied	 two	things:	 first,	 the	need	 for	a	supervisory	authority	able	 to	set	impersonal	rules	and	assess	merit,	and	second,	unrelenting	competition	among	equals	 whose	 rank	 was	 never	 fixed	 once	 and	 for	 all.	 This	 resulted	 in	 constant	striving	 and	 insecurity,	 but	 also	 turned	 Rousseau	 and	 Smith’s	 theories	 of	 vanity	and	the	reliance	on	external	opinion	into	an	experience	which	would	progressively	become	 common	 for	 schoolchildren	 and	 adults	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 This	
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constant	 striving	 among	 equals	 under	 impersonal	 rules	 was	meant	 to	minimize	resistance	 to	 authority,	 which	 was	 no	 longer,	 a	 personal,	 embodied	 power,	 but	rather	 an	 anonymous	 mechanism	 resembling	 the	 school	 bell.	 Under	 this	arrangement,	 as	 Guizot	 noticed,	 competitors	 would	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 natural	advantages	 some	 had	 on	 account	 of	 their	 strength	 or	 superiority.	 Therefore,	 a	competition	 among	 ‘equals’	 that	 was	 supervised	 by	 an	 authority	 generated	 the	very	experience	and	perception	of	equality	that	it	took	for	granted.		This	chapter	emphasized	the	importance	of	insecurity	and	uncertainty	in	the	rise	of	 the	 modern	 self.	 While	 Marx	 and	 Engels	 wrote	 of	 the	 necessary	 existence	 in	capitalism	 economies	 of	 a	 ‘reserve	 army	 of	 labour’	 resulting	 from	 a	 permanent	surplus	of	population,	which	made	it	possible	to	keep	wages	low	and	jobs	insecure	through	 fierce	competition,	Elias	spoke	of	a	 ‘“reserve	army”	of	 the	upper	class’	 in	the	Old	Regime.	The	royal	court,	he	argued,	organized	competition	‘under	constant	pressure	 from	 a	 reserve	 army	 of	 country	 aristocracy	 and	 raising	 bourgeois	elements’.304	This	 disciplining	 effect	 of	 competition	 reached	 a	 new	 height	 in	 the	first	 half	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 This	 was	 not	 only	 the	 case	 in	 the	 market	economy	and	the	school	ranking.	Competition	held	a	problematic	relationship	with	morality	in	Malthusianism,	which	was	hegemonic	in	France	from	the	1820s	to	the	1860s.	As	the	views	of	the	English	author	were	being	relegated	in	France	in	1865,	one	 Malthusian	 economist	 described	 what	 could	 be	 called	 a	 biological	 reserve	army.	 One	 fictional	 bourgeois	 family	 was	 described	 as	 seeking	 to	 restrain	 the	number	 of	 their	 offspring	 in	 order	 to	 offer	 them	 a	 good	 life.	 ‘But	 this	 excessive	prudence	is	often	punished’.	The	child	died	and	the	family	went	extinct.	‘Then	out																																																									304	Elias,	Power	and	Civility,	pp.	41,	67,	200,	269.	
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of	 the	 ranks	 of	 the	 proletariat	 rises	 some	 intelligent,	 laborious	 [and]	 active	man	who	becomes	rich,	elevates	himself	and	 in	 turn	 founds	a	 family’.	But	before	 long	this	 one	 also	 went	 extinct.	 And	 thus	 the	 impossible-to-anticipate	 demands	 of	reproductive	 ‘prudence’	 often	 led	 to	 extinction	 while	 ‘new	 families,	 exiting	 the	inexhaustible	womb	 of	 the	 proletariat,	 constantly	 come	 to	 replace	 them’.	 It	 was	therefore	a	good	thing	that	the	poor	did	not	read	Malthus	and	bred	prolifically.305	Not	reproducing	beyond	one’s	means	was	a	moral	and	social	necessity	as	well	as	the	 only	way	 to	 try	 to	 offer	 one’s	 children	 stability	 in	 an	 egalitarian	 society	 and	inheritance	 regime.	However,	 the	grave	difficulty	of	 getting	 it	 right	 could	 lead	 to	the	disappearance	rather	than	the	advancement	of	the	family	name.	Therefore	the	stakes	were	not	 limited	 to	 losing	one’s	 rank	 in	 society.	For	 the	wage	 labourer	 in	search	for	work	or	the	bourgeois	family	seeking	permanence,	competition	became	coloured	 with	 a	 pressing	 uncertainty	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 basics	 of	 biological	survival	and	self-preservation.306	While	in	turn,	this	insecurity	came	to	be	cast	as	a	prerequisite	for	moral	character	and	happiness.	Say	made	this	plain:			A	man	who	has	 received	 from	his	parents	 a	made	 fortune,	 and	who	conserves	 it	without	conflicts	or	setbacks,	is	a	picture	without	shadow,	a	Chinese	painting,	and	insipid	object.[…	T]his	object	that	 is	 insipid	for	everyone	else	is	even	more	so	for	him.	He	is	missing	a	little	misfortune	in	order	to	be	happy.307	Unlike	the	serf	and	aristocrat	of	old,	the	nineteenth-century	individual	did	not	find	a	 set	 place	 in	 society.	 Finding	 one’s	 rank	 depended	 on	 the	 individual’s	 daily	struggle	against	misfortune,	conflicts	or	setbacks,	which	in	turn	required	an	even	greater	inner	battle	to	achieve	increasing	self-disciplining.																																																									305	Léon,	 ‘De	l’accroissement	de	la	population	en	France	d’après	les	derniers	recensements’,	Revue	
contemporaine,	14/46/81	(1865),	p.	653.	306	See:	 Angus	 McLaren,	 Sexuality	 and	 Social	 Order:	 The	 Debate	 over	 the	 Fertility	 of	 Women	 and	
Workers	in	France,	1770-1920	(New	York,	1983).	307	Say,	Petit	volume,	p.	22.	
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	In	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	indivisible	and	timeless	individual	would	be	abandoned	 for	a	new	understanding	of	 the	 self	 as	 socially	determined,	plural	and	fragmented.	This	led	to	new	forms	of	social	belonging	that	did	not	rest	on	competition	and	self-evaluation	alone.	While	we	will	explore	this	process	in	the	third	chapter,	we	will	now	situate	 the	discussion	about	 the	 individual	within	 the	larger	 matrix	 of	 authority,	 family	 and	 social	 relationships	 that	 served	 as	 the	backdrop	of	the	evolving	self	in	the	middle	decades	of	the	century.			 	
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Chapter	2	
	
Parenthood	and	Authority:	
The	Rise	and	Fall	of	the	Obligatory	Family,	1830s-1880s.			
Introduction.	
	As	 Giovanna	 Procacci,	 Philippe	 Sassier	 and	 Catherine	 Duprat	 have	 shown,	 the	nineteenth-century	discourses	on	pauperism	and	social	assistance	highlighted	the	collective	 impact	of	personal	 faults.	Their	 targets	were	 the	 failings	of	 individuals	with	 regards	 to	 morality,	 personal	 responsibility	 and	 self-sufficiency.1	But	 the	welfare	 policies	 implemented	 were	 not	 aimed	 at	 these	 personal	 shortcomings,	which	were	 left	 to	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 concerned	 individual	 through	 foresight	 and	hard	 work,	 with	 at	 best	 some	 moralizing	 help	 from	 private	 charity.	 Social	assistance	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries	 did	 not	 focus	 on	 the	necessities	 of	 individuals	 as	 such.	 Since	 Napoleonic	 law	 had	 inscribed	 personal	hardship	in	the	sphere	of	family	responsibilities,	relief	from	the	wider	community	was	 due	 only	 when	 kinship	 groups	 were	 absent	 or	 unable	 to	 shoulder	 the	
obligation	alimentaire	or	alimony.2	Thus,	social	assistance	came,	in	theory,	to	step	in	 for	 the	 failings	 of	 family	 solidarity,	 while,	 as	 Elinor	 Accampo	 has	 shown	 for	Saint-Chamond	(Loire),	the	actual	policies	implemented	‘assumed	family	functions																																																									1	Giovanna	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère	(Paris,	1993);	Philippe	Sassier,	Du	bon	usage	des	pauvres	(Paris,	1990);	Catherine	Duprat,	Les	temps	des	philanthropes	(Paris,	1993)	and	Usage	et	pratiques	de	
la	philanthropie	(Paris,	1997).	2	Alimony	 responsibilities	 are	 defined	 in	 the	 French	 Civil	 Code	 of	 1804	 in	 Title	 V,	 Chapter	 V,	(articles	203-211),	with	further	spousal	responsibilities	listed	in	Chapter	VI.	
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in	the	care	of	the	children,	the	sick,	and	the	old’.3	Rachel	Fuchs	has	emphasized	that	charity	 and	 welfare	 were	 ‘designed	 and	 implemented	 to	 help	 women	 in	 their	domestic	 role’.4	By	 intervening	 to	 mitigate	 the	 lack	 or	 breakdown	 of	 the	 family	structure,	 social	 policy	 promoted	 the	 ideal	 of	 an	 autonomous	 and	 self-sufficient	family	as	the	basic	social	unit.			As	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	 the	writings	of	 social,	 political	 and	 religious	 thinkers	and	reformists	will	make	it	possible	to	identify	the	different	conceptualizations	of	the	 family	and	authority	and	how	these	changed	through	time.	This	will	 serve	 to	contextualize	 the	 archival	 and	 administrative	 material	 pertaining	 to	 the	 ban	 on	child	abandonment	and	the	attempts	to	provide	temporary	subsidies	to	destitute	mothers	 who	 wished	 to	 abandon.	 Together,	 these	 sources	 will	 be	 deployed	 to	elucidate	the	wide-ranging	changes	that	affected	the	concepts	and	practices	of	the	family	 and	 power	 from	 the	 1830s	 to	 the	 1880s.	 The	 focus	 will	 be	 on	 the	government	of	relating,	specifically	through	the	lens	of	parenting.	The	fundamental	ties	between	fatherhood	and	authority	will	serve	to	shed	light	on	the	broader	issue	of	 the	governing	of	others.	 In	 turn,	 the	rise	of	motherhood	will,	on	the	one	hand,	provide	an	understanding	of	the	shift	 towards	social	 functions	that	characterized	the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 core	 of	 social	assistance	 in	 France.	 French	welfare	 since	 the	Revolution	 has	 been	 described	 as	‘maternalist’,	 given	 its	 noticeable	 focus	 on	 assisting	 children	 and	 their	mothers.5	The	 most	 important	 and	 expensive	 welfare	 policy	 in	 the	 period,	 the	 case	 of																																																									3	Elinor	 Accampo,	 Industrialization,	 Family	 Life,	 and	 Class	 Relations:	 Saint	 Chamond,	 1815-1914	(Berkeley,	1989),	p.	159.	4	Rachel	Fuchs,	‘Charity	and	welfare’,	in:	David	Kertzer	and	Marzio	Barbagli	(eds),	Family	Life	in	the	
Long	Nineteenth	Century,	1789-1913	(New	Haven,	2002),	p.	156.	5	Philip	Nord,	‘The	Welfare	State	in	France,	1870-1914’,	French	Historical	Studies,	18/3	(1994),	pp.	827-833.	
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foundlings	and	single	mothers	will	thus	highlight	family	reform	as	the	main	aim	of	social	assistance	as	well	as	document	how	administrators	and	experts	attempted	to	put	 it	 into	practice.	 In	doing	so,	this	chapter	will	throw	into	relief	the	complex	and	 shifting	 interplay	 between	 the	 private	 and	 public	 divide	 within	 the	 wider	question	 of	 government.	 This	 will	 serve	 to	 contextualize	 the	 historical	development	 of	 the	 modern	 individual	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France	 which	 is	considered	in	the	other	two	chapters.			While	 the	 discursive	 construction	 of	 modern	 (bourgeois)	 motherhood	 as	 a	naturalized	social	and	biological	 ideal	can	be	 traced	back	 to	 the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries,	this	chapter	will	not	deal	with	that	ideal	in	itself,	so	much	as	with	cases	that	explicitly	contravene	it.	By	analysing	social	programmes	aimed	at	destitute	 single	 mothers,	 this	 chapter	 follows	 administrators,	 elected	representatives	 and	 experts	 in	 their	 attempts	 to	 grapple	with	motherhood	 at	 its	very	margins,	where	it	diverted	the	most	from	moral	codes	and	the	family	ideal.	I	argue	that	this	experience	was	central	to	the	definition	of	the	maternal	function	at	large	by	carving	out	a	specific	social	niche	for	female	reproduction.		One	 of	 the	 most	 relevant	 studies	 of	 the	 family	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France	 is	Roddey	 Reid’s	 Families	 in	 Jeopardy.	 Reid	 has	 analysed	 six	 key	 novels,	 which	contextualized	by	the	works	of	reformists,	hygienists	and	moralists,	have	enabled	him	 to	 document	 the	 key	 changes	 in	 domesticity	 from	 1750	 to	 1910.	 His	 main	contribution	has	been	the	concept	of	family	discourse,	through	which	he	has	been	able	to	grasp	the	thread	of	change	in	the	nineteenth	century	without	losing	sight	of	the	nuances	of	each	period	and	novelist.	Instead	of	understanding	the	narrative	of	
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family	 only	 through	 the	 ideal	 it	 represented,	 Reid	 has	 analysed	 the	 mutually	supportive	 nature	 of	 ‘a	 lack	 and	 a	 desire	 (defined	 as	 lack)’.6	‘[I]t	 was	 as	 much	through	 the	 perception	 of	 transgression	 or	 lack	 as	 through	 idealized	 scenes	 of	restored	family	life	that	cultural	narratives	produced	the	desire	for	the	normative	conjugal	family	household’.7	While	family	ideals	were	numerous	and	varied,	what	made	them	converge	in	a	common	family	discourse	was	the	lack	of	the	ideal	they	signalled.	This	lack,	which	Reid	has	argued	was	conveyed	by	the	narrative	medium	of	melodrama,	served	as	a	call	to	action	in	defence	of	the	normative	ideal	in	one’s	life	and	in	public.		By	means	 of	 their	 plots,	 reports,	 and	 treatises,	 novelists,	 physicians,	 jurists,	 and	social	workers	penned	narratives	of	 family	 life	deferred,	 disrupted,	 or	destroyed	by	all	manners	of	agents,	internal	and	external:	the	cash	nexus,	criminals,	disease,	non-normative	 sexuality,	 and	 hereditary	 disorders,	 to	 name	 a	 few.	 […	 I]t	 was	primarily	 through	 tales	 of	 endangered	 or	 lost	 family	 life	 that	 in	 France	 familial	discourse	 negatively	 constructed	 and	 disseminated	 new,	 positive	 norms	 of	household	living,	the	body,	subjectivity,	and	social	relations.8		Exploring	the	positive	and	generative	consequences	of	narratives	of	absence	offers	an	 invaluable	 analytical	 approach	 to	 our	 topic.	 In	 matters	 of	 social	 and	 family	reform	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 dreams	were	 very	 lofty,	 the	 dangers	most	imminent,	 but	 the	 actions	 taken	 were	 always	 rather	 modest.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	between	 1830	 and	 1848,	 the	 liberal	 state	 in	 its	 thriftiness	 delegated	 socio-economic	 solutions	 to	 individual	 responsibility	 and	 family	 solidarity,	 understood	to	 be	 the	 sources	 of	 wealth	 and	 education	 on	 which	 political	 franchise	 and	
																																																								6	Roddey	 Reid,	 Families	 in	 Jeopardy:	 Regulating	 the	 Social	 Body	 in	 France,	 1750-1910	 (Stanford,	1993),	p.	110.	7	Ibid.,	p.	5.		8	Ibid.		
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citizenship	 depended.	 On	 the	 other,	 the	 information	 made	 known	 through	 the	institutions	 and	 publications	 of	 the	 state	 provided	 the	 primary	material	 for	 the	family	and	social	discourse	of	lack	and	immorality,	which	in	1848	ultimately	stood	as	the	evidence	indicting	the	regime	for	its	inactivity.	In	her	study	of	the	Académie	des	 sciences	 morales	 et	 politiques,	 Sophie-Anne	 Leterrier	 has	 shown	 how	 the	institution’s	prize-winning	essays,	which	uncovered	the	wide	range	of	social	ills	of	their	 time,	 served	 to	 undermine	 the	 very	 social	 and	 political	 order	 they	 were	meant	to	uphold.9		I	will	 show	how	at	 the	moment	of	 their	birth	 in	 the	1830s,	 the	debate	on	 family	breakdown	 and	 family	 reform	 was	 inseparable	 from	 the	 debate	 on	 social	breakdown	 and	 social	 reform.	 I	 will	 explore	 one	 of	 the	 earliest	 disputes	 on	 the	‘social	question’,	the	case	of	foundlings,	and	will	follow	the	changes	in	policy	over	the	 course	 of	 half	 a	 century.	 This	 polemic	 served	 to	 draw	 the	 ideological	 line	between	two	understandings	of	power,	at	work	both	in	the	family	and	in	society	at	large.	On	the	one	hand	were	the	advocates	of	what	I	will	call	guardianship,	a	new	mode	of	 impersonal	and	socialized	power	 that	was	 to	be	 limited,	 temporary	and	exercised	in	favour	of	the	governed.	This	was	the	position	the	government	adopted	and	imposed	through	policy.	On	the	other	stood	those	who	tried	to	hold	on	to	the	traditional	 and	 increasingly	 elusive	 notion	 of	 personal	 and	 moral	 authority,	 a	power	as	absolute	as	burdensome	was	its	responsibility	before	god	and	king,	and	thus	 exercised	 indefinitely	 for	 its	 own	 necessary	 good.	 This	 was	 especially	 the	position	 of	 the	 Catholic	 opposition	 to	 the	 July	 monarchy,	 who	 were	 profoundly	provoked	into	a	debate	by	the	new	family	reforms	being	implemented	by	the	state.																																																									9	Sophie-Anne	 Leterrier,	 L’institution	 des	 sciences	 morales:	 L’Académie	 des	 sciences	 morales	 et	
politiques,	1795-1850	(Paris,	1995),	p.	271.	
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Since	the	opposition	was	powerless	in	matters	of	policy	reform,	the	confrontation	generated	 a	 surge	 in	 Catholic	 charities.	 But	 charitable	 experiences	 and	participation	in	the	debate	largely	served	to	highlight	the	conceptual	incoherencies	and	 contradictions	 behind	 the	 project	 of	 reviving	 past	 forms	 of	 authority	 in	 the	family	and	society.	Bitterly	defeated	in	matters	of	family	policy	from	1830	to	1870,	Catholics	would	gradually	come	to	accept	their	opponent’s	model	of	the	family	in	the	 later	 part	 of	 the	 century,	 while	 in	 turn	 the	 victorious	 liberals	 and	 later	 on,	republicans,	gained	a	more	plural	view	of	social	power	which	was	largely	indebted	to	Catholics.	By	the	1880s,	a	new	understanding	of	social	government	meant	that	both	approaches	could	integrate	and	converge	with	no	contradiction.	The	notion	of	institution	brought	together	and	embodied	in	the	new	social	expert	(called	a	social	worker	 after	 the	 First	 World	 War)	 the	 impersonal,	 limited	 and	 temporary	administrative	 power	 that	 liberals	 had	 espoused	 with	 the	 Catholic	 focus	 on	personal	 involvement,	 love,	morality	 and	 authority.	No	 longer	 at	 odds	with	 each	other	were	state	power	and	social	power,	public	assistance	and	private	charity	or	the	 expertise	 of	 the	 notables	 and	 of	 the	 administration.	 By	 means	 of	 a	multiplication	of	authoritative	agents	at	the	local	level,	networks	of	interpersonal	and	 impersonal	 power	 came	 to	 support	 each	 other	mutually.	 In	 order	 to	 tackle	these	matters,	 the	point	of	departure	will	be	to	unravel	 the	connections	between	the	family	and	political	ideals	in	the	nineteenth	century.			
The	politics	of	the	family.		The	 family	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 strategic	 concepts	 for	 any	 ideology	 or	 political	tradition	because	it	was	seen	as	the	irreducible	nucleus	where	problems	of	power	
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and	government	were	posed.	Whereas	each	political	tradition	promoted	a	specific	understanding	of	the	family,	they	were	agreed	in	making	of	the	domestic	sphere	a	politically	operative	category,	invariably	cast	in	political	thought	as	a	harmonious	community	 of	 interests	 with	 a	 single	 will.10	The	 vicomte	 de	 Bonald,	 a	 legitimist	statesman,	argued	that	‘being	the	family	the	element	of	the	State,	and	the	State	the	development	of	 the	 family,	 and	both	 societies	being	 similar	 in	 their	 constitution,	every	 change	will	be	 reciprocal	between	 them’.11	Every	political	 tradition	 tended	to	 draw	 similar	 analogies	 and	 reciprocities	 between	 family	 and	 political	 system.	For	 ultra-royalists	 like	 Bonald,	 the	 family	 was	 an	 autocratic	 and	 hierarchical	structure	that	would	provide	the	basis	for	monarchic	government.	For	republicans,	the	 home	was	 a	 site	 of	 equality	 and	 liberty,	 the	 source	 of	 the	 political	 good	 life.	Doctrinaire	 liberal	 François	 Guizot	 justified	 the	 rule	 of	 reason	 through	 censitary	suffrage	limited	to	social	‘capacities’	by	modelling	it	on	the	father,	who		observes,	listens,	consults	those	who	should	obey	him,	enters	into	negotiations	at	the	 very	 instant,	 in	 a	 formal	 transaction	 with	 their	 reason	 and	 their	 liberty,	modifies	 their	wills	 according	 to	 their	dispositions	or	 their	 ideas,	 [and]	 conducts	himself	 naturally	 and	 necessarily,	 according	 to	 the	 protective	 principle	 of	 law,	which	wants	power	to	justify	its	legitimacy	in	making	itself	freely	accepted.12	If	 reason	was	 to	 rule	 the	 state,	 Guizot	 assumed	 the	 same	 thing	 was	 true	 of	 the	home.	 As	 legitimists	 and	 liberals,	 republicans	 also	 cast	 the	 family	 as	 a	 political	microcosm.	The	Garnier-Pagès	Dictionnaire	politique,	edited	by	Laurent	Pagnerre,																																																									10	Frédéric	Le	Play,	La	réforme	sociale	en	France,	I	(Paris,	1867),	pp.	434-448;	‘Famille’	and	‘Mariage’	in:	Laurent	Pagnerre	(ed.),	Dictionnaire	politique	(Paris,	1860),	pp.	391-394,	568-573;	‘Famille’	and	‘Femme’	in:	Maurice	Block	(ed.),	Dictionnaire	général	de	la	politique,	1	(Paris,	1873),	pp.	1010-1012,	1014-1020.	11	Quoted	 in:	Claudie	Bernard,	Penser	la	famille	au	XIXe	siècle,	1789-1870	 (Saint-Étienne,	2007),	p.	211.	12	Quoted	 in:	 Anne	 Verjus,	 ‘Les	 femmes,	 épouses	 et	 mères	 de	 citoyens:	 De	 la	 famille	 comme	catégorie	 politique	 dans	 la	 construction	 de	 la	 citoyenneté,	 1789-1848’,	 Ph.D.	 thesis,	 École	 des	Hautes	Études	en	Sciences	Sociales	(Paris,	1997),	p.	181.	
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is	widely	 understood	 to	 have	 expressed	 the	mainstream	views	 of	 republicans	 in	the	1840s.	 In	 it,	 Élias	Regnault	wrote	 that	 ‘The	Family	makes	of	 the	 two	 sexes	 a	single	individual	and	creates	the	collective	being’.13		Marriage	is	the	reunion	of	two	individuals	in	one	only	being,	the	transformation	of	the	double	nature	 in	a	single	nature,	more	powerful	and	more	beautiful;	 it	 is	not	only	the	coming	together	of	a	man	and	a	woman,	it	is	the	human	being	completing	its	unity	by	the	intimate	cohesion	of	the	active	and	passive	principles,	henceforth	indistinguishable	 in	 a	 glorious	 harmony.[…]	 Marriage	 therefore	 makes	 a	 new	human	 being[…],	 androgyne	 social,	 a	 single	 and	 double	 being	 whose	 bodies,	concentrated	 in	 a	 single	 soul,	 destined	 to	 enjoy	 the	 same	 joys,	 suffer	 the	 same	pains.14	The	 transcendental	 nature	 of	 this	 ‘physical	 and	 moral	 union’	 had	 wider	implications.	 ‘[T]his	 true	appreciation	of	Marriage	could	serve	usefully	 to	resolve	grave	problems	in	political	law’.	Regnault	then	discussed	volition,	concluding	that,	‘according	to	the	real	meaning	of	Marriage,	the	woman	who	has	another	will	than	her	husband’s,	 the	husband	who	has	another	will	 than	his	wife’s,	 commits	moral	adultery’. 15 	For	 republicans,	 the	 family	 solved	 the	 key	 political	 problem	 of	individual	 wills	 merging	 into	 a	 greater,	 collective	 will	 where	 they	 were	 to	 be	‘indistinguishable	in	a	glorious	harmony’.		Every	political	ideology	or	intellectual	tradition	in	France	had	its	own	ideal	of	the	family	 as	 a	necessary	part	 of	 the	 greater	 vision	of	 the	 social	 ‘good	 life’	 that	 they	
																																																								13	Élias	Regnault,	‘Famille’,	in:	Pagnerre,	Dictionnaire,	p.	392.	14	Regnault,	‘Mariage’,	in:	Ibid.,	pp.	569-570.	15	Ibid.,	p.	570.	
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espoused. 16 	It	 became	 common	 for	 political	 ideology	 to	 be	 naturalized	 and	legitimized	 by	 projecting	 any	 ideal	 onto	 the	 family	 as	 the	 pre-political	 state	 of	‘nature’.	 But	 this	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 political	 traditions	 envisioned	 a	 clear	programme	of	family	reform	or	indeed	a	coherent	narrative	about	the	family.	The	best	study	of	the	profound	multiplicity	of	family	ideals	between	the	Revolution	and	the	end	of	the	Second	Empire	in	France	remains	Claudie	Bernard’s	Penser	la	famille	
au	XIXe	siècle.	Without	reducing	the	complexity	of	family	models,	she	has	been	able	to	 identify	 three	 global	 currents	 in	 the	 writings	 on	 the	 family:	 patriarchalism,	progressivism	or	paternalism,	and	utopianism.	These	broad	discursive	tendencies	do	not	 coincide	with	 standard	political	 differences,	 but	 actually	 clash	with	 them.	Thus,	 the	 first	brings	 together	ultra-conservatives	such	as	 the	vicomte	de	Bonald	and	 Joseph	de	Maistre	with	 liberal	Guizot	and	anarchist	Pierre-Joseph	Proudhon;	the	 second	encyclopédiste	Denis	Diderot,	 the	marquis	de	Sade	and	 socialist	Flora	Tristan;	the	third	liberal	Tocqueville,	positivist	Comte	and	socialist	Pierre	Leroux.17	Little	intelligibility	then	seems	to	be	gained	from	considering	the	contents	of	family	discourses.			A	 second	 approach	 adopts	 a	 simple	 division	 many	 contemporaries	 would	 have	identified	with:	 the	 old	 family	 and	 the	 new.	 Two	 clearly	 opposed	models	 of	 the	family	 were	 articulated	 during	 the	 French	 Revolution.	 Building	 on	 Jacques	Mulliez’s	 contrast	between	 the	 tyrannical	and	 the	 loving	 father,	André	Burguière	highlighted	the	revolutionaries’	search	to	‘substitute	for	a	conception	of	paternity	built	 on	 authority	 and	 lineage	 in	 which	 the	 father	 essentially	 intervened	 as	 an																																																									16	Michelle	Perrot,	‘La	famille	triomphante’,	in:	Philippe	Ariès	and	George	Duby	(eds),	Histoire	de	la	
vie	privée,	4	(Paris,	1999),	pp.	81-92.	17	Bernard,	Penser	la	famille,	part	2.	
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agent	of	 transmission	of	 the	rights,	goods,	and	honour	of	 the	 lineage,	a	voluntary	and	 individual	 conception	 of	 paternity’.	 This	 view	 ‘counterbalanced	 the	 rights	 of	the	 father	 with	 his	 duties	 (those	 of	 nourishing,	 protecting,	 [and]	 educating	 his	children)	 and	 counts	 affection	 among	 his	 duties	 and	 rights’.	 So,	 from	 being	embedded	 in	 a	 deeper	 structure,	 making	 ‘of	 the	 father-child	 relation	 a	 passing	sequence	 of	 a	 more	 fundamental	 bond,	 that	 of	 lineage’	 in	 which	 the	 ‘father	 is	limited	to	punishing’,	filiation	in	the	new	family	became	increasingly	thrown	upon	itself,	 framed	 within	 ‘a	 more	 individualized	 and	 affective	 conception	 of	 the	paternal	role	that	implies	duties	of	assistance	and	comprehension	with	regards	to	the	child’.18			This	opposition	between	the	‘old’	and	the	‘new’	family	was	at	the	centre	of	political	imaginations	 during	 the	 Revolution,	 and	 indeed	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 nineteenth	century	could	be	read	as	the	more	or	less	explicit	battle	between	these	two	family	ideals.	The	problem	may	come	from	this	opposition’s	ability	to	explain	too	much.	Cognitive	 linguist	 Georges	 Lakoff,	 after	 asking	 himself	 ‘If	 there	 are	 two	 different	understandings	of	the	nation,	do	they	come	from	two	different	understandings	of	family?’,	 has	 reduced	 the	 ideological	 distances	 that	 constitute	 the	 political	spectrum	 in	 the	 modern-day	 United	 States	 to	 the	 simple	 but	 very	 meaningful	contrast	between	a	‘strict	father	morality’	and	a	‘nurturant	parent	morality’	(which	‘is	gender	neutral’).19	Reading	his	outline	of	such	family	models,	both	would	seem	to	 be	 as	 alive	 and	 distinct	 as	 they	were	 in	 the	 early	 1790s.	 These	 two	 ideals	 of	parenting	seemed	to	have	arisen	at	the	same	time	and	to	be	inexorably	tied	to	the																																																									18	André	 Burguière,	 ‘La	 famille	 comme	 enjeu	 politique:	 De	 la	 Révolution	 au	 Code	 civil’,	 Droit	 et	
société,	14	(1990),	pp.	26-28,	See:	Jacques	Mulliez,	‘La	volonté	d’un	homme’,	in:	Jean	Delumeau	and	Daniel	Roche	(eds.),	Histoire	des	pères	et	de	la	paternité	(Paris,	2000),	pp.	289-327.	19	George	Lakoff,	Don't	Think	of	an	Elephant!	(White	River	Junction,	2004),	pp.	5,	11.	
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difference	 between	 the	 political	 Left	 and	 Right,	 which	 after	 the	 Revolution	 has	carried	on	structuring	political	confrontation.	Despite	the	changes	of	the	 last	two	centuries,	it	is	as	if	political	identities	somehow	remain	wedded	to	lingering	family	ideals	whose	 changing	 forms	 only	 reaffirm,	multiply	 and	 confirm	 their	 founding	dissimilarity	with	startling	continuity.			If	the	French	Revolution	politicized	the	family,	it	was	by	borrowing	the	Old-Regime	assumption	 that	 made	 of	 it	 the	 bedrock	 of	 the	 political	 system.	 The	 absolutist	monarchy	 had	 explicitly	 assigned	 politically	 crucial	 functions	 to	 the	 Old-Regime	family,	 whose	 head	 was	 in	 practice	 a	 royal	 delegate.	 After	 1789,	 the	 stakes	represented	by	‘new’	and	‘old’	families	became	indistinct	from	the	larger	problems	of	a	 ‘new’	and	‘old’	political	system.	By	assimilating	the	founding	correspondence	between	 political	 and	 family	 system,	 revolutionaries	 turned	 the	 family	 into	 a	central	category	in	nineteenth-century	political	thought.			However,	the	analytical	twinning	of	family	and	politics	has	the	effect	of	collapsing	the	 former	 into	 the	 latter.	 When	 the	 family	 ideal	 becomes	 so	 closely	 tied	 to	 a	political	 regime	 that	 it	 effectively	 can	 be	 reduced	 to	 it,	 then	 the	 family	 becomes	highly	elusive	as	an	object	of	study.	Any	attempt	to	think	the	family	can	thus	only	lead	to	a	reflection	upon	the	wider	issue	of	authority	in	society	at	large,	and	one	in	which	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 separate	 the	 domestic	 and	 social	 ‘good	 life’.	 In	 other	words,	 to	 attempt	 to	 think	 the	 family	 from	politics	 leads	 to	 a	 reflection	 that	 has	
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little	to	say	about	the	home	as	such,	and	a	lot	to	say	about	social	authority,	or	how	relationships	of	equality	and	inequality	should	be	structured	within	society.20					There	 have	 also	 been	 efforts	 to	 grasp	 the	 family	 through	 the	 authority	model	 it	represents.	Although	Foucault	had	 little	 to	say	about	 the	 family	 itself,	 there	have	been	numerous	attempts	to	apply	his	theorizations	about	different	forms	of	power	to	the	domestic.21	Usually	ignoring	his	posterior	work	that	went	beyond	this	 idea	of	 two	 powers,	 scholars	 have	 drawn	 on	 the	 opposition	 between	 ‘sovereign’	 and	‘disciplinary	power’	that	he	introduced	in	Discipline	and	Punish.	The	result	of	these	attempts	 has	 only	 revived	 the	 opposition	 between	 ‘strict	 father’	 and	 ‘nurturant	parent’	 using	 different	 terminology.	 Chloë	 Taylor,	 in	 assessing	 these	 works,	 has	made	 it	 clear	 that	 no	 one	 form	of	 these	 powers	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 inherent	 to	 the	family.	Modes	of	both	powers	can	be	present	at	different	times	and	places;	they	are	fluid	and	changing	because	power,	as	 the	 family	 itself,	has	no	essence.	As	Taylor	argued,	‘We	should	not	be	trying	to	discover	the	correct	theory	of	the	family,	but	to	genealogize	 it’.22	Reduced	 to	 a	 form	 of	 relating	 that	 is	 potentially	 everywhere,	power	 itself	 should	 cease	 to	 be	 the	 question.	 Foucault’s	 work	 in	 the	 1980s	was	already	moving	in	this	direction.23Inquiry	should	move	on	to	focus	on	relating	(to	self	 and	 other),	 for	which	 power	 is	 but	 one	way	 of	 reading	 and	 organizing	 such	relationships.			By	 decentring	 the	 opposition	 between	 ‘strict	 father’	 and	 ‘nurturant	 parent’,	 the	focus	 can	 turn	 to	 the	 family	 discourse	 that	 sustained	 them	 both.	 What	 was																																																									20	Lynn	Hunt,	The	Family	Romance	of	the	French	Revolution	(Berkeley,	1992).	21	Chloë	Taylor,	‘Foucault	and	familial	power’,	Hypatia,	27/1	(2012),	pp.	201-218.	22	Ibid.,	p.	216.	23	See:	Stuart	Elden,	Foucault’s	Last	Decade	(Cambridge,	2016).	
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characteristic	of	this	discourse	was	that	broad	social	problems	were	individualized	and	 tied	 to	 personal	 behaviour,	 while	 private	 life	 became	 politicized.	 Family	discourse	 highlighted	 lacks,	 both	 in	 individual	 behaviour	 and	 in	 the	 capacity	 of	collective	 agency	 to	 correct	 or	 direct	 private	 conduct.	 As	 reform	 from	 the	 top	seemed	 elusive,	 the	 individual	 was	 mobilized	 to	 correct	 his	 or	 her	 conduct	 in	private	and	public	life.	This	was	novel.	In	the	Old	Regime,	behaviour	was	regulated	by	 strict	 social	 norms	with	 the	 backing	 of	 the	 judicial	 system.	 In	 the	 nineteenth	century,	mores	 and	 law	 became	 separated.	Morality	was	 no	 longer	 to	 be	 legally	enforced.	 Consequently,	 the	 individual	was	 called	 upon	 to	 engage	 and	 step	 in	 to	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 moral	 ideal	 and	 the	 immoral	 state	 of	 affairs	 being	highlighted	by	family	and	social	lacks.			
Authority	and	equality.		In	the	1890s,	Catholic	Émile	Cheysson,	one	of	 the	 leading	social	reformists	of	 the	conservative	Le	Play	school,	placed	love	at	the	centre	of	the	task	of	the	benevolent	
patron.	‘As	for	the	common	inspiration	to	all	bosses,	it	consists	of	their	attachment	to	their	personnel.	Herein	lies	the	great	secret:	knowing	how	to	love.	Outside	that,	everything	 is	 sterile	 and	 one	 only	 finds	 inanimate	 mechanisms’.24	As	 François	Ewald	 argued,	 the	 practice	 of	 inter-class	 relations	 of	 guardianship	 ‘consisted	 in	substituting	economic	and	juridical	relationships	between	the	boss	and	the	worker	for	relations	of	sentiment:	gratefulness,	respect,	affection’.25		
																																																								24	Quoted	in:	François	Ewald,	L'État	providence	(Paris,	1986),	p.	126.	25	Ibid.	
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Cheysson	illustrated	the	deliberate	attempt	of	conservative	reformists	throughout	the	nineteenth	 century	 to	 return	 to	 the	Christian	 ideal	 in	which	 the	problems	of	relations	of	inequality	were	solved	through	the	Christian	imperative	of	mutual	love	and	service.	This	view	had	gradually	been	abandoned	 long	before	the	Revolution	as	 the	eighteenth	 century	 saw	 the	development	of	 a	new	order	of	 the	affections,	one	linked	to	the	nuclear	family.			Despite	 actual	 inequality	 within	 the	 family,	 the	 home	 gradually	 emerged	 as	 the	primary	conceptual	site	of	a	new	type	of	relations	of	equality.	 In	the	seventeenth	century,	 an	 extensive	 literature	 had	 brought	 the	 concept	 of	 friendship	 under	attack.	 The	 debate	 on	 friendship	 operated	 as	 a	way	 of	 prioritizing	 and	 ordering	loyalties,	 strengthening	 ‘formal’	 hierarchical	 ties	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 ‘informal’	 or	horizontal	bonds.26	The	outcome	of	this	process	can	be	read	in	his	1701	Traité	de	
l’amitié,	 where	 author	 Louis-Silvestre	 de	 Sacy	 argued	 that	 the	 fundamental	condition	of	virtue	was	‘an	inviolable	attachment	to	our	duties’.	These	 duties	 have	marked	 ranks	 and	 are	 in	 such	 subordination,	 that	 one	 cannot	displace	 them	 without	 destroying	 them.	 In	 this	 order,	 those	 of	 friendship	 come	last.	 Born	 creatures,	 we	 belong	 to	 the	 Creator;	 born	 subjects,	 we	 belong	 to	 the	State;	 born	 in	 a	 family,	 we	 belong	 to	 our	 family.	 In	 short,	 we	 are	 born	 men,	subjects,	relatives;	we	become	friends.	We	only	receive	life	charged	with	these	first	debts;	these	must	be	settled	before	those	we	want	to	contract	ourselves.27		
																																																								26	Foucault	made	suggestive	comments	on	the	history	of	friendship,	see	especially:	‘Sex,	power,	and	the	politics	of	identity’,	in:	Paul	Rabinow	(ed.),	Ethics:	Subjectivity	and	Truth	(New	York,	1994),	pp.	163-173.	 After	 his	 death	 there	 has	 been	 an	 important	 surge	 of	 scholarly	 interest	 in	 the	 topic	 of	friendship	and	politics,	which	casts	new	light	on	the	issue	of	equality	and	inequality.	For	a	detailed	literary	review	see:	Heather	Devere	and	Graham	M.	Smith,	'Friendship	and	politics’,	Political	Studies	
Review,	 8	 (2010),	 pp.	 341-356,	 Devere,	 'Amity	 update:	 The	 academic	 debate	 on	 friendship	 and	politics’,	Amity:	The	Journal	of	Friendship	Studies,	1	(2013),	pp.	5-33.	27	Louis-Silvestre	de	Sacy,	Traité	de	l’amitié	(Paris,	1722),	pp.	137-138.	
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Personal	observance	of	the	rules	of	virtue	was	tied	to	the	social	order.	‘In	the	exact	submission	to	these	different	duties	[to	God,	patrie	and	family]	is	contained	all	the	tranquillity	of	society’.28	Loyalty	was	to	derive	 from	one’s	obligations	rather	than	affections	and	choices.	Thus,	any	interaction	that	could	place	itself	in	opposition	to	these	public	interests	becomes	une	liaison	si	monstrueuse.29			The	 affections	 were	 ordered	 and	 gendered	 inside	 the	 home	 in	 a	 similar	 way.	Religious	author	Catherine	Lévesque,	in	her	1685	treatise	on	the	perfection	of	love,	offered	a	dramatic	warning	on	the	dangers	of	family	love	degenerating	into	incest	and	carnal	love.	‘The	father,	seeing	the	beauty	[and]	agreeableness	of	the	youth	of	his	daughter,	loves	her	at	the	detriment	of	the	love	he	must	have	for	the	mother’.	The	 same	case	was	argued	 for	 the	mother	with	her	 sons.	The	way	 to	avoid	 such	sins	was	 through	a	disembodied	 love,	 ‘the	purely	spiritual	 love	of	God	with	 their	love’.	 The	 reason	 for	 her	 argument	 was	 a	 new	 reading	 of	 love	 that	 made	 it	incompatible	with	social	hierarchy	and	order,	for	the	‘ruse	of	carnal	love[…]	has	no	eyes	 at	 all	 to	 discern	 the	 rank	 of	 People.	 All	 that	 is	 needed	 for	 it	 to	 take	 hold	 is	someone	 of	 the	 opposite	 sex’.30	Love,	 Lévesque	 argued,	 was	 disruptive	 of	 ranks	and	 hierarchies	 inside	 the	 family	 and	 in	 society	 at	 large.	 Order	 could	 only	 be	upheld	by	an	interiorizing	and	taming	of	the	affections.			As	 the	 belief	 in	 freedom	 advanced	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 unequal	 social	relations	 became	 more	 uncomfortable	 intellectually.	 In	 practice,	 these	 unequal	relations	 were	 rendered	 problematic	 by	 the	 gradual	 abandonment	 of	 the																																																									28	Ibid.,	p.	136.	29	Ibid.,	p.	207.	30	Catherine	Lévesque,	La	perfection	de	l'amour	du	prochain	dans	tous	 les	états...	 (Paris,	 1685),	pp.	257-258.	
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traditional	 norms	 that	 regulated	 the	 master-servant	 bond,	 wages	 and	 worker	mobility	 in	 the	 local	 economy.31	The	mutual	 love	 that	 had	 been	 thought	 to	 bind	master	 and	 servant	 became	 increasingly	 suspect	 and	 untenable.	 Where	 once	 a	single	form	of	love	circulated	in	the	social	body,	ultimately	the	duty	of	an	exalted	and	 universal	 spiritual	 love	 which	 their	 God	 had	 imposed	 on	 Christians,	 a	hierarchy	 of	 loves	 seemed	 to	 have	 emerged	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century.	 Thus	 the	Dauphin,	father	to	Louis	XVI,	Louis	XVIII	and	Charles	X,	could	write	that		A	king	must	see	himself	in	his	domains	as	a	père	de	famille	among	his	children.	He	must	love	his	peoples	not	as	a	master	loves	his	slaves,	but	as	a	father	loves	his	own	children;	he	owes	them	the	same	care,	the	same	protection	and	the	same	efforts	to	render	them	happy.32			Indeed,	 the	 greater	 the	 liberty	 imagined	 for	 the	 adult	 individual,	 the	 more	unshakable	 the	 dependency	 of	 the	 child	 seemed.	 But	while	 slavery	 or	 servitude	was	 a	 construction	 of	 men,	 childhood	 belonged	 to	 nature.	 As	 the	 Dauphin	 had	done,	recourse	to	the	child-father	analogy	in	political	thought	clung	on	to	the	most	‘natural’	 of	 a	 rapidly	 receding	 constellation	 of	 previously	 acceptable	 relations	 of	inequality.	Having	 lost	 their	now	 inexplicable	hue	of	 intimacy,	 love	and	affection	that	had	once	defined	them,	the	relationship	between	master	and	servant,	owner	and	slave,	boss	and	underling,	indeed,	between	any	two	persons	deemed	‘unequal’,	became	reduced	to	the	quintessential	basis	of	modern	politics:	a	problem	of	power.		It	 was	 imagined	 that	 true	 relating	 and	 affections	 could	 only	 take	 place	 in	 the	absence	 of	 this	 problem	 of	 power,	 meaning	 that	 one	 could	 only	 fully	 relate	 to																																																									31	Edward	Shorter,	The	Making	of	the	Modern	Family	(Glasgow,	1979),	p.	251.	32	Quoted	in:	Henri	de	L'Épinois,	Vie	du	Dauphin	(Paris,	1858?),	p.	161.	Emphasis	added.	
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equals.	Equality	entered	into	the	home	in	two	ways	in	the	eighteenth	century.	The	first	was	the	obligation	to	 love	one’s	children	equally.	In	his	short	story	 ‘The	Bad	Mother’,	 encyclopédiste	 Jean-François	 Marmontel	 understood	 this	 frequent	‘monstrosity’	to	mean	‘a	mother	that	loves	one	of	her	children	to	the	exclusion	of	all	 the	 others’.	 ‘I	 am	 speaking	 of	 a	 blind	 tenderness,	 often	 exclusive,	 sometime	jealous,	 that	 choses	 an	 idol	 and	 victims	 among	 those	 innocent	 children	 one	 has	brought	into	this	world,	and	for	whom	one	is	equally	obliged	to	lighten	the	burden	of	 life’.33	After	1789	this	 focus	on	equal	treatment	of	children	would	find	its	 legal	translation	 into	 equal	 inheritance	 rights	 for	 siblings,	 which	 undermined	 the	aristocratic	foundations	of	the	Old	Regime.			The	 second	 impact	 of	 egalitarianism	was	 on	 the	 relations	 between	 spouses.	 The	difference	 between	 affectionate	 and	 interested	 marriage	 came	 to	 rest	 on	 the	degree	 of	 equality	 among	 the	 spouses.	 In	 1773,	 père	 Richard,	 a	 professor	 in	theology,	challenged	the	pope’s	use	of	his	ability	to	dispend	approval	for	marriage	to	relatives	in	the	first	degree.	Direct	forebears,	he	argued,	were	at	least	potential	surrogate	fathers	and	mothers,	and	their	descendants	‘owe	them	a	respect	that	is	naturally	incompatible	with	the	equality	found	between	spouses	in	the	custom	of	marriage’.	The	argument	thus	did	not	fall	on	the	biology	or	morality	of	incest,	but	rather	 in	 the	 inacceptable	 mixing	 of	 two	 incompatible	 forms	 of	 relating:	 the	hierarchy	 of	 the	 parent-child	 bond	 and	 the	 horizontality	 of	 marriage.34	In	 1792,	novelist	 Nicolas-Edme	 Rétif	 highlighted	 the	 parameters	 of	 that	 equality.	 In	 his	fictional	 saga	 depicting	 the	 love	 affair	 between	 le	 Chevalier	 de	 Joinville	 and	Mademoiselle	d'Arans,	Rétif	had	the	latter	write:																																																										33	Jean-François	Marmontel,	Oeuvres	complètes,	2	(Paris,	1819),	p.	146.	34	Charles-Louis	Richard,	Analyse	des	Conciles	généraux	et	particuliers,	2/4	(Paris,	1773),	p.	333.	
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Everything	 contributes	 to	 assure	 us	 a	 constant	 happiness:	 equality	 of	 birth,	compatibility	 of	 characters,	way	 of	 thinking,	 the	 intimate	 union	 of	 our	 souls	 and	both	of	us	are	favoured	by	the	gifts	of	wealth.35	Marriage	 and	 sentimental	 relations	 had	 come	 to	 necessitate	 an	 equality	 of	condition	wherein	the	parity	of	dignity	and	rank	maintained	a	balance	of	honour,	power	and,	increasingly,	wealth.	Edward	Shorter	has	added	to	this	list	equality	of	age	which	‘rendered	unacceptable	the	older	woman	and	the	younger	man’;	for	‘it	is	increasing	 equality	 in	 the	 ages	 of	 the	 partners	 that	 points	 to	 romantic	 love,	increasing	 disparity	 that	 points	 to	 instrumental	 considerations’.36	Thus	 discrete	domains	of	essential	equality	were	being	found	for	both	siblings	and	spouses.		Having	homogeneous	backgrounds	and	biologies	became	the	condition	for	equality	inside	 the	home.	As	a	pamphleteer	 in	1790	under	 the	pseudonym	M***	explored	the	 issue	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 fraternité,	 he	 imagined	 it	 was	 only	 possible	 in	private.	It	was	in	‘the	private	society’	where	‘persons	of	the	same	order	are	closer	together’	because	of	their	similarity.	There	is	between	them	a	type	of	fraternity	that	designates	them	to	be	the	society	of	each	 other,	 to	 live	 together	 rather	 than	 with	 persons	 of	 other	 orders.	 Of	 this	habitude	 of	 living	 together	 and	 conversing,	 an	 analogy	 of	 principles	 and	mœurs	results.	He	assumed	that	only	good	principles	would	take	hold	among	them.	And	if	‘citizens	of	 the	 other	 orders	 will	 adopt’	 their	 principles	 and	 customs,	 ‘a	 larger	 fraternity	among	men	will	result’.37	Therefore,	fraternity	was	only	possible	among	those	who	
																																																								35	Nicolas-Edme	Rétif,	Les	nouvelles	liaisons	dangereuses,	IV	(Paris,	1792),	pp.	9-10.	36	Shorter,	Making	of	the	Modern	Family,	pp.	157,	159.	37	Quoted	 in:	 Anne-Rozenn	 Morel,	 ‘Le	 principe	 de	 fraternité	 dans	 les	 fictions	 utopiques	 de	 la	Révolution	française’,	Dix-huitième	siècle,	1/41	(2009),	p.	124.	
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were	 equal,	 either	 because	 they	 belonged	 to	 the	 same	 ‘order’	 and	 lived	 in	 a	proximate,	 almost	 domestic	 relation,	 or	 because	 they	 shared	 the	 same	 views.	Hence	difference	had	come	to	be	seen	an	obstacle	for	social	fraternity	as	it	was	for	an	affectionate	marriage.		The	divide	between	the	private	and	the	public	highlighted	an	opposition	between	familiarity	and	hostility,	while	triggering	a	paradoxical	fear	of	isolation.	On	the	one	hand,	‘Solitude	seems	like	a	lack	on	connection	and	therefore	a	lack	of	constraint’.38	The	royalist	diplomat	and	writer	vicomte	de	Chateaubriand	expressed	concern	at	the	proliferation	of	unmarried	men	in	all	the	classes	of	his	time.	These	isolated	men,	who	are	consequently	selfish,	search	to	fill	a	void	in	their	life	by	troubling	the	families	of	others.[…]	The	man	who	no	longer	finds	his	happiness	in	the	union	of	a	family,	who	often	gives	up	the	sweet	title	of	father,	becomes	used	to	forming	a	happiness	independently	of	others.39		The	absence	of	a	 family	marked	a	 troublesome	detachment	 from	society	and	 the	rise	of	asocial	happiness.	But	to	be	attached	to	the	family,	on	the	other	hand,	was	depicted	as	 feeling	 isolated	from	and	 lost	 in	the	unfamiliar	hostility	of	 the	world.	George-Marie	Raymond,	the	emulation	theorist	we	encountered	earlier,	wrote	of	a	fictional	young	man	who	was	much	loved	in	his	family	and	village,	and	thus		he	 believes	 himself	 a	 very	 important	 being	 in	 the	world.	 He	 leaves,	 arrives	 in	 a	large	city;	nobody	 looks	at	him,	no	one	even	supposes	he	exists.	He	 finds	himself	lost	 in	 an	 immense	 sea,	 and	 he	 is	 astonished	 to	 be	 but	 an	 invisible	 point	 in	 the	unlimited	space	what	opens	up	to	his	gaze.	In	order	to	know	ourselves,	in	order	to	
																																																								38	Richard	Sennett,	Authority	(London,	1993),	p.	4.	39	Quoted	in:	Bernard,	Penser	la	famille,	p.	205.	
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judge	 the	 rank	 that	we	 occupy,	we	 need	 to	measure	 the	 horizon	 that	 surrounds	us.40	Outside	the	 limits	of	 familiarity,	 the	self	did	not	matter	 in	and	of	 itself	but	rather	occupied	 a	 contextual	 and	 shifting	 position;	 indeed,	 outside	 the	 home,	 rank	was	uncertain.	One	hygienist	cast	the	immense	sea	of	social	anonymity	as	the	slow	and	imperceptible	‘source	of	many	illnesses’,	a	powerful	claim	at	a	time	when	the	1832	cholera	 epidemic	 had	 not	 been	 forgotten.	 The	 danger	 came	 from	 ‘the	 miasmas	exuded	 by	 so	many	 bodies	 assembled	 [and]	 the	 fetid	 odours	 resulting	 from	 the	uncleanliness	of	most	of	them’.41			Discourses	of	disease	joined	those	of	crime	to	project	an	emotional	map	onto	the	domestic-social	split.	The	fascination	with	crime	seems	to	have	been	born	during	the	Restoration,	especially	with	 the	publication	of	 the	Gazette	des	tribunaux	 from	1825.	 The	 popular	 press,	 scholarly	 publications	 and	 novels	 cross-fertilized	 each	other	 to	 produce	what	 Louis	 Chevalier	 termed	 ‘la	 psychose	du	 crime’.42	In	 1843,	the	vicomte	de	Launay	wrote	about	how	 fear	of	 crime	had	reduced	his	domestic	interaction	to	those	of	the	nuclear	family.	After	a	month	one	hears	about	nocturnal	attacks,	ambushes,	audacious	robberies…	The	most	shocking	thing	about	these	nightly	attacks	is	the	noble	impartiality	of	the	assailants:	 they	 strike	upon	 the	 rich	 and	 the	poor[…]	Before,	misery	 at	 least	 had	the	privilege	of	security:	that	is	no	longer	the	case.	Paris	is	most	troubled	by	these	sinister	 adventures;	 family	 reunions	 suffer	 in	 particular	 of	 these	 defensive	
																																																								40	George-Marie	Raymond,	Essai	sur	l’émulation	(Geneva,	1802),	p.	30.	41 	J.P.	 Thouvenin,	 Hygiène	 populaire	 à	 l’usage	 des	 ouvriers	 des	 manufactures	 de	 Lille	 et	 du	
Département	du	Nord	(Lille,	1842),	p.	72.	42	Louis	Chevalier,	Classes	laborieuses	et	classes	dangereuses	(Paris,	2007),	p.	x.	
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preoccupations.[…]	 One	 only	 lets	 relatives	 and	 friends	 leave	 one’s	 house	 after	having	inspected	their	weapons.43	A	new	form	of	blind	and	deadly	criminality	reframed	extra-domestic	sociability	in	terms	 of	 risk.	 Fear	 of	 crime	was	 becoming	 an	 impediment	 for	 ‘intimate	 soirées’	with	 friends	 and	 relatives,	 tending	 to	 reduce	 evening	 socialization	 to	 the	household	itself.	To	be	attached	to	the	family	increasingly	meant	an	isolation	from	the	 exterior.	 The	 home	 that	 produced	 the	 nuclear	 family	 and	 grounded	 the	experience	 of	 the	 private-public	 divide	 served	 as	 a	 refuge	 from	 hostility	 and	 a	sanctuary	of	familiarity	where	individuals	could	feel	like	a	‘very	important	being	in	the	world’.			Relations	 of	 equality	 emerged	 with	 a	 belief	 that	 it	 was	 not	 interpersonal	sentiments,	 love	or	service	 that	could	bind	 two	persons	 together,	but	rather	 that	only	equality	in	circumstances	and	bodies	could	allow	for	a	relationship	in	which	power	and	abuse	were	absent.	At	the	same	time,	this	implied	a	disconnection	from	the	 social	world,	 interpreted	as	a	 space	where	anonymity	and	difference	did	not	provide	 the	 grounds	 for	 relationships	 of	 equality.	 Such	 an	 equality	 could	 only	arrive	 in	 a	 future	 in	 which	 the	 commonality	 of	mœurs	 and	 beliefs	 would	 have	ironed	 out	 inequalities	 among	 strangers,	 thus	 opening	 the	 way	 for	 civic	communion.	Until	then,	the	home	served	as	a	retreat	from	inequality	and	a	shelter	for	interpersonal	bonds.	But	this	domestic	haven	would	not	be	spared	in	1789.			
																																																								43	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	v.	
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Guardianship.			It	 was	 precisely	 by	 framing	 the	 child-father	 bond	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 power	 and	subjection	that	the	revolutionary	process	destroyed	the	symbolic	coherence	of	the	patriarchal	order.	After	1789,	no	form	of	love	was	free	of	abuse.	There	could	be	no	equality	 if	 the	 father	 and	 son	 remained	 qualitatively	 different.	 The	 conflict	 was	dramatized	via	the	absolutism	of	the	Roman	paterfamilias,	whose	rights	‘were	the	same	over	his	children	as	over	his	slaves;	he	had	the	right	over	their	life	and	death;	he	 also	had	 the	 right	 to	 sell	 them.	The	 terms	and	duration	of	 this	power	had	no	limits;	while	the	father	lived,	he	conserved	over	his	children	this	jus	dominii	that	in	nothing	differed	from	that	masters	had	over	slaves’.44	Through	this	despotism	over	lives,	bodies	and	properties,	paternal	power	was	cast	as	indistinct	from	that	of	the	slave	 master.	 But	 this	 was	 not	 another	 debate	 contrasting	 the	 ancients	 to	 the	moderns.	Until	 the	Revolution	abolished	it,	Roman	law,	albeit	with	modifications,	continued	to	govern	the	pays	de	droit	écrits,	which	encompassed	the	entire	south	of	France.	In	these	lands,	the	situation	of	the	so-called	fils	de	famille	was	not	far	from	that	 of	 the	 slave:	 he	 remained	 under	 the	 command	 of	 the	 father	 unless	 he	 was	emancipated	 or	 the	 father	 died.	 Any	 children	 the	 fils	 had	 before	 them	 also	 fell	under	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 paterfamilias,	 who	 could	 theoretically	 even	 emancipate	 a	grandson	but	not	his	son,	who	could	be	approaching	mature	age	by	then.	For	the	revolutionaries,	this	was	a	barbaric	humiliation.			
																																																								44	F.	Brasser,	De	l'émancipation	en	droit	français	(Geneva,	1866),	p.	3.	
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While	 the	 constraint	 of	 custom	 was	 greatly	 exaggerated	 and	 affected	 mostly	married	 descendants	 living	 under	 the	 paternal	 roof,	 the	 tyrannical	 paterfamilias	was	a	crucial	driving	force	in	the	revolutionary	imagination.45	The	Revolution	put	an	end	to	the	patriarchal	family	and	inaugurated	the	age	of	paternalism,	that	is,	of	a	power	that	is	limited	in	scope	and	time.		The	 limitation	 in	 scope	was	 fundamental,	 as	 it	made	 compatible	 the	 exercise	 of	authority	 while	 guaranteeing	 the	 liberty,	 lives	 and	 property	 of	 children.	 But	beyond	 that,	 the	 limits	 to	 paternal	 power	 were	 most	 diffuse.	 This	 is	 how	 the	authors	of	the	Napoleonic	Code	explained	the	spirit	of	the	new	family	legislation:	Children	must	be	subjected	to	the	father;	but	the	latter	must	only	listen	to	the	voice	of	nature,	the	sweetest	and	tenderest	of	all	voices.	His	name	is	at	the	same	time	a	name	of	love,	dignity	and	power	(puissance);	and	his	magistrature	that	has	been	so	religiously	 called	 piété	 paternelle,	 does	 not	 include	 any	 other	 severity	 than	 that	which	can	bring	repentance	to	a	stray	heart,	and	that	aims	less	to	inflict	a	penalty	than	to	make	pardon	merited.46		Given	the	greater	concern	with	arming	parents	against	domestic,	and	thus	social,	unrest	 tied	 to	 an	 image	 of	 the	 father	 as	 ‘naturally’	 suited	 to	 his	 role,	 hardly	 any	provisions	were	included	in	the	Napoleonic	Code	against	paternal	abuse.	However	neglectful,	brutal	or	immoral,	no	father	could	be	legally	deprived	of	his	property-like	 rights	over	his	 children	until	1889.	 If	 these	 legal	 rights	were	not	absolute,	 it	was	because	they	were	subjected	to	clear	temporal	limits;	with	exceptions,	the	age	of	legal	majority	was	set	and	maintained,	from	1792	to	1974,	at	age	21.																																																									45	For	a	discussion	of	the	practices	in	the	pays	de	droit	écrits	before	1789	see:	Philippe	Maurice,	‘Les	limites	de	l'autorité	paternelle	face	aux	droits	patrimoniaux	dans	le	Gévaudan	médiéval:	Fin	XIIIe-fin	XVe	siècles’,	Cahiers	de	recherches	médiévales,	4	(1997),	electronic	edition;	Julien-Michel	Dufour,	
Observations	sur	le	nouveau	projet	de	Code	civil	(Paris,	1800),	pp.	15-32.	46	Conseil	d’État,	Motifs	et	discours	prononcés	lors	de	la	publication	du	Code	civil	(Paris,	1841),	p.	17.	
	 211	
With	 [legal]	 majority,	 the	 power	 of	 fathers	 ceases;	 but	 it	 only	 ceases	 in	 its	 civil	effects:	the	respect	and	recognition	continue	to	demand	considerations	and	duties	that	 the	 legislator	 no	 longer	 commands,	 and	 the	 deference	 of	 children	 for	 their	parents	is	the	work	of	the	mœurs,	rather	than	the	law.47	In	other	words,	 the	basis	of	 the	system	that	promised	to	harmonize	equality	and	inequality	was	that	the	strict	gap	separating	the	father	and	the	child	would	vanish	with	the	latter’s	majority;	any	residual	difference	would	belong	to	the	caprices	of	custom	 and	 sentiment,	 not	 law.	 Parental	 authority	 in	 the	 family	 was	 to	 be	legitimate	 so	 long	 as	 it	 served	 to	 produce	 and	 reproduce	 responsible	 and	 free	adults.			While	legal	majority	and	minority	had	long	existed,	revolutionaries	refashioned	it	as	the	foundation	for	the	legal	individual,	each	one	of	which	now	transitioned	from	dependency	 to	 autonomy.	 The	 contradiction	 between	 equality	 and	 inequality,	between	liberty	and	servitude,	was	thus	replayed	within	every	individual	life	cycle.	Born	 weak	 and	 dependant,	 childhood	 necessarily	 represented	 an	 age	 of	subordination.	However,	these	years	of	bondage	brought	with	them	the	promise	of	freedom	through	the	gradual	development	of	discernment,	which	became	the	main	responsibility	of	the	authority	figure.	Power	was	thus	justified	insofar	as	 it	was	a	necessary	and	temporary	means	of	emancipation,	in	other	words,	in	the	interest	of	the	 subordinate.	 But	 there	was	 something	 indistinct	 and	 disembodied	 about	 the	new	paternal	power.	The	new	‘magistrate’	was	an	authority	of	a	somewhat	more	bureaucratic	and	impersonal	kind.	Indeed,	although	it	tended	to	coincide	with	the	father,	 the	 new	 authority	was	 not	 the	 father.	 Instead,	 the	 Civil	 Code	 established	
																																																								47	Ibid.	
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that	 paternal	 power	 belongs	 ‘to	 the	 mother	 as	 to	 the	 father	 when	 there	 is	 no	division	between	 them;	 but	 to	 the	 father	 in	 preference	 to	 the	mother,	 for	 things	that	 are	 not	 forbidden,	 and	 over	 which	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 [between	 the	parents]’.48			Burguière,	 among	 others,	 has	 emphasized	 the	 coherence	 of	 the	 family	 reform	legislation	 through	 the	 different	 phases	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 which	substituted	 paternal	 and	marital	 authority	 in	 the	 family	 for	 formally	 egalitarian	bonds.	 Legislators	 proclaimed	 the	 strict	 equality	 of	 inheritance	 claims	 among	siblings,	later	extended	to	illegitimate	children.	The	1792	redefinition	of	marriage	and	divorce	placed	the	spouses	on	an	equal	footing.	Understood	as	a	civil	contract,	its	 new	 basis	 rested	 on	 the	 equality,	 mutuality	 and	 equity	 of	 the	 contracting	parties.	 The	 highest	 development	 of	 this	 principle	 came	 in	 the	 first	 draft	 of	 the	revolutionary	civil	code,	voted	in	October	1793	but	which	never	came	into	effect.	It	stipulated	 the	 joint	 administration	 of	 the	 communal	 property,	 meaning	 all	decisions	concerning	shared	property	required	the	spouses’	agreement.49			Even	 as	 the	 Napoleonic	 Code	 reinstated	 some	 forms	 of	 marital	 inequality	 that	would	remain	in	place	for	the	rest	of	the	century,	family	authority	was	imagined	as	‘gender	neutral’,	despite	the	actual	and	insurmountable	inequalities	between	men	and	women	 in	 law	and	custom.	The	home	was	conceptually	placed	above	power	disputes,	while	the	conceptual	complementarity	and	unity	of	the	spouses	dispelled	struggles	over	authority.	The	power	of	 the	 father	was	reduced	 to	having	 the	 last	word	 in	 case	of	disagreement,	 but	 the	 ‘office’	 he	held	 itself	 included	 the	mother.																																																									48	Dufour,	Observations,	p.	31.	49	Suzanne	Desan,	The	Family	on	Trial	in	Revolutionary	France	(Berkeley,	2004),	pp.	41,	66.	
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Anne	 Verjus	 has	 shown	 that	 in	 the	 Civil	 Code,	 it	 was	 the	 marital	 couple	 that	substituted	the	Old	Regime’s	patriarch.50	The	fiction	of	gender	neutrality	spoke	of	a	power	imagined	as	purely	functional	and	faceless;	it	was	the	governed	as	object	of	guardianship	that	mattered,	not	the	person	at	the	top.		As	 authority	 became	 gender	 neutral	 and	 defined	 by	 temporary	 functions	 rather	than	absolute	rights,	a	new	understanding	of	 impersonal	authority	could	emerge.	Since	 the	 adoption	 of	 minors	 was	 unlawful	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France,	parenthood	became	a	role	 that	was	restricted	to	the	biological	parents.	The	 legal	guardians	that	could	occupy	their	places	were	sketched	out	in	clearer	terms	by	the	authors	of	the	Civil	Code	than	those	of	the	parents	themselves.		Guardianship	 (tutelle)	 is,	 in	 the	 domestic	 government,	 a	 sort	 of	 subsidiary	magistrature,	 for	 which	 we	 have	 determined	 the	 duration	 and	 functions.[…]The	guardian	acts	as	 legal	agent	 for	 the	person	and	goods;	he	 [for	only	men	could	be	guardians]	must	be	chosen	by	the	family	and	from	within	the	family:	because	it	is	necessary	for	him	to	have	a	real	interest	to	conserve	the	goods,	and	an	interest	of	honour	and	affection	to	oversee	the	upbringing	and	safety	of	the	person.	He	cannot	alienate,	without	cause	and	form,	the	estate	entrusted	to	him,	he	must	administer	with	 intelligence,	 manage	 with	 fidelity;	 he	 is	 accountable	 because	 he	 is	 an	administrator,	he	answers	for	his	conduct;	he	can	do	no	wrong	without	having	to	repair	it.	Here	is	all	the	theory	of	guardianship.51			On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 individual	 was	 identified	 with	 discernment;	 on	 the	 other,	there	was	a	power	capable	of	bringing	about	that	very	discernment,	of	identifying,																																																									50	Verjus,	‘Révolution	et	conception	bourgeoise	de	la	famille’,	in:	Jean-Pierre	Jessenne	(ed.),	Vers	un	
ordre	bourgeois?	Révolution	française	et	changement	social	(Rennes,	2007),	pp.	364-367.	51	Conseil	d’État,	Motifs	et	discours,	p.	17.	Women	could	not	serve	as	guardians,	even	to	their	own	children	in	the	case	of	widows.	
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instilling	and	educating	it.	Indeed,	the	development	of	the	legal	fiction	of	tutelle	or	guardianship,	 the	 new	 template	 for	 a	 new	 paternal	 model	 of	 family	 command,	would	 become	 the	 crucial	 idiom	 through	 which	 power	 in	 society	 could	 be	understood.	According	to	Robert	Castel,	it	was	‘a	new	relationship,	one	which	is	no	longer	 that	 of	 formal	 reciprocity	 but	 of	 regulated	 subordination[…]	 This	 is	 the	matrix	for	every	policy	of	assistance.	Doubtless	it	 is	a	relationship	of	domination,	but[…]	 it	 is	 unleashed	 for	 the	 good	 of	 those	 subjected	 to	 it’.	 First	 articulated	 in	1791,	this	was	a	‘conception	of	social	non-adulthood	that	is	shared	by	both	children	and	the	insane’.52	The	defining	discernment	of	the	adult	individual,	what	separated	him	or	her	 from	the	minor,	required	a	clear	way	of	recognizing	and	dealing	with	non-discerning	adults.	The	1838	law	on	the	insane	was	among	the	first	to	serve	to	fix	these	limits.	Castel	argued	that	this	 ‘was	the	first	great	 legislative	measure	[in	France]	 that	 recognized	 a	 right	of	assistance	and	 treatment	 for	 a	 category	 of	 the	sick	 or	 those	 in	 need.	 It	 was	 the	 first	 to	 set	 up	 a	 complete	 mechanism	 of	assistance’.53	Parents	exercised	guardianship	over	children	in	the	family,	while	the	administration	exercised	the	same	legal	tutelle	through	public	assistance.			The	foundation	of	paternalism	was	laid	upon	the	legal	fiction	of	guardianship,	that	is,	 the	 functional	right	and	duty	of	 the	guardian	to	act	 in	 the	tutee’s	best	 interest	within	the	limits	of	time	defined	by	minority.	The	legitimacy	of	guardianship	was	found	on	 the	 lack	of	maturity	and	self-sufficiency	of	 the	beneficiary.	The	need	 to	act	on	behalf	of	some	sort	of	group	cast	 in	the	role	of	 legal	minor	came	to	 justify	administrative	 and	 private	 interventions	 in	 social	 problems	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
																																																								52	Robert	Castel,	The	Regulation	of	Madness	(Cambridge,	1988),	p.	37.	53	Ibid.,	p.	14.	
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century.	As	we	will	see	next,	this	was	the	case	even	among	those	who	defended	an	authoritarian	view	of	domestic	and	social	relations.		
Omnia	munda	mundis:	The	question	of	virtue.		The	 parameters	 of	 family	 discourse,	 its	 mobilizing	 lacks	 and	 desires,	 can	 be	identified	 even	 in	 deliberately	 authoritarian	 depictions	 of	 the	 family.	 We	 will	consider	 the	1844	pastoral	 letter	 for	Lent	by	the	archbishop	of	Lyon,	cardinal	de	Bonald,	 the	 son	 of	 the	 legitimist	 statesman	 and	 sociologist	 discussed	 above,	 the	vicomte	 de	 Bonald.	 In	 line	 with	 much	 legitimist	 thought,	 this	 letter	 evoked	 a	conscientious	‘return’	to	‘traditional’	values	that	outlined	the	rationale	and	duties	of	the	‘Christian	family’,	or	more	specifically	 l’éducation	chrétienne,	encompassing	both	 education	 and	 upbringing,	 an	 ideal	 which	 in	 this	 particular	 instance	 was	deployed	against	secularized	education.54	In	order	to	attack	the	regime’s	schooling	policy,	de	Bonald	penned	a	passionate	pastoral	in	the	style	of	contemporary	family	discourse.			For	the	cardinal	de	Bonald,	the	attack	from	evil	and	sin,	namely	liberal	society,	was	compared	to	‘that	great	combat	that	Satan	wages	against	Michael	and	his	Angels’.	This	was	a	confrontation	in	which	faithful	but	crucially	gender-neutral	parents	—	for	he	 addressed	both	 ‘Pères	 et	Mères’	 indistinctly—	were	 called	 to	be	médecins	
des	âmes,	or	doctors	of	souls,	in	order	to	combat	‘the	contagion	of	vice’.55		
																																																								54	On	legitimist	thought	see:	Steven	Kale,	Legitimism	and	the	Reconstruction	of	French	Society	(Baton	Rouge,	 1992);	 Pierre	Macherey,	 ‘Bonald	 et	 la	 philosophie’,	Revue	de	synthèse,	 1	 (1987),	 pp.	 3-30;	Carolina	Armenteros,	The	French	Idea	of	History:	Joseph	de	Maistre	and	His	Heirs,	1794–1854	(Ithaca,	2011).	55	Cardinal	de	Bonald,	Lettre	pastrorale…	sur	l’éducation	chrétienne	(Lyon,	1844),	pp.	4,	6.		
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Struck	 by	 the	 dangers	 of	 which	 infancy	 is	 surrounded	 on	 every	 side,	 and	 the	criminal	 negligence	of	 so	many	heads	of	 families	who	do	not	want	 to	 rise	 to	 the	height	of	 their	 vocation,	 […	bishops	must]	 remind	 those	parents	who	 forget	 it	 of	the	sanctity	of	their	mission.56		This	mission	was	the	salvation	of	children’s	soul	that	relied	on	the	proper	choice	of	schooling.		Child	rearing	was	a	‘sacred	debt’	towards	God	and	society.	The	means	of	fulfilling	this	 duty	 was	 for	 both	 parents	 to	 become	 a	 completely	 transparent	 and	permanently	 legible	 embodiment	 of	 the	 ideal.	 Thus	 the	 parent’s	 example	 was	placed	‘at	the	head	of	all	your	duties,	because	you	will	not	find	a	more	persuasive	language	to	make	yourselves	understood’.57		There	was	an	insistence	on	teaching	‘more	by	their	examples	than	by	their	discourses’.58	Bonald	seems	to	underscore	a	form	 of	 moral	 transmission	 through	 a	 grammar	 of	 the	 body,	 not	 words.	 The	objective	was,	 ‘In	 short,	 that	your	 children	may	see	 in	you	nothing	 that	 they	can	imitate	without	sinning’.59	‘Your	life	must	be	an	open	book	in	front	of	their	eyes,	in	which	 they	 can	 read	 all	 that	 is	 true,	 all	 that	 is	 chaste,	 all	 that	 is	 just,	 all	 that	 is	
saintly’.60			The	 lack	of	vigilance	 that	 could	place	a	profane	book	or	a	poorly	 chosen	 teacher	before	 the	 child,	 or	 indeed	 any	 deviation	 from	 the	 ‘Christian’	 ideal,	 any	contamination	from	the	modern,	world	would	destroy	the	family	and	condemn	the	
																																																								56	Ibid.,	p.	5.	57	Ibid.,	p.	7.	58	Ibid.,	p.	30.	59	Ibid.,	pp.	12-13.	60	Ibid.,	p.	13.	
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parents,	 to	whom	all	 the	 temporal	 and	 spiritual	 blame	belonged.61	The	 ‘precious	treasure	of	their	innocence	and	their	candour’	could	be	undone	in	an	instant:	 ‘An	enemy	 hand	 has	 touched	 it;	 everything	 has	 dissipated’.62 	Thus	 the	 need	 for	perpetual	 surveillance:	 ‘this	 obligation	 to	 always	 be	 on	 guard	 (veiller)	 and	 fear	(craindre)	must	make	you	 lose	 sleep’.63	A	parent	had	 to	 ‘Deepen	more	and	more	this	examination	to	which	is	attached	the	salvation	of	your	children,	your	domestic	happiness,	 the	 future	of	 your	house’.64	If	 not	 the	 father	would	 ‘reap	what	he	has	sown.	 Instead	 of	 a	 tender	 and	 respectful	 son,	 he	 finds	 by	 his	 side	 a	 young	
philosophe,	 emancipated	 from	 all	 prejudices,	 well	 imbibed	 of	 his	 dignity,	 and	knowledgeable	of	his	rights’.65		Paternal	 power	 thus	 became	 articulated	 through	 a	 narrative	 of	 lack,	 through	anxiety	 and	 fear	 delivered	 through	 a	 melodramatic	 medium.	 But	 a	 lack	 that	highlighted	not	 the	 institutional	 shortages	of	 the	 likes	of	 the	 archbishop	himself,	incapable,	 given	 his	 position	 and	 power	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 both	 the	 Church	 and	 the	state,	of	upholding	virtue	as	a	socially-imposed	law,	but	rather	that	of	an	absence	thrown	back	upon	the	parents.	They	were	to	fight	the	battle	between	secular	and	religious	 education	 in	 their	 own	 daily	 lives	 through	 an	 unrelenting	 and	 ‘painful	vigilance	 that	 extends	 to	 everything’.	 This	 included	 their	 children,	 domestic	servants,	 teachers,	 but	 especially	 the	parents	 themselves	 ‘in	order	 to	 say	 and	do	nothing	that	may	be	an	occasion	of	scandal	and	fall’.	The	goal	of	this	suffering	was	the	fulfilment	of	higher	duties.	 ‘[W]hen	these	children	have	been	born	to	religion	
																																																								61	Ibid.,	p.	26.	62	Ibid.,	p.	24.	63	Ibid.,	pp.	26-27.	64	Ibid.,	p.	22.	65	Ibid.,	p.	11.	
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and	virtue,	you	will	forget	all	your	torment	because	you	will	have	given	the	Church	a	true	believer	(fidèle)	and	society	a	useful	member’.66		In	 other	 words,	 Bonald’s	 argument	 was	 that	 of	 family	 discourse	 itself;	 grave	dangers,	such	as	the	monstrosity	of	the	philosophe-child,	were	used	as	a	war	cry	for	a	certain	type	of	self-fashioning.	Any	struggle	between	ideological	models	of	family	themselves	consolidated	 family	discourse	 in	 its	universality	and	desirability.	And	the	means	of	such	self-production	were	the	same	as	well.	Bonald	demanded	virtue	not	through	the	observance	of	the	old	social-legal	practices,	but	of	practices	of	the	self,	 expressed	 as	 acute	 vigilance	 and	 discipline	 of	 self	 and	 other,	 as	 well	 as	 an	alienation	from	the	results	of	such	an	activity.	The	end	game	behind	the	torments	of	 becoming	 a	 subject	 was	 that	 these	 would	 simply	 be	 forgotten.	 Even	 the	otherworldly	 rewards	 and	 the	 eschatological	 climax	 were	 absent;	 the	 subject	vanished	 the	 moment	 his	 or	 her	 deeds	 were	 done,	 once	 they	 ‘have	 given	 the	Church	 a	 true	 believer	 and	 society	 a	 useful	 member’.	 Bonald,	 in	 criticizing	 the	modern	ways,	could	only	 formulate	a	counter-conduct	 that	 itself	reproduced	and	validated	 the	 modern	 practices	 of	 subjectivity	 he	 combated	 and	 the	 domestic	discourse	that	sustained	them.			The	 cardinal	 very	 clearly	 understood	 that	 the	 vehicle	 of	 disbelief	 in	 the	modern	world	was	the	 inevitable	consequence	of	 the	secular	 faith	 in	progress.	That	 force	which	 ‘pushes	 forward	with	 the	 increasing	 speed	 of	 progress	 towards	 an	 era	 of	prosperity,	knowledge,	and	sympathetic	union,	such	that	the	eye	of	man	has	never	
seen,	 the	 ear	 heard,	 or	 the	 mind	 understood’.	 Progress	 promised	 to	 change																																																									66	Ibid.,	p.	27.	
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everything,	even	Catholicism.	‘The	religion	of	the	morrow	will	bury	the	religion	of	the	 eve’.	 Instead,	 Christianity,	 like	 the	Old	Regime,	 demanded	 fixity	 and	 stability	across	time	and	space.	‘As	for	the	Church	of	Jesus-Christ,	it	will	always	be	the	same	until	the	end	of	time’.67	But	the	argument	of	progress,	of	a	drive	to	perfection	that	propelled	man	and	mankind	forward,	equally	relied	on	the	mobilizing	force	behind	the	narrative	of	lack,	danger	and	involution.	Both	the	movements	of	progress	and	backwardness	 —that	 is,	 the	 understanding	 that	 the	 actual	 and	 the	 ideal	 are	separated	by	the	two-way	street	of	time—,	made	it	possible	to	qualify	and	situate	spaces	 and	 bodies	within	 the	 temporal	matrix	 of	 idealness,	 casting	 some	 places	and	 faces	as	 future	 and	others	as	past.	Either	evolution	or	 involution	could	be	as	effective	 in	 impeding	 static,	merely	 quantitative	 conceptions	 of	 time.	 By	 using	 a	narrative	of	the	slipping	backwards	from	the	ideal,	of	parents	failing	to	‘raise	to	the	height	of	their	vocation’,	Bonald	was	forced	to	imagine	his	own	vision	of	progress;	he	may	have	populated	this	future	that	‘the	eye	of	man	has	never	seen’,	with	purity,	pious	 vigilance	 and	 ‘hearts	 that	 vibrate	 every	 moment	 of	 the	 day’,	 but	 it	nonetheless	reaffirmed	and	consolidated	the	very	narrative	of	progress	he	wished	to	oppose.			De	Bonald	 illustrates	 the	potential	shortcomings	of	reifying	 family	models.	When	applied	 to	 the	 family,	 the	 analytical	 dependency	 on	 power	 and	 politics	 is	misleading	on	three	accounts.	First,	in	the	Old	Regime,	there	was	a	unified	sense	of	authority	on	which	power	rested,	in	which	power	was	embodied.	Thus,	the	father	did	 not	 have	 authority	 because	 he	 was	 the	 father,	 but	 rather	 was	 the	 father	because	 he	 had	 authority,	 which	 was	 granted	 and	 closely	 regulated	 by	 the																																																									67	Ibid.,	pp.	17-18.	
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community.	In	the	strategies	of	different	family	lineages,	not	all	men	were	destined	to	head	a	household.	And	even	if	he	was,	the	door	of	his	house	was	never	closed	to	scrutiny	 and	 corrective	 interventions	 in	 his	 exercise	 of	 command,	 founded	 as	 it	was	on	reciprocity.68	For	 the	cardinal,	 the	 family	remained	within	an	Old-Regime	logic	in	which	power,	of	a	sovereign	kind	in	their	domain,	was	delegated	to	families	and	corporations	in	exchange	for	their	 legal	responsibility	before	the	crown	over	their	 subordinates.	 In	 this	 relay	 of	 power	 and	 punishment,	 the	 family	 had	 to	respond	 before	 God	 and	 the	 state.	 So,	 while	 paternal	 power	 was	 evidently	asymmetrical,	 it	 was	 a	 power	 in	 which	 there	 was	 an	 ultimate	 solidarity	 in	responsibility	 among	 the	members	 of	 the	 family.	 Before	 damnation	 or	 salvation,	father	 and	 son	 stood	 together.	 The	office	 of	 head	of	 family	was	 a	 judging	power	that	was	under	constant	indictment,	an	unremitting	observer	observed.		Thus	 the	 pure	paterfamilias	 as	 an	 island	 of	 sovereignty	 and	 absolute	 power	 is	 a	myth.	But	this	points	to	the	fact	that	the	modern	family	was	severed	from	this	tie	to	 social	 authority;	 rather	 command	 became	 a	 function	 of	 a	 context-specific	situation,	 not	 derived	 from	 or	 extended	 beyond	 its	 confines.	 In	 other	words,	 an	authoritative	 and	 socially-sanctioned	 head	 was	 no	 longer	 needed	 as	 in	 the	 Old	Regime	for	social	reproduction,	which	could	be	left	to	parents	who,	as	we	will	see	below,	may	not	have	been	social	role	models	or	even	married	(meaning	integrated	into	the	religious	and	national	community).			Second,	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 father	 and	 his	 punishments	 was	 a	 wilful	reduction	that	obscured	the	ways	of	relating,	rationality	and	legitimacy	that	such	a																																																									68	See:	Shorter,	Making	of	the	Modern	Family,	p.	13.	
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social	model	 implied	—a	 question	 of	 key	 importance	 to	 understand	 nineteenth-century	paternalism.	De	Bonald’s	notion	of	authority	was	not	limited	to	the	home.	His	called	 for	a	new	aristocracy	of	virtue,	one	 that	could	be	 fashioned	within	 the	family,	from	where	it	could	rise	to	the	rank	of	social	authority.	Rather	than	a	return	to	 the	 past,	 Bonald’s	 text	 then	 could	 be	 placed	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 large	 body	 of	writing	that	unified	most	of	the	political	establishment	in	the	nineteenth	century,	from	 the	 ultra-royalists	 and	 their	 liberal	 counterparts,	 in	 the	 search	 for	 a	 new	social	aristocracy.69	The	hyper-virtuous	and	vigilant	head	of	household	would	then	be	 the	 self-made	 model	 for	 the	 good	 père-patron,	 the	 agents	 of	 a	 new	 social	paternity	 capable	 of	 governing	 failing	 families.	 In	 1863,	 the	 legal	 expert	 Charles	Fliniaux	recommended	that	 industrialists	modelled	on	 father	 figures	should	offer	incentives	in	order	to	prevent	strikes,	such	as	paying	by	hour	and	good	conduct.		But	 besides	 these	 material	 means,	 the	 patron	 must	 employ	 others	 that	 are	 of	 a	more	 elevated	order;	 it	 is	 a	 duty	 for	 him	 to	 instruct	 those	 that	 surround	him,	 to	moralize	them,	to	inspire	in	them	religious	practice,	and	everywhere	and	always	to	be	a	role	model;	it	is	through	example	that	one	persuades,	it	is	by	example	that	one	inflames	 strength;	 the	 captain	 does	 not	 send	 his	 soldiers	 onto	 the	 attack,	 he	conducts	them	and	marches	at	their	head!	The	patron	must	love	his	workers,	direct	them,	encourage	them,	in	one	word,	form	with	them	but	one	family.70		Fliniaux	underscored	how	 this	was	a	mode	of	authority	 in	which	duty	was	 to	be	carried	out	through	an	array	of	forms	of	relating	—patron,	teacher,	priest,	captain,	friend,	father—	that	today	either	seem	misplaced	and	confused	in	vertical	relations	of	 power	 or	 are	 themselves	 proof	 of	 abuse	 of	 power.	 And	 yet,	 Fliniaux’s	patron-
père	was	not	a	negative,	punitive	power,	but	rather	an	excessively	productive	one;																																																									69	See:	 Annelien	 de	 Dijn,	 French	 Political	 Thought	 from	 Montesquieu	 to	 Tocqueville	 (Cambridge,	2008).	70	Charles	Fliniaux,	La	grève,	les	patrons	et	les	ouvriers	(Paris,	1863),	p.	13.	
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we	might	 object	 not	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 nurturing,	 care,	 and	 affection,	 but	 rather	 to	 an	excess	in	content	and	form,	 ‘everywhere	and	always’,	over	bodies	and	souls,	with	no	regards	for	boundaries.	These	boundary	crossings	point	to	important	historical	changes	 in	 the	 structuring	 of	 relating	within	 the	 family	 and	 the	 state.	 The	 ideal	among	conservatives	was	to	ground	hierarchical	relations	in	holistic	interpersonal	bonds	 in	which	 command	did	not	 exclude	 affection.	Questions	 of	 power	 and	 the	politics	of	family	obscure	such	transgressions	by	oversimplification	and	distortion.			Third,	the	political	confrontation	of	family	models	hid	the	opacity	that	family	had	for	 contemporaries.	 In	 the	Restoration,	 after	 the	 two	models	 of	 family	 had	 been	debated	for	thirty	years,	there	was	an	enormous	rejection	of	the	egalitarian	family	among	 legitimists,	 but	 no	 clear	 sense	 of	 the	 alternative	 to	which	 they	 had	 to	 go	back.	 Public	 opinion	 was	 exasperated	 and	 there	 were	 desertions	 among	 their	ranks.	 The	 comte	 de	 Villèle,	 the	 Restoration’s	 prime	 minister	 for	 much	 of	 the	1820s,	wrote	in	1834	that	Louis	XVIII	had	named	the	comte	K…	a	peer,	which	charged	him	with	establishing	an	entitlement:	
he	let	his	peerage	perish	rather	than	wrong	his	daughters	by	favouring	his	son.	Out	of	 twenty	well-off	 families,	 there	 is	but	one	 that	uses	 the	 faculty	of	 favouring	 the	eldest	 or	 any	 other	 of	 their	 children.	 Egotism	 is	 everywhere,	 one	 prefers	 to	 live	well	with	one’s	children,	and	when	setting	them	up,	one	promises	to	favour	none	of	them.	 The	 bonds	 of	 subordination	 are	 so	 loose	 everywhere	 that	 in	 families,	 the	father	 would	 be	 obligated,	 I	 think,	 to	 treat	 his	 children	 with	 consideration	(ménager	 ses	 enfants).	 If	 government	 proposed	 to	 re-establish	 primogeniture	rights,	it	would	not	find	a	single	vote	in	favour.71		
																																																								71	Paul	Bernard,	Histoire	de	l’autorité	paternelle	en	France	(Montdidier,	1863),	p.	415.	
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Beyond	 a	 ban	 on	 divorce,	 the	 Civil-Code	 family	 changed	 little	 in	 the	 nineteenth	century.	 In	 the	picture	de	Villèle	painted	of	high	 society,	 political	 views	 failed	 to	translate	 into	 expected	 familial	 behaviour.	 The	 conservative	 family	 was	conceptually	 attached	 to	 a	 past	 whose	 language	was	 no	 longer	 comprehensible,	and	the	progressive	family	was	tied	to	a	 future	 in	which	not	even	utopians	could	envisage	 any	 clear	 family	 form.	 Family	 lacked	 detail	 in	 the	 political	 imagination.	The	 family	 was	 opaque	 because	 law	 and	 political	 system	 were	 never	 its	 most	powerful	sources;	rather	 it	belonged	to	the	mysteries	of	 ‘nature’	and	mœurs.	The	ideal	 family	was	 not	 a	 product	 of	 law,	 but	 of	morality.	 And	 it	was	 precisely	 the	Revolution	 that	 drove	 a	 wedge	 between	 both;	 producing	 a	 certain	 family	 form	through	 law	 (marriage	 and	 inheritance)	 and	 keeping	 silent	 on	 and	 eliminating	many	 of	 the	 legally	 binding	 moral	 rules	 through	 which	 state,	 Church,	municipalities,	 bodies	 and	 corporation	 had	 imposed	 decency	 inside	 the	 home.	Morality	 became	 a	 private	 affair,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 parent’s	 hands.	 Thus	 the	moment	the	family	became	a	highly	charged	political	concept	there	was	already	a	slipping	away	of	family	and	politics,	which	became	situated	in	different	conceptual	territories.	 The	 difference	 between	 ‘strict	 father’	 and	 ‘nurturant	 parent’	 thus	occulted	 their	 ability	 to	 turn	 a	 common	 form	 of	 domesticity	 into	 a	 condition	 of	social	ordering.	And	as	we	will	explore	next,	 in	de	Bonald’s	time	family	discourse	had	 already	 been	 altering	 the	 understanding	 of	 authoritarian	 father	 for	 some	decades.	 In	religious	and	theological	circles	since	the	 late	eighteenth	century,	 the	authority	of	the	paterfamilias	was	no	longer	tied	to	the	absolute	sovereign	power	that	 descended	 from	 God.	 Instead,	 family	 discourse	 offered	 a	 new	 way	 of	contextualizing	and	relativizing	authority.			
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Guardian	of	the	Son	of	God.		The	 complex	 and	 fragmented	 spiritual	 landscape	 of	 personal,	 local	 and	 strategic	venerations,	gave	way	in	the	nineteenth	century	to	two-fold	process	involving	the	nationalization	of	devotion	in	figures	such	as	Joan	of	Arc	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	 other	 (and	 of	more	 relevance	 to	 our	 discussion),	 a	 devotional	 centralization	focused	upon	the	Holy	Family.	The	latter	was	possible	thanks	to	a	recasting	of	the	person	of	Saint	Joseph.	The	relatives	of	Jesus	could	only	gain	legitimate	devotional	attention	 as	 ‘a	 consequence	 of	 the	 devotion	 to	 the	 humanity	 of	 Christ,	 which	characterizes	 the	 spirituality	 of	 the	 twelfth	 century’.72	But	 while	 Mary	 gradually	moved	to	the	centre	stage	in	the	following	centuries,	Joseph	remained	an	obscure	figure.73	This	changed	only	after	 the	gradual	 ‘discovery’	of	childhood,	human	and	divine,	 and	 especially	 the	 crystalizing	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 family	 in	 the	 seventeenth	and	eighteenth	century,	as	Ariès	has	shown.74		Towards	the	mid-nineteenth	century	Saint	Joseph	became	the	subject	of	a	massive	expansion	 of	 popular	 devotion,	 sociability	 and	 publications,	 which	 only	 gained	pace	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century.	Contemporaries	were	well	aware	of	this	sudden	popularity.		Catholicity	 has	 entered	 today	 in	 an	 epoch	 where	 the	 all-merciful	 grace	 of	 God	moves	pious	souls	to	a	tender	and	generous	devotion	to	Saint	Joseph.	Everywhere,	
																																																								72	Joseph	Dusserre,		‘Les	origines	de	la	dévotion	à	Saint	Joseph’,	Cahiers	de	Joséphologie,	II/I	(1954),	p.	84.	73	See:	 Paul	 Payan,	 ‘Pour	 retrouver	 un	 père:	 La	 promotion	 du	 culte	 de	 Saint	 Joseph	 au	 temps	 de	Gerson’,	Cahiers	de	recherches	médiévales,	 4	 (1997),	 [online];	 and	 ‘Ridicule?:	 L'image	 ambiguë	 de	Saint	Joseph	à	la	fin	du	Moyen	Âge’,	Médiévales,	39	(2000),	pp.	96-111;	Leonardo	Boff,	Saint	Joseph:	
The	Father	of	Jesus	in	a	Fatherless	Society	(Eugene,	2009),	[ebook].	74	Philippe	Ariès,	Centuries	of	Childhood	(New	York,	1962),	for	Saint	Joseph	see	pp.	362-364.	
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the	very	deserved	cult	of	 this	great	patriarch	 is	acquiring	such	a	growth	that	one	can	follow	its	marvellous	development	on	a	day-to-day	basis.75	Pope	Leo	XIII	affirmed	that	the	cult	had	 ‘grow[n]	 into	greater	proportions	 in	Our	time,	 particularly	 after	 Pius	 IX’.76	While	 in	 the	 Vatican,	 the	 latter	 had	 greatly	elevated	 the	 Saint’s	 role	 and	 that	 of	 the	 Holy	 Family.	 The	 doctrine	 of	 the	Immaculate	Conception,	decreed	in	1854,	came	in	the	midst	of	a	series	of	advances	made	by	the	cult	of	Joseph.	Without	a	day	in	the	calendar	until	1847,	his	liturgical	importance	expanded	in	1861,	1871,	1872	and	1877,	when	he	was	given	a	whole	month	à	la	par	with	his	wife,	later	every	Wednesday,	mentions	in	daily	mass,	and	so	 on.	 While	 Pius	 IX	 held	 the	 First	 Vatican	 Council,	 convened	 to	 condemn	rationalism,	the	sudden	fall	of	Napoleon	III	in	1870	left	the	city	of	Rome	without	its	protector.	 In	 the	 immediate	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Italian	 occupation	 that	 led	 to	 the	suspension	of	the	Council,	in	the	first	days,	that	is,	of	the	‘Roman	Question’,	it	was	to	 Joseph	 that	 the	 pope	 turned,	 declaring	 him	 the	 Patron	 Saint	 of	 the	 Universal	Church.77			The	 arguments	 sustaining	 his	 sudden	 ‘discovery’	 changed	 little	 since	 they	 first	appeared	 in	 the	 second	half	of	 the	eighteenth	century,	 and	on	 through	 the	many	hundreds	of	 tomes	of	hagiographic	and	devotional	 literature	 in	France	 repeating	each	other	verbatim,	until	Leo	XIII	firmly	consolidated	the	position	of	the	Saint	by	giving	him	his	very	own	encyclical	in	1889.	The	source	of	the	change,	I	argue,	was	the	 new	 understanding	 of	 authority	 that	 family	 discourse	 introduced.	 In	 a	panegyric	 published	 one	 year	 before	 his	 death	 in	 1787,	 the	 abbé	 Barthélémy																																																									75	Louis	Barthés,	La	régénération	de	la	famille	par	Saint	Joseph	(Paris,	1868),	p.	1.	76	Leo	XIII,	Quamquam	Pluries,	1889,	section	2.	77	Boff,	Saint	Joseph;	A.	D’Esprées,	‘Saint	Joseph:	tapes	successives	de	son	culte’,	pp.	105-106,	article	without	reference	available	at:	http://www.liberius.net/articles/Saint_Joseph.pdf.		
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Baudrand,	a	former	Jesuit,	was	one	of	those	who	found	in	the	belief	in	equality	of	spouses	the	basis	for	the	new	interpretation	of	the	role	of	Saint	Joseph	within	the	Holy	Family.		Who	 can	 doubt	 in	 effect	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 husband	 to	 Mary	 did	 not	naturally	require	in	Joseph	an	intimate	resemblance	with	her?[…]	God,	in	creating	Joseph,	destined	him	to	be	Mary’s	husband,	he	chose	him	for	her,	he	 formed	him	for	 her,	 he	 rendered	him	worthy	 of	 her:	 and	 yet,	 a	 husband	worthy	 of	Mary	 can	only	be	a	husband	similar	to	Mary,	similar	in	graces,	similar	in	saintliness,	similar	in	 virtue:	 this	 is	 a	 law	 dictated	 by	 nature,	 that	 in	 an	 alliance,	 in	 a	well-matched	marriage,	equality	is	necessary	between	the	spouses,	and	where	equality	cannot	be	found,	at	least	proportion	is	necessary.78	A	 new	 idea	 borrowed	 from	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 a	 need	 for	 ‘intimate	resemblance’	was	not	part	of	Catholic	doctrine	with	regards	to	marriage,	although	there	 was	 insistence	 on	 some	 similarity	 in	 age,	 condition	 and	 temperament	whenever	possible.79	This	change	would	have	profound	repercussions.	The	belief	in	equality	of	spouses	meant	that	 Joseph	could	be	raised	to	the	status	of	divinity,	offering	a	new	model	of	paternity.			These	 claims	were	developed	 in	 the	hagiographic	work	of	Bertrand	de	Latour,	 a	prolific	polemist	and	dean	of	the	chapter	of	the	cathedral	of	Montauban	(Tarn-et-
																																																								78	Abbé	Baudrand,	Panégyriques	des	saints	(Lyon,	1786),	pp.	261-262.	79	The	whole	list	of	things	to	take	into	account	before	marrying,	which	did	not	include	love,	which	had	no	specificity	with	regards	to	marriage,	was	the	following:	1)	Consult	marriage	decisions	with	God	and	those	that	hold	his	place.	2)	Not	marry	for	interest,	ambition,	etc.	‘rather	with	the	sole	goal	of	sanctifying	oneself	in	such	a	state,	provide	children	for	the	Church,	procure	care	for	infirmity’.	3)	Give	more	importance	to	virtue	than	wealth	in	the	choice	of	a	partner,	‘observing	in	this	choice,	as	much	as	possible,	 an	equality	of	 age	and	condition’,	 and	avoid	 those	of	 troublesome	humours.	4)	Behave	with	maximum	restraint	 in	pre-marital	encounters,	which	must	be	chaperoned.	5)	Not	be	together	in	the	same	house	before	marriage,	and	6)	Become	instructed	in	the	main	mysteries	of	the	Religion	 and	 the	 duties	 and	 sanctity	 of	marriage.	 Duc	 de	 Fitz-James,	Rituel	du	diocèse	de	Soissons	(Paris,	1753),	p.	289.	
	 227	
Garonne)	until	his	death	in	1780.	De	Latour	wished	to	argue	that	Joseph	was	‘the	first	 of	 the	 saints’,	 above	 the	 apostles	 and	 even	 the	 angels,	 a	 rather	 bold	 claim,	given	 that	 for	 many	 centuries	 his	 well-known	 deeds,	 marriage	 and	 surrogate	paternity	 did	 not	 seem	 to	 qualify	 him	 above	 his	 possible	 competitors.80	Familial	discourse	allowed	de	Latour	to	establish	a	novel	sense	of	unity	in	sentiment	and	a	shared	dignity	 in	 the	Holy	home.	The	point	of	departure	was	 the	union	between	Mary	 and	 Joseph,	 ‘so	 close,	 that	 they	 were	 but	 one	 heart	 and	 one	 soul’.81	This	enabled	de	Latour	to	argue	that,	just	as	the	Holy	Trinity,	in	the	Holy	Family	‘three	Persons	 have	 but	 one	 heart	 and	 one	 soul’.82	From	 here,	 and	 not	 without	 some	hesitation,	 de	 Latour	 was	 able	 to	 re-contextualize	 the	 order	 of	 legitimacy	 and	hierarchy	 of	 his	 time.	 Agreeing	 with	 his	 contemporaries	 that	 ‘All	 creatures	 are	more	excellent	the	closer	they	are	to	their	source’,	he	confessed	that		It	is	true	that	Joseph	is	the	last	person	of	this	order	[the	trinity	of	the	Holy	Family];	but	 that	 is	enough	to	raise	him	above	all	of	an	 inferior	order,	even	angels[…]	But	even	if	in	this	order	he	is	the	least	perfect	person,	he	holds	there	the	most	elevated	rank,	the	rank	of	chief,	husband	and	father.	Nothing	equals	this	eminent	perfection.	There	 was	 a	 split	 here	 between	 the	 temporal	 and	 the	 spiritual;	 the	 vertical	continuum	 descending	 from	 God	 no	 longer	 grounded	 the	 transmission	 of	legitimate	 authority.	 Joseph	 was	 at	 once	 superior	 and	 inferior.	 It	 was	 as	 if	 the	domestic	 was	 summoned	 to	 neutralize	 the	 ‘exterior’,	 usually	 the	 social	 and	economic	context,	but	in	this	case	it	dismissed	the	issue	of	the	cosmological	order	of	 beings.	 Rather	 than	 receiving	 authority	 from	on	 high,	 Joseph	 received	 it	 from	below.	His	dignity	derived	not	from	his	command,	but	from	their	obedience;	it	was	
																																																								80	Bertrand	de	Latour,	Œuvres	complètes,	VI	(Petit-Montrouge,	1855),	p.	635.	81	Ibid.,	p.	651.	82	Ibid.,	p.	639.	
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the	 fact	 that	Mary	 and	 Jesus	 subjected	 themselves	 to	 his	 authority	 that	 elevated	him.	Thus	‘Jesus	only	washed	saint	Peter	once,	but	a	thousand	times	did	he	render	service	 to	 Joseph’,	while	 ‘Mary	 saw	him	as	 her	 Lord’.83	This	 argument	ultimately	confused	 and	 distorted	 the	 issue	 of	 authority	 altogether,	 establishing	 rather	 a	reciprocity	of	bonds	dependent	on	sentiment	and	duty.	 In	other	words,	paternity	was	being	re-founded	on	functional	grounds:	rather	than	emphasizing	godly-kingly	sovereignty	that	derived	legitimacy	from	its	origin	and	position	of	centrality,	that	is,	from	who	the	father	was;	it	was	now	possible	to	focus	instead	on	what	he	did.			Thus	 the	 Church,	 despite	 its	 insistence	 on	 traditional-sounding	 marital	 and	paternal	 authority,	 had	 come	 into	 line	 with	 modern	 family	 discourse,	 which	displaced	 the	question	of	 the	 father’s	authority	 for	 that	of	his	guardianship.	This	can	 most	 clearly	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 1889	 encyclical	Quamquam	 Pluries	 proclaiming	Joseph	‘the	guardian	of	the	Son	of	God’.	Leo	XIII	repeated	the	arguments	circulated	since	the	eighteenth	century.	Mary	and	Jesus	had	subjected	themselves	to	Joseph.		From	this	two-fold	dignity	flowed	the	obligation	which	nature	lays	upon	the	head	of	 families,	 so	 that	 Joseph	 became	 the	 guardian,	 the	 administrator,	 and	 the	 legal	defender	of	the	divine	house	whose	chief	he	was.	And	during	the	whole	course	of	his	life	he	fulfilled	those	charges	and	those	duties.84		First	 among	 these	 duties	was	 providing	materially	 for	 the	 family	 through	work.	More	generally,	it	involved	being	‘the	companion,	the	assistance,	and	the	upholder	of	the	Virgin	and	of	Jesus’.85	The	parent-child	bond	was	understood	in	the	context	of	reciprocity	of	obligations	and	solicitude.	Paternity	no	longer	seemed	to	be	self-
																																																								83	Ibid.,	p.	652.	84	Leo	XIII,	Quamquam	Pluries,	section	3.		85	Ibid.		
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explanatory.	 It	 had	 to	 be	 broken	 down	 into	 a	 list	 of	 functions,	 which	 were	 as	important	 as	 they	 were	 de-centred:	 guardian,	 administrator,	 legal	 defender,	protector,	 provider,	 companion,	 assister,	 upholder…	 As	 in	 the	 wider	 family	discourse,	 the	 domestic	 became	 the	 means	 of	 reforming	 the	 social	 as	 well.	 The	pope	 recommended	 Saint	 Joseph	 as	 the	 role	 model	 for	 ‘men	 of	 every	 rank	 and	country’.	He	was	 to	be	 the	 inspiration	of	 fathers	 and	 the	protector	of	 virgins;	he	would	teach	the	highborn	to	find	dignity	in	misfortune	and	the	‘workmen,	artisans,	and	persons	of	lesser	degree’	an	example	of	labour	and	toil	for	one’s	family	as	well	as	 of	 being	 contented	with	 few	possessions	 ‘with	 greatness	 of	 soul’.86	Therefore,	there	was	 an	 abandoning	 of	 the	 ideal	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 father	 in	 the	 Catholic	Church	 for	 an	 increasingly	 enclosed	and	 self-contained	nuclear	 family	 that	 could	embody	the	social	and	religious	ideal.			
The	axis	of	authority.		Few	legislative	measures	directly	tackled	family	and	social	problems	in	the	almost	seven	 decades	 spanning	 from	 the	 Civil	 Code	 to	 the	 Third	 Republic.	 Besides	 the	1833	 Guizot	 law	 that	 made	 free	 schooling	 available	 to	 poor	 families	 where	municipalities	could	provide	the	facilities,	and	the	1838	law	on	the	mentally	insane	that	provided	free	hospitalization	for	poor	 families,	 the	other	 important	measure	affecting	poor	families	was	the	1841	law	on	child	labour.			The	 legislation	 on	 child	 labour	 and	 its	 implementation	 in	 nineteenth-century	France	is	very	well	known	following	many	good	national	and	local	studies.	While																																																									86	Ibid.,	section	4.	
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allowing	for	many	nuances	and	for	geographic	pockets	of	vigilant	compliance,	the	consensus	 in	 these	works	 points	 to	 the	 serious	 shortcomings	 of	 its	 enforcement	and	lack	of	political	will	behind	these	regulations.87	Without	needing	to	challenge	this	 literature,	 I	should	 like	to	analyse	this	 law	within	a	wider	 issue	of	reforming	domestic	relations,	and	in	so	doing	highlight	an	aspect	of	these	measures	that	has	been	overlooked.		Liberalism	 was	 founded	 on	 the	 belief	 that	 liberty	 logically	 ensued	 when	 the	obstacles	 to	 it	 had	 been	 removed.	 This	 liberty-obstacle	 polarity	 applied	 to	 the	markets	as	much	as	 to	anything	else,	 including	undesirable	 liberties,	 such	as	any	bohemian	or	 ‘antisocial’	 activity.	Government	was	hence	 concerned	not	with	 the	removal	 of	 obstacles	 to	 liberty,	 but	 rather	 with	 their	 careful	 and	 creative	management.	The	1841	law	on	child	labour,	I	argue,	served	to	manage	the	parent-child	 bond	 in	 a	 certain	 way	 through	 this	 interplay	 of	 liberties	 and	 obstacles.	Instead	of	a	solidarity	between	father	and	son,	master	and	slave	or	ruler	and	ruled,	guardianship	required	a	clear	hierarchical	ordering	of	authority	within	the	family.			Regulating	child	labour	directly	affected	two	‘sacred’	liberties,	those	of	employers	and	 fathers.	 While	 most	 of	 the	 public	 and	 legislative	 debates	 and	 compromises	centred	on	the	former,	concerns	‘regarding	the	legislature’s	alleged	encroachments																																																									87	Colin	 Heywood,	 Childhood	 in	 Nineteenth-Century	 France	 (Cambridge,	 1988),	 part	 3;	 Lee	 Shai	Weissbach,	Child	Labor	Reform	in	Nineteenth	Century	France	(Baton	Rouge,	1989),	chapters	4	and	5;	Catherine	Rollet,	Les	enfants	au	XIXe	siècle	(Paris,	2001),	chapter	4;	Katherine	Lynch,	Family,	Class,	
and	Ideology	in	Early	Industrial	France	(Madison,	1988),	chapter	5;	Claire	Lemercier,	‘“Il	faut	parler	de	ce	qu’on	sait”:	“Hommes	pratiques”,	“économistes	distingués”	et	législateurs	face	au	travail	des	enfants,	1837-1874’,	 in:	Christophe	Charle,	 Julien	Vincent	(dir.),	La	société	civile:	Savoirs,	enjeux	et	
acteurs	en	France	et	en	Grande-Bretagne,	1780-1914	 (Rennes,	2011),	pp.	127-146;	Philippe	Sueur,	‘La	loi	du	22	mars	1841,	un	débat	parlementaire:	L’enfance	protégée	ou	la	liberté	offensée’,	in:	Jean-Louis	Harouel	(ed.),	Histoire	du	droit	social	(Paris,	1989),	pp.	493-508;	Francis	Choisel,	‘Le	Sénat	du	Second	 Empire	 et	 le	 travail	 des	 enfants	 dans	 les	 manufactures’,	 Parlemen[s]:	 Revue	 d’histoire	
politique,	17	(2012),	pp.	132-148.	
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on	 paternal	 authority’	 were	 quickly	 dispelled	 after	 the	 baron	 Charles	 Dupin,	 a	mathematician	 and	 economist,	 a	 liberal	 parliamentarian	 from	1827	 to	 1870	 and	one	 of	 the	 key	 champions	 of	 the	 1841	 law,	 stated	 that	 ‘In	 our	 view,	 [parental	authority]	is	fortified	by	the	same	laws	that	circumscribe	it,	as	if	to	surround	by	a	social	rampart	 the	 free	 field	of	 its	exercise’.	He	understood	as	 the	right	of	fathers	simply	 their	 obligations	 to	 feed	and	 clothe	 their	 children,	watch	over	 their	 souls	and	bodies	and	instil	in	them	love	of	virtue	and	work.	‘But	as	to	the	supposed	right	to	sell,	without	control	or	restraint,	the	force,	health,	and	lives	of	their	children,	we	want	 the	 law	 to	 ban	 it,	 have	 it	 wilted	 and	 punished	 in	 the	 person	 of	 fathers	unworthy	of	 that	holy	name’.	This	would	reduce	 ‘paternal	authority	to	the	happy	need	of	no	 longer	manifesting	by	 abuses’.88	Here	 it	was	 the	obstacles	of	 a	 ‘social	rampart’	that	opened	up	the	space	of	a	designated	liberty	and	‘the	free	field	of	its	exercise’,	or	that	rather	divided	acceptable	from	unacceptable	freedoms.			The	 ‘fathers	unworthy	of	 that	holy	name’	were	very	 specifically	 those	who	were	thought	as	living	off	the	labour	of	their	children.	Swiss-born	Alsatian	industrialist	and	 philanthropist	 Daniel	 Legrand,	 one	 of	 the	 advocates	 of	 child	 labour	 reform,	highlighted	that	to	be	fed	‘by	their	children	at	an	age	when	they	should	feed	them	themselves’	 involved	 and	 ‘overturning	 [of]	 all	 the	 bases	 of	 paternal	 authority’.89	However,	 the	evidence	 for	 this	was	at	best	 extremely	 thin.	 In	his	 support,	Dupin	could	only	cite	to	the	Chamber	one	hesitant	fragment	that	read:	‘In	Elbeuf	[Seine-Maritime],	one	seems	 to	believe	 that	 the	state	of	disorder	 in	which	some	 fathers	live	obligates	 them	to	give	 their	children	over	 to	premature	work.	 If	 this	opinion																																																									88	See	 the	 proceedings	 of	 the	 discussions	 in	 ‘Travail	 des	 enfans	 (sic)	 dans	 les	 manufactures'	 in:	
Annales	du	Parlement	française,	2	(Paris,	1841),	p.	83.	89	Quoted	in:	Lynch,	Family,	Class,	and	Ideology,	p.	183.	
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were	true,	the	work	of	very	young	children	would	thus	most	often	serve	to	pay	for	the	misconduct	of	the	fathers’.	Dupin	added:	‘This	doubting	manner	of	presenting	the	facts,	[which	are]	unfortunately	too	certain,	must	not	carry	less	weight	before	your	eyes’.90	After	much	debate,	the	chamber	was	persuaded	and	the	law	passed.			I	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 1841	 law	 advanced	 the	 establishment	 a	 clear	 order	 of	dependencies	within	the	family.	The	‘natural	laws’	forcing	the	able	bodied	to	work	for	survival	needed	to	be	differentiated	and	organized	within	 the	 family	 in	order	for	the	male	breadwinner	to	be	born.	The	first	step	was	to	emancipate	the	father	from	the	extra-domestic	labour	of	his	children.			The	 law	 created	 a	 scale	 of	 graduated	 working	 hours	 according	 to	 age	 and	 an	obligation	 to	 make	 schooling	 arrangements	 for	 child	 workers	 below	 the	 age	 of	twelve.	 Those	 employed	 in	 factories	were	 the	 only	 French	 children	 subjected	 to	mandatory	schooling	until	the	Jules	Ferry	Laws	of	1881	and	1882.	If	these	children	had	 a	 basic	 certificate	 before	 this	 age,	 they	 could	 be	 exempt	 from	 schooling.	Provision	of	education	was	often	lacking	in	industrial	areas	and	even	where	they	existed,	attendance	and	learning	outcomes	were	very	poor;	few	children	could	get	exempted	 and	 even	 verifying	 their	 age	 and	 identity	 was	 problematic.	 The	maximum	legal	working	hours	depended	on	age,	and	never	matched	a	full	or	half	working	day	 for	 an	 adult.	 Children	 thus	had	 to	 be	 organized	 in	 relays	 in	 several	odd	shifts.	Even	if	enforcement	was	deficient,	it	could	entail	onerous	dealings	with	the	administration	and	asking	for	favours	in	order	to	get	excused	from	compliance	
																																																								90	‘Travail	des	enfans’,	p.	81.	
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or	 discharged	 from	 fines.91	The	 managerial	 disruptions	 this	 entailed	 necessarily	must	have	raised	the	cost	and	inconveniences	of	employing	children.			Colin	 Heywood	 showed	 that	 the	 1841	 law	 ‘had	 the	 unintended	 effect	 of	 driving	some	of	the	younger	children,	under	the	age	of	twelve,	out	of	the	factories.[…]	The	extent	 of	 the	 exodus	 is	 not	 clear’.	 But	 he	 cites	 fragmentary	 evidence	 of	 some	important	declines	for	Seine-Maritime,	the	Nord,	the	Aisne,	the	Somme,	the	Haut-Rhin	 and	 the	 Vosges.92	I	 would	 contend	 that	 these	 effects	 were	 unintended	 or	unforeseeable;	rather	child	labour	was	gradually	priced	out	of	the	marketplace	by	making	it	bothersome.	The	age	limit	of	twelve	was	significant.	By	law,	foundlings	were	treated	and	referred	to	as	‘adults’	at	age	twelve,	with	the	consequent	need	to	earn	 their	 own	 living.	 Subsequent	 but	 unsuccessful	 efforts	 would	 also	 focus	 on	women’s	 labour.	Dupin	was	 pushing	 forward	 a	 bill	 further	 regulating	 infant	 and	female	work	when	the	1848	revolution	interrupted	these	determinations.	The	end	of	his	long	and	turbulent	legislative	career	found	Dupin	introducing	legislation	to	the	same	end	in	the	spring	of	1870	with	a	similar	fate.	This	became	the	basis	of	the	law	of	19	May	1874	 further	 regulating	 the	 industrial	work	of	 children	and	adult	women,	which	marked	the	start	of	uninterrupted	family	reform	legislation	into	the	twentieth	century.93			The	1841	law	did	not	question	the	presence	of	children	in	the	industrial	economy,	despite	acknowledging	the	inability	of	the	wage-bond	to	generate	the	right	kinds	of	
																																																								91	Heywood,	Childhood,	pp.	243-244.	92	Ibid.,	p.	244.	93	Véronique	Antomarchi,	Politique	et	famille	sous	la	IIIe	République,	1870-1914	(Paris,	2000);	Sylvia	Schafer,	 Children	 in	 Moral	 Danger	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Government	 in	 Third	 Republic	 France	(Princeton,	1997).	
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social	 subjects.	 There	was	 broad	 agreement	 that	 factory	work	 did	 not	 provide	 a	proper	moral	upbringing	for	children.	The	solution	was	either	to	keep	children	at	home	 or	 subject	 them	 to	 the	 extra-domestic	 guardianship	 of	 administrators,	philanthropists	 and	 industrialists	 capable	 of	 intervening	 between	 home	 and	market	to	redress	the	imbalances.			From	this	indirect	means	of	family	reform	that	the	1841	law	represented,	we	now	turn	to	the	more	direct	forms	of	reform.	Despite	the	relative	legislative	silence	on	family	issues	from	the	1840s	to	1870s,	these	middle	decades	of	the	century	were	the	 testing	 grounds	 of	 a	 social	 government	 through	 guardianship.	 These	 efforts	were	not	 the	result	of	new	 legislation,	but	rather	of	an	aggressive	programme	of	family	reform	through	administrative	means	at	the	local	level.	From	the	1830s	to	the	1880s,	 local	authorities	sought	to	transform	poor	families	by	impeding	single	women	from	abandoning	their	illegitimate	children.			
The	origins	of	the	foundling	system.		Bastardy	 served	 as	 the	main	 fault	 line	 in	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 family;	 it	 posed	 the	problem	 of	 biological	 ties	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 the	 moral	 prerequisites	 of	 family	existence.	The	women	and	children	who	enjoyed	the	exclusive	legal	rights	granted	to	 them	by	marriage	were	 identified	as	being	 ‘legitimate’.	By	 contrast,	 the	 single	mother,	 disapprovingly	 called	 a	 fille-mère,	 and	her	 children,	 for	 standing	outside	the	 socio-juridical	 scope	 of	 wedlock,	 were	 ‘illegitimate’	 or	 ‘natural’.	 Victims	 of	profound	prejudices,	indigent	single	mothers	and	their	children	increasingly	came	under	 the	 guardianship	 of	 the	 administration.	 Policymakers,	 officials,	 police	
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officers	 and	 doctors	 now	 became	 tasked	 with	 directly	 supervising	 and	 shaping	families.	By	having	to	determine	(in)eligibility	and	moral	worthiness,	 they	had	to	create	new	normative	parameters	for	family	functions	that	could	be	put	in	practice	and	assessed.	The	single	mother	and	her	children	thus	became	the	testing	grounds	for	 new	 concepts	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 family	 and	 also	 for	 social	 government	through	guardianship.		Starting	in	the	1830s,	some	unwed	mothers	were	offered	departmental	aid	to	keep	them	 from	abandoning	 their	 children	 in	 foundling	hospitals.	The	new	policy	was	introduced	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 existing	 foundling	 system,	which	was	 set	 up	with	 the	 intention	 of	 soaking	 up	 all	 children	 conceived	 outside	 the	 confines	 of	marriage.	 The	 new	 programme	 was	 motivated	 by	 a	 straightforward	 desire	 to	reduce	 public	 spending.	 By	 providing	 some	 indigent	 single	 mothers	 with	 paltry	sums	 for	only	 some	months	or	years	 in	exchange	 for	 rearing	 their	own	children,	the	administration	could	impede	abandonment	and	escape	its	legal	responsibility	of	having	to	maintain	all	foundlings	until	the	end	of	their	twelfth	year.	This	implied	not	 only	 a	 change	 in	 welfare	 policy,	 but	 also	 a	 profound	 change	 in	 the	understanding	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 its	 defining	 relationships	 to	 the	 patriarchal	family	and	the	wider	society.	It	came	face	to	face	with	the	deep-seated	repudiation	of	single	mothers	and	their	children	and	thus	had	to	find	the	leeway	to	negotiate	significant	revisions	of	the	role	of	motherhood	and	the	cultural	boundaries	of	the	family	ideal	defined	by	a	male-dominated	marriage.			Child	abandonment,	organized	around	foundling	hospitals,	was	the	first	universal	welfare	programme	in	France.	From	the	seventeenth	century,	single	mothers	had	
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been	socially	compelled	to	give	up	their	children	to	a	foundling	hospital.	In	defence	of	the	normative	family,	the	state	assumed	the	growing	financial	burden	of	extra-marital	 sexuality.	 Following	 an	 1811	 decree,	 small	 infants	 could	 be	 freely	abandoned	 at	 designated	 public	 hospitals	 using	 the	 tour	 d’exposition,	 a	 turning	cradle	placed	 in	 an	opening	 in	 the	 external	wall	 of	 a	 foundling	hospital	with	 the	aim	 of	 granting	 complete	 secrecy	 to	 the	 abandoner.94	Abandoned	 children	 were	then	 sent	 off	 to	 wet-nurses	 in	 the	 countryside	 as	 soon	 as	 possible.	 While	admittance	 was	 in	 theory	 gratuitous,	 anonymous	 and	 unconditional,	 practice	varied	widely	within	France.			This	 foundling	 system	originated	 from	 legal	 changes	 to	 the	 family	 regime.	 In	 the	context	 of	 the	 gradual	 transference	 of	 family	 regulation	 from	 the	 Church	 to	 the	state,	 a	 royal	 order	 of	 1639,	 building	 on	 previous	 experience,	 ordered	 that	 any	marriage	 promise	 that	 had	 not	 received	 parental	 consent	 was	 void	 and	unenforceable.	 This	 enabled	 elite	 families	 to	 prevent	 socially	 unequal	marriages	caused	 by	 their	 children’s	 youthful	 pregnancies.	 Before	 these	 changes,	 canonical	and	 common	 law,	 less	 concerned	 with	 pre-marital	 sexuality	 than	 with	transgressions	 against	 the	 family	 order,	 had	 protected	 women	 who	 had	 been	‘seduced’	 following	 dishonest	marriage	 promises.	When	 pregnancy	 resulted,	 the	couple	could	be	forced	to	marry	or	the	father	made	to	bear	childbirth	and	alimony	expenses.	The	morose	were	imprisoned.95	The	1804	Civil	Code	mandated	parental	consent	and	introduced	the	strict	prohibition	of	paternity	searches	except	in	cases																																																									94	Fuchs,	Abandoned	Children:	Foundlings	and	Child	Welfare	 in	Nineteenth-Century	France	 (Albany,	1984),	pp.	21-22.	In	Europe,	the	tours	came	to	be	used	in	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Belgium,	and	Italy.	Fuchs,	‘Charity	and	Welfare’,	pp.	158-159.	95	Isidro	Dubert,	 ‘Église,	monarchie,	mariage	et	contrôle	social	dans	la	Galice	rurale,	XVIIIe	et	XIXe	siècles’,	Annales	de	démographie	historique,	 2/118	 (2009),	 p.	 109;	 Ivan	 Jablonka,	Ni	père	ni	mère:	
Histoire	des	enfants	de	l’assistance	publique,	1874-1939	(Paris,	2006),	p.	13.	
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of	rape.	Even	if	the	filiation	was	of	public	knowledge,	men	had	no	responsibility	for	out-of-wedlock	children,	while	women	remained	liable.96		The	direct	result	of	these	legal	changes	was	a	significant	rise	in	bastardy.97	While	the	 burden	 theoretically	 fell	 on	 women	 alone,	 the	 strong	 taboos	 against	 single	motherhood	 impeded	 these	 from	 raising	 their	 children.	 Fearing	 infanticide	 and	social	 disorder,	modern	 foundling	policy,	 formulated	by	 Saint	Vincent	de	Paul	 in	1638,	 sought	 to	 preserve	 the	 life	 of	 the	 infants	 and	 the	 family	 regime.	 Public	authorities	assumed	the	burden	of	raising	illegitimate	children	in	order	to	manage	transgressions	to	the	family	system.	Originally	financed	by	local	‘feudal’	lords	with	some	 involvement	 of	 the	 Church	 and	 the	 crown,	 the	 system	 became	 a	 state	responsibility	 in	 1790.98	Secret	 abandonment	 would	 preserve	 the	 personal	 and	family	honour	of	women.	With	her	‘fault’	or	pregnancy	thus	effaced,	the	seduced	or	fallen	woman	could	still	‘return	to	virtue’	and	marry	honourably	in	the	future.99	In	France,	 there	was	 a	 six-fold	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	 abandoned	 children	 from	1740-1749	to	1820-1829.100	At	 its	peak	 in	1831	and	1832,	some	35,000	children	were	abandoned	every	year.101		
																																																								96	Paternity	 searches	 were	 allowed	 in	 1912	 only	 if	 the	 putative	 father	 was	 unmarried.	 This	restriction	 was	 lifted	 in	 1972.	 For	 a	 detailed	 study	 of	 paternity	 searches	 see:	 Fuchs,	 Contested	
Paternity:	Constructing	Families	in	Modern	France	(Baltimore,	2008).		97	Dubert	demonstrated	 in	his	study	of	provincial	Spain,	where	 the	same	measures	were	adopted	between	1776	and	1788,	that	this	rise	in	bastardy	cannot	be	explained	by	reference	to	economic	or	sexual	modernization.	 Instead,	 he	 highlights	 the	 changes	 in	 family	 structures	 triggered	 by	 these	legal	 changes	 that	 altered	 ‘the	 traditional	 mechanisms	 of	 social	 and	 family	 control	 over	 the	prenuptial	universe	of	inland	Galicia’.	Dubert,	‘Église,	monarchie,	mariage’,	pp.	116-117.		98	Felix	Martin-Doisy,	Dictionnaire	d’économie	charitable	(Petit-Montrouge,	1857),	pp.	445-582.	99	Congrès	 scientifique	 de	 France,	 Seconde	 Session	 Tenue	 a	 Poitiers	 en	 Septembre	 1834	 (Poitiers,	1835),	p.	331.	100	Volker	Hunecke,	 ‘Les	 enfants	 trouvés:	 Contexte	 européen	 et	 cas	milanais,	 XVIIIe-XIXe	 siècles’,	
Revue	d’histoire	moderne	et	contemporaine,	32	(1985),	p.	5.	101	L.A.	Labourt,	Recherches	historiques	sur	les	enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1845),	p.	89.	
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In	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 Russia	 and	 all	 predominantly	 Catholic	 countries	 in	Europe	implemented	the	same	foundling	system	France	was	building	at	the	time.	In	 the	 following	 century,	 these	 developed	 into	 nationalized	 and	 secularized	systems	of	mass	child	abandonment,	affecting	hundreds	of	 thousands	of	children	every	 year	 in	 Europe	 for	 the	 explicit	 purpose	 of	 protecting	 the	 honour	 of	 the	unwed	 mother	 and	 her	 family,	 thus	 alleviating	 the	 burden	 of	 illegitimacy	 and	preventing	infanticide.102	These	systems	remained	in	place	well	into	the	twentieth	century,	despite	the	fact	that	since	the	early	years	of	the	foundling	hospitals	their	disproportionate	 mortality	 became	 evident.	 In	 1758,	 the	 death	 rate	 in	 the	foundling	hospital	 in	Paris	was	68	per	cent.103	A	century	 later	 in	 Ille-et-Vilaine,	 it	was	70	per	cent,	and	as	high	as	92	per	cent	 in	 the	worse	hospices	 (compared	 to	16.83	per	 cent	 for	 the	 general	 population).104	If	 it	were	 not	 for	 these	 high	death	rates,	and	despite	having	the	lowest	proportion	of	illegitimate	births	and	assisted	children	in	the	country,	the	burden	of	foundlings	would	have	consumed	a	fourth	of	the	Ille-et-Vilaine’s	departmental	budget.105	Many	more	were	suspected	of	dying	in	transit	 to	 these	 hospitals.	 Until	 the	mid-nineteenth	 century,	 between	 two	 thirds	and	 three	 fourths	of	 foundlings	died.	Fuchs	 stresses	 that	 these	death	 rates	made	‘this	 form	 of	 welfare	 tantamount	 to	 culturally	 sanctioned	 infanticide’. 106 	The	endurance	of	this	form	of	welfare	speaks	to	the	tenacity	of	the	notions	of	honour	surrounding	the	family	regime.	
																																																								102	Fuchs,	‘Charity	and	welfare’,	p.	174.		103	Isaac	Joseph,	‘Tactiques	et	figures	disciplinaires’,	in:	Joseph,	Philippe	Fritsch	and	Alain	Battegay,	
Disciplines	à	domicile:	L’édification	de	la	famille	(Fontenay-Sous-Bois,	1977),	p.	62.		104	Conseil	Général	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	2e	Session	de	1848	pour	1849	(Rennes,	1849),	p.	130.	105 	C.G.	 d’Ille-et	 Vilaine,	 1848,	 pp.	 16-17,	 129-130;	 J.F.	 Terme	 and	 J.B.	 Monfalcon,	 Nouvelles	
Considerations	sur	les	Enfants	Trouvés	(Paris,	1838),	p.	475.	The	illegitimacy	rate	in	the	1830s	was	22	per	thousand,	against	316	in	the	Seine.	In	the	1860s,	the	department	aided	one	child	per	3,520	inhabitants,	 compared	 to	 the	 Rhône	 with	 one	 per	 110.	 Rollet,	 La	 politique	 a	 l’égard	 de	 la	 petite	
enfance	sous	la	IIIe	République	(Paris,	1990),	p.	64.	106	Fuchs,	‘Charity	and	welfare’,	pp.	160,	171.	
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	Child	 abandonment,	 by	 contrast,	 was	 not	 practised	 in	 predominantly	 Protestant	countries,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 often	 had	 higher	 illegitimacy	 rates	 than	Catholic	countries.107	Northern	countries	retained	some	form	of	protection	against	seduction,	and	while	mothers	had	to	keep	their	children,	fathers	or	the	next	of	kin	could	be	made	to	face	the	expenses.	These	contrasting	models	could	also	be	seen	within	France,	between	the	North	and	the	Midi	or	between	Alsace	and	Brittany.108			The	existence	of	divergent	Catholic	and	Protestant	systems	first	became	known	in	France	 in	 1829	 when	 Frenchman	 H.	 de	 Gouroff	 circulated	 a	 short	 number	 of	brochures	 containing	 the	 preliminary	 results	 of	 his	 research	 commissioned	 by	Russian	 government,	 not	 published	 in	 full	 until	 1839.109 	Rather	 than	 a	 fatal	response	 to	 poverty	 and	 illegitimacy,	 de	 Gouroff	 had	 read	 the	 foundling	 system,	which	 he	 opposed,	 as	 a	 culturally	 relative	 practice	 belonging	 to	 the	 sphere	 of	morality	and	religion.	Some	interpreted	these	findings	as	evidence	that	it	was	the	very	policy	 of	 free	 abandonment	 that	 caused	 the	 effects	 it	 sought	 to	 alleviate	by	generating	 undesired	 incentives.	 Thus,	 ‘the	 existence	 of	 the	 tours	 increases	 the	number	of	abandonments’.110	Or	worse	yet,	it	was	their	cause.	‘The	department	of	Haute-Saône,	which	has	no	tours,	has	no	foundlings	either’.111	For	single	mothers,	‘if	[the	tours]	had	not	existed,	the	thought	of	abandoning	would	not	have	crossed	their	minds’.112																																																									107	For	and	international	overview	see:Martin-Doisy,	Dictionnaire,	pp.	582-629.	108	Fuchs,	‘Charity	and	welfare’,	p.	159.	109	H.	de	Gouroff,	Essai	sur	les	enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1829)	and	Recherches	sur	les	enfants	trouvés	et	
les	enfants	illégitimes	en	Russie,	dans	le	reste	de	l’Europe,	en	Asie,	et	en	Amérique	 (Paris,	1839).	See:	Congrès	scientifique	de	France,	Seconde	session,	p.	312.	110	Ibid.,	p.	313.	111	Terme	and	Monfalcon,	Histoire	des	enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1840),	p.	479.	112	Ibid.,	p.	494.	
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	This	 came	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 foundling	 system	 was	 under	 attack	 because	 of	suspected	abuses	and	its	growing	financial	cost.	Firstly,	there	was	some	evidence	that	 legitimate	 children	were	 being	 abandoned	 in	 the	 tours.	 Secondly,	 it	 became	commonplace	to	assume	that	mothers	abandoned	their	children	to	then	offer	their	services	as	a	wet-nurse	at	the	same	hospital,	leading	to	calls	to	‘put	an	end	to	the	scandal	of	children	being	nursed	at	the	State’s	expense	by	their	own	mothers’,	who	thus	 ‘receive	 a	 salary	 to	 carry	 out	 an	 obligation	 that	 nature	 imposes	 on	 her’.113	Rather	than	protecting	their	honour,	families	seemed	to	be	making	strategic	use	of	the	 system.	 Thus,	 some	 parents	 seemed	 to	 use	 the	 foundling	 hospital	 as	 a	temporary	 deposit	 for	 their	 children	 in	 times	 of	 hardship,	 a	 practice	 that	 was	lawful	 in	 the	 Ille-et-Vilaine	and	that	was	habitual	 in	some	 foreign	countries.114	In	an	 attempt	 to	 eradicate	 local	 misuses	 of	 the	 system,	 the	 government	 had	introduced	several	unsuccessful	reforms	that	had	tried	to	make	the	system	stricter	and	 render	 abandonment	 irreversible.	 These	 had	 little	 long-term	 effect	 on	abandonment	 numbers,	 entailed	 greater	 spending	 and	 deeply	 divided	 public	opinion.115			Emboldened	by	de	Gouroff’s	 findings,	and	as	a	way	to	address	growing	expenses	and	 perceived	 abuses,	 the	 departmental	 council	 of	 Vienne,	 after	 a	 15-to-14	 vote	and	despite	local	opposition,	decided	to	experimentally	supress	all	the	tours	in	the	
																																																								113	Congrès	scientifique	de	France,	Seconde	session,	pp.	315,	320.	114	C.	G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1848,	pp.	16-17.	One	of	the	better-studied	examples	is	Milan:	Hunecke,	‘Les	enfants	trouvés’.	115	The	most	 important	of	 these	measures	was	a	swap	of	assisted	children	between	neighbouring	departments.	 See:	 Isabelle	 Le	 Boulanger,	 ‘Les	 échanges	 d'enfants	 assistés	 dans	 les	 années	 1830:	Objets,	 enjeux,	 bilan:	 L'exemple	des	Côtes-du-Nord	»,	Revue	d’histoire	de	 l’enfance	 ‘irrégulière’,	 14	(2012),	pp.	223-248.	
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department,	except	for	the	one	in	Poitiers,	starting	in	1834.116	At	this	stage,	there	was	no	alternative	aid	for	those	seeking	to	abandon.	Coincidentally,	the	September	session	of	 the	1834	Congrès	scientifique	de	France	was	held	 in	Poitiers,	bringing	together	 national	 figures	 with	 local	 opponents	 of	 the	 measure	 and	 the	 elective	representatives	 who	 had	 voted	 it.	 There	 was	 a	 heated	 and	 lengthy	 debate	 that	quickly	 transcended	 its	 local	 boundaries.	 The	 conference	 crystallized	 a	 sharp	opposition	 on	 the	 subject	 that	 would	 last	 many	 decades,	 pitting	 Catholics	 and	social	economists,	on	the	one	hand,	against	liberals	and	political	economists,	on	the	other.	While	the	general	assembly	was	finally	swayed	in	favour	of	the	tours,	it	was	made	plain	that	‘the	experience	is	totally	lacking,	the	facts	are	not	known,	and	that	it	is	urgent	to	gather	them’.117	This	marked	the	birth	of	the	first	modern	debate	on	the	 ‘social	question’	 in	France	and	the	 first	modern	uses	of	statistics	 to	 influence	public	 opinion.	 The	 Statistique	 générale	 de	 la	 France,	which	Adolphe	Thiers	 had	founded	 in	 1833,	 devoted	 its	 first	 published	 volume	 in	 1835	 to	 the	 collection	 of	national	 and	 local	 statistics	 on	 foundlings	 from	 1824	 to	 1833.118	Meanwhile,	scholars,	publicists	and	administrators	undertook	numerous	studies	on	the	subject	that	 were	 printed	 in	 1837	 and	 1838,	 when	 the	 debate	 became	 national.119	The	
tours	 debate,	 thus,	 brought	 together	 for	 the	 first	 time	 the	 complex	 interaction	between	 politics	 and	 administration,	 scholarship	 and	 academies,	 and	 public	opinion	and	literature	that	would	come	to	identify	social	debates	for	the	rest	of	the	nineteenth	century.																																																										116	Congrès	scientifique	de	France,	Seconde	session,	pp.	310,	317-318,	344	117	Ibid.,	p.	332.	118	Muriel	 Jeorger,	 ‘L'évolution	des	 courbes	de	 l'abandon	de	 la	Restauration	à	 la	première	Guerre	mondiale,	 1815-1913’,	Publications	de	 l'École	 française	de	Rome,	 140/1	 (1991),	 p.	 705;	 Hervé	 Le	Bras,	 ‘La	 Statistique	 générale	 de	 la	 France’,	 in:	 Pierre	 Nora	 (ed.),	 Les	 lieux	 de	 mémoire,	 2	 (Paris,	1986),	pp.	317-353;	Ann	La	Berge,	Mission	and	Method:	The	Early	Nineteenth-Century	French	Public	
Health	Movement	(Cambridge,	1992),	chapter	2.	119	For	an	annotated	bibliography	see:	Terme	and	Monfalcon,	Histoire	des	enfants	trouvés,	pp.	474-486.	
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	The	controversy	surrounding	the	tours	only	died	out	after	the	turn	of	the	century,	with	a	major	national	debate	taking	place	every	decade	until	the	1880s.	The	same	discussion	was	echoed	verbatim	in	countless	sub-national	assemblies	and	learned	societies	 during	 the	 period.	 However,	 this	 long-lived	 debate	 was	 singularly	monotonous	and	unoriginal.	Every	new	instalment	of	the	polemic,	whether	locally	or	nationally,	turned	to	the	same	set	of	opposing	arguments	and	rationales	set	out	in	the	late	1830s.	The	new	data	and	administrative	experiences	had	little	effect	on	what	 was	 but	 an	 instance	 in	 a	 larger	 clash	 between	 two	 opposing	 models	 of	personal,	 family	 and	 social	 responsibilities	 tied	 to	 competing	 geographies	 of	 the	public-private	divide.	We	will	now	explore	in	turn	the	opposing	views	of	Catholics	and	liberals	on	the	issue	of	the	abolition	of	the	tours.	
	
The	Catholic	position.			For	 Catholics	 and	 social	 economists,	 foundling	 hospitals	 were	 vital	 for	 the	protection	 of	 the	 family	 regime	 and	 morality,	 on	 which	 the	 social	 order	 was	founded.	 The	 tour	 was	 an	 escape	 valve	 for	 the	 family	 ideal.	 It	 absorbed	 all	illegitimate,	 adulterous	 and	 incestuous	 children,	 and	 also	 relieved	 indigent	marriages	from	the	members	they	could	not	feed.120	‘In	reality,	what	is	the	tour?’,	asked	 Auguste	 Nicolas,	 a	 Catholic	 writer	 and	 official	 in	 the	 ministry	 of	 public	worship,	‘It	is	a	drain,	an	outlet,	a	sewer,	if	you	will,	but	a	cesspit	that	is	necessary	to	 save	 the	 child	 from	death	 or	 perversity,	 the	mother	 from	 crime	 [and]	 society	
																																																								120	Ibid.,	pp.	476,	478,	483,	485,	498.	
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from	scandal’.121	Social	intervention	was	necessary	to	manage	and	contain	both	the	transgressions	and	 the	shortfalls	of	 the	rules	of	marriage	and	honour.	 ‘A	 family’s	honour,	 which	 must	 not	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 misconduct	 of	 one	 of	 its	 members,	demands	 secrecy’.122	The	 shame	 and	 opprobrium	 resulting	 from	 her	 immoral	behaviour	 naturally	 resulted	 in	 child	 abandonment;	 if	 impeded	 from	 carrying	 it	out,	 and	 faced	with	 a	 lifetime	of	 infamy,	 family	disaffiliation	 and	unemployment,	then	it	was	a	 logical	 inevitability	that	the	result	would	be	abortion,	 infanticide	or	even	suicide.	This	system	of	honour	and	the	growing	gendering	of	the	cash-nexus	meant	that	few	women	could	afford	to	raise	a	child	outside	marriage.123	The	tour	saved	lives	as	much	as	it	avoided	the	mother	from	being	‘condemned	to	live	fatally	in	disorder’,	an	easy	prey	to	new	seducers.124	By	hiding	her	fault,	anonymous	and	secret	 abandonment	 gave	 a	 worthy	 woman	 the	 opportunity	 of	 rehabilitation,	leading	 perhaps	 to	 a	 respectable	 marriage	 and	 maternity	 in	 the	 future.	 Thus,	 a	single	mother	and	her	child	needed	to	be	separated	for	their	mutual	benefit	and	in	order	 to	 prevent	 immoral	 examples	 from	 contaminating	 the	 community.	Consequently,	 the	 issue	 was	 of	 the	 highest	 importance,	 for	 on	 it	 rested	 the	tranquillity	of	households	and	 local	communities	as	much	as	 the	very	survival	of	the	state.	As	a	result,	Catholics	sought	to	have	foundling	expenses	assumed	by	the	state	and	the	national	budget	rather	than	leave	it	in	the	hands	of	departments,	as	established	by	the	1811	decree.		
																																																								121	Commission	des	enfants	trouvés,	Travaux,	1	(Paris,	1850),	pp.	98-99.	122	A.	 Legoyt,	 ‘De	 l’assistance	 des	 enfants	 en	 France’,	 Jouranl	 de	 la	 société	 statistique	 de	 Paris,	 5	(1864),	p,	p.	284.	123	Congrès	scientifique	de	France,	Seconde	session,	pp.	315,	321.	124	Legoyt,	‘Assistance	des	enfants’,	p.	284;	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1848,	p.	137.	
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While	 the	 only	 enduring	 solution	 was	 increased	 religious	 observance,	 Catholics	demanded	 a	 law	 against	 seduction	 that	 would	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	 unpunished	victimization	of	 girls	 that	was	 the	 immediate	 cause	of	 the	problem.	 If	 Protestant	countries	 had	 no	 foundling	 hospitals	 it	 was	 because	 ‘paternity	 searches	 are	permitted	 and	 that	 the	 mother	 almost	 always	 obtains	 a	 judicial	 decision	condemning	 her	 seducer	 to	 a	 temporary	 or	 life	 annuity’. 125 	Catholics	 thus	emphasized	the	necessary	accountability	of	the	stronger	party,	in	terms	of	gender,	hierarchies	in	the	workplace	and	also	class.126			Catholics	 favoured	 a	 complex	 household	 model,	 where	 orderly	 and	 morally-sanctioned	bonds	of	authority	produced	family-like	sentiments	beyond	wage	and	blood	relations	to	include	servants,	workers	and	strangers.	Rather	than	filiation,	it	was	 these	 relations	 of	 moralized	 authority	 that	 structured	 and	 held	 the	 social	order	together.	They	were	equally	favourable	to	institutional	care,	convinced	that	‘[i]t	 is	 often	more	 beneficial	 for	 children	 to	 be	 raised	 in	 a	 hospice	 than	 in	 their	family’.127	Single	 mothers	 ‘would	 make	 of	 [their	 children]	 beggars	 [or]	 scamps,	whereas	 in	 the	 hospice,	 they	 receive	 or	 could	 receive	 a	 good	 upbringing’.128	The	‘hospice	 guarantees	 the	morality	 of	 foundlings,	 and	 is	 favourable	 to	 that	 of	 their	mothers’.129	With	Alphonse	de	Lamartine,	one	of	the	leading	defenders	of	the	tours,	they	 were	 optimistic	 that	 foundlings	 would	 find	 and	 adequate	 home	 with	 their	
																																																								125	Legoyt,	‘Assistance	des	enfants’,	p.	287.		126	Congrés	scientifique	de	France,	Seconde	session,	p.	323.	127	Ibid.,	p.	327.	128	Ibid.,	p.	331.	129	Quoted	in:	Terme	and	Monfalcon,	Histoire	des	enfants	trouvés,	p.	477.	
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guardians	 in	 the	 countryside,	where	 cohabitation	would	 ‘inspire	 a	 consanguinity	almost	as	strong	as	that	of	nature’.130		Catholicism	thus	‘aids	both	the	child	and	the	mother,	but	isolates	them	as	if	seeing	a	 moral	 contagion	 in	 their	 mutual	 contact’.131	Conseiller-général	 Rouxin	 did	 not	deny	 that	 ‘natural	 children	 should	 be	 assisted’,	 but	 added:	 ‘do	 you	 believe	 that	their	 mothers	 are	 suitable	 to	 instil	 in	 them	 moral	 principles?’132	Catholics	 used	strong	 language	 to	 reject	 the	 possibility	 of	 unmarried	 motherhood.	 The	 Abbé	Adolphe-Henri	Gaillard,	who,	together	with	Lamartine,	was	the	foremost	champion	of	the	tours,	argued	that		often	nothing	is	more	deplorable	for	the	children	that	to	be	kept	by	their	mothers.	Indeed,	 can	 they	 lay	 claim	 to	 this	 sacred	 title,	 they	 who	 have	 conceived	 in	 the	manner	 of	 beasts?	 Can	 they	 claim	 their	 rights,	when	neither	 religion	nor	 society	have	 recognized	 their	 union?	 Is	 it	 not	 justice	 as	 well	 as	 wisdom	 to	 rescue	 their	victims?	They	have	sullied	 their	children	by	giving	 them	 life;	do	not	 tolerate	 that	they	 poison	 still	 the	 rest	 of	 their	 life.[…]	 a	 fille-mère	 has	 no	 right	 over	 her	 child,	especially	when	she	has	abandoned	him;	 the	most	beneficial	 for	her	and	 for	him	[the	 child]	 is	 that	 his	 origin	 remains	 unknown,	 and	 that	 she,	 in	 turn,	 decides	 to	forget	him.	Following	the	expression	of	Mme	La	Vallière,	one	must	cry	more	over	his	
birth	than	his	death.133	Family	could	simply	not	exist	outside	marriage,	of	which	it	was	but	a	consequence.	‘Never,	 in	effect,	would	he	find	beside	a	natural	mother	the	advantages	he	would	find	next	 to	 a	 legitimate	mother’.	 Since	 authority,	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 social	 and	 the	family	order,	 only	derived	 from	moral	observance,	 ‘she	will	never	have	over	her																																																									130	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	481.	131	Martin-Doisy,	Dictionnaire,	p.	660.	132	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	Session	de	1851	(Rennes,	1851),	p.	257.	133	Adolphe-Henri	Gaillard,	Recherches…	sur	les	enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1837),	p.	355-356.	
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child	the	necessary	authority’.134	Furthermore,	to	provide	only	single	mothers	with	assistance	would	create	a	very	dangerous	incentive	for	public	immorality.			The	 liberal	 reforms	 were	 finally	 successful,	 despite	 the	 tenacity	 of	 Catholic	opposition	at	the	national	and	local	level.	The	most	immediate	reason	why	liberals	had	the	upper	hand	was	the	active	and	durable	support	of	 the	government,	 from	the	July	Monarchy	to	the	Third	Republic.	The	administration	had	the	authority	to	overturn	the	votes	of	the	conseils	généraux,	municipal	councils	and	hospital	boards	which	in	predominantly	Catholic	departments,	such	as	Ille-et-Vilaine,	were	openly	defiant	 of	 the	 official	 policy. 135 	However,	 there	 also	 was	 a	 fundamental	epistemological	 reason.	 From	 the	 late	 eighteenth	 century,	 political	 economy	 had	introduced	a	new	mode	of	 argumentation	 that	 relied	heavily	 on	 statistics	 and	 in	the	 assertion	 that	 cause-effect	 correlations	 and	economic	 laws	had	been	derived	from	 empirical	 data	 gathered	 through	 scientific	 observation,	 thus	 enabling	systematic	 deductive	 and	 inductive	 operations.	 When	 applied	 to	 human	populations,	quantitative	evidence	was	philosophically	 troublesome	 for	Catholics	and	 conservatives,	 since	 it	 presupposed	 that	 persons	 were	 equal	 and	interchangeable.	 Qualitative	 evidence	 was	 better	 able	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	innate	 hierarchy	 among	 individuals,	 the	 moral	 order	 of	 Creation	 and	 the	 local-historical	 complexity	 of	 things;	 this	 was	 the	 founding	 principle	 of	 the	 social-scientific	schools	of	Bonald	and	Frédéric	Le	Play.	Catholics	and	conservatives	did	not	 share	 the	 liberal	method	 of	 argumentation	 because	 they	 did	 not	 see	 a	 clear	distinction	 between	moral	 reflexion	 and	 empirical	 data.	 Indeed,	 their	 opponents																																																									134	Léon	Lallemand,	‘Rapport	sur	les	enfants	trouvés’,	in:	Comités	catholiques	de	France,	Assemblée	
général	(Paris,	1873),	p.	198.	135	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1848,	p.	143;	1851,	pp.	221-223,	264;	1855	(Rennes,	1855),	p.	151.	
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were	 able	 to	 link	 the	 two	 in	ways	 that	were	 unclear.	 For	 liberal	 thinkers	 at	 the	time,	statistics	served	more	to	illustrate	than	shape	their	‘empirical’	observations.	This	meant	that	any	data	that	did	not	agree	with	the	observations	was	dismissed.	Informing	 the	king	on	 the	abuses	of	 the	 system	and	 the	 first	 foundling	 statistics,	prepared	 in	 1835	 by	 the	 prefect	 of	 the	 Yonne	 the	 vicomte	 de	 Bondy,	 Adrien-Etienne	 de	 Gasparin,	 the	minister	 of	 the	 interior,	 found	 a	 list	 of	 things	 that	 ‘are	impossible	insofar	they	clash	with	the	simplest	of	understandings	and	good	sense’.	Statistical	data	contradicted	his	claims	of	immoral	abuses,	but	he	argued	that	this	itself	was	proof	of	the	abuses:	These	abuses,	as	you	will	recognize,	Sire,	have	been	so	great	in	some	locations	as	to	change	 the	 natural	 relationships	 of	 things,	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 is	 no	 longer	possible	to	establish	statistical	calculations	on	any	base	that	is	not	false.136	Statistics	were	 nonetheless	 portrayed	 as	 ‘hard’	 proof.	 The	 departmental	 debates	show	 how	 this	 epistemological	 gap	 between	 the	 opponents	 made	 Catholics	vulnerable	 to	 vigorous	 attacks	 for	 relying	 on	 ‘circumstantial	 evidence’	 and	 ‘une	foule	d’anecdotes’.137	Although	his	own	arguments	were	no	more	substantive	than	his	 adversaries’,	 prefect	 Pagès	 of	 Ille-et-Vilaine,	 in	 refuting	 the	Conseil’s	 Catholic	majority	obstinate	resolve	to	repeal	the	new	policies,	argued	that:		with	 over	 nine	 hundred	 children	 under	 the	 administration’s	 guardianship,	 you	have	been	able	to	cite	but	a	few	facts,	so	isolated	and	unimportant	that	it	has	not	been	 possible	 to	 make	 them	 pass	 through	 the	 administrative	 sieve.	 Their	 small	number,	compared	to	the	very	elevated	figure	of	admissions,	proves,	furthermore,	the	benefits	of	the	policies	in	place.138	
																																																								136	Adrien-Etienne	 de	 Gasparin,	 Rapport	 au	 Roi	 sur	 les	 hôpitaux,	 les	 hospices	 et	 les	 services	 de	
bienfaisance	(Paris,	1837),	p.	65.	137	Eugène	Ory,	La	protection	de	l’enfant	et	de	l’adulte	(Saint-Étienne,	1883),	p.	171.	138	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1851,	pp.	262-264.	
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The	‘immense	advantages’	of	the	system	were	‘proven’.139	Gradually	in	the	second	half	of	the	century,	both	approaches	converged	in	a	shared	‘scientific’	epistemology	and	methodology.			
The	liberal	position.			In	turn,	 liberals	and	political	economists	sought	to	eliminate	secret	abandonment	and	partly	substitute	 it	 for	temporary	assistance	to	unwed	mothers,	a	policy	that	‘is	 more	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 responsibility,	 which	 is	 one	 of	 the	bases	 of	 our	 social	 edifice’.140	Liberalism,	 political	 economy,	 Malthusianism	 and	utilitarianism	 all	 rested	 on	 shared	 assumptions	 about	 the	 individual.	 The	understanding	 of	 the	 abstract	 individual	 as	 a	 rational,	 autonomous	 and	 self-interested	agent	demanded	that	 it	be	held	fully	 liable	for	 its	actions,	and	only	for	these.	The	same	was	true	of	collective	responsibilities.	Thus	local	spending	needed	to	 match	 and	 derive	 from	 local	 taxation	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 accountable	 and	limited;	this	was	especially	true	of	foundling	charges,	the	most	expensive	welfare	programme	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 liberals	 wanted	 to	 see	 transferred	 from	 the	departmental	 to	 the	 municipal	 budget. 141 	Since	 ‘One	 knows	 too	 well	 that	 a	responsibility	 spread	 out	 among	many	 is	 not	 borne	 by	 anyone’,	 social	 or	 public	agency	was	to	be	kept	to	the	minimum.142	State	activity	was	expected	to	focus	on	eliminating	the	obstacles	to	the	‘natural’	development	of	the	free	market,	rational	individuality	and	the	acceptance	of	full	responsibility	by	persons	and	groups.	The																																																									139	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1854	(Rennes,	1854),	p.	104.		140	Xavier	Delore,	‘La	verité	sur	les	tours’,	Annales	de	la	société	de	médicine	de	Lyon,	XXVI	(1878),	p.	289.	141	Congrès	 scientifique	 de	 France,	 Seconde	 session,	 p.	 343;	 Frédéric	 Cuvier,	 ‘Enfants	 trouvés’,	 in:	Charles	 Coquelin	 and	 Gilbert	 Guillaumin	 (eds.),	 Dictionnaire	 de	 l’économie	 politique	 (Brussels,	1853),	p.	769.	142	Ibid.,	p.	768.	
	 249	
foundling	 system	 went	 against	 these	 core	 beliefs.	 It	 required	 strong	 public	intervention	and	spending,	enabled	paupers	to	reproduce	beyond	their	means	and	exempted	 individuals	 from	 the	 responsibility	 of	 their	 moral	 transgressions.	Moreover,	 it	 was	 indiscriminate,	 an	 aspect	 that	 galvanized	 widespread	condemnation	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France	 against	 all	 universal	 welfare	programmes,	 the	 most	 emblematic	 of	 which	 was	 the	 English	 Poor	 Law.	 As	 one	departmental	 representative	 put	 it,	 welfare	 across	 the	 Channel	 ‘gives	 aid	indistinctly	 to	all	 the	 indigent,	 even	 to	 those	whose	poverty	 is	 the	 result	of	 their	misconduct’. 143 	Individualizing	 schemes,	 in	 turn,	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 operate	differently	on	the	worthy	and	the	unworthy.			The	 primary	 cause	 and	 main	 argument	 for	 the	 liberal	 reforms	 of	 the	 foundling	system	 were	 financial,	 claiming	 that	 the	 rapidly	 increasing	 burden	 on	 the	departmental	purse	was	on	the	verge	of	becoming	intolerable.	Mortality	statistics	also	showed	that	the	system	was	wasteful	in	human	lives,	provoking	the	demise	of	most	 of	 its	 beneficiaries,	with	 a	 death	 rate	 for	 foundlings	 that	was	 two	 or	 three	times	that	of	 illegitimate	children	reared	by	their	mothers.	The	ease	of	gathering	and	 presenting	 these	 statistics	 provided	 valuable	 ammunition	 against	 the	Catholics.	Protecting	the	life	of	the	child	became	one	of	the	keystone	arguments	in	favour	of	the	new	policy	since	the	1830s,	anticipating	by	a	generation	the	rationale	of	 child-saving	campaigns	 that	became	so	characteristic	of	 the	second	half	of	 the	century.			
																																																								143	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1848,	p.	191.		
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The	 system	was	 uneconomical,	 deadly	 and	 plagued	 by	 abuses	 and	misuses,	 but	also	 deeply	 immoral.	 The	 tour,	 by	 effacing	 moral	 culpabilities,	 personal	responsibility	and	lack	of	foresight,	was	seen	as	an	encouragement	of	debauchery.	But	 the	 focus	 again	 fell	 squarely	 on	 women	 here.	 On	 the	 part	 of	 the	 mother,	abandonment	 was	 a	 guilty	 act,	 per	 se,	 regardless	 of	 its	 lawfulness;	 ‘it	 is	 an	 act	contrary	to	nature;	even	the	beast	cares	 for	her	young.	 It	 is	an	anti-religious	and	immoral	 act’,	 indeed,	 ‘the	 supreme	 expression	 of	 selfishness’.144	Abandonment	prevented	 her	 from	 developing	 ‘maternal	 sentiments’,	 an	 unrivalled	 force	‘deposited	by	nature	deep	down	in	the	mother’s	heart	for	the	conservation	of	the	species’	 that	 functioned	 as	 a	 primitive	 and	 biological	 moral	 compass	 capable	 of	rehabilitating	even	reprehensible	females.145	‘One	sees	even	prostitutes	raise	their	children	 with	 solicitude,	 having	 them	 receive	 a	 good	 upbringing	 and	 guarding	them	 attentively	 against	 bad	 examples	 and	 influences’.146	The	 aim	 was	 ‘to	 push	back	 vice	 by	 removing	 comforts	 and	 facilities	 of	 which	 it	 abuses’,	 for	 ‘It	 is	 not	public	charity,	but	rather	his	mother	that	the	foundling	needs’.147				The	tour,	equally,	was	‘an	obstacle	for	the	repentance	of	the	mother,	because	it	is	a	complete	and	definitive	concealment	of	her	fault.	In	keeping	her	child,	the	mother	carries	out	an	act	of	courage	and	resignation	that	rehabilitates	her	to	her	own	eyes	and	 brings	 about	 the	 suffering	 of	 her	 conscience’.148	Only	 this	 penitence	 could	rehabilitate	her.	Since	men	seeking	only	to	satisfy	their	desires	would	be	deterred	by	 the	 fille-mère’s	 hefty	 load,	 ‘The	 child	 is	 a	 safeguard	 against	 a	 second	 fault.	 Its	
																																																								144	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	pp.	284-285.	145	Legoyt,	‘Assistance	des	enfants’,	pp.	283,	285.		146	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	283.	147	Terme	and	Monfalcon,	Histoire	des	enfants	trouvés,	p.	495.	148	Legoyt,	‘Assistance	des	enfants’,	p.	283.	
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presence,	 moreover,	 can	 make	 the	 seducer	 decide	 to	 repair	 his	 fault,	 either	 by	recognizing	 the	 child	 or	 marrying	 the	 mother’.149	More	 so,	 ‘marriages	 are	 the	consequence	of	the	awakening	of	moral	faculties’	in	these	girls.150	In	this	rationale,	the	 father’s	 claim	 to	 responsibility	 was	 the	 hypothetical	 and	 idyllic	 act	 that	certified	and	concluded	the	successful	atonement	of	the	mother’s	sins.	In	the	case	of	 the	 fille-mère,	 the	 focus	 on	 ‘personal	 responsibility’	 both	 intensified	 and	 hid	from	 sight	 the	 structural	 conditions	 determining	 and	 advancing	 the	 unequal	allocation,	along	gender	and	class	lines,	of	legal,	social	and	economic	resources	and	burdens,	especially	marriage,	family	dependency	and	wages.		Indigence	alone,	in	the	absence	of	depravation,	liberals	claimed,	could	not	lead	to	abandonment.151	Economic	 reasons	 for	 family	 malfunction	 were	 brushed	 aside.	Prosper	 Gauja,	 prefect	 of	 the	 Loire-Atlantique,	 asserted	 in	 1852	 that	 ‘An	 honest	female	worker,	when	she	wants	to	behave	well,	always	finds	enough	resources	in	her	 trade	and	condition	on	which	 to	 live’.152	The	same	 thinking	applied	 to	 things	such	 as	 medical	 care.	 ‘One	 could	 object	 that	 the	 [indigent]	 mother,	 if	 medical	assistance	were	 not	 free	 [as	 part	 of	 the	 assistance	 programme],	would	 refuse	 to	call	in	the	doctor	if	her	child	were	ill?	Such	a	conduct,	if	it	were	to	occur,	which	we	doubt,	would	 be	 guilty	 to	 the	 highest	 degree’.153	This	 imagined	 ability	 to	 survive	regardless	of	circumstances	especially	applied	to	legitimate	mothers.	Rather	than	accounting	 for	 structural	 economic,	 social	 and	 cultural	 factors,	 the	 problem	 of	
																																																								149	Ibid.	150	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	283.	151	Terme	and	Monfalcon,	Histoire	des	enfants	trouvés,	pp.	476,	478,	483,	485,	498.	152	Conseil	Général	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	Session	de	1852	(Nantes,	1852),	p.	222.	153	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	Session	d’aout	1881	(Nantes,	1881),	p.	392.	
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family	 breakdown	 at	 the	 bottom	 of	 the	 social	 pyramid	 was	 thus	 reduced	 to	 a	matter	of	moral	reform	that	aimed	to	re-establish	‘natural’	behaviour.			Liberals	very	ambiguously	asserted	that	one	of	the	central	aims	of	the	assistance	to	unwed	mothers	was	to	‘conserve	a	family’	for	the	child	or	‘to	attach	the	child	to	the	mother	by	 the	bonds	of	 family’,	 since	 ‘by	 creating	 a	 family	 for	him,	 one	 attaches	him	to	society	through	the	sweetest	of	all	ties’.154	Thus,	even	without	marrying	the	father,	 ‘through	 her	 recognition,	 the	 mother	 confers	 the	 child	 an	 état	 civil	 [the	socio-legal	proof	of	family	filiation	and	social	affiliation,	traditionally	reserved	for	legitimate	 children]	 which,	 albeit	 incomplete,	 is	 preferable	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 all	filiation,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 family,	 whose	 care,	 tenderness	 [and]	 solicitude,	 cannot	 be	replaced	 by	 the	 hospital	 guardianship’.155	‘Family’	 here	 would	 seem	 to	 imply	 a	reduction	 to	biological	 filiation	or	 its	 existence	 in	 the	absence	of	marriage	and	a	male	 chief,	 which	 stood	 in	 contradiction	 to	 contemporary	 morality.	 Catholics	would	not	have	been	alone	in	finding	the	mention	of	a	family	without	marriage	to	be	 an	 oxymoron.	 The	 rarely	 developed	 assumption	 here	 was	 that	 the	 woman’s	parents	 would	 receive	 her	 and	 her	 child.	 The	 child	 would	 thus	 ‘remain	 in	 the	family’,	 since	 ‘after	 their	 fault,	which	 is	 for	 them	a	harsh	 lesson,	 [single	mothers]	return	 to	 their	 families	 where	 their	 child	 is	 often	 surrounded	 by	 attention	 and	affection’.156	Liberals	 thus	 sought	 to	 see	 the	 standard	 of	 personal	 responsibility	extended	to	the	family.	‘The	honour	of	families	is	a	very	beautiful	thing;	but	above	all	 it	 should	 consist	 of	 keeping	 their	 filles’,	 or	 unmarried	 girls	 who	 became	
																																																								154	Conseil	Général	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1861	(Tulle,	1861),	p.	111;	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1851,	p.	253,	and,	1860	(Rennes,	1860),	p.	108.	155	Legoyt,	‘Assistance	des	enfants’,	p.	283.	156	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	283;	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	1852,	p.	210.	
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pregnant.157	‘It	is	important	that	that	false	sense	of	honour	be	destroyed,	and	that	dishonour	be	attached	to	abandonment	rather	than	to	raising	a	natural	child’.158	At	the	 heart	 of	 the	 policy	 shift	 was	 then	 the	 desire	 that	 the	 legal	 responsibility	families	 had	 for	 providing	 nourishment	 to	 their	members	would	 extend	 to	 their	reproductive	 liabilities	 as	well.	Thus,	 ideally,	 the	mother’s	parents	or	next	of	 kin	would	take	charge	of	her	and	her	child,	 if	 they	had	the	means.	 If	poor,	assistance	would	be	provided.	In	cases	of	‘absolute	isolation’,	single	mothers	would	be	denied	aid	 and	 encouraged	 to	 abandon.	 However,	 this	 reading	 of	 poor	 families	 proved	very	optimistic.	 It	was	 customary	 for	 families	 to	disown	 the	 fille-mère	 to	protect	their	 honour.	 Indeed,	 aid	 to	 unwed	mothers	 explicitly	 took	 into	 account	 	 ‘those	without	a	 family	or	domicile’.159	Therefore,	 in	many	cases	 these	 ‘families’	created	by	the	new	programme	consisted	only	of	the	mother	and	her	child(ren).	‘Personal	responsibility’	for	unwanted	pregnancies	fell	exclusively	upon	the	woman,	and	the	expenses	tended	to	fall	increasingly	on	the	public	purse.			In	 opposition	 to	 the	 legal-economic	 rationality	 of	 the	public	 sphere,	 liberals	 cast	the	 family	 in	 a	 naturalized	 biological	mould	 that	 became	 increasingly	 feminized.	Only	the	primitive	and	irrational	bonds	of	kinship,	comparable	perhaps	to	religious	fervour,	 could	 motivate	 the	 blind	 devotion	 and	 self-sacrifice	 needed	 to	 rear	 a	family.160	Family-style	 bonds	 and	 sentiments	 were	 thus	 incompatible	 with	 any	commercial	 or	 wage	 relationship,	 governed	 by	 the	 economic	 rationality	 of	 self-interest.	This	was	assumed	to	be	the	case	of	servants	in	general,	and	especially	of	the	wet-nurse	sur	place	in	a	bourgeois	home,	for	whom	money	overrode	the	drive																																																									157	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	295.	158	Congrès	scientifique	de	France,	Seconde	session,	p.	315.	159	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1843	(Tulle,	1843),	p.	28.	160	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	285.	
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of	biological	attachment.161	There	could	be	no	mercenary	parenting,	no	 ‘maternal	sentiment’	 for	hire.	This	essentialist	mothering	did	not	concern	the	quality	of	the	care,	but	a	mystical	attribute	of	vigilance	and	clairvoyance,	contained	in	‘maternal	sentiment’,	that	grasped	what	was	best	for	the	child,	even	in	extreme	poverty	or	if	sent	far	away	to	nurse	in	the	countryside.162		A	 curious	 and	 incontestable	 fact	 is	 that	 the	 surveillance	 exercised	 by	 the	government	 [through	 the	 inspection	 of	 assisted	 children]	 is,	 despite	 its	 zeal	 and	intelligence,	 very	 inferior	 to	 that	 which	 a	 poor	 single	 mother	 can	 provide;	 the	mother’s	 eye	 exercises	 its	 influence	 despite	 distance	 and	 the	most	 unfavourable	conditions.163		As	child	mortality	statistics	showed,	‘the	anxious	gaze	of	a	poor	fille-mère	is	more	efficient	 than	all	 this	 [official]	deployment	of	means’.164	Through	the	mother,	and	her	proverbial	visual	prowess,	the	private	sphere	amalgamated	the	domestic	and	the	‘natural’	to	create	a	unique	and	irreplaceable	space	of	primal	socialization	and	individuation.	The	continuity	of	the	family	name	and	position	signalled	one’s	fatal	place	in	society,	turning	the	social	hierarchy	into	a	private	and	biological	affaire.			The	absence	of	a	family	was	seen	as	a	dangerous	state	of	social	isolation,	creating	‘a	separate	category	of	individuals	who	are	the	pariah	of	society’.165	‘The	quality	of	recognized	 natural	 child	 is	 a	 lot	 better	 than	 isolation	 within	 society	 and	 the	
																																																								161 	‘As	 for	 the	 maternal	 attachment	 that	 accompanies	 breast-feeding,	 against	 what	 some	
philanthopes	 claim,	experience	unfortunately	shows	that	[for	wet-nurses]	 it	does	not	persist	 long,	and	 never	 survives	 absence.	 Its	 length	 most	 often	 is	 equal	 to	 the	 cause	 that	 provoked	 it	 [i.e.,	employment]	 and,	 when	 the	 cause	 is	 no	 more,	 the	 attachment	 disappears’.	 Amédée	 Achard,	 ‘La	nourrice	sur	place’,	in:	Léon	Curmer	(ed.),	Les	français	peints	par	eux-mêmes,	I	(Paris,	1840),	p.	300.	162	Cuvier,	‘Enfants	trouvés’,	p.	767.	163	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	287.	164	Ibid.,	p.	290.	165	Ibid.,	p.	285.	
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absence	of	a	family	name’.166	The	notion	of	‘isolation’,	and	equivalent	fin-de-siècle	terms	 such	 as	 ‘asocial’	 or	 ‘antisocial’,	 made	 no	 reference	 to	 actual	 sociability,	professional	 and	 social	 relationships	 and	 solidarities	 or	 community	 belonging.	Rather,	 it	 implied	a	state	of	perceived	disaffiliation	with	the	social	order	at	 large,	encompassing	drifting	characters	to	where	not	embedded,	attached	or	anchored	in	the	socio-economic	system,	through	family,	market,	labour	and	the	state.	It	was	the	rational,	 self-controlled	 individual’s	 ‘other’,	 living	 in	 a	 completely	 unrestrained	state.		 Emancipated	 by	 law	 and	 in	 fact,	 [once	 they	 are	 adults]	 foundlings	 are	 absolute	masters	of	their	actions.	No	control	is	imposed	on	them;	they	recognize	no	special	surveillance.	Without	family	bonds,	strangers	to	parental	authority,	they	are	in	the	condition	of	an	orphan.	This	near	complete	isolation,	this	emancipation	from	every	family	 responsibility	 has	 deplorable	 consequences.	 Poor,	 normally	 deprived	 of	education,	and	too	often	without	a	clear	profession,	foundlings	are	accessible	to	all	seductions;	many	give	in	to	these,	many	give	in	to	a	vagabondage	of	which	prisons	are	the	ordinary	endpoint.167			This	was	‘an	unrestrained	population’	that	had	to	be	fed	the	first	part	of	their	life	and	surveyed	thereafter.168	Catholics	participated	in	an	equivalent	anxiety.	Rather	than	the	breakdown	of	filiation,	they	decried	the	weakening	of	the	moral	authority	in	 the	 family.	 Nicolas,	 using	 de	 Gérando’s	 figures	 argued	 that	 ‘It	 is	 proven	 that	among	 criminals,	 there	 are	 considerably	 fewer	 foundlings	 than	 illegitimate	children.	 By	 turning	 foundlings	 into	 illegitimate	 children,	 what	 do	 you	 achieve?	You	 turn	 into	 crooks	 men	 who	 are	 honest	 and	 useful	 in	 their	 majority’.169	In	
																																																								166	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	Session	de	1869	(Rennes,	1869),	p.	301.	167	Terme	and	Monfalcon,	Histoire	des	enfants	trouvés,	p.	309.	168	Ibid.,	p.	479	169	Lallemand,	‘Rapport	sur	les	enfants	trouvés’,	p.	199.	
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writing	the	history	of	the	foundling	system	in	1904,	Charles	Porak	commented	that	‘Never,	 perhaps,	 has	 statistics	 been	 more	 intensively	 employed	 than	 in	 these	debates;	never,	perhaps,	has	it	led	to	more	contradictory	conclusions’.170		With	the	application	of	the	liberal	reforms	by	1840,	filiation	had	thus	become	the	linchpin	of	social	stability.	And	the	irreducible	nucleus	of	filiation,	 it	seemed,	was	the	mother-child	 bond.	 Through	 the	 application	 of	 the	 programme	 to	 aid	 single	mothers,	departmental	administrators	found	themselves	tasked	with	giving	such	a	bond	normative	contents.	Leaving	behind	the	intellectual	focus	of	the	tour	debate,	the	practical	question	now	arose	of	how	to	identify	and	enforce	adequate	‘maternal	sentiment’.	 It	was	 necessary	 to	 define	what	 these	 vague	 ‘natural’	 forces	 entailed	and	 if	 they	went	beyond	 their	mystical	 emotional-biological	 aspects	 to	 articulate	some	 form	 of	 maternal	 practice	 involving	 actual	 maternal	 care	 and	 desirable	mother-child	 relationships	 that	 could	 be	 objectively	 assessed	 and	 enforced.	 It	remained	to	be	seen	how	‘nature’	related	pragmatically	to	the	mother’s	morality,	and	what	relation	it	had	to	the	primary	moralizing	effect	of	the	programme.			
Administering	virtue.		At	 its	 height	 in	 the	 early	 1830s,	 there	 were	 some	 273	 hospices	 dépositaires	 to	receive	 abandoned	 children.	 Of	 these,	 250	 had	 a	 tour,	 although	 some	 were	monitored	 to	 prevent	 anonymous	 abandonment.	 Most	 of	 these	 were	 closed	between	1834	and	1844.	By	 the	 late	1840s,	 there	were	only	141	hospices,	76	of	them	 without	 a	 tour.	 Thus	 185	 tours	 had	 closed	 and	 of	 the	 65	 remaining	 in																																																									170	Charles	Porak,	 ‘Rapport	 [sur	 la	 loi	de	27	 juin	1904]’,	Bulletin	de	l’Académie	de	médicine,	68/LII	(1904),	p.	671.	
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operation,	only	25	were	not	policed	and	allowed	anonymous	abandonment.171	In	1858	 there	 remained	 but	 48	 increasingly	 surveyed	 tours,	 a	 figure	 that	 further	dropped	 to	 25	 in	 1860	 and	 5	 in	 1862.	 The	 last	 turning-cradle,	 in	Marseille,	was	closed	 between	 1866	 and	 1868.172	At	 that	 point,	 the	 tours	 remained	 a	 public	obligation	mandated	by	the	1811	decree.	They	were	only	banned	in	1869,	by	a	law	that	 recommended	 optional	 aid	 to	 unwed	 mothers	 and	 made	 the	 service	 of	assisted	 children	 a	 departmental	 domain	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 prefect.	 This	culminated	 the	 process	 started	 in	 the	 1830s	 of	 shifting	 control	 of	 the	 foundling	system	 from	 the	 unpaid	 local	 hospitals	 boards	 controlled	 by	 local	 notables	 to	inspectors	appointed	from	Paris.	These	inspectors	of	assisted	children	or	welfare	establishments	were	the	basis	of	the	newly	centralized	system.173		However,	 the	 dramatic	 decrease	 in	 tours	 and	 hospices	 was	 not	 mirrored	 in	 the	number	of	 abandonments,	which	only	declined	gradually.	 From	1838	 to	 the	mid	1850s,	 yearly	 admissions	 stabilized	 at	 25,000,	 despite	 a	 population	 increase	 of	over	 three	million	 or	 ten	 per	 cent	 in	 this	 period.	 The	 overall	 ‘stock’	 of	 children	under	public	guardianship	decreased	by	a	fourth	from	1833	to	1838	and	remained	at	 just	under	100,000	until	 the	1850s,	kept	 in	check	by	very	high	death	rates.	As	the	 general	 inspector	 for	 public	 assistance	Adolphe	de	Watteville	 remarked,	 this	meant	 that	 life	 expectancy	 for	 foundlings	 was	 just	 four	 years.174	Abandonment	would	plummet	in	the	following	decades.	In	1861,	the	figure	of	yearly	admissions																																																									171	While	 the	 rapid	 abolition	 of	 abandonment	 hospices	 and	 tours	 is	 indisputable,	 there	 is	 little	agreement	 as	 to	 the	 actual	 numbers.	 For	 the	 1830s	 and	 1840s	 I	 have	 relied	 on	 Adolphe	 de	Watteville,	 Statistique	 des	 établissements	 et	 services	 de	 bienfaisance	 (Paris,	 1849),	 pp.	 13-16.	 See	also:	 Jeorger,	 ‘Évolution	 des	 courbes	 de	 l'abandon’,	 pp.	 721-722;	 Bernard-Benoît	 Remacle,	 Des	
hospices	d'enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1838),	p.	217.	172	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	pp.	272,	274;	Porak,	‘Rapport’,	p.	667;	Rollet,		Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	64.	173	Virginie	De	Luca,	Aux	origines	de	l’État-providence	(Paris	2002).	174	De	Watteville,	Statistique,	p.	27.	
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was	half	what	it	had	been	30	years	before.	In	1881,	it	would	reach	its	lowest	point	at	 10	 thousand	 per	 year,	 before	 starting	 to	 increase	 again	 over	 the	 following	decades.175	In	1849,	8,072	filles-mères	were	receiving	aid,	while	this	rose	to	19,660	by	 1860. 176 	But	 this	 important	 increment	 did	 not	 make	 up	 for	 the	 fall	 in	abandonments.		If	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 system	 was	 able	 to	 successfully	 curb	 the	 progression	 of	admissions,	 its	 main	 impact	 was	 on	 the	 form	 of	 child	 abandonment.	 The	 1811	decree	 established	 three	 categories	 of	 children	 at	 the	 charge	 of	 the	 state:	foundlings	 (enfants	 trouvés)	 were	 those	 of	 unknown	 parents;	 the	 enfants	
abandonnés	were	born	to	known	parents	who	had	disappeared;	and	poor	orphans	were	 those	 without	 relatives.	 Local	 and	 governmental	 practices	 tended	 to	confound	these	categories;	 indeed,	until	1854,	statistics	 included	all	 three	classes	only	as	an	aggregate	under	 the	generic	 term	enfants	trouvés.	After	 the	closure	of	the	 tours,	 the	 number	 of	 enfants	 trouvés	 proper	 dropped	 quickly	 reaching	negligible	figures	by	1870,	while	the	abandonnés	rose	sharply.	The	importance	of	this	 fact	 is	 that,	while	 the	 former	 category	 placed	 abandonment	 in	 the	 hands	 of	parents	and	local	hospices,	 the	 latter,	 like	assistance	to	unwed	mothers,	required	prefectural	 approval.	 Under	 the	 new	 system	 of	 admission	 réglementée	 a	 woman	seeking	 to	 abandon	went	 through	 a	 thorough	 application	 procedure	 involving	 a	series	 of	meticulous	 inquiries	 and	 counter-inquiries	 into	 her	 circumstances.	 The	process	 took	months	 and	eleven	per	 cent	of	 children	died	before	 a	decision	was	pronounced.177	These	meticulous	 inquiries	would	rapidly	become	the	norm	 in	all																																																									175	Jeorger,	‘Évolution	des	courbes	de	l'abandon’,	pp.	703-740.	176	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	64.	177	Delore,	‘Verité	sur	les	tours’,	p.	293.	
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welfare	services	in	France.	While	they	did	occasionally	make	use	of	philanthropic-style	home	visits,	the	investigation	usually	fell	to	the	local	police.	Standard	policing	techniques	thus	became	central	to	the	intelligibility	of	the	reality	of	 local	poverty	and	the	day-to-day	functioning	of	welfare	services.	It	was	thus	possible	to	impede	all	married	 and	non-indigent	 single	women	 from	 relying	on	 the	hospital-hospice	system.	Not	only	were	they	excluded	from	permanent	abandonment,	but	also	from	the	longstanding	tradition	of	having	children	admitted	temporarily	into	a	hospice	in	times	of	family	hardship.178	Now	the	final	decision	on	a	family’s	disaggregation	was	in	the	hands	of	the	prefect.	The	central	administration	thus	gained	the	means	to	enforce	a	family	policy	set	from	Paris.			While	the	law	established	a	strong	preference	for	assistance	in	kind	since	at	least	1796,	 unwed	mothers,	 and	 later	 other	 poor	mothers,	 were	 the	 first	 category	 of	assisted	persons	 to	 receive	 aid	 in	 cash	until	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 This	was	 the	case,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 was	 a	 consensus,	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Third	Republic,	on	the	fact	that	the	poor	could	not	be	trusted	with	money.	Their	poverty	testified	to	their	lack	of	responsibility,	which	tied	to	some	degree	of	irrationality	or	immorality,	meant	that	pecuniary	aid	could	cause	more	harm	than	good.179	While	poor	unwed	mothers	would	have	been	especially	targeted	by	these	prejudices,	the	
																																																								178 	With	 the	 exception	 of	 those	 whose	 parents	 were	 hospitalized	 for	 medical	 reasons	 or	imprissoned.			179	The	opinions	expressed	on	 the	subject	 in	1839	by	 the	baron	de	Gérando	remained	unchanged	until	the	twentieth	century:	De	la	bienfaisance	publique,	4	(Paris,	1839),	pp.	231-232.	While	the	new	social	programmes	in	the	early	twentieth	century	used	monetary	aid,	the	reserves	regarding	its	use	did	not	seem	to	change.	There	was	an	inconclusive	debate	on	the	subject	in	the	1900s	in	La	revue	
philanthopique:	 Bienvenu	Martin,	 ‘L’assistance	des	 vieillards	 et	 des	 infirmes’,	 VIII	 (1901),	 p.	 289;	and	the	‘Bulletin	de	la	Société	internationale	pour	l’étude	des	questions	d’assistance’,	sessions	of	24	January	1906,	XVIII	(1906),	pp.	481-485,	and	of	24	March	1909,	XXIV	(1909),	pp.	746-755.	Viviana	Zelizer,	The	Social	Meaning	of	Money	(New	York,	1994),	chapter	4,	studied	the	turn-of-the-century	shift	 towards	monetary	aid	 in	 social	 assistance	 the	United	States,	which	 served	 to	 tutor	 the	poor	into	acceptable	forms	of	economic	rationality.	This	was	not	the	case	in	France	at	the	time.	
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programmes	 to	 assist	 them	were	 not	modelled	 on	 indoor	 or	 outdoor	 relief,	 but	were	a	simple	extension	of	the	policies	in	place	for	foundlings.			Babies	abandoned	in	hospices	were	farmed	out	quickly	to	the	countryside	to	one	family	who	would	nurse	and	raise	them	to	the	age	of	twelve.180	In	1859	there	were	75,620	 such	 children.181	The	 administration	 paid	 as	 little	 as	 possible	 for	 these	services,	attracting	only	the	poorest	 families	and	often	unhealthy	wet-nurses	and	carers	 from	 remote	 rural	 areas.182	The	 national	 average	 paid	 for	 the	 complete	upbringing	 of	 a	 foundling	was	 923	 francs	 in	 1860,	 or	 6.41	 francs	 per	month.183	Payment	was	higher	for	the	first	years	and	decreased	as	the	child	grew,	under	the	assumption	 that	 their	 labour	would	 increasingly	 cover	 their	 expenses.	 The	 logic	behind	 these	 fees	 was	 never	 entirely	 clear,	 since	 the	 sum	 paid	 was	 meant,	problematically,	 both	 as	 retribution	 to	 the	 guardians	 for	 their	 work	 and	maintenance	 allowance	 for	 the	 child.	 The	 administration	 also	 provided	 their	clothes;	 these	 coarse	 uniforms	 made	 them	 instantly	 recognisable	 as	 foundlings,	while	the	identification	tags,	initially	attached	through	one	then	two	earrings	that	
																																																								180 	The	 word	 nourrice	 made	 reference	 to	 paid	 or	 ‘mercenary’	 childrearing	 in	 general.	 Thus	guardians	raising	foundlings	until	the	age	of	twelve	were	called,	nourrice,	famille	nourricière,	mère	
nourricière,	etc.	It	can	be	translated	as	wet-nurse,	but	does	not	exclusively	 imply	breastfeeding.	 It	also	applied	to	child-minders	and	nannies,	which	together	with	those	who	bottle-fed	babies	for	pay,	could	 also	 be	 called	 a	 nourrice	 sèche.	 Sources	 are	 usually	 not	 very	 precise.	 Bottle-feeding	dramatically	increased	infant	mortality	compared	to	breastfeeding	until	the	mid-twentieth	century,	despite	becoming	safer	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	and	was	widespread	in	some	regions	such	 as	 Brittany.	 The	 administration	 preferred	 wet-nurses,	 but	 often	 made	 recourse	 to	 bottle-feeders.	181	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	63.	182	In	 the	 1830s,	 as	many	 as	 three	 fourths	 of	wet-nurses	 hired	 by	 the	 Parisian	 Public	 Assistance	were	 considered	 unfit	 for	 the	 job,	 but	 were	 accepted	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 alternatives.	 Fuchs,	
Abandonded	Children,	p.	168.	Similarly,	even	though	the	Parisian	administration	preferred	married	wet-nurses,	they	did	accept	unwed	ones.	See	the	cases	of	the	filles	Rosin,	Houée,	and	Bongualt,	in:	A[rchives]	M[unicipales	de]	R[ennes].	5Q20.	183	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	66.	
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would	 commonly	 tear,	 leaving	 visible	 scars	 for	 life	 that	 ‘indicated	 the	 origin	 of	these	children	and	could	harm	their	future’.184			Since	 Paris	 produced	 a	 third	 of	 the	 national	 foundlings	 that	 had	 to	 be	 sent	 to	increasingly	 distant	 departments,	 the	 Seine	 had	 to	 pay	 higher	 fees	 to	 attract	guardians.	Those	caring	for	very	young	Parisian	foundlings	earned	12	francs	in	the	1860s,	 18	 in	 1876,	 and	28	 in	 1902.185	In	 the	 Ille-et-Vilaine,	wet-nurses	 earned	7	francs	 per	 month,	 which	 had	 to	 be	 increased,	 much	 to	 the	 irritation	 of	 the	Department,	 to	 10	 francs	 in	 1862	 because	 the	 ‘invasion’	 of	 1,200	 Parisian	foundlings	had	made	it	impossible	to	find	guardians.	In	the	Corrèze,	the	equivalent	payment	 was	 4	 francs,	 raised	 to	 6	 in	 1843	 and	 to	 7	 in	 1862.	 For	 comparison,	privately-hired	wet-nurses	 in	 the	countryside	earned	20	 to	25	 francs	per	month.	Wet-nursing	costs	depended	on	location.	In	a	typical	fashion,	in	the	Haute-Vienne,	monthly	fees	au	sein	within	the	city	of	Limoges	averaged	25	to	30	francs,	down	to	20	to	25	in	the	bordering	communes,	and	15	to	20	in	the	more	distant	rural	areas.	For	older	children,	a	guardian	in	Limoges	cost	15	francs.186			As	 in	 many	 departments,	 the	 Loire-Atlantique	 established	 that	 unwed	 mothers	could	not	 claim	more	 than	 the	 ‘allowance	allocated	 to	wet-nurses	 for	 children	of	the	same	age’.187	This	enabled	them	either	to	send	away	their	children	or	provide	these	services	themselves.	In	fact,	in	the	first	decades	of	the	programme,	both	were	
																																																								184	In	 the	1850s	 these	were	substituted	 for	 lead	pendants,	with	 their	register	number,	on	a	collar	that	 could	 not	 be	 removed.	 These	 had	 to	 be	worn	 until	 about	 the	 age	 of	 6	 to	 prevent	 fradulent	substitutions	of	children.		185	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	185.		186	A[rchives]	M[unicipales	de]	L[imoges].	5Q198.	Wet-nurse	register	for	1890.	187	A[rchives]	 M[unicipales	 de]	 N[antes].	 Q5C15D2.	 Prefect’s	 letter	 of	 11	 June	 1847.	 This	 was	 7	francs	per	month	for	two	years,	lowered	to	3	francs	in	the	third	year.	
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entirely	 interchangeable.	 There	 seemed	 to	 be	 no	 specific	 criteria	 for	 mothering	that	distinguished	it	from	the	work	of	a	paid	wet-nurse.	And	assisted	mothers	were	banned	from	working	as	wet-nurses	themselves.188	Thus	the	‘maternal	sentiment’	that	the	programme	sought	to	 instil	would	develop	 just	the	same	whether	or	not	the	mother	and	child	cohabitated.			In	the	early	years,	the	overriding	concern	was	to	make	the	mother	keep	the	child	at	any	cost.	In	order	to	justify	closing	the	last	remaining	tour	 in	the	department,	the	prefect	of	the	Corrèze	argued	that	not	all	women	would	accept	aid.		There	will	always	be	a	certain	number	of	filles-mères	whose	coldness	of	heart	and	the	desire	to	regain	their	liberty	will	lead	them	to	rid	themselves	of	their	children,	so	long	as	there	is	a	tour	where	they	can	leave	them.	The	departmental	succours,	even	 if	 granted	 liberally,	will	 ever	 convince	 these	 girls	 to	 carry	 out	 the	duties	 of	nature.	They	only	 think	of	 themselves.[…]	 [T]hey	never	hesitate	 to	 sacrifice	 their	children	to	their	personal	conveniences.	For	abandonments	with	this	cause,	I	know	no	other	remedy	than	to	supress	the	tours.189	The	aim	was	for	the	mother	to	learn	personal	responsibility	and	the	police	tracked	down	any	unapproved	abandonment.190	Since	 it	was	 considered	 improbable	 that	legitimate	 families	 ‘had	 the	 criminal	 idea	 of	 abandoning’	 their	 children,	 the	 key	suspects	 were	 illegitimate	 mothers	 and	 particularly	 those	 whose	 benefits	 had	expired.191	In	 Paris,	 8.1	 per	 cent	 abandoned	 at	 the	 end	 of	 their	 twelve-month	succour	 from	 1863	 to	 1867,	 and	 only	 6	 per	 cent	 from	 1870	 to	 1873.192	Often,	
																																																								188	AMR.	5Q20.	Prefect’s	letter	of	17	September	1883.		189	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	1843,	pp.	27-28.	190	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1839	(Tulle,	1839),	p.	24-25.	191	AMN.	Q5C15D2.	Letter	dated	1	November	1849	about	a	child	names	Jules-Marie.		192	Fuchs,	Abandonded	Children,	pp.	72-74;	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	69.	
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children	were	left	with	a	rural	wet-nurse	while	the	mother	disappeared.193	In	one	such	 case	 in	 Nantes,	 the	 police	were	 asked	 to	 investigate	 a	mother	who	 said	 to	have	left	for	the	colonies.194	But	in	any	case,	the	state	became	increasingly	effective	in	impeding	unauthorized	abandonment.			But	 perhaps	 the	 most	 important	 way	 of	 preventing	 abandonment	 was	 by	regulating	 the	 midwifery	 sector,	 by	 substituting	 the	 age-old	 rural	 matronnes,	known	for	their	knowledge	of	abortive	practices	and	for	being	intermediaries	for	child	 abandonments,	 for	 publicly	 educated	 and	 certified	 sages-femmes.195 	The	quality	of	 the	 instruction	was	 less	 important	 than	 ‘pursuing	 the	ends	of	 the	new	policy’.	‘The	aim	of	the	department	is	less	give	students	a	remarkable	training	than	midwives	 who	 can	 meet	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 countryside’.	196	At	 the	 same	 time	 the	policy	 tackled	 urban	midwifery;	 the	midwife	 training	 schools	 served	 as	 birthing	hospitals	for	those	so	poor	that	they	did	not	have	another	option.	Designed	to	cater	to	 unwed	 mothers,	 these	 hospitals	 had	 extraordinary	 mortality	 rates.	 The	maternity	ward	 for	 filles-mères	 in	 Lyon	 serviced	more	 than	 twice	 the	 amount	 of	patients	and	had	almost	four	times	the	mortality	rate	as	the	maternity	ward	in	the	Hôtel-Dieu	 devoted	 to	 married	 women.197 	But	 they	 were	 very	 successful	 in	preventing	 abandonment.	 ‘Most	 pregnant	 girls	 enter	 the	 establishment	with	 the	intention	 of	 abandoning	 their	 children.	 Almost	 all,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 yield	 to	 the	advice	 that	 the	members	of	 the	Commission	have	given	them,	and	have	made	up	
																																																								193	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	pp.	68-69.	194	AMN.	Q5C15D2.	Letter	dated	16	July	1849	on	Marie-Louise	Fauchoux.	195	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	1843,	p.	28;	Annick	Tillier,	Marie	Vaillant:	Histoire	tragique	d’une	infanticide	en	
Bretagne	(Paris,	2011),	chapter	4.	196	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	1839,	p.	40.	197	E.	Fayard,	Modifications	apportées	par	la	loi	du	5	mai	1869	dans	le	Service	des	enfants	assistés	du	
Département	du	Rhone	(Paris-Lyon,	1871),	pp.	10-11.	
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their	 minds	 to	 fulfil	 the	 duties	 of	 nature	 and	 maternity’.198	Their	 stay	 at	 the	maternity	ward	also	helped	identify	the	women	in	case	they	did	later	abandon,	as	was	 the	 case	 in	 the	 Ille-et-Vilaine	 for	 one	 fille	 who	 was	 rapidly	 identified	 and	prosecuted	 for	 committing	 ‘une	 action	 si	 criminelle’.199	But	 the	 prevention	 of	abandonment	was	not	necessarily	achieved	through	force.	De	Gérando	spoke	with	admiration	of	a	new	technology	of	maternal	attachment	he	saw	being	deployed	in	Seine-Maritime	and	Pas-de-Calais.		Several	 hospital	 administrations	 in	 France	 have	 successfully	 tested	 obligating	women	who	 come	 to	 give	 birth	 in	 their	 establishments	 to	 breastfeed	 their	 own	children	 during	 the	 first	 few	 days.	 After	 this	 trial,	 the	mothers	 have	 themselves	asked	to	keep	their	children,	which	at	first	they	had	wanted	to	separate	themselves	from	and	deposit	at	the	hospice.200	In	 short,	 either	 out	 of	 constraint	 or	 attachment,	maternity	 became	 obligatory	 in	France.			Parenthood	 as	 a	 duty	 was	 the	 reverse	 side	 of	 the	 sacred	 rights	 with	 which	 the	private	sphere	was	invested.	Thus	while	Catholics	insisted	that	bad	parents	should	be	 deprived	 of	 their	 children,	 liberals	 denounced	 this	 as	 socialism.	 In	 the	parliamentary	 commission	 on	 foundlings	 that	 convened	 in	 1849,	 Nicolas,	representing	 the	common	Catholic	view,	asked	whether	a	prostitute	should	have	custody	 reinstated	 for	 a	 child	 she	 had	 abandoned	 and	 then	 reclaimed.	 Victor	Lefranc,	 a	 moderate	 republican	 representative	 during	 the	 Second	 Republic	 who	would	 be	 part	 of	 the	 first	 cabinets	 of	 the	 1870s	 and	 interior	 minister	 in	 1872,	replied	 that	nobody	would	have	 the	 right	 to	 refuse	her	her	 child,	 any	more	 than																																																									198	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1840	(Tulle,	1840),	pp.	28,	67.	199	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1851,	p.	260.	200	De	Gérando,	Bienfaisance	publique,	2,	p.	11.	
	 265	
criminals	could	be	deprived	of	their	offspring.	As	Nicolas	insisted	on	the	right	and	duty	society	had	to	step	in	for	the	family	in	such	cases,	Lefranc	argued	that	it	was	very	dangerous	for	the	state	to	have	the	right	to	confiscate	children,	for	the	rights	of	the	family	had	to	be	respected.201			
Moralizing	motherhood.		Not	 all	 departments	 offered	 assistance	 to	 single	 mothers	 once	 the	 tours	 were	closed,	which	meant	these	had	access	to	no	form	of	help,	since	‘legitimate	children	have	 the	 exclusive	 support	 of	 the	 Maternal	 Charity	 Societies,	 crèches,	 nursery	schools,	 and	 beneficence	 bureaus,	 private	 charity	 not	 having	 yet	 here	 adopted	natural	children	nor	having	them	participate	of	their	alms’.202	However,	assistance	to	filles-mères	gradually	became	commonplace	in	the	1850s	and	1860s.	There	was	an	 enormous	 geographic	 variation	 in	 policy.	 While	 the	 services	 of	 a	 rural	 wet-nurse	 averaged	 25	 francs	 per	 month,	 in	 the	 1860s	 the	 filles-mères	 received	 an	average	national	allowance	of	between	3	and	15	francs	per	month	during	the	first	year	and	from	2	to	10	francs	per	month	in	the	third	year,	which	was	the	average	length	of	the	benefits.	203	Whereas	these	quantities	were	very	low,	they	had	a	huge	impact	 on	 the	 finances	 of	 the	 recipients,	 who	were	 indigent.	 In	 Nantes	 in	 1850,	claimants	reported	incomes	of	15	to	60	centimes	per	day,	or	about	4	to	18	francs	per	month	or	50	to	200	francs	per	year.204	While	the	invention	of	the	‘poverty	line’	is	 usually	 attributed	 to	 the	 work	 of	 British	 social	 reformers	 Charles	 Booth	 and																																																									201	Commission	des	enfants	trouvés,	Travaux,	1,	p.	366.	202	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1851,	p.	227.	203	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	pp.	67-68.	204	See	 the	dozen	claim	 forms	dating	September	 to	December	1850	 in	AMN	Q5C15D2.	These	give	daily	or	yearly	figures.	It	is	problematic	to	extrapolate	yearly	or	monthly	income	from	daily	income	and	 vice	 versa,	 since	most	workers	 cannot	 be	 assumed	 to	 have	 been	 in	 continuous	 employment	throughout	the	year.		
	 266	
Joseph	Rowntree	 from	the	1880s	onwards,	Alan	Gillie	argues	 that	English	school	boards	had	already	applied	an	equivalent	notion	 in	 the	early	1870s.205	In	France,	effective	 poverty	 thresholds	 had	 been	 developed	 in	 official	 industrial	 studies	 in	1848.	 Thus	 the	 ‘Enquête	 du	 25	 mai	 1848	 sur	 le	 travail	 industriel	 et	 agricole,	cantons	 de	 Saint-Genest-Malifaux	 et	 Bourg-Argental’	 found	 that	 a	 family	 of	 four	required	a	minimum	of	500	francs	per	year.206	The	parliamentary	commission	that	in	1849	and	1850	studied	the	issue	of	foundlings	and	assisted	children	was	more	precise.	In	his	report,	Adolphe	Thiers	informed	the	commission	that	a	poor	family	required	 124.25	 francs	 per	 person	 per	 year,	 or	 34	 centimes	 daily	 per	 capita.207	These	 calculations	 seem	 to	 have	 had	 an	 impact	 on	 local	 policy.	 Thus,	 single	mothers	living	in	Rennes	and	earning	20	francs	in	monthly	wages	were	considered	above	the	poverty	line,	able	to	support	themselves	and	their	child	without	help.208			With	 these	 paltry	 amounts,	 most	 lived	 in	 extreme	 poverty	 and	 either	 left	 their	children	 alone	 all	 day	 or	 had	 to	 pay	 6	 or	 10	 francs	 per	month	 to	 someone	 even	poorer	to	mind	the	child.	In	1864,	the	foundling	inspector	of	the	Loire-Atlantique	commented	that	the	children	of	filles-mères	were	generally	well,	in	particular	those	raised	by	their	mothers	or	by	rural	wet-nurses.	‘The	least	favoured	are	those	left	to	urban	women’	who	were	 ‘atrociously	destitute	 and	 in	 the	 impossibility	of	 giving	the	children	all	the	cares	they	would	need’.	Given	the	poverty	of	the	involved,	‘you	will	understand	to	which	rank	of	society	one	if	forced	to	go	to	seek	these	supposed	wet-nurses’.	 The	 inspector	 asserted	 that	 there	 was	 no	 remedy.	 ‘One	 cannot																																																									205	Alan	Gillie,	‘The	origin	of	the	poverty	line’,	Economic	History	Review,	49/4	(1996),	pp.	715-730.	206 	Quoted	 in:	 James	 Lehning,	 ‘Family	 life	 and	 wetnursing	 in	 a	 French	 village’,	 Journal	 of	
Interdisciplinary	History,	12/4	(1982),	p.	650.	207	Quoted	 in:	 Paul	 Dartiguenave,	 ‘Les	 enfants	 trouvés,	 une	 histoire	 immorale?:	 L’example	 du	Calvados’,	Cahier	des	annales	de	Normandie,	13	(1981),	pp.	124-125.	208	AMR.	5Q20.Letter	of	7	March	1883.		
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demand	 a	 poor	 girl,	 who	 already	 deducts	 from	 her	 extremely	 low	 wages	 the	complement	for	her	child’s	boarding,	to	send	her	child	to	an	affluent	nourrice’.	But	he	 tried	 to	 elicit	 sympathy	 for	 himself,	 given	 the	 ‘moral	 calamities	 to	which	 are	exposed	the	eyes	of	the	Inspector	charged	with	watching	over	the	poor	creatures	whom	 the	 departmental	 administration	 takes	 under	 its	 protection’.	 Indeed,	 he	argued	that	this	part	of	his	work	‘is	the	hardest’.209	Morally,	my	 task	 is	 also	 arduous,	 because	 I	must	 penetrate	 hovels	 of	 a	 repulsive	aspect	 and	 often	 fight	 against	 vice	 and	 the	most	 deplorable	 instincts;	 because	 it	would	 be	 a	 deceiving	 utopia	 to	 think	 that	 the	 succours	 granted	 operate	 a	miraculous	metamorphosis	over	all	those	who	receive	it.210			In	its	implementation,	the	repressive	new	system	was	able	to	reduce	abandonment	to	negligible	figures	while	offering	relief	to	a	small	but	stable	portion	of	the	former	clients	of	 the	tours.	This	 led	to	 immense	savings,	since,	as	one	1860	report	made	plain,	 to	 help	 a	 fille-mère	 cost	 six	 times	 less	 than	 to	 provide	 for	 a	 foundling	 or	assisted	 child	 for	 twelve	 years.211	But	 few	 unwed	 mother	 received	 help.	 In	 this	respect,	 the	 department	 of	 Ille-et-Vilaine	was	 representative.	 Under	 a	 system	 of	free	 abandonment	 between	 1801	 and	 1846,	 19	 per	 cent	 of	 illegitimate	 children	were	 recognized	 by	 a	 parent	 in	 the	 Breton	 department	 and	 the	 rest,	 a	 yearly	average	of	433,	were	abandoned	in	the	tour.	The	new	policy	impeded	virtually	all	abandonments	while	aiding	only	about	100	of	the	single	mothers.212	The	same	was	the	 case	 in	 other	 departments	 and	 nationally.	 Thus,	 under	 the	 new	 policy	 in	France,	 only	 about	 a	 quarter	 of	 poor	 unwed	 mothers	 met	 the	 behavioural	 and																																																									209	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	Session	de	1864	(Nantes,	1864),	pp.	57-58.	210	Ibid.	211	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	70.	212	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1848,	pp.	17,	129-132.	Abandonments	averaged	20	per	year	 from	the	 late	1840s	to	1870.	
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financial	requirements	 to	qualify	 for	assistance.213	While	 there	 is	no	 indication	 in	the	 administrative	 sources	 to	 explain	 this	 quantitative	 tendency,	 it	 was	 likely	derived	 from	 the	 classification	 of	 illegitimate	 mothers	 offered	 in	 1839	 by	 de	Gérando,	whereby	From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	morals	 (mœurs),	 women	 [who	 have	 conceived	 out	 of	wedlock]	 can	 be	 classified	 as	 follows:	 a	 fourth	 have	 been	 seduced	 by	 marriage	promises,	etc.,	and	can	be	brought	back	to	the	good	path;	a	fourth	already	disposed	to	 surrender	 to	 debauchery,	 but	 that	 one	 could	 perhaps	 bring	 back	 also;	 half	composed	of	more	or	less	perverted	women,	but	towards	which	all	attempts	would	be	futile.214	In	line	with	the	moralizing	aims	of	assistance	to	single	mothers,	the	administration	would	thus	have	focused	only	on	the	portion	of	them	believed	to	be	susceptible	to	reform.	However,	despite	this	prudence,	a	large	enough	number	of	those	assisted	was	later	found	to	be	unsuitable	so	as	to	lead	the	prefect	of	the	Loire-Atlantique	in	1851	 to	 qualify	 the	 programme	 as	 a	 failure.	 The	 assistance	 was	 not	 aimed	primarily	 at	 their	 indigence,	 but	 rather	 sought	 moral	 rehabilitation	 through	maternity	and	‘an	existence	that	is	henceforth	honest	and	exclusively	consecrated	to	 the	upbringing	(éducation)	and	 the	needs	of	 their	child’.	Unfortunately,	not	all	had	 realized	 ‘the	 hopes	 of	 the	 administration’.	 Some	 had	 further	 illegitimate	children,	meaning	that	 their	conduct	was	 ‘a	perpetual	disorder’;	others	 lived	 in	a	
																																																								213	In	Haute-Alpes,	the	108	foundling	admissions	of	1840	were	reduced	to	five	in	1843	and	one	the	following	year.	28	single	mothers	received	assistance.	T.	Curel,	Parti	à	prendre	sur	la	question	des	
enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1845),	p.	129.	In	the	Corrèze,	following	strong	fluctuations	in	the	late	1830s	and	1840s,	some	200	women	on	average	were	aided	in	the	1850s,	while	the	number	of	foundlings	had	 averaged	 one	 thousand	 in	 the	 late	 1820s	 and	 early	 1830s.	 Elisabeth	 Barge-Meschenmoser,	
L'administration	préfectorale	en	Corrèze,	1800-1848	 (Limoges,	 2000),	 p.	 253	 and	 see	 the	 relevant	departmental	proceedings	for	the	1850s.	Nationwide,	8,072	filles-mères	were	receiving	aid	in	1849,	which	was	 about	 a	 fourth	 of	 the	 number	 of	 abandonments	 at	 its	 height	 15	 years	 earlier.	 Rollet,	
Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	64.	214	De	Gérando,	Bienfaisance	publique,	1,	p.	353.	
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state	 of	 concubinage.215	This	 further	 increased	 the	 downward	 trend	 in	 assisted	mothers,	which	had	fallen	every	year	in	the	department	from	284	in	1848	to	134	in	1851.216	Meanwhile,	the	inspector,	who	had	ended	the	last	two	fiscal	years	with	a	surplus	 in	 the	 assisted	 children	 budget	 totalling	 a	 saving	 of	 over	 four	 thousand	francs	in	1851,	received	a	bonus.217	These	concerns	over	abuses	and	raising	costs	became	 common	 in	 the	 1840s	 and	 1850s,	 leading	 to	 an	 increasingly	 repressive	system.	While	the	administration	succeeded	in	significantly	limiting	abandonment,	the	predominantly	moral	aims	of	the	policies	involved	were	unsuccessful.		And	 yet,	 the	 programme	 succeeded	 in	 a	 way	 few	 cared	 to	 notice.	 Nineteenth-century	assistance	was	a	fundamentally	urban	phenomenon.	Rural	assistance	only	became	 a	 matter	 of	 discussion	 in	 the	 late	 1880s.218 	And	 yet,	 the	 masses	 of	foundlings	pouring	out	from	cities	into	the	countryside	tended	to	be	concentrated	in	very	specific	rural	regions.	The	Yonne	was	part	of	the	large	area	that,	in	addition	to	its	own	abandoned	children,	received	foundlings	from	the	three	departments	in	the	Paris	region.	Anne	Cadoret	has	estimated	that	in	1861	the	number	of	assisted	children	represented	up	to	62	per	cent	of	the	local	youth	in	some	villages.219	This	meant	 that	 the	 most	 utopian	 experiment	 of	 governmental	 guardianship	 was	carried	 out	 in	 these	 villages	 where	 virtually	 all	 households	 depended	 on	administrative	intervention.	The	nature	of	this	administrative	intervention	tended	
																																																								215	AMN.	Q5C15D3.	 ‘Supression	des	secours	aux	 filles-mères’.	Letter	of	5	February	1851	 from	the	prefect	to	the	mayor	of	Nantes.		216	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	1852,	p.	69.	217	Ibid.,	pp.	71-72	218 	Georges	 Picot,	 Rapport	 sur	 l’assistance	 publique	 dans	 les	 campagnes	 (Paris,	 1888);	 Émile	Chevallier,	De	 l'assistance	 dans	 les	 campagnes:	 indigence,	 prévoyance,	 assistance	 (Paris,	 1889);	 G.	Saunois	 de	 Chevert,	 L'indigence	 et	 l'assistance	 dans	 les	 campagnes	 depuis	 1789	 jusqu'à	 nos	 jours	(Paris,	1889).	219	Quoted	in:	Marie-Laure	Las	Vergnas,	Histoire	de	l’Agence	d’Avallon	des	enfants	assistés	de	la	Seine	(Paris,	2012),	p.	55.	
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to	focus	on	very	basic	domestic	issues,	the	most	important	of	which	were	the	use	of	 fireguards	 and	 individual	 beds.	 In	 the	 Loire-Atlantique,	 the	 inspector	complained	of	rural	houses	being	too	small	and	the	‘lack	of	concern	of	country	folk	for	 the	 moral	 and	 physical	 dangers	 of	 beds	 shared	 by	 several	 individuals	 of	different	sexes	and	ages’.	Demanding	individual	beds,	as	the	regulation	did,	proved	troublesome,	since	‘wet-nurses	often	prefer	to	give	up	the	foundlings,	rather	than	do	 something	 for	 them	 that	 they	 do	 not	 do	 for	 their	 own	 children’.	 But	 beyond	these	 small	 but	 crucially	 individualizing	 domestic	 improvements,	 the	administration	was	promoting	a	small	family	model.	Foundlings	were	to	be	placed	in	households	with	no	more	than	three	or	four	children,	but	the	ideal	was	‘placing	an	orphan	 in	 a	house	where	 there	 are	no	other	 children’.	 This	 allowed	 for	more	intensive	 and	 emotional	 parenting,	 ‘not	 only	 avoids	 the	 inconveniences	 of	agglomerations,	 but	 also	 finds	 guardians	who	get	 attached	 to	him,	 often	keeping	him	beyond	the	period	of	payment,	and	occasionally	adopting	or	endowing	him’.220	Equally,	the	administration	promoted	a	certain	vision	of	intensive	mothering.	For	example,	foster	parents	were	not	to	be	old,	for	it	was	argued	that	‘raising	a	child	is	a	 lot	more	 difficult	 than	 one	 generally	 thinks’.	 Old	women	 not	 only	 had	 archaic	prejudices	 but	 ‘they	 do	 not	 have	 the	 health	 or	 force	 necessary	 to	 provide	 their	foundlings	with	the	thousand	cares	that	they	demand’.221	While	the	state	did	very	little	 for	 the	 health,	 education	 and	 social	 opportunities	 of	 the	 children	 under	 its	direct	care	until	 the	Third	Republic,	and	even	then	groomed	them	to	 fill	only	the	lowest	 ranks	 of	 society,	 the	main	 concern	 behind	 policies	 on	 abandonment	 and	child	welfare	seemed	to	have	been	the	promotion	of	the	modern	domestic	ideal.																																																										220	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	1864,	p.	55.	221	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	Session	d’aout	1883	(Nantes,	1883),	p.	519.	
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In	the	Corrèze,	the	last	remaining	tour,	in	Tulle,	was	finally	closed	in	1857.	Despite	having	been	heavily	policed	since	1839,	 its	closure	 led	to	a	three-fold	 increase	 in	assisted	 unmarried	 mothers.	 The	 prefect,	 suspecting	 abuses	 and	 ‘struck	 by	 the	number	of	succoured	children’	that	could	not	be	explained	by	the	extension	of	aid	from	15	months	 to	 three	 years,	 ordered	 an	 investigation	 into	 admissions.	Of	 the	233	applications	of	the	last	year,	only	42	were	turned	down,	owing	to	recidivism	or	sufficient	income.	Suspecting	abuses	and	seeking	to	keep	expenses	under	control,	a	new	 criteria	 was	 introduced:	 ‘that	 the	 filles-mères	 breastfeed	 their	 children	themselves,	except	in	exceptional	cases	in	which	they	would	be	authorized	to	send	them	 to	 a	wet-nurse	 following	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 inspector.	One	would	better	 attach	 them	 by	 this	 means	 to	 the	 sentiment	 of	 maternity;	 closer	 bonds	would	be	formed	between	them	and	their	children;	one	would	finally	protect	them	against	 new	 deviations’.222	The	 suggestion	was	 very	well	 received	 in	 the	 Conseil	
Général,	 since	 ‘the	 foremost	 protection	 owed	 to	 the	 child	 is	 breastfeeding,	 the	bosom	 of	 the	mother’.	223	While	 there	was	 no	way	 in	which	 this	measure	would	have	 been	 compatible	 with	 extra-domestic	 work	 commitments	 of	 the	 recipients	and	 could	 only	 have	 promoted	 that	 children	 be	 left	 unattended,	 these	 women	became	 the	 testing	 grounds	 for	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 motherhood	 that	 was	becoming	 increasingly	 tied	 to	 specific	 functions	 rather	 than	 vague	 natural	instincts.	Breastfeeding	not	only	implied	the	mother’s	direct	and	intensive	care	of	the	child,	but	more	importantly	domestic	cohabitation.	Sending	the	child	to	a	wet-nurse	no	longer	counted	as	appropriate	parenting.			
																																																								222	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1860	(Tulle,	1860),	pp.	81-82.	223	Ibid.,	p.	137.	
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Saving	children.		In	 1868,	 the	 Ille-et-Vilaine	 foundling	 inspector,	 Pierre	 Bellamy,	 came	 across	 a	disturbing	finding.	The	advances	in	medical	services	provided	to	assisted	children	had	 made	 death	 rates	 plummet.	 From	 1861	 to	 1870,	 mortality	 for	 all	 assisted	children	 in	 the	 department	 (either	 abandoned	 or	 under	 the	 care	 of	 a	 single	mother)	had	averaged	19.5	per	cent	for	those	under	the	age	of	one.	And	that	was	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	wet-nurses	 in	Brittany,	 virtually	 all	were	bottle-fed	 and	 thus	 in	 greater	 danger.	 But	 illegitimate	 children	 of	 the	 same	 age	‘over	 which	 no	 surveillance	 is	 exercised’	 died	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 66	 per	 cent.224	The	department	 was	 then	 only	 aiding	 one	 fifth	 of	 all	 illegitimate	 children.225	This	shifted	 things	 radically	 in	 the	 inspector’s	eyes.	While	 the	problem	had	until	 then	focused	on	 those	mothers	seeking	aid,	 it	now	turned	 to	 those	 the	administration	ignored.	Bellamy	suspected	criminal	 intentions	on	behalf	of	these	mothers.	Filles-
mères	 in	 extreme	poverty,	 even	when	 they	were	assured	 to	obtain	monetary	aid	and	 clothes,	 refused	 to	 apply,	 he	 argued	 ‘so	 as	 to	 avoid	 the	 surveillance	 and	especially	 the	 inquiry	 made	 in	 case	 of	 death’	 of	 the	 child.226 	The	 inspector	convinced	the	prefect	 to	solicit	 from	all	mayors	the	 list	of	 illegitimate	children	 in	their	 locality.	But	 the	measure	was	declared	 illegal.	 ‘The	administration	does	not	have	 the	 right,	 regardless	of	how	praiseworthy	 its	 end	may	be,	 to	meddle	 in	 the	search	and	verification	of	illegitimate	births	and	penetrate	thus	in	the	private	lives	and	secrets	of	 families’.227	Such	 information	could	only	be	obtained	 if	 the	woman	applied	 for	 aid.	 A	 commission	was	 appointed	 for	 the	 subject	 and	 recommended																																																									224	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1871	(Rennes,	1871),	pp.	201,	219-220	;	2e	session	de	1872	(Rennes,	1872),	p.	350.	225	Ibid.,	p.	351.	226	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	Session	d’aout	1882	(Rennes,	1882),	p.	486.	227	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1871,	p.	201.	
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multiplying	 the	 amount	 of	 women	 assisted,	 even	 if	 they	 had	 more	 than	 one	illegitimate	child,	but	they	had	to	be	the	ones	to	ask	for	the	succour.			In	1870,	 the	death	rates	of	assisted	children	 further	dropped	 to	 just	over	16	per	cent.	The	following	year,	it	was	just	below	13.5	per	cent.228	According	to	the	1869	census	data,	 the	mortality	 figure	 for	children	under	the	age	of	one	 in	 the	general	population	was	17.6	 for	both	 Ille-et-Vilaine	and	France.	Shockingly,	 it	meant	 that	the	 children	 of	 the	 poorest,	 most	 stigmatized	 and	 marginal	 women,	 when	subjected	to	a	light	administrative	supervision	and	periodical	medical	visits,	were	outliving	the	rest.	The	content	of	these	visits	we	would	not	class	as	medical	today,	but	 rather	 as	 related	 to	 cleanliness	 and	 hygiene.	 One	 medical	 inspector	 for	foundlings	 opined:	 ‘Vigilance	 towards	 the	 application	 of	 the	 rules	 of	 hygiene	 in	food,	clothing	and	housing,	such	is	the	threefold	perspective	that,	in	my	eyes,	must	guide	 the	 medical	 inspection’.229	It	 seemed	 that	 this	 basic	 hygienic	 monitoring	‘outperformed’	the	most	naturally	gifted	mothers.			This	was	a	turning	point	 in	the	understanding	of	assistance.	Poverty	 increasingly	gave	 way	 to	 more	 general	 social	 problems,	 which	 in	 turn	 could	 gradually	 be	imagined	 as	 a	 technical	 issue,	 unrelated	 to	 personal	 or	 moral	 considerations.	Money	was	 equally	 not	 the	 problem.	 The	 success	 of	medical	 and	 administrative	guardianship	 in	 reducing	 child	mortality	 confirmed	 the	 approach	 of	 nineteenth-century	 philanthropy	 that	 favoured	 advice	 over	 material	 assistance.	 But	 rather	than	moralizing	advice,	what	was	needed	was	scientific	guidance	not	only	for	the	poor,	but	also	for	everyone.	But,	to	the	frustration	of	the	medical	profession,	there																																																									228	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1872,	p.	351.	229	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	Session	d’aout	1882	(Nantes,	1882),	p.	534.	
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was	 too	much	 opposition	 to	 direct	 intervention	 into	 family	 homes.	 In	 1874,	 the	Théophile	Roussel	law	extended	state	and	medical	protection	to	all	children	being	raised	 by	 ‘mercenary’	 hands,	 targeting	 specifically	 legitimate	 children	 raised	outside	the	home	by	wet-nurses.	The	medical	supervision	consisted	in	having	wet-nurses	take	their	foster	children	to	the	doctor’s	surgery	where	these	were	assessed	and	always	weighed	in	order	to	keep	track	of	their	progression.	Doctors	reported	that	 wet-nurses	 and	 assisted	 mothers	 not	 only	 complied,	 but	 ‘are	 currently	interested	 with	 the	 greatest	 attention	 in	 the	 periodic	 weighing	 of	 their	 babies’.	They	developed	‘a	sort	of	envy	among	them’	that	worked	to	the	child’s	benefit.230		At	 the	time	of	 the	Roussel	 law,	 the	notion	of	medical	supervision	of	children	and	the	technology	of	weighing	were	no	older	than	a	decade.	In	the	mid	1860s,	medical	experts	 such	 as	 doctor	 Paul	 Lorain,	 professor	 of	medicine	 in	 Paris,	were	 putting	forward	a	new	vision	of	medicalized	childcare	that	focused	on	feeding.	This	is	plain	in	 Lorain’s	 entry	 in	 an	 1864	 medical	 dictionary	 on	 the	 topic	 of	 allaitement	 or	lactation,	which	 included	natural	 lactation	or	breastfeeding,	 artificial	 lactation	or	bottle-feeding,	and	the	recommended	mixture	of	both.	‘The	times	of	grand	utopian	philosophies	is	passed’	and	the	masses	now	resisted	the	seductions	of	the	likes	of	Rousseau,	he	wrote,	whose	romantic	views	on	breastfeeding	had	been	relegated	to	the	 ‘curiositiés	de	 l'histoire’.231	Bottle-feeding	was	a	necessary	supplement	 to	 the	breast	that	the	child’s	appetite,	‘l’instinct	des	mères’	and	‘physical	or	social’	causes	rendered	 'indispensable'.	 Given	 time,	 work	 or	 health	 constraints,	 most	 women	were	 unable	 to	 properly	 nurse	 a	 child	 without	 the	 bottle.	 It	 was	 in	 lactation,																																																									230	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	Session	d’aout	1909	(Rennes,	1909),	pp.	613-614,	617-618,	642.	231	Paul	 Lorain,	 ‘Allaitement’,	 in:	 Sigismond	 Jaccoud	 (ed.)	Nouveau	dictionnaire	de	médecine	 et	 de	
chirurgie	pratiques,	I	(Paris,	1864),	p.	729.	
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regardless	of	 its	type,	he	argued,	that	 ‘l’instinct	de	la	maternité	is	shown	in	all	 its	activity’.	This	reflected	the	shift	in	the	essence	of	mothering	from	her	morality	and	‘nature’	to	the	wellbeing	of	the	child,	now	as	specifically	defined	by	nurture.	This	defined	 mothering	 as	 a	 specific	 function:	 making	 sure	 through	 unwavering	attentiveness	 and	 medicalized	 supervision	 that	 the	 child	 was	 always	 well	fed.		 Medicalized	 care	 was	 imagined	 as	 superfluous	 for	 rural	 mothers,	 since	 the	countryside	naturally	produced	vigorous	children.	But	somehow	when	these	same	women	 nursed	 the	 children	 of	 urban	 women,	 the	 infants	 were	 ‘almost	 fatally	predestined	 to	 an	 imperfect	 development’.	 Medicalization	 was	 thought	 of	 as	necessary,	 in	turn,	 for	urban	dwellers,	naturally	predisposed	to	 illness,	especially	for	 working-class	 mothers	 and	 the	 wet-nurses	 boarding	 in	 bourgeois	 homes.	Without	 the	 doctor’s	 oversight,	 there	 developed	 among	 urban	 carers	 the	‘pernicious	 practice	 of	 a	 lactation	 that	 is	 more	 apparent	 than	 real,	 that	 serves	better	the	softness	or	vanity	of	a	mother	who	is	penetrated	by	her	worldly	duties	or	 obligations,	 than	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 child,	 an	 innocent	 victim	 who	 finds	 his	natural	advocate	 in	 the	 [medical]	doctor’.	232	The	 focus	on	 feeding	also	decentred	the	 specificity	 of	 the	 mother	 and	 left	 room	 for	 the	 function	 to	 be	 delegated	 to	surrogate	 carers,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 in	 bourgeois	 households.	 Lorain	 did	 not	distinguish	 among	 carers.	 Instead	of	 referring	 to	mothers,	 Lorain’s	 text	 spoke	 of	the	mothering	 subject	 as	 ‘la	 nourrice’,	 the	 term	 that	 could	 apply	 for	 ‘mercenary’	wet-nurses,	 guardians	 and	 carers,	 which	 simply	 meant	 the	 feeder,	 the	 one	 who	nurses,	the	one	who	carried	out	the	essential	function	of	the	mother.			
																																																								232	Ibid.,	pp.	722,	730-731,	736.	
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Other	 than	enforcing	 ‘the	rules	of	hygiene’,	medical	supervision	specifically	came	down	to	one	act:	weighing	the	baby,	as	the	basis	of	diagnostic	assessment.	It	is	above	all	by	the	appearance	of	the	child,	by	the	progress	of	his	development,	that	one	judges	the	qualities	of	his	nurse	(nourrice).	One	thus	judges	the	cause	by	the	effect.	Little	attention	 is	still	given	 to	 the	progressive	weight	of	 infants	 in	 the	initial	 periods	 following	birth;	 this	would	be	 the	best	means	of	 control.	A	 strong	and	well-constituted	child,	 if	he	has	a	good	nurse	(nourrice),	may	gain	300	grams	of	weight	weekly,	or	more.233	The	absence	of	such	gains	signalled	negligent	and	ignorant	care.	Lorain	argued	that	just	as	 ‘you	can	tell	an	artist	by	his	work’,	 the	changing	states	of	 the	child’s	body	defined	the	quality	of	his	or	her	mother(ing).234	Mothering	had	consequently	been	reduced	to	a	 function	whose	performance	could	be	measured	precisely	 in	grams.	The	 difference	 between	 a	 good	 or	 bad	 mother	 was	 now	 objective.	Instead	 of	 a	creation	 of	 ‘nature’,	 the	mother	 had	 become	 a	 technology	 for	 the	 production	 of	child	welfare,	 which	 in	 turn	 could	 only	 be	 defined	 and	 assessed	 by	 the	medical	gaze.			At	the	turn	of	the	century,	these	initiatives	of	medical	supervision,	 first	tested	on	welfare	recipients	and	extended	to	those	nursed	outside	the	home	in	1874,	would	be	 rolled	 out	 to	 the	 general	 population	 through	 infant	welfare	 centres	 and	milk	dispensaries.	The	aim	was	 to	 ‘cause	all	 the	mères	de	famille	without	exception	 to	come	and	 follow	the	advice	of	 the	medical-inspectors’.235	But	since	 the	 law	could	not	compel	them,	the	problem	was	no	longer	how	to	keep	the	needy	from	applying	for	 aid	 through	 discipline	 and	 constraints,	 but	 rather	 how	 to	 lure	 mothers	 into																																																									233	Ibid.,	p.	728.	234	Ibid.,	p.	731.	235	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	Session	de	septembre	1912	(Rennes,	1912),	p.	590.	
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these	 centres.	 The	 staff	 were	 trained	 to	 seem	 comprehensive	 and	 accessible.	Sometimes	 women	 were	 given	 an	 incentive	 such	 as	 a	 one-franc	 piece,	 a	 kilo	 of	meat	or	four	to	five	kilos	of	bread	in	exchange	for	taking	the	child	to	be	weighed	every	 week;	 for	 others	 there	 were	 awards	 and	 Christmas	 or	 Easter	 events.236	There	 was	 a	 brief	 experiment	 with	 using	 baby	 pageants	 as	 an	 enticement.	Imported	 from	 the	 United	 States	where	 these	 contests	 emerged	 in	mid-century,	they	became	very	popular	 spectacles	 in	France	 in	 the	1890s	and	1900s.237	But	 it	quickly	 got	 out	 of	 the	 hands	 of	 doctors.238	‘Each	 arrondissement	 has	 wanted	 to	have	its	own	baby	exhibit’.	The	medical	profession	denounced	some	entrepreneurs	in	 the	 field	 for	 profiteering	 and	 the	 epidemic	 risks	 of	 the	 agglomerations.	 But	above	 all,	 the	medical	 excitement	with	weighing	 babies	weekly,	 together	with	 a	populationist	 beauty	 standard	 that	 celebrated	 plump	 children,	 meant	 that	 some	mothers	 had	 started	 fattening	 their	 young:	 ‘nobody	 ignores	 the	 preparation	process	 of	 foi	 gras’.	 Force-feeding	 was	 the	 logical	 result	 of	 the	 grave	 confusion	between	appearance	and	health	 that	 such	events	bred,	 a	 confusion	derived	 from	the	unlearned	claiming	a	vantage	point	from	where	to	assess	child	wellbeing	which	bypassed	 the	 medical	 expert.	 It	 was	 claimed	 that	 several	 children	 had	 died	immediately	 after	 winning	 baby	 pageants.	 Doctors,	 it	 was	 recommended	 at	 the	start	of	 the	new	century,	 should	start	promoting	 the	effort	 of	 childrearing	rather	than	valuing	it	through	measurement.239	
																																																								236	E.	Ausset,	‘Le	bilan	des	consultations	de	nourrisons	et	des	gouttes	de	lait’,	Revue	philanthropique,	xxiv	(1909),	pp.	564-614.	237	AMR.5Q20.	Société	d’hygiène	de	l’enfance:	Concours	de	bébés,	1892-1904.	238	In	 the	 1920s	 a	 similar	 situation	would	 happen	with	 the	 development	 of	 regionalist	 festivities	which	 quickly	 escaped	 the	 limits	 the	 regionalist	 and	 cultural	 elites	 had	 in	 mind.	 Patrick	 Young,	‘Fashioning	 heritage:	 Regional	 costume	 and	 tourism	 in	 Brittany,	 1890–1937’,	 Journal	 of	 Social	
History,	42/3	(2009),	p.	643.	239	Adolfo	 Scander	 Levi,	 ‘Communication	 sur	 les	 concours	 à	 prix	 entre	 les	 parents…’,	 in:	William	Chance,	Report	of	the	Proceedings	of	the	Third	International	Congress	for	the	Welfare	and	Protection	
of	Children	(London,	1902),	pp.	318-336.	
	 278	
	For	 Bellamy	 and	 inspectors	 in	 other	 departments,	 the	 1870s	 was	 a	 period	 of	increased	 activity	 following	 the	 1870	 war.	 With	 the	 new	 decade	 came	 a	 new	language	and	energy	into	the	service.	While	depicting	single	mothers	as	victims	of	poverty	and	seduction	in	need	of	help,	regardless	of	their	number	of	 ‘faults’,	they	were	gradually	able	to	dismiss	financial	considerations	for	the	interests	and	lives	of	 the	 children	 they	 administered,	 rather	 than	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	mother.240	‘We	carry	out	assistance	with	the	heart	and	we	apply	the	spirit	rather	than	the	letter	of	the	 regulation’.241	With	 these	 arguments	 and	 encouragement	 from	 Paris	 they	sought	 to	 elicit	 the	 support	 and	 funding	 of	 the	 Conseils	 Généraux	 for	 a	 new	generous	 understanding	 of	 public	 assistance.	 Bellamy	 kept	 pushing	 for	 an	expansion	in	the	service.	Assistance	to	filles-mères,	he	argued,	should	be	given	for	ten	 rather	 than	 three	 years.242	In	 1874,	 he	 proposed	 extending	 aid	 to	 legitimate	children,	and	by	1881	383	were	benefiting,	although	lack	of	funding	restricted	this	to	 large	 families	 after	 1893.243	Indre-et-Loire	 in	 1873	 is	 also	 an	 example	 of	 this	dramatic	expansion	of	assistance	to	unwed	mothers.	The	background	and	morality	check	for	one	fille	Dallières	who	was	granted	aid	was	based	on	the	good	references	given	by	her	own	mother.	244	One	Pelletereau	was	granted	aid	for	two	years	based	on	 the	 recommendation	 of	 her	 local	 mayor	 who	 noted	 that	 ‘In	 Amboise	 she	 is	known	 as	 having	 had	 guilty	 relations	 only	 with	 a	 young	 soldier,	 her	 neighbour,	who	has	promised	to	marry	her	as	soon	as	he	is	freed	from	service,	which	will	be	
																																																								240	Ory,	La	protection,	pp.	139,	146,	179.	241	Ibid.,	p.	160.	242	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1871,	pp.	219-227;	1872,	p.	149.	243	Laurence	 Léonard,	 ‘Les	 enfants	 assistés	 et	 le	 Conseil	 général	 de	 la	 Gironde	 sous	 la	 IIIe	République,	1870-1914’,	MA	Dissertation,	Université	de	Bordeaux	1	(Bordeaux,	1993),	p.	53.	244	A[rchives]	D[épartementales	d']I[ndre-et-]L[oire].	3X230.	August	1873.	Only	files	dated	between	June	and	September	1873	seemed	to	have	survived,	but	these	show	this	expansive	trend.		
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soon.	Her	antecedents	are	thus	satisfactory’.245	One	née	Huguet	was	recognized	as	having	bad	conduct,	but	was	nonetheless	assisted	for	five	years	on	account	of	the	infirmities	of	her	child	and	the	expenses	incurred	in	his	treatment.246	While	these	cases	would	have	been	scandalous	a	decade	before,	the	Indre-et-Loire	was	not	an	exception	 in	 its	 generous	 approach.	 In	 the	 Seine,	 the	 number	 of	 assisted	 filles-
mères	went	from	25,208	in	1872,	to	38,962	in	1873.247		This	 drive	 for	 enlargement	 was	 only	 curbed	 by	 the	 budgetary	 paucity	 of	 some	Conseils	 Généraux.	 A	 dramatic	 case	 of	 this	 was	 the	 conservative	 department	 of	Loire-Atlantique.	Together	with	men	like	Eugène	Ory	in	the	Loire,	H.	Pallu	was	part	of	 a	 new	 cohort	 of	 young,	 republican	 inspectors.	 After	 being	 appointed	 in	 1879,	Pallu	 became	 notorious	 for	 his	 shameless	 budgetary	 deficits.	 With	 the	 discrete	support	of	the	prefect,	he	exceeded	funding	every	year	and,	when	called	to	order	by	the	Conseil	Général,	he	would	propose	further	expansions,	especially	a	medical	service	 that	 did	 not	 yet	 exist,	 and	 even	 higher	 budgets.	 To	 the	 horrified	representatives	who	 had	 convened	 him	 for	 a	 disciplinary	 hearing,	 one	 of	whom	had	 been	 in	 the	 chamber	 since	 1852	 and	 reminisced	 about	 the	 days	 when	 the	budget	was	 50,000,	 Pallu	 proposed	 in	 effect	 a	 doubling	 of	 the	 foundling	 budget	between	1879	and	1882,	 from	140,000	to	274,000	francs,	while	adding	that	new	deficits	were	to	be	expected	due	to	the	harsh	winter.248	In	turn,	inspector	Belhache,	appointed	in	l’Eure	in	1860,	was	typical	of	his	mid-century	colleagues.	He	received	very	good	commendations	from	the	prefects	until	1881,	when	a	general	inspection	came	from	Paris.	It	was	found	that	his	books	were	kept	immaculately,	but	he	had																																																									245	Ibid.	August-September	1873.		246	Ibid.	247	Rollet,	Politique	a	l’égard,	p.	64.	248	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	1881,	pp.	369-393.	
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visited	only	a	twelfth	of	the	children	in	the	last	six	months.	His	overriding	concern	was	to	economize	public	funds,	even	by	cutting	transport	costs.	He	retired	in	1883,	giving	way	 to	 a	 younger	 inspector	who	 followed	 Paris	 in	 constantly	 pushing	 for	new	measures	 in	 the	 years	 of	 budgetary	 expansion	 following	 the	 Ferry	 laws	 on	free,	public	education.249	But	these	years	also	revived	the	old	ghost	of	the	tours.		
Revisiting	the	tours.		In	 1876,	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 these	 developments,	 André-Théodore	 Brochard	successfully	re-launched	the	tours	debate	with	a	highly	provocative	and	combative	book.	 Brochard	 was	 one	 of	 the	 Catholic	 doctors	 who	 in	 the	 mid	 1860s	 had	published	statistical	studies	about	the	enormous	impact	of	wet-nursing	and	bottle-feeding	 on	 infant	 mortality.	 These	 studies	 translated	 immediately	 into	 a	 series	campaigns	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 Sociétés	 protectrices	 de	 l’enfance	 across	 the	country.	 After	 having	 found	 that	 basic	 medical	 supervision	 halved	 death	 rates,	these	 associations	 highlighted	 the	 need	 for	 state	 and	 medical	 intervention	 in	favour	of	a	 reformed	understanding	of	mothering	centred	on	breast-feeding,	and	marked	the	birth	of	modern	child-saving	initiatives.	Banking	on	his	reputation	as	a	child-welfare	 expert,	 Brochard	 now	 launched	 a	 fierce	 attack	 on	 the	 foundling	system.	 While	 sparing	 the	 Parisian	 service,	 his	 wrath	 particularly	 targeted	 his	former	employer,	 the	department	of	the	Rhône,	which,	he	claimed,	had	subjected	him	to	a	series	of	reprisals	for	speaking	 ‘the	truth’,	 including	the	attempt	to	strip	him	 of	 the	 Légion	 d’honneur	 distinction	 granted	 to	 him	 a	 quarter	 of	 a	 century	earlier.	Brochard	had	a	knack	for	spectacle;	his	book	wove	together	a	tale	of	state																																																									249	De	Luca,	Aux	origines,	pp.	56-59.	
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conspiracy,	while	his	public	speaking	engagements	in	favour	of	breastfeeding	were	filled	with	graphic	 tales	of	 tragic	deaths	 in	 the	hands	of	 ignorant	wet-nurses	and	horrific	 statements:	 ‘it	 shall	 suffice	 for	 us	 to	 say	 that	 the	mother	 who	 does	 not	nurse	her	child	willingly	doubles	or	triples	the	chances	of	him	dying’.250		He	 repeated	 all	 the	 Catholic	 attacks	 and	 solutions	 of	 old,	 to	which	 he	 added	 the	absolute	 need	 to	 organize	 the	 foundling	 system	 on	 medical	 grounds	 with	 an	extensive	system	of	health	inspections.	This	was	an	important	argument,	since	by	the	mid	1860s	 the	Malthusian	qualms	over	overpopulation	had	given	way	 to	 the	fears	of	depopulation,	exacerbated	by	the	1870	defeat	to	Germany.251	Fluent	in	the	use	of	both	quantitative	and	dramatic	qualitative	data,	Brochard	was	now	able	to	confirm	an	increase	in	infanticides	that	Catholics	had	suspected	for	four	decades.	Furthermore,	 he	 denounced	 how	 foundlings	 suffered	 an	 appalling	 lack	 of	 good	wet-nurses,	vaccinations,	medical	supervision,	 food,	opportunities	and	education;	in	 fact,	 most	 of	 the	 children	 raised	 by	 the	 departments	 were	 illiterate.252	The	children	of	assisted	filles-mères,	he	argued,	had	it	even	worse	and	lived	in	extreme	poverty,	were	unsupervised	by	 the	 authorities	 and	doctors,	 their	mortality	 rates	were	 twice	 or	 thrice	 that	 of	 abandoned	 children	 and,	 since	 illegitimate	 children	were	not	admitted	 into	nurseries,	 they	were	 left	alone	at	home	all	day	while	 the	mother	worked.	However,	he	did	not	object	to	filles-mères	keeping	their	children,	but	argued	that	it	had	to	be	their	choice	rather	than	an	official	 imposition.253	The	biggest	 fault	 of	 the	 system,	 he	 argued,	 were	 the	 inspectors	 who	 had	 exclusive	
																																																								250	André-Théodore	Brochard,	De	l’amour	maternelle	(Lyon,	1872),	p.	5.	251 	Yves	 Charbit	 located	 this	 shift	 between	 1856	 and	 1866,	 see:	 Du	 malthusianisme	 au	
populationnisme:	Les	économistes	français	et	la	population,	1840-1870	(Paris,	1981).	252	Brochard,	La	verité	sur	les	enfants	trouvés	(Paris,	1876),	pp.	21-22.	253	Ibid.,	pp.	140,	239-268.	
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control	 of	 the	 foundling	 system	with	no	 local	 or	 legal	 accountability;	 indeed,	 the	department	 assemblies	 that	 funded	 the	 programme	 had	 no	 oversight	 and	 could	only	 receive	 information	 of	 the	 service	 from	 the	 inspector	 himself.	 Nobody	inspected	 the	 inspectors,	 he	 claimed.	 Brochard	 documented	 the	 profound	indolence,	 lies,	 false	 statistics	 and	 lack	 of	 transparency	 of	 these	 delegates	 of	 the	prefect	in	the	hands	of	the	minister	of	the	interior.	Himself	a	correspondent	for	the	journal	La	décentralisation,	 the	greatest	 fault	Brochard	found	in	this,	as	had	been	the	case	with	most	of	the	Catholic	authors	who	had	participated	in	the	old	debate,	was	the	progressive	substitution	since	the	1830s	of	assemblies	of	charitable	local	notables	in	the	foundling	and	hospital	administration	for	a	single	Parisian	agent.254				Dr	Brochard‘s	supporters	in	the	Senate	brought	his	findings	to	the	floor,	leading	to	a	new	round	of	national	consultations	on	the	topic	of	the	tours.	These	consultations	and	the	debates	they	provoked,	however,	showed	that	a	significant	shift	had	taken	place	in	the	previous	decade.	There	no	longer	was	a	confrontation	between	liberals	and	Catholics,	 indeed,	the	old	positions	no	longer	made	sense.	Instead	a	common	ground	 had	 emerged:	 abandonment	 had	 to	 be	 free,	 but	 without	 a	 return	 to	 the	past.			Brochard	 was	 warmly	 received	 at	 the	 liberal	 Société	 d’économie	 politique.	Members	readily	admitted	that	 ‘it	 is	very	true	that	this	suppression	[of	the	tours]	seems	 to	have	 risen	 the	number	of	 infanticides’	 and	 they	 criticized	 assistance	 to	single	mothers	as	a	‘negligible	succours	that	represents	a	third	or	a	quarter	of	the	
																																																								254	Ibid.,	pp.	29-32.	
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expenses	 of	 the	 child’. 255 	Frédéric	 Passy,	 one	 of	 the	 most	 respected	 liberal	economists	of	his	time,	vigorously	called	for	a	law	on	seduction	and	admitted	that	‘une	 sorte	 de	 demi-tour’	 was	 needed,	 meaning	 that	 secret	 abandonment	 was	necessary	in	a	lot	of	cases.256			When	the	issue	was	discussed	in	the	Conseil	Général	de	la	Seine,	the	approach	was	the	 same;	 the	 faults	 Brochard	 had	 brought	 to	 light	 were	 readily	 admitted	 and	condemned,	 but	 his	 solutions	 were	 quickly	 dismissed.	 There	 was	 a	 desire	 to	receive	 abandoned	 children	 with	 open	 arms	 from	 anyone	 who	 could	 not	 raise	them.		 It	matters	 little	 from	the	point	of	view	of	results	 that	 families	be	disinterested	 in	their	 children	 and	 abandon	 them;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 fortunate	 that	 capable	fathers	and	mothers,	so	long	as	they	are	not	forced,	commit	such	an	act	and	leave	their	little	children	to	the	department’s	charge,	because	they	would	not	have	been	able	to	themselves	to	make	of	them	honest	citizens.257	The	concern	with	personal	 responsibility	of	 the	previous	decades	had	made	way	for	collective	interests.	An	attempt	would	still	be	made	to	try	and	have	the	mother	keep	the	child	in	exchange	for	aid,	but	 it	was	pointed	out	that	the	administration	needed	to	be	able	to	remove	the	child	in	case	of	negligence.	The	Conseil	voted	to	receive	children	under	a	bureau-ouvert	system,	open	all	day	and	night.	Under	this	arrangement,	 secrecy	 and	 anonymity	 could	 be	 guaranteed	 while	 also	 allowing	officials	to	offer	aid	and	intervene	in	abandonment	cases.258																																																											255	Arthur	Mangin,	 ‘Les	 discussions	 de	 la	 Société	 d’économie	 politique’,	 L’économiste	 français	 (13	October	1877),	p.	459.	256	Ibid.,	p.	460.	257	Conseil	Général	de	la	Seine,	Session	d’octobre-novembre	1878	(Paris,	1878),	p.	512.	258	Ibid.,	p.	522.	
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On	a	national	basis,	 there	had	been	a	tendency	to	allow	free	abandonment	 in	the	1870s,	 while	 by	 1883	 the	 bureau-ouvert	 was	 already	 being	 called	 ‘the	 current	system’.259	All	 restrictions	 to	abandonment	were	 lifted	 in	1886,	although	 the	 law	only	 reflected	 this	 in	 1904.260	These	 changes	 were	 part	 of	 a	 more	 profound	transformation	of	the	nineteenth-century	family	that	took	place	at	the	turn	of	the	century.	 Among	many	 other	measures,	 divorce	was	 reinstated	 in	 1884,	 children	were	 allowed	 to	 marry	 without	 paternal	 consent	 at	 age	 21	 in	 1907,	 paternity	searches	were	allowed	 if	 the	 father	was	unmarried	 in	1912,	while	 in	 the	 interim	illegitimate	children	gained	 inheritance	rights	and	women	gained	 the	capacity	 to	legally	 represent	 the	 family	 and	 control	 her	 earnings.261 	Family	 was	 quickly	becoming	a	voluntary	affair.			As	 a	 result	 of	 free	 abandonment,	 maternity	 became	 detached	 from	 biology	 and	became	a	free	choice	for	any	woman.	And	at	the	same	time	the	possibility	of	non-biological	 kinship	 opened	 up	 for	 their	 abandoned	 children.262	Ivan	 Jablonka	 has	shown	 how	 the	 language	 used	 between	 foundlings	 and	 their	 foster	 families	changed	 in	 the	 fin	de	 siècle.	 From	at	 least	 the	1890s,	 the	novelty	was	 that	 these	started	using	terms	and	behaviours	of	family	affection	and	biological	affiliation.263			‘Nature’	was	 no	 longer	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 for	 parenting,	 and	 as	 the	 twentieth	century	progressed	the	task	of	the	mother	in	particular	would	come	to	be	seen	as	a																																																									259	Ory,	La	protection,	p.	159.	260	Fuchs,	Abandoned	Children,	p.	57;		261	Lloyd	Bonfield,	‘European	family	law’,	in:	David	Kertzer	and	Marzio	Barbagli	(eds),	Family	Life	in	
the	Long	Nineteenth	Century,	1789-1913	(New	Haven,	2002),	pp.	140-142;	Remi	Lenoir,	Généalogie	
de	la	morale	familiale	(Paris,	2003),	p.	185.	262	The	adoption	of	minors	was	not	legal	in	France	until	1923,	and	remained	impractical	until	1939.	The	conditions	were	so	strict	that	only	wealthy	bourgeois	families	met	them.	So	paid	foster	parents	and	their	foundling	child	formed	‘administrative’	rather	than	legal	families.	263	Jablonka,	Ni	père	ni	mère,	pp.	98-106.	
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semi-professional	occupation.	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter,	parenting	became	increasingly	 understood	 as	 a	 technique	 that	 experts	 could	 apply	 in	 schools	 and	other	institutions.			The	reverse	side	of	 this	 tendency	was	 to	make	biological	parenthood	conditional	on	 performance.	 An	 1889	 law	 further	 expanded	 in	 1898	 enabled	 the	 state	 to	deprive	parents	of	 their	 children’s	 custody.	Once	again,	 the	practice	had	become	common	 long	 before	 then.	While	 there	was	no	 legal	 basis	 for	 this,	 officials	were	able	to	‘persuade’	mothers	to	abandon.	Vagabonds	were	particularly	targeted.	This	was	the	case	of	Estelle	Maître-Jean,	a	vagrant	and	a	registered	prostitute	in	Rennes,	where	 the	 police	were	 also	 asked	 to	 investigate	 vagabond	Marie	 Junot	 and	 ‘give	their	opinion	on	the	inconveniences	that	there	could	be	in	leaving	her	child	in	his	mother’s	 care’.	 The	 death	 of	 the	 child	 stopped	 the	 inquiry.264	Thus	 in	 the	 fin	 de	siècle,	 parenthood	 was	 no	 longer	 understood	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 sacred	property	 rights	 and	 obligations.	 Instead,	 the	 family	 was	 a	 social	 function	 which	individuals	were	 free	 to	pursue,	while	 the	 state	 and	 society	 gained	 the	 ability	 to	regulate	the	domestic	sphere	as	it	did	other	social	functions.	Thus	the	family	joined	other	 domains	 governed	 through	 freedom,	 in	 which	 free	 and	 voluntary	 choices	were	inseparable	from	liability	over	conduct	and	performance.			The	 tension	 Brochard	 had	 emphasized	 between	 the	 inspectors	 appointed	 from	Paris	 and	 local	 notables	 could	 also	 be	 quickly	 dispelled.	 A	 zero-sum	 view	 of	central-local	and	administrative-private	power	had	been	gradually	giving	way	to	a	multiplication	of	social	authorities	under	the	institutional	axis	of	the	state.	After	it																																																									264	AMR.	5Q20.	Documents	dated	May,	August,	September	1879.		
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was	recommended	in	1847	by	inspector	de	Watteville,	there	was	a	timid	attempt	to	 build	 a	 support	 network	 of	 charitable	 workers	 to	 complement	 the	administrative	 supervision	 of	 the	 assisted.	 Local	visiteurs,	visiteuses	 and	 ‘comités	de	 surveillance	et	de	patronage’	were	 to	 take	on	 the	exclusively	affectionate	and	charitable	 dimension	 of	 welfare,	 mostly	 visiting	 and	 encouraging	 foundlings	periodically,	 without	 affecting	 policy	 or	 having	 any	 responsibilities.	 ‘To	 see,	 to	listen,	 to	 advice,	 to	 encourage:	 that	 is	what	 the	Administration	demands	of	 your	zeal’.265	This	often	implied	siding	with	the	administration	against	the	local	notables	of	 the	hospital	 and	beneficence	boards.	 In	1860,	 the	prefect	 of	 the	 Ille-et-Vilaine	hoped	to	create	these	committees	and	encouraged	local	priests	to	make	foundlings	the	 object	 of	 their	 charitable	 attentions.266	Few	 of	 these	 initiatives	 were	 put	 in	place	or	lasted	very	long.			By	 the	 1880s	 this	 changed.	 Bellamy	 boasted	 excellent	 results	 with	 his	 assisted	children	owing	to	a	new	form	of	surveillance,	an	‘authority	that	is	exercised	in	so	many	ways	and	at	every	 instant’.	Foundlings	and	assisted	children	were	not	only	subject	to	the	attention	of	the	departmental	inspector	and	his	medical	staff.		In	 the	 towns	 they	 are	 the	 object	 of	 an	 incessant	 surveillance	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	authority,	which	appears	not	only	in	the	persons	of	inspectors,	but	that	multiplies	itself	 in	all	 forms,	 in	 the	person	of	 the	priest,	 the	mayor,	 the	 teacher	 [and]	of	 the	village	 police	 officer	 even:	 finally	 anyone	 who	 has	 an	 authority	 can	 correct	 and	advise	them	and	inform	us	about	it.267	It	 had	 become	 possible	 to	 imagine	 a	 single	 authority	 in	 society	 that	 could	 be	embodied	in	any	authoritative	person	with	no	conflict.	Who	held	legitimate	power																																																									265	C.G.	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1851	(Tulle,	1851),	p.	315.	266	C.G.	d’Ille-et	Vilaine,	1860,	p.	123.	267	C.G.	de	la	Loire-Inférieure,	1882,	p.	434.	
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was	 no	 longer	 the	 issue.	 The	 focus	 shifted	 from	 the	 exercise	 of	 power	 to	 the	productivity	of	its	outcomes	and	utility.	Previous	understandings	of	power,	either	the	command	of	the	patriarch	or	the	functional	guardianship	of	the	parent,	had	still	relied	on	an	authority	understood	as	an	exclusive	possession.	Throughout	most	of	the	 century,	 debating	 social	 reform	 or	 decentralization	 implied	 a	 confrontation	between	private	and	public	or	local	and	national	agency.	This	either-or	opposition	tended	to	loosen	as	the	twentieth	century	approached.	This	may	be	contextualized	within	 the	wider	 shift	 from	 rights	 and	 sovereignty	 to	 function	 that	Donzelot	has	analysed	 for	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 century.268	In	 matters	 of	 social	 and	 family	reform,	 the	multiplication	of	authorities	came	 to	populate	 the	 ‘void’	between	 the	individual	 and	 the	 state	 or	 governors	 and	 the	 governed	 with	 a	 dense	 capillary	network	of	 relays	or	points	of	non-exclusive	 and	 functional	 authority.	Moreover,	this	 was	 an	 understanding	 of	 authority	 that	 did	 not	 necessitate	 the	 paternal	analogy.	Sylvia	Schafer	has	shown	how	the	1874	 law	on	child	 labour	established	for	 the	 first	 time	 a	 clear	 distinction	 between	 the	 roles	 of	 the	 parents	 and	 the	employers	 of	 children.	 ‘Employers	 could	 no	 longer	 be	 trusted	 to	 fulfil	 “paternal”	functions	where	 their	young	workers	were	concerned’.269	As	distinctly	social	and	institutional	functions	emerged,	claims	to	social	authority	could	no	longer	depend	on	the	duplication	of	paternal	roles.		Increasingly	 this	 multiplication	 of	 authorities	 came	 to	 include	 private	 charity.	Colette	Bec	has	argued	that	from	1886	the	close	collaboration	between	the	mostly	Catholic	charitable	sector	and	the	welfare	administration	was	an	essential	piece	of	
																																																								268	Jacques	Donzelot,	L’invention	du	social	(Paris,	1984).	269	Schafer,	Children	in	Moral	Danger,	p.	51.	
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the	republican	project.270	Despite	 the	bitter	divisions	on	 ideological	and	religious	grounds	at	 the	fin	de	siècle,	Topalov	and	Bec	have	shown	how	1900	represented	the	golden	age	of	this	search	for	collaboration.271		A	new	partnership	was	able	to	advance	 a	 social	 vision	 in	 which	 secular	 and	 religious	 or	 impersonal	 and	interpersonal	 forms	 of	 welfare	 were	 fully	 compatible	 under	 republican	 legality.	Charitable	 religious	 groups	 in	 this	 period	 exceeded	 the	 boundaries	 of	 their	community	 of	 faith.	 The	 beneficiaries	 of	 French	 Jewish	 and	 Protestant	 charity	gradually	expanded	beyond	their	original	confessional	lines	to	the	point	of	largely	blending	in	with	secularised	assistance.	Catholicism	underwent	a	similar	process,	with	 fundamentally	 lay	works	 that	operated	beyond	religious	exclusivity	or	with	personal	voluntary	engagement	in	the	‘terrain	laïc’.272	Indeed,	it	was	Catholics	who	spearheaded	the	pan-charitable,	non-religious	ideal	of	beneficent	organisation	and	collaboration,	 most	 notably	 in	 the	 Parisian	 Office	 central	 des	 oeuvres	 de	
bienfaisance	and	its	equivalent	in	Bordeaux.273			Therefore,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 social	 assistance,	 there	was	 a	 clear	 shift	 towards	what	Pierre	Rosanvallon	has	termed	the	Network	state,	consisting	of	the	integration	of	associations	 and	 intermediate	 bodies	 into	 a	 complex	 vision	 of	 ‘society’.	 In	 this	respect,	 he	mentioned	 two	of	 the	 forms	 this	 integration	 took:	 ‘First,	 associations	
																																																								270	Colette	 Bec,	 Assistance	 et	 République:	 La	 recherche	 d’un	 nouveau	 contrat	 social	 sous	 la	 IIIe	
République	(Paris,	1994),	p.	143.	271 	Ibid.;	 Bec,	 ‘Deux	 congrès	 internationaux	 d’assistance,	 Paris,	 1889-1900:	 Temps	 forts	 des	rapports	public-privé’,	in:	Bec,	Duprat,	Jean-Noël	Luc	and	Jacques-Guy	Petit	(eds)	Philanthropies	et	
politiques	 sociales	 en	 Europe,	 XVIIIe-XXe	 siècles	 (Paris,	 1994),	 pp.	 145-157;	 Christian	 Topalov,	‘Langage	 de	 la	 réforme	 et	 déni	 du	 politique:	 Le	 débat	 entre	 assistance	 publique	 et	 bienfaisance	privée,	1889-1903’,	Genèses,	23	(1996),	pp.	30-52.	272	Sandra	Dab,	‘La	philanthropie	laïque:	Facteur	d’intégration	des	juifs	sous	la	IIIe	République’,	in:	Bec,	Duprat,	Luc	and	Petit	(eds)	Philanthropies,	pp.	105-112.	273	Steven	M.	 Beaudoin,	 ‘“A	Neutral	 Terrain:”	 Public	 Assistance,	 Private	 Charity,	 and	 The	 State	 in	Third	Republic	Bordeaux,	1870-1914’,	Ph.D.	Dissertation,	Carnegie	Mellon	University	 (Pittsburgh,	1996),	pp.	221-222.	
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and	intermediate	bodies	were	co-opted	as	political	agents	of	the	monist	republican	vision.	Second,	they	became	functional	auxiliaries	of	the	state’.274		There	no	longer	was	a	contradiction	between	the	authority	of	the	patron	that	was	based	 on	 patriarchal	 love	 and	 Christian	 charity	 and	 that	 of	 the	 secular	administrator	 or	 expert	 that	 relied	 on	 an	 impersonal	 and	 technocratic	 vision	 of	society.	 Institutions	 were	 able	 to	 end	 the	 zero-sum	 game	 of	 power	 between	 the	state	and	the	individual	and	unite	the	notions	of	traditional	authority	and	modern	guardianship.	 If	 power	 rested	 in	 society	 at	 large,	 then	 it	 neither	 belonged	 to	 the	individual	nor	 the	state.	The	word	 institution	only	gained	 its	 current	meaning	 in	the	 fin	de	siècle;	before	then	 its	use	was	very	 loose.	Thus	 in	1799	 liberal	 thinker	Germaine	 de	 Staël	 took	 social	 institutions	 to	 refer	 to	 equality	 and	 liberty.275	Around	1900,	the	modern	sense	of	the	word	institution	was	already	being	used,	as	will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 following	 chapter.	 It	 implied	 a	 regulated	 and	 hierarchical	structure	 of	 relations	 in	 which	 personality	 and	 impersonality	 could	 be	 made	compatible.	 In	 institutions,	 impersonal	 functions	 remained	 unaffected	 by	 the	personality	of	 its	holder,	while	 the	 individual	 could	not	be	 reduced	 to	his	or	her	institutional	 role	 alone.	 The	 charitable	 sector	 in	 France	 towards	 1900	 became	highly	 institutionalized	and	organized	 in	a	vast	network	of	 local	associations	and	societies,	 which	were	 in	 turn	 organized	 into	 larger	 federations	 and	 bodies.	 This	complex	matrix	of	 initiatives	was	able	 to	 integrate	 individuals	regardless	of	 their	ideological	 or	 confessional	 views.	 Local	 (and	 often	 self-defined)	 experts	 and	notables	 gradually	 were	 invested	 with	 social	 authority	 and	 legitimated	 in	 their																																																									274 	Pierre	 Rosanvallon,	 The	 Demands	 of	 Liberty:	 Civil	 Society	 in	 France	 since	 the	 Revolution	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	2007),	p.	231.	275	Germaine	 de	 Staël,	 De	 la	 littérature	 considérée	 dans	 ses	 rapports	 avec	 les	 institutions	 sociales	(Paris,	1842),	p.	423.	
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roles	 as	 social	 guardians,	 while	 the	 disparate	 conglomerate	 of	 characters	 and	initiatives	served	to	buttress	legality	and	the	wider	institutional	structure	of	state	guardianship.			In	the	fin	de	siècle,	power	and	authority	no	longer	depended	on	family	analogies.	Instead,	the	family	itself	came	to	be	derived	from	a	broader	scientific	rather	than	moral	 understanding.	 Consequently,	 the	 opposition	 between	 ‘strict	 father’	 and	‘nurturant	 parent’	 lost	 its	 political	 import	 as	 the	 nuclear	 family	 and	 domesticity	came	to	be	subsumed	into	‘nature’	and	became	hegemonic.			
The	nuclear	family.			The	abbé	Auguste	Riche,	of	 the	order	of	 the	Saint-Supilce,	was	a	widely	read	and	translated	 scholar.	With	 the	overt	 endorsement	of	 pope	Pius	 IX,	Riche	dedicated	his	life	to	the	combative	demonstration	that	Christianity	and	the	Catholic	doctrine	were	compatible	with	the	modern	world	and	political	and	scientific	developments.	As	 for	 many	 Catholic	 scholars	 of	 his	 generation,	 this	 meant	 proving	 that	Christianity	was	the	very	source	of	the	modern	individual,	its	liberties,	and	dignity,	as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 contrast	 with	 the	 brutality	 of	 the	 pagan	 world.	 If	 Western	modernity	was	founded	on	Christ,	then	secularism	denatured	it	entirely,	leading	to	the	widespread	ills	of	the	day.	This	applied	with	exceptional	urgency	to	the	family,	a	matter	on	which	Riche	wrote	much.276			
																																																								276 	Auguste	 Riche,	 Le	 Catholicisme	 considéré	 dans	 ses	 rapports	 avec	 la	 société	 (Paris,	 1866);	
Agreement	of	Science	and	Faith	upon	the	Sacred	Heart	of	Jesus	(London,	1883).	
	 291	
Besides	his	long	intellectual	career,	he	served	as	an	army	vicar	during	the	war	with	Prussia	and	was	 later	appointed	as	a	confessor	 to	 the	Communards	who	were	to	face	the	execution	squads	on	25	May	1871.	This	odious	role	would	however	award	him	 his	 fifteen	 minutes	 of	 fame.	 Shortly	 thereafter,	 he	 published	 the	 dramatic	account	of	how,	in	the	course	of	one	of	these	confessions,	a	prisoner	had	revealed	having	placed	explosives	and	petrol	in	Notre-Dame	cathedral	set	to	go	off	with	the	most	pressing	imminence.	He	was	able	to	alert	the	authorities,	who	arrived	just	in	time	as	the	fire	had	started	to	consume	some	of	the	furniture.	He	secured	a	pardon	for	the	prisoner	and	a	name	for	himself	in	the	gossip	columns	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	as	the	man	who	saved	Notre-Dame.			But	 it	 is	perhaps	a	 lesser-known	work	by	 the	abbé	Riche	 that	can	shed	 the	most	light	 on	 the	 modern,	 individualistic,	 nuclear	 family,	 despite	 being	 a	 treatise	 on	friendship.	The	nuclear	family	was	no	longer	the	domain	of	one	social	or	political	group	by	the	aftermath	of	the	Commune,	when	Riche	first	published	his	treatise	on	friendship	 anonymously,	 showing	 some	hesitance	 to	 avow	 the	work,	 he	 claimed,	given	 the	 frivolity	 of	 the	 subject	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 ‘calamities	 that	 have	 shaken	France	down	to	 its	 foundations’.277	The	hesitance	to	publish	under	his	own	name	could	 well	 have	 resulted	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 had	 far	 departed	 from	 the	‘traditional’	 family.	But	 a	warm	reception,	 among	 the	public	 and	presumably	 the	Church	 hierarchy,	 led	 to	 an	 extended	 edition	 that	 bore	 his	 name,	 and	 a	 third	edition	 by	 1886.	 This	 work	 documented	 the	 moment	 when	 French	 Catholics	adopted	the	nuclear	family	model.																																																										277	Riche,	L’amitié	(Paris,	1886),	p.	1.	
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The	first	part	of	the	book	sought	to	provide	a	much-needed	re-contextualization	of	the	writings	on	 friendship	 from	 the	 ancient	world	 to	 the	 end	of	 the	Old	Regime.	Indeed,	most	historical	writings	on	the	subject	would	have	evoked	adultery	in	the	minds	of	Riche’s	readers,	for	definitions	like	Aristotle’s	(‘friendship	is	like	one	soul	in	 two	 bodies’)	 elicited	 a	 level	 of	 unity	 that	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 reserved	 for	husband	and	wife.278			The	second	part	of	the	book	considered	friendship	almost	exclusively	in	or	through	the	family,	the	basis	of	which	was	equality.279	Equality	of	wealth	and	status	meant	that	marriages	driven	by	interest	and	egotism	were	immoral,	while	he	argued	that	‘we	 know	 of	 nothing	 more	 monstrous’	 that	 spouses	 of	 different	 ages.280	One	anonymous	 American	 reviewer	 of	 Riche’s	 earlier	 work	 had	 picked	 up	 on	 his	tendency,	increasingly	common	in	the	French	Catholic	Church,	to	move	away	from	marital	and	paternal	authority	as	the	basis	of	the	family.		The	 abbé	 knows	 and	 concedes	 [the	 proper	 subordinate	 place	 of	women],	 but	 he	uses	expressions	which	are	too	favorable	to	the	Women's	Rights	movement,	as	we	have	 sometimes	 found	 the	 illustrious	 Bishop	 of	 Orleans	 [Dupanloup]	 himself	doing.281	Now	 Riche	 took	 this	 even	 further	 by	 not	 only	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	equality,	 but	 also	 by	 substituting	 authority	 for	 friendship	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	domesticity.		
																																																								278	Ibid.,	p.	64.	279	Ibid.,	p.	66.	280	Ibid.,	pp.	136-138.	281	Anonymous,	 ‘[Review	 of:	 Riche,	 The	 Family	 (New	 York,	 1875)]’,	Brownson’s	Quarterly	 Review,	III/4	(1875),	p.	477.	
	 293	
Friendship	was	central	to	Riche’s	Christian	family.	Since	‘Year	by	year	love	grows	weaker	and	 finally	disappears’,	 only	 a	 ‘superior	 friendship’	built	 of	devotion	and	sacrifice,	indeed	‘something	more	pure	and	calm’	than	love,	could	keep	the	family	together.282	For	Riche,	as	for	all	who	defended	and	indissoluble	marriage,	such	an	important	union	could	not	be	based	on	the	whims	of	love,	hence	this	deployment	of	 ‘friendship’,	 as	 a	 passionless,	 disinterested	 form	 of	 relating	 that	 finds	 in	 the	home	 its	most	naturalized	expression.	 In	 turn,	 love	had	 to	be	 channelled	 toward	parenting.	‘There	is	something	even	more	ardent	and	tender	than	friendship	in	the	heart	of	a	father	and	a	mother	with	regards	to	their	children:	there	is	love’.283			The	 domain	 of	 this	 love,	 argued	 Riche,	was	 pure	 feminine	 sentimentality.	While	‘men	of	money	and	men	of	pleasure[…]	do	not	love	like	the	others’,	he	narrated	the	case	of	a	seasoned	general,	 the	 tears	running	 from	his	eyes	on	the	eve	of	a	great	battle	as	he	saw	off	his	little	boy.	 ‘I	am	not	at	all	surprised:	this	general,	he	was	a	father,	 and	 he	 had	 in	 his	 heart	 a	whole	 treasure	 of	 love’.284	The	 same	 happened	with	 a	 scientist,	 who	 in	 his	 tormented	 seriousness	 found	 time	 at	 night	 for	sentiment:	 ‘the	man	of	 science	 has	 picked	up	 [his	 small	 son]	 from	his	 bed,	 he	 is	caressing	and	kissing	him	with	all	the	precautions	and	the	tenderness	of	a	mother’.	Then	 a	 worker	 had	 a	 tender	 encounter,	 following	 the	 common	 literary	 trope	 of	coming	 home	 to	 his	 son’s	 arms	 ‘and	 the	 worker	 forgets	 in	 those	 caresses	 the	worries	 and	 fatigues	 of	 the	 day’.285	The	 androgynous	 nature	 of	 parenting	 and	domestic	ties	was	a	common	theme	in	family	literature	of	the	fin	de	siècle.	Literary	critic	 and	moralist	Thérèse	Bentzon	 remarked	 that,	while	 the	 father	 represented																																																									282	Riche,	L’amitié,	pp.	146-147.	283	Ibid.,	p.	149.	284	Ibid.,	p.	151.	285	Ibid.,	p.	153.	
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authority	 and	 the	 mother	 tenderness,	 ‘there	 is	 nothing	 rigorous	 about	 this	division’.286	The	 mother	 communicated	 heart	 and	 gentleness	 to	 her	 son,	 ‘she	feminized	 him	 in	 the	 best	 sense	 of	 the	 word’,	 while	 the	 father	 hardened	 the	intelligence	 of	 his	 daughter,	 ‘he	 makes	 of	 her	 an	 honest	 man,	 which	 is	 never	damaging	to	an	honest	woman’.287	Riche	concurred,	‘it	seems	possible	to	conclude	that	there	is	something	more	maternal	in	the	father’s	love	for	his	daughters,	and	on	the	contrary,	something	more	paternal	in	the	love	of	a	mother	for	her	sons’.288	As	Reid	 has	 argued,	 building	 on	 the	 de-centring	 of	 gender	 carried	 out	 by	 literary	scholar	 Nancy	 Armstrong,	 a	 split	 occurred	 between	 gender	 and	 sex	 in	 the	mid-century.289	In	1859	doctor	P.	Briquet	cast	hysteria	as	a	mental	condition	that	was	no	longer	derived	from	the	uterus.	By	translating	the	boundaries	of	this	excess	of	female	 sensitivity	 from	 the	 body	 to	 the	 mind,	 the	 borders	 between	 male	 and	female	 became	 more	 permeable	 and	 the	 indeterminate	 sexes	 and	 the	 male	hysteric,	later	to	be	termed	homosexual,	became	a	medical	possibility.	‘The	weaker	the	 discursive	 differences	 between	 men	 and	 women’,	 Reid	 has	 remarked,	 ‘the	stronger	the	solicitation	to	define,	detect,	and	perhaps	control	them’.290	While	this	translated	into	greater	stakes	in	social	self-steering	and	self-policing,	I	would	argue	that	for	parents	it	carved	out	a	new	gender-neutral	space	in	which	sentimentality	and	emotionality	gained	a	legitimate	object	and	means	of	expression.			
																																																								286	Thérèse	Bentzon,	Causeries	de	morale	pratique	(Paris,	1913),	p.	12.	287	Ibid.,	pp.	13-14.	288	Riche,	L’amitié,	p.	158.	289	Nancy	 Armstrong,	Desire	and	Domestic	Fiction:	A	Political	History	of	 the	Novel	 (Oxford,	 1987);	Thomas	Laqueur,	Making	Sex:	Body	and	Gender	from	the	Greeks	to	Freud	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1990);	Gillian	 Brown,	 Domestic	 Individualism:	 Imagining	 Self	 in	 Nieteenth-Century	 America	 (Berkeley,	1990).	290	Reid,	Families	in	Jeopardy,	pp.	59,	61.	
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Riche’s	 treatment	of	 friendship	outside	 the	 family	 is	 thin.	True	 friendship	at	best	could	be	experienced	at	school	with	one’s	peers,	which	were	carefully	chosen	by	parents.291	These	 childhood	 friendships	 experienced	 devotion	 ‘to	 the	 danger	 of	death	 for	 themselves’.	 	 ‘The	 virtuous	 friendships	 of	 youth	 provide	 a	 lifetime	 of	sweet	and	perfumed	memories’.292	But	adult	life	left	very	little	room	for	friendship.	The	lucky	few	retained	their	childhood	friends	and	could	see	them	sparingly.	The	rest	retained	only	the	pleased	reminiscence	of	these	bygone	days.	‘The	father	and	the	mother	speak	happily	 [of	 their	childhood	 friends]	and,	even	 in	old	age,	 these	loved	memories	give	charm	to	their	stories’.293	After	childhood,	such	feelings	were	to	be	reserved	for	one’s	own	children	and	grandchildren.			The	 Catholic	 family	 was	 no	 longer	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 moral	 beacon	 and	 a	bastion	of	virtue	as	it	had	been	by	the	cardinal	de	Bonald;	instead	it	adapted	to	the	times	 and	 came	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 temporary	 refuge	 in	 an	 intimidating	 world.	 The	Catholic	père	de	 famille	could	 still	 act	 as	 a	 role	model	 in	 the	 community,	 but	 his	legitimacy	no	longer	derived	from	his	moral	sovereignty	and	totalizing	command.	As	the	century	came	to	an	end,	the	père-patron	adapted	to	the	boundaries	between	the	 private	 and	 the	 public.	 Fatherhood	 within	 the	 home	 came	 to	 depend	increasingly	on	emotional	and	egalitarian	bonds	and	functional	performance,	while	authority	 in	 society	 became	 a	 personal	 embodiment	 of	 an	 impersonal	 power	derived	 from	 the	 wider	 institutional	 framework	 of	 republican	 legality	 and	morality.	 The	 moral	 superiority	 of	 the	 loving	 Catholic	 patriarch	 no	 longer	represented	 an	 alternative	 form	 of	 government	 of	 the	 family	 and	 society,	 but																																																									291	Riche,	L’amitié,	p.	190-191.	292	Ibid.,	p.	191.	293	Ibid.	
	 296	
rather	 came	 to	 be	 subsumed	 as	 functional	 guardians	 of	 the	wider	 secular	 order.	Thus,	 while	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle	 represented	 the	most	 overt	 confrontation	 between	Catholicity	and	secularism,	 it	was	as	 if	 the	more	the	terms	of	disagreement	could	be	expressed	in	strictly	political	terms,	the	more	space	could	open	up	for	a	broader	moral	and	civic	consensus.	Hence	the	politicization	and	‘ideologization’	of	this	old	confrontation	 between	 Catholics	 and	 liberals	 developed	 a	 new	 governmental,	social	and	familial	consensus	around	1900.		
Conclusion.		This	chapter	has	traced	how	parenting	and	authority	unfolded	and	developed	at	a	time	 when	 understandings	 of	 governing	 and	 verticality	 found	 their	 ideal	 in	 the	notion	of	guardianship,	as	a	limited	and	temporary	power	exercised	for	the	benefit	of	the	governed.	In	order	to	do	so,	we	have	considered	a	wide	range	of	case	studies	ranging	from	the	profanity	of	‘fallen’	and	marginal	women	to	the	holiest	family	of	Christianity.	The	influence	of	the	family	discourses	we	have	considered	did	not	rest	only	 in	 the	 ideal	 they	 put	 forward;	 instead,	 as	 Reid	 has	 shown,	 these	 narratives	mobilized	 a	 dramatized	 sense	 of	 lack	 which	 itself	 had	 a	 productive	 effect	 in	shaping	behaviours	and	perceptions.	Thanks	to	this	approach	to	lack,	this	chapter	has	 been	 able	 to	 highlight	 the	 productive	 influence	 of	 social	 debates	 and	administrative	action	in	shaping	parenting	in	the	home	and	authority	in	society	at	large.	 This	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 move	 beyond	 political	 and	 ideological	confrontations	 without	 denying	 the	 importance	 they	 played.	 In	 particular,	 this	chapter	moved	 away	 from	 the	 problematic	 simplicity	 of	 the	 opposition	 between	the	‘strict	father’	and	‘nurturant	parent’	in	order	to	trace	the	complex	development	
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of	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 family,	 motherhood	 and	 fatherhood	 in	 nineteenth-century	France	 as	well	 as	 the	 intimate	 connexions	between	 the	domestic	 sphere	and	the	broader	problem	of	power	and	authority	in	society.	By	tracing	the	rise	and	fall	 of	 the	 obligatory	 family	 in	 nineteenth	 century	 France	 and	 the	 thought	 and	practices	that	sustained	this	process,	it	has	been	possible	to	document	the	shifting	nature	of	parenting	and	social	government.		Within	 the	 Old	 Regime’s	 unified	 and	 patriarchal	 conception	 of	 authority,	 there	were	no	clear	boundaries	between	the	domestic	and	the	social,	private	and	public,	morality	 and	 law	 or	 love	 and	 power,	 but	 there	was	 an	 irreducible	 gap	 between	those	who	had	authority	and	those	who	never	would.	With	the	French	Revolution	and	 the	Civil	Code,	 an	 increasingly	egalitarian	 family	model	 emerged.	The	 family	was	egalitarian	on	two	accounts.	First,	by	creating	a	family,	all	adults	gained	equal	access	 to	 exercise	 an	 exclusive	 authority	 within	 the	 home.	 Authority	 no	 longer	depended	 on	 moral	 superiority.	 Unequal	 access	 to	 power	 in	 society	 was	compensated	by	an	equal	access	to	sovereign	command	within	the	family.	Second,	domestic	 authority	 drew	 a	 clear	 vertical	 rupture	 between	 parents	 and	 children,	while	conceptually	equalizing	 the	position	of	both	parents,	despite	actual	gender	inequalities,	and	eliminating	the	differences	in	legal	and	affectionate	treatment	of	children.	 The	 family	 respectively	 equalized	 parents	 and	 children	 by	 separating	both	 along	 a	 vertical	 axis	 of	 power.	 The	 1841	 law	 on	 child	 labour	 served	 to	reinforce	 this	 vertical	 order	 inside	 the	 family.	 The	 separation	 between	 legal	minority	 and	 legal	 majority	 became	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 nineteenth-century	understanding	 of	 power.	 Paternal	 guardianship	was	 no	 longer	 absolute	 because	the	 inequality	 of	 power	 on	 which	 it	 rested	 was	 temporary,	 functional	 and	
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utilitarian.	The	inequality	between	infant	and	grownup	ended	when	it	fulfilled	its	purpose,	that	is,	when	the	child	became	an	equal	adult	capable	of	reproducing	the	cycle	 indefinitely,	 making	 biological	 reproduction	 indistinct	 from	 social	reproduction.	 In	other	words,	paternal	guardianship	 justified	 inequality	precisely	because	 it	 promised	 to	 eliminate	 it.	 As	 such,	 the	 opacity	 of	 the	 private	 sphere	became	 central	 for	 the	 justification	 of	 state	 power	 as	 a	 guardian	 of	 social	betterment	as	well	as	 for	 the	rationalization	of	 the	 irreducible	social	 inequalities	that	were	mapped	onto	the	adult-child	opposition.		Thus	 the	 split	 between	 the	 domestic	 and	 the	 social	 carved	 out	 two	 separate	domains	 of	 sovereign	 authority	 operating	 on	 dissimilar	 but	 complementary	manners.	In	the	home	and	in	private	charity	work,	power	and	love	still	went	hand-in-hand,	while	social	government	rested	on	an	impersonal	state	authority	capable	of	steering	the	atomized	crowd	of	strangers	that	society	was	now	imagined	to	be.	In	 the	social	and	domestic	domains,	 sovereign	rights	and	 legitimacy	were	 tied	 to	inescapable	 obligations.	 While	 parents	 exercised	 property-like	 rights	 over	 their	children	 and	 home,	 they	 gained	 an	 absolute	 obligation	 to	 keep	 their	 children	regardless	 of	 circumstances.	 These	 absolute	 rights	 and	 obligations	 derived	 from	biological	 affiliation	 provocatively	 came	 to	 override	 the	 previous	 conditions	 of	marriage	 and	morality	 that	had	defined	 the	 family.	The	 rights	 and	obligations	of	the	state	were	equally	as	absolute,	but	 focused	 less	on	assisting	 families	 than	on	enforcing	 paternal	 obligations	 while	 keeping	 public	 spending	 at	 a	 minimum	 in	order	to	protect	the	property	rights	of	taxpayers.	While	in	the	Old	Regime	morality	had	 been	 a	 precondition	 for	 family	 life,	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 the	 domestic	sphere	 became	 an	 extra-judicial	 space	 where	 the	 rewards	 and	 punishments	 for	
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morality	 could	 be	 allocated	 impersonally.	 The	 virtuous	 enjoyed	 the	 home	 as	 a	sacred	space	that	guaranteed	their	rights	and	properties,	while	the	vicious	found	in	the	burden	of	domesticity	the	retributions	for	their	transgressions.	In	either	case,	the	 private	 and	 the	 public	 sphere	 were	 inseparable	 within	 the	 larger	understanding	of	government	in	society.		From	the	1860s,	 this	 tight	opposition	between	private	and	public	and	rights	and	obligations	gradually	 loosened.	Without	eliminating	 them,	 society	emerged	as	an	intermediary	entity	between	the	binary	oppositions	that	had	been	so	dear	 to	 the	first	half	 of	 the	 century.	 Social	 interest	 and	utility,	 rather	 than	morality,	 came	 to	determine	the	orientation	of	both	the	private	and	public	sphere.	Parenting	became	a	 temporary	 and	 voluntary	 social	 function	 that	was	 to	 be	 exercised	 on	 behalf	 of	society	in	the	interest	of	the	child,	regardless	of	his	or	her	ingratitude.	Marriage	in	France	 increasingly	 became	 little	 more	 than	 the	 social	 function	 that	 articulated	productive	 and	 reproductive	 duties.	 In	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 there	was	 a	tendency	 to	 consider	 unmarried	 couples	 in	 the	 same	 light	 as	 married	 spouses,	further	 emphasizing	 function	 over	 form.	While	 even	 by	 1899	 close	 to	 a	 third	 of	those	 prosecuted	 spent	 time	 in	 prison,	 adulterous	 couples	 gained	 the	 right	 to	marry	in	1904.294	By	1919	pensions	for	widows	of	combatants	were	also	granted	to	their	concubines.295	As	with	foundlings’	foster	parents,	parenting	was	becoming	a	matter	of	procedure	and	practice	rather	than	a	defining	ontological	category.		
																																																								294	Patricia	 Mainardi,	 Husbands,	 Wives,	 and	 Lovers:	 Marriage	 and	 its	 Discontents	 in	 Nineteenth-
Century	France	(New	Haven,	2003),	p.	220.	295	Stéphanie	Petit,	 ‘La	pension	de	veuve	de	guerre	de	14-18:	Une	pension	de	fidélité?’,	in:	Évelyne	Morin-Rotureau	(ed.),	Combats	de	femmes,	1914-1918	(Paris,	2004),	pp.	119-120.	
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Paternal	authority	was	no	longer	only	gender	neutral,	but	became	unhinged	from	biology	 and	 reduced	 to	 technical	 tasks	 destined	 to	 (re)produce	 socially-viable	individuals.	This	progression	was	clearly	seen	in	the	case	of	maternity.	While	the	figure	 of	 the	 mother	 was	 indistinct	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 century	 and	indistinguishable	 from	 that	 of	 a	 paid	 wet-nurse	 or	 guardian,	 the	 focus	 on	breastfeeding	implied	not	only	that	motherhood	became	linked	to	an	obligation	of	direct	care,	but	that	the	cohabitation	of	mother	and	child	had	become	central	to	the	mother-child	 bond.	 From	 the	 1860s,	 the	 duties	 of	 mothering	moved	 away	 from	vague	notions	of	 instinct,	nature	and	morality	 towards	 the	need	 for	an	 intensive	and	constant	attention	towards	the	child,	implying	a	fragmented	series	of	hygienic	operations	 that	 were	 most	 successfully	 carried	 out	 under	 medical	 and	administrative	 supervision.	 These	 savoirs	 and	 practices	 were	 defined	 and	promoted	 by	 institutions	 through	 a	 sensationalist	 narrative	 of	 lack	 and	 danger,	most	 notably	 through	 the	 use	 and	 vulgarization	 of	 statistics.	 Thus	 the	 domestic	was	no	longer	the	hidden-from-view	space	where	inequality	could	be	naturalized	in	 the	 parent-child	 bond	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 social	 government.	 Instead,	 the	 home	became	increasingly	permeable	to	the	gaze	and	influence	of	these	administrators,	scientists,	 philanthropists	 and	 doctors,	who	 gained	 the	 ability	 to	 either	 sever	 or	reinforce	 biological	 bonds.	 While	 no	 longer	 a	 right,	 parenting	 became	 in	 turn	optional	 and	 voluntary;	 and	 as	 the	 First	 World	 War	 approached,	 it	 became	 a	subsidized	and	progressively	professionalized	social	occupation.			Equally	 standardized	 became	 the	 role	 of	 local	 and	 charitable	 authorities.	 A	 new	framework	 of	 impersonal	 and	 institutional	 power	 emerged	 into	 which	interpersonal	 authority	 and	 affection	 could	 integrate	 without	 contradiction.	
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Authority	became	unified	in	the	legality	of	social	government	at	the	same	time	that	it	 multiplied	 locally	 as	 a	 dense	 web	 of	 authorities	 that	 came	 to	 structure	 the	national	 space	 into	 the	 solidary,	 totalizing	 and	 indistinct	whole	 that	 society	was	imagined	 to	 be.	 Private	 and	 public	 power	 thus	merged	 to	 generate	 a	 new	 social	authority;	one	as	unified	as	it	was	manifold.		While	the	family	and	the	wider	issue	of	social	government	were	inseparable	in	the	nineteenth	century,	one	could	not	be	reduced	to	the	other,	or	indeed	exist	without	the	other.	The	nineteenth	 century	 saw	 the	 implementation	of	 a	 regulation	of	 the	affects	to	bring	them	in	line	with	duty,	a	process	whose	origins	dated	back	to	the	seventeenth	 century.	 The	 home	 came	 to	 represent	 the	 space	 where	 love	 and	inequality	were	to	remain	compatible	owing	to	the	dictates	of	nature.	Elsewhere,	affection	was	 imagined	 as	 dependent	 on	material	 or	moral	 equality,	 a	 condition	that	was	absent	in	most	social	interactions.	Thus	the	school	gradually	emerged	as	a	supervised	space	of	egalitarian	sociability	where	friendships	could	flourish.	As	the	family	 lost	 its	 centrality	 in	 the	 1880s,	 schooling	 became	 free	 and	 universal	 in	France,	 while,	 as	 we	 will	 see	 next,	 these	 institutional	 spaces	 of	 egalitarian	interaction	 would	 multiply,	 breaking	 up	 the	 hostility	 of	 the	 social	 world	 into	manageable	spheres	of	voluntary	group	belonging	and	recognition.	The	sources	of	the	 individual	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	nineteenth	 century	were	no	 longer	 to	be	found	in	the	privacy	of	the	home	and	the	moi.	We	will	now	explore	the	rise	of	the	increasingly	socialized	self.				 	
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Chapter	3	
	
Gouverner	les	Mœurs:	
The	Sociology	of	the	Plural	Self,	1848-1914.			
Introduction.		‘The	 notion	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 individual	 and	 society’,	 wrote	statesman	 Léon	 Bourgeois	 in	 1896,	 ‘has	 been	 profoundly	 modified	 in	 the	 last	quarter	 of	 a	 century’.	 Although,	 he	 pointed	 out,	 ‘In	 appearance,	 nothing	 has	changed’.1	Pierre	Rosanvallon	has	called	these	fundamental	yet	hidden	changes	‘a	silent	revolution	of	the	political	system,	in	its	facts’.2	A	‘great	turn’	took	place	from	1870	 to	 1920,	 with	 the	 1890s	 being	 the	 watershed	 moment.3	While	 politics	became	 permeable	 to	 ‘social’	 interests	 to	 which	 parliamentarians	 were	increasingly	 bound,	 parliament	 lost	 its	monopoly	 on	 democratic	 life	 vis-à-vis	 an	increasingly	dynamic	civil	 society.4	While	universal	 (male)	suffrage	 finally	gained	generalized	 acceptance,	 a	 demopedic	 determination	 arose,	 seeking	 to	 ‘educate	democracy’	 and	 channel	 political	 participation	 into	 the	 act	 of	 voting. 5 	The	conceptualization	 of	 society	 as	 an	 organic	 entity	 altered	 the	 notions	 of	 political																																																									1	Léon	Bourgeois,	Solidarité	(Paris,	1902),	p.	8.	2	Pierre	 Rosanvallon,	 La	 démocratie	 inachavée	 (Paris,	 2000),	 p.	 266.	 See:	 Andrew	 Jainchill	 and	Samuel	Moyn,	 ‘French	democracy	between	 totalitarianism	and	 solidarity:	Pierre	Rosanvallon	and	revisionist	historiography’,	Journal	of	Modern	History,	76/1	(2004),	pp.	140-146.	3 	Rosanvallon,	 Demands	 of	 Liberty	 (Cambridge,	 Mass.,	 2007),	 p.	 215.	 The	 rise	 of	 ‘national-protectionnisme’	 in	 the	period	 is	analysed	 in:	Rosanvallon,	La	société	des	egaux	 (Paris,	2011),	pp.	183-202.	4	Rosanvallon,	Démocratie	inachavée,	pp.	258-329;	Nicolas	Rousselier,	Le	parlement	de	l'éloquence:	
La	souveraineté	de	la	délibération	au	lendemain	de	la	Grande	guerre	(Paris,	1997).	5	Rosanvallon,	La	consagración	del	ciudadano	(Mexico,	D.F.,	1999),	pp.	312-351.	
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representation	 and	 gradually	 made	 acceptable	 the	 presence	 of	 particularistic	interests	 in	 the	 public	 realm.	 This	 was	 a	 rupture	 with	 the	 Jacobin	 tradition	 in	French	 political	 culture.	 François	 Furet	 defined	 Jacobinism	 as	 a	 belief	 in	 ‘the	central	figure	of	a	sovereign	and	indivisible	public	authority	with	power	over	civil	society’.6	The	counterpart	to	the	 indivisible	moi,	 the	Jacobin	understanding	of	the	state	had	sought	to	guarantee	equality	by	impeding	the	formation	of	intermediary	bodies	between	the	individual	and	the	state.	This	view	of	the	state	was	abandoned	towards	the	1890s,	making	possible	the	institutionalization	of	political	parties,	the	legalization	 of	 trade	 unions	 and	 associations;	 in	 short,	 the	 rise	 of	 new	 forms	 of	structuring	 of	 the	 social	 did	 away	 with	 the	 opposition	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	individual.	Networks	of	intermediary	bodies	gradually	fused	with	the	state	as	the	early	 twentieth	 century	 progressed. 7 	‘[A]	 veritable	 general	 economy	 of	representation	 was	 progressively	 realized,	 making	 the	 original	 revolutionary	model	 more	 complex	 and	 plural’.8	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	witnessed	 the	 abandonment	 of	 the	 old	 understanding	 of	 pauperism	 and	 the	transition	towards	modern	universal	welfare	practices.	These	substantive	changes	that	led	to	a	‘normalization’	of	politics	in	France	took	place	while	‘The	Constitution	remained	unchanged’.	 ‘It	is	therefore	not	the	institutions	that	changed.	Nor	was	a	social	 rupture	 the	 cause	 [of	 the	 shift].	 It	 is	 quite	 simply	 that	 the	 mores	 and	practices	 had	 imperceptibly	 remodelled	 the	 life	 of	 the	 institutions	 and	 changed	their	spirit’.9		
																																																								6	François	 Furet,	 ‘Jacobinism’,	 in:	 Furet	 and	Mona	Ozouf	 (eds.),	A	Critical	Dictionary	of	 the	French	
Revolution	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1989),	p.	710.	7	Rosanvallon,	Le	peuple	introuvable	(Paris,	1998),	pp.	133-175;	and	Demands	of	Liberty,	part	III.	8	Rosanvallon,	Peuple	introuvable,	p.	221.	9	Rosanvallon,	Démocratie	inachavée,	pp.	260,	267.	
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This	 chapter	 continues	 the	discussion	on	 subjectivity	 started	 in	 the	 first	 chapter	and	contextualized	by	the	second.	The	writings	of	physiologists	and	aliénistes	will	be	used	to	show	how	the	former	unity	of	the	moi	came	to	be	challenged,	while	with	the	 sociological	 views	 of	 Auguste	 Comte	 there	 emerged	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	society	as	a	reified	force	that	was	necessary	to	govern	individuals	now	imagined	as	divided.	An	instrumental	figure	in	developing	these	medical	and	social	views	was	physician	Émile	Littré,	one	of	the	key	developers	of	Comte’s	positivist	views	and	an	‘intellectual	 founding	 father	 of	 the	 Third	 Republic’.10 	In	 turn,	 Jules	 Simon,	 a	republican	politician	and	prolific	thinker,	will	help	us	document	the	leap	of	these	ideas	into	the	field	of	welfare	and	social	government.11	The	new	developments	of	the	 positivist	 sciences	 of	 the	 mind	 in	 the	 1870s	 and	 1880s	 demonstrated	 the	fragmentation	of	 consciousness,	 further	entrenching	 the	division	of	 the	 self.	This	paved	the	way	for	the	work	of	the	well-known	sociologist	Émile	Durkheim.	I	will	argue	that	Durkheim	very	deliberately	put	forward	a	new	paradigm	of	subjectivity	much	in	the	same	way	that	Victor	Cousin	had	done	earlier	in	the	century.12	As	the	first,	this	chapter	will	discuss	the	origins	and	development	of	this	model	of	the	self,	as	well	 as	 the	 governmental	 technologies	 of	 the	 self	 that	 sustained	 it.	 As	 society	became	 the	 source	 of	 morality,	 a	 new	 ‘sense	 social’	 came	 to	 substitute	 the	 old	‘sense	moral’	of	 the	 first	half	of	 the	nineteenth	century.	Each	 individual	was	now	
																																																								10	Sudhir	Hazareesingh,	Intellectual	Founders	of	the	Republic	(Oxford,	2001),	chapter	1.	11	Philip	Bertocci,	 Jules	Simon:	Republican	Anticlericalism	and	Cultural	Politics	in	France,	1848-1886	(Columbia,	1978).	12	On	 this	 parallel	 between	 V.	 Cousin	 and	 É.	 Durkheim	 see:	 Jerrold	 Seigel,	 The	 Idea	 of	 the	 Self	(Cambridge,	 2005),	 chapter	 14.	 I	 have	 found	 few	 others	 authors	 who	 have	 studied	 Durkheim’s	views	as	one	 historical	 conceptualization	of	 subjectivity,	 rather	 than	a	normative	 and	descriptive	scientific	theorization	of	how	humans	really	are	(as	is	the	case	among	present	day	 ‘sociologists	of	the	 individual’	 in	 France).	 One	 exception	 is	 Anoop	 Gupta,	 Kierkegaard's	 Romantic	 Legacy:	 Two	
Theories	of	the	Self	(Ottowa,	2005),	chapter	7,	but	his	aim	is	not	to	historicize	Durkheim	but	rather	to	 offer	 an	 original	 theorization	 of	 selfhood.	 Although	 with	 a	 similar	 purpose,	 Massimo	 Rosati,	
Ritual	and	 the	Sacred:	A	Neo-Durkheimian	Analysis	of	Politics,	Religion	and	 the	Self	 (Surrey,	 2009)	provides	a	most	thought-provoking	engagement	with	Durkheim’s	notion	of	moi.	
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called	upon	to	fully	participate	in	society	by	engaging	in	a	myriad	of	self-governing	groups,	 each	 of	 which	 held	 specific	 standards	 of	 normality.	 The	 self	 became	identified	with	a	plurality	of	non-exclusive	functions	and	memberships.	Individuals	were	to	find	in	their	social	occupations	and	participations	their	own	sense	of	self	worth.	 ‘One	 esteems	oneself	 in	 considering	 that	 one	has	 done	his	 duty,	 and	 that	one	 is	 useful	 to	 oneself	 and	 others’,	 wrote	 republican	 politician	 Édouard	Laboulaye,	 the	man	who	gave	New	Yorkers	their	Statue	of	Liberty.13		We	will	see	how	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 self-mastery,	 consisting	 in	 actively	 willing	 social	compliance	 and	 function	 performance,	 became	 the	 new	 standard	 for	 self-government.	And	yet,	this	was	not	the	obedience	of	old.	Submission	to	society	now	became	 tied	 to	 the	 affirmation	 of	 one’s	 individuality	 and	 particularity,	 as	 an	uncertain	 mixture	 of	 authenticity	 and	 aesthetic	 self-fashioning,	 sameness	 and	diversity,	compliance	and	defiance.	Through	one	bestseller	by	Jules	Payot,	we	will	see	 how	modern	 self-improvement	 literature	 offered	 specific	 guidance	 for	 these	tasks.	 These	 technologies	 of	 the	 self	 would	 take	 the	 place	 of	 the	 moral	deliberations	 Elie	 Luzac	 had	 proposed.	 We	 will	 also	 see	 how	 the	 new	understanding	of	 the	 self	was	 translated	 into	 innovative	pedagogical	 approaches	that	 no	 longer	 relied	 on	 comparison	 with	 others.	 The	 old	 schools	 tasked	 with	producing	 and	 policing	 sameness	 and	 discipline,	 now	 focused	 on	 developing	socially	 integrated	 individual	personalities	 capable	of	 self-mastery	and	voluntary	obedience.	Writings	by	 the	 influential	 education	minister	Léon	Bourgeois	will	be	key	 to	 document	 some	of	 these	 governmental	 changes	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 the	thought	of	François	Guizot	did	in	the	first	chapter.	Bourgeois	was	prime	minister	in	the	mid	1890s	and	a	cabinet	member	for	most	of	the	decade.	This	1920	Peace	Prize																																																									13	Edouard	Laboulaye,	Discours	populaires	(Paris,	1869),	p.	61.	
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laureate	 is	 best	 known	 as	 the	 theorist	 of	 solidarisme,	 the	 official	 political	philosophy	of	the	Third	Republic.14	I	argue	that	solidarisme	was	closely	linked	with	the	new	model	of	sociological	subjectivity.	The	majority	of	the	views	and	authors	discussed	 in	 this	 section	were	 linked	 to	 this	doctrine	of	 solidarity.	As	 in	 the	 first	chapter,	my	focus	on	the	governmental	applications	of	theories	of	subjectivity	had	led	me	to	leave	aside	competing	views	on	the	self	and	governing.	In	so	doing,	this	chapter	 concludes	 the	 lines	 of	 inquiry	 begun	by	 the	 first.	 The	 same	 genealogical	approach,	with	its	reliance	on	printed	sources,	will	be	used.		Through	 these	 sources,	 I	 should	 like	 to	 explore	 the	 profound	 changes	 that	 took	place	in	the	fin	de	siècle	and	that	Rosanvallon	dubbed	‘le	moment	1890’.	My	claim	is	 that	 these	 cannot	 be	 attributed	 to	 seemingly	 unintelligible	 transformations	 in	‘mores	and	practices’,	but	rather	that	they	reveal	the	emergence	of	a	new	paradigm	for	the	modern	individual	and	the	state.	Equally,	rather	than	‘imperceptible’,	these	changes	 came	 about	 after	 decades	 of	 intense	 public	 debate	 on	 the	 nature	 of	individual	 and	 social	 life.	 This	 chapter	 will	 thus	 trace	 the	 gradual	 and	 hesitant	development	 of	 the	 fin-de-siècle	 shift	 in	 subjectivity	 by	 tracing	 its	 origins	 in	 the	profound	 intellectual	 crisis	 that	 resulted	 from	 the	1848	 revolution	and	 the	1851	coup	d'état	by	prince	Louis-Napoléon	Bonaparte.			The	 changes	 that	 took	 place	 by	 the	 fin-de-siècle	 implied	 an	 abandonment	 of	 the	unified	 theory	 of	 the	 moi,	 the	 socialization	 of	 moral	 deliberations,	 the	 end	 of	educational	emulation	and	a	deep	transformation	in	the	nature	of	social	assistance.																																																									14	J.E.S.	 Hayward,	 ‘The	 official	 philosophy	 of	 the	 French	 Third	 Republic:	 Leon	 Bourgeois	 and	Solidarism’,	 International	 Review	 of	 Social	 History,	 6/1	 (1961),	 pp	 19-48;	 Serge	 Audier,	 Léon	
Bourgeois:	Fonder	la	solidarité	(Paris,	2007);	Marc	Sorlot,	Léon	Bourgeois:	Un	moraliste	en	politique	(Paris,	2005);	Marie-Claude	Blais,	La	solidarité:	Histoire	d'une	idée	(Paris,	2007).	
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While	these	changes	in	welfare	policy	were	linked	with	the	rise	of	so-called	‘social	rights’,	 the	 very	 notion	 of	 rights	 had	 changed.	 Bourgeois	 wrote	 that	 ‘Society	 is	formed	 by	 fellows	 (semblables),	 that	 is,	 by	 beings	 that	 have,	 under	 the	 real	inequalities	that	distinguish	them,	a	primary	[and]	indestructible	identity’.	Instead	of	drawing	on	abstract	notions	of	the	rights	and	duties	as	inalienable	possessions	of	 ‘man’,	 he	 argued	 that	 rights	 belonged	 to	 this	 shared	 social	 identity.	 Rights	belonged	 to	 society,	 not	 the	 individual.	 The	 ‘natural	 inequality	 of	 all	 sorts	 that	separate	 and	 differentiate	 men[…]	 will	 be	 the	 only	 causes	 of	 a	 difference	 that	should	 never	 be	 increased	 by	 an	 inequality	 of	 rights’. 15 	Key	 among	 such	inequalities	granted	by	 ‘nature	and	 luck’	were	personal	health	and	 lifespan.16		 In	other	words,	claims	 to	assistance	did	not	derive	 from	citizenship	nor	were	equal	for	all;	 they	were	not	subjective	or	dependent	on	the	subject	 itself,	and	therefore	nothing	 anyone	 had	 an	 innate	 right	 to.	 Instead,	 they	 were	 grounded	 in	 the	objectivity	 of	 ‘natural	 inequalities’,	 that	 is,	 in	 the	 tangible	 body	 as	 apprehended	specifically	by	the	sciences	of	‘man’.	This	explains	the	particular	morphology	of	the	welfare	edifice	built	in	the	Third	Republic.	Édouard	Campagnole	was	a	civil	servant	in	 Henri	 Monod’s	 influential	 Direction	 de	 l'assistance	 publique,	 the	 public	institution	that	served	as	 intellectual	engine	behind	Republican	welfare	reform.17	He	 clearly	 emphasized	 the	 tripartite	 nature	 of	 this	 republican	 social	 policy.	 ‘The	assistance	of	children,	the	assistance	of	ill	adults	[and]	the	assistance	of	the	elderly	form,	properly	speaking,	the	tree	aspects	of	a	single	difficulty,	the	three	terms	of	a	
																																																								15	Bourgeois,	Solidarité,	pp.	112-114.	16	Ibid.,	p.	174.	17	The	Direction	and	the	Conseil	supérieur	together	formed	the	heart	of	Third	Republic’s	assistance	
publique.	 Colette	 Bec,	 Assistance	 et	 République	 (Paris,	 1994),	 chapter	 3,	 and	 ‘Politique	 sociale	 et	initiative	administrative:	L'exemple	du	Conseil	 supérieur	de	 l'assistance	publique,	1886-1906’,	Le	
mouvement	social,	163	(1993),	pp.	67-84.	
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single	question’.18	Biological	 and	bodily	difference	made	 it	possible	 to	 isolate	 the	worker	in	all	his	purity;	age	and	health	became	the	only	objective	criteria	for	being	exempt	 from	work.	The	reduction	of	 individuality	 to	 the	body	made	possible	 the	development	 of	 increasingly	 encompassing	 forms	 of	 social	 assistance	 without	violating	 the	 liberal	 maxim	 that	 there	 should	 never	 be	 a	 personal	 right	 to	assistance	from	the	collective.	Work	no	longer	needed	to	be	apprehended	through	the	moral	 lens	of	 political	 economy	or	biblical	 condemnations.	The	 consensus	 in	the	early	half	 of	 the	 century	had	 coincided	with	Tocqueville’s	 claim	 that	poverty	and	 crime	 were	 the	 result	 of	 individual’s	 ‘natural	 passion	 for	 idleness’. 19	Consequently,	the	‘true’	causes	of	misery	had	been	hidden	under	the	moral	veil	of	the	poor’s	intentionality;	no	institutional	mechanism	had	been	able	find	objective	grounds	 to	 distinguish	 the	 ‘good’	 poor	 who,	 unable	 to	 subsist	 on	 their	 own,	merited	genuine	help	and	 the	 ‘bad’	poor	who	were	social	parasites	because	 they	refused	to	sell	their	labour.	At	best	the	matter	could	be	taken	up	by	private	charity,	for	 which	 the	 litmus	 test	 to	 separate	 the	 ‘good’	 and	 the	 ‘bad’	 was	 the	 former’s	willingness	to	recognize	their	own	childish	inability	for	self-government	and	cede	their	intentionality	to	a	benevolent	guardian.	By	the	fin	de	siècle,	every	adult	was	defined	as	a	dutiful	and	productive	member	by	‘nature’;	ready	to	work	when	a	job	was	available.	This	was	a	 ‘nature’	 that	also	 randomly	allocated	exceptions	 to	 the	rule	in	the	form	of	bad	health.	Individual	particularities	and	the	recalcitrance	of	the	body	or	the	mind	they	housed	could	be	treated	and	educated	through	specialized	interventions.	 But	 while	 discourses	 on	 health	 and	 the	 body	 came	 to	 shape	individuals’	place	 in	 society	and	 the	market	 in	new	ways,	 state	expertise	did	not	yet	have	the	coercive	powers	it	would	acquire	later	in	the	twentieth	century.	And																																																									18	Édouard	Campagnole,	L’assistance	médicale	gratuite	(Paris,	1895),	p.	1.	19	Quoted	in:	Michael	Drolet,	Tocqueville,	Democracy	and	Social	Reform	(Basingstoke,	2003),	p.	142.	
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even	then,	oppression	was	not	the	aim	and	means	of	these	medical	discourses.	As	Robert	 Nye	 argued,	 medical	 discourses	 operated	 through	 ‘a	 process	 whereby	medical	and	health	precepts	have	been	embodied	in	individuals	who	assume	this	responsibility	 for	 themselves’	 as	 subjects	 of	 their	 own	 health.20	As	 the	 first,	 this	chapter	 will	 therefore	 explore	 the	 ‘structure	 of	 experience’	 that	 provided	individuals	with	the	possibility	and	tools	in	order	to	constitute	themselves	as	free,	responsible	 subjects,	 and	 this	 self-construction	 constituted	 the	 ultimate	 end	 of	state	policies	such	as	social	assistance,	schooling	or	military	service.		By	 the	end	of	 the	nineteenth	century,	poverty	was	no	 longer	related	 to	morality,	but	had	become	an	objective	category	 tied	 to	 state	 institutions.	 In	1908,	German	sociologist	Georg	Simmel	argued	that:	 ‘He	is	poor	whose	means	are	not	sufficient	to	 attain	 his	 ends’.	 Since	 levels	 of	 needs	 are	 specific	 to	 the	 person’s	 milieu	 and	class,	he	argued,	it	is	therefore	not	possible	to	establish	a	level	of	absolute	poverty.	Relative	 poverty	 in	 one	 class	 could	 mean	 abundance	 in	 an	 inferior	 one.	 The	conclusion	 was	 that	 if	 poverty	 was	 possible	 in	 all	 social	 classes,	 then	 not	 all	poverty	could	be	relieved	through	social	assistance.21		For	 this	reason,	no	one	 is	socially	poor	until	he	has	been	assisted.	And	this	has	a	general	 validity:	 sociologically	 speaking,	 poverty	 does	 not	 come	 first	 and	 then	assistance[…]	but	a	person	is	called	poor	who	receives	assistance[…]	The	poor,	as	a	sociological	 category,	 are	 not	 those	 who	 suffer	 specific	 deficiencies	 and	deprivations,	 but	 those	who	 receive	 assistance	 or	 should	 receive	 it	 according	 to	social	 norms.[…]	 This	 group	 does	 not	 remain	 united	 by	 interaction	 among	 its																																																									20	Robert	Nye,	‘The	evolution	of	the	concept	of	medicalization	in	the	late	twentieth	century’,	Journal	
of	History	of	the	Behavioral	Sciences,	39/2	(2003),	pp.	117-119.	21	Georg	Simmel,	‘The	poor’,	in:	Donald	Levine	(ed.),	Georg	Simmel	on	Individuaity	and	Social	Forms	(Chicago,	1971),	pp.	172-174.	
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members,	but	by	 the	collective	attitude	which	society	as	a	whole	adopts	 towards	it.22	Poverty	 did	 not	 refer	 to	 an	 individual	 situation,	 regardless	 of	 actual	 hardship.	Poverty	was	simply	a	standard	that	society	set	at	random.	And	by	society	Simmel	meant	 welfare	 agencies.	 It	 was	 these	 state	 benefits	 that	made	 the	 poor	 a	 valid	category.	The	moral	and	subjective	traits	had	disappeared,	making	way	for	public	welfare	 programmes	 and	 considerations	 of	 public	 utility.	 Poverty	 now	 spoke	 of	governmental	 rather	 than	 individual	 inadequacies.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 welfare	programmes	 were	 becoming	 increasingly	 complex,	 each	 catering	 for	 more	 and	more	disaggregate	and	distinct	groups.	There	was	little	use	for	‘poverty’	as	a	vague	umbrella	 term.	 By	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 its	 use	 was	 increasingly	restricted	 to	 ex-colonial	 peoples	 and	 was	 more	 a	 way	 of	 remarking	 the	shortcomings	 of	 their	 governments	 than	 that	 of	 the	 poor	 themselves.	Consequently,	 ‘the	 term	poor	 seemed	 to	 have	 been	 crossed	 out	 once	 and	 for	 all	from	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 vocabulary	 of	 the	 West’,	 argued	 father	 Joseph	Wresinski.23	This	 was	 the	 case	 until	 1965,	 when	 Jules	 Klanfer	 rediscovered	 the	concept	of	poverty	together	its	conceptual	synonym	‘exclusion’,	both	of	which	have	known	a	surprising	intellectual	success	in	France	in	the	last	fifty	years.24	In	effect,	the	changes	in	the	understanding	of	the	subject	and	the	state	in	the	1890s	caused	the	very	notion	of	poverty	to	disappear	from	France	for	more	than	half	a	century.		
	
																																																								22	Ibid.,	pp.	175-177.	23	Quoted	in:	Philippe	Sassier,	Du	bon	usage	des	pauvres	(Paris,	1990),	p.	341.	24	Ibid.,	pp.	342-377.	See:	 Jules	Klanfer,	L’exclusion	sociale:	Etude	de	la	marginalité	dans	les	sociétés	
occidentales	 (Paris,	 1965)	 and	 Le	 sous-developpement	 humain	 (Paris,	 1967);	 Julien	 Damon,	 ‘La	protection	sociale	à	l'épreuve	de	l'exclusion’,	Regards	sur	l'actualité,	345	(November	2008),	pp.	37-49.	
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Healing	1848.		While	 the	 opposition	 to	 the	 July	 monarchy	 had	 been	 very	 diverse,	 their	 shared	rejection	of	 the	regime	had	pushed	them	to	adopt	a	common	position.	 Instead	of	
order,	 the	watchword	 of	 the	 heterogeneous	 opponents	 of	 the	 regime	 that	 fell	 in	1848,	 from	socialists	 and	Saint-Simonians	 to	 the	Catholic	Church	and	 legitimists,	was	organization.	There	was	to	be	an	organized	society	of	‘organized	beings’.25	To	base	the	government	of	the	body	politic	on	the	free	play	of	 ‘human	nature’	 led	to	social	disintegration,	depravity	and	anarchy.	This	was	a	reaction	‘against	that	“void	of	society”	that	should	allow,	according	to	liberal	theory,	to	preserve	the	distance	between	the	State	and	the	individual,	but	that	did	not	solve	the	political	danger	of	their	confrontation’.26	The	place	of	power	needed	to	be	occupied,	either	by	reason	or	 morality.	 The	 social	 body	 needed	 to	 be	 organized	 in	 accordance	 with	 that	power,	 and	 steered	 in	 the	 rightful	 direction.	 But	 liberalism	 was	 not	 just	 one	political	 ideology	 among	 others;	 instead,	 liberalism,	 as	 a	 model	 of	 governing	through	liberty,	was	what	made	possible	to	speak	of	politics	in	any	modern	sense.	The	 political	 field	 was	 not	 an	 open	 space	 of	 possibility,	 but	 rather	 a	 highly	determined	and	structured	domain.			After	eighteen	years	of	liberal	hegemony,	the	capacity	to	think	the	state,	society	or	the	 individual	 had	 been	 reduced	 to	 a	 Manichean	 opposition,	 either	 liberal	 or	illiberal,	 and	 both	 options	 had	 been	 drawn	 up	 and	 theorized	 by	 liberal	 thinkers	themselves.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 alternative	 available	 to	 the	 ‘innovators’	 of	 1848	was	 the	 very	 antithesis	 that	 liberal	 thinkers	 themselves	 had	 sketched	 out.																																																									25	L.-F.	Jéhan,	Dictionnaire	d’anthropologie	(Paris,	1853),	p.	955.	26	Giovanna	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère	(Paris,	1993),	p.	306.	
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Illiberalism	took	two	forms,	both	of	which	could	be	traced	back	to	J.-J.	Rousseau.	As	Judith	 Shklar	 has	 shown,	 Rousseau	 offered	 two	 different	 utopias,	 not	 as	programmatic	 ideals,	 but	 as	 a	 nostalgic	 longing	 for	 a	 simpler	 and	more	 virtuous	past	 that	was	 forever	 lost	 to	 civilized	man.	 The	 first	was	 the	 image	 of	 domestic	bliss	in	a	remote	rural	village	devoid	of	strangers.	It	is	the	ideal	of	a	simple	social	existence	 reduced	 to	 nothing	 but	 truly	 personal	 and	 familiar	 interactions.	 The	second	 was	 that	 of	 the	 Spartan	 city,	 a	 domain	 of	 pure	 civic	 and	 public	 life,	 an	impersonal	 world	 in	 which	 family,	 humanness	 and	 intimate	 ties	 had	 been	sacrificed	 to	 the	 greater	 glory	 of	 the	 city.27 	Since	 both	 had	 become	 equally	impossible	and	oppressive,	Rousseau	argued,	what	was	left	was	the	unstable	and	distressing	compromise	of	a	social	contract,	that	imperfect	synthesis	that	tried	to	salvage	 and	 shore	 up	what	 it	 could	 of	 individual	 and	 collective	 existence,	 while	offering	 no	 solution	 to	 inevitable	 human	 suffering	 and	 the	 longing	 for	 perfect	equality.	 ‘The	 road	 from	 nature	 might	 have	 led	 men	 to	 Spartan	 virtue	 or	 to	domestic	bliss.	In	actuality	he	chose	civilization,	a	condition	in	which	neither	duty	nor	felicity	is	possible’.28		The	 intentions	of	some	groups	of	utopian	socialists,	Catholics,	Freemasons	or	the	young	 Louis-Napoléon	 Bonaparte	 alike	 coincided	 with	 Rousseau’s	 first	 utopia.	Between	 1830	 and	 1870,	 there	 was	 vast	 deployment	 of	 agricultural	 colonies,	model	settlements,	patronages	or	institutions	that	were	to	sequester	inmates	in	a	highly	 regulated	 private	 kingdom	 of	 interpersonal	 virtue,	 walled	 off	 from	 the	world.	 Even	 when	 working	 almost	 exclusively	 with	 very	 keen	 and	 submissive																																																									27	See:	 Varad	 Mehta,	 ‘Sparta	 in	 the	 Enlightenment’,	 Ph.D.	 thesis,	 George	 Washington	 University	(Washington,	2009).	28	Judith	Shklar,	Men	and	Citizens	(Cambridge,	1969),	p.	33.	See	especially	chapter	1.		
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inmates	who	voluntarily	chose	the	seclusion,	no	wall	seemed	to	be	tall	enough	to	keep	 the	 vices	 of	 the	 world	 out.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 dream	 managed	 to	 survive	unscathed	 the	 uninterrupted	 chain	 of	 failures	 and	 bankruptcies	 of	 nineteenth-century	utopian	initiatives.	Rousseau’s	second	utopia	was	the	nineteenth-century	authoritarian	dream	 that	 sought	 to	place	 infallible	and	 indisputable	virtue	at	 the	summit	 of	 the	 state,	 and	 from	 where	 impersonal	 harmony	 and	 order	 would	descend	 to	 reign	 in	 a	 world	 in	 which	 individuals	 would	 make	 free	 and	 eager	sacrifices	for	the	good	of	all.	While	this	dream	was	never	far	from	the	nineteenth-century	 thought,	 it	only	seemed	possible	 to	develop	 the	 idea	by	arming	 the	state	against	 individuals.	 Tocqueville	 perceived	 this	 situation	 very	 clearly	 when	 he	wrote	 that	 ‘two	 revolutions	 seem	 to	 be	 in	 operation	 in	 our	 days	 in	 opposite	directions;	one	weakens	power	continuously	and	the	other	reinforces	it	endlessly;	in	no	other	period	in	our	history	has	[power]	appeared	so	weak	or	so	strong.	But	when	 one	 considers	 more	 closely	 the	 state	 of	 the	 world,	 one	 sees	 that	 both	revolutions	are	intimately	tied	one	to	the	other’.29	Both	rejected	what	astronomers	call	the	Goldilocks	zone,	their	power	was	too	cold	or	too	hot.	The	alternative	that	remained	was	Rousseau’s	bland	stalemate,	devoid	of	duty	and	happiness.			Whether	 in	 the	 opposition	 of	 individualists	 or	 collectivists,	 spiritualists	 or	materialists,	 proponents	 of	 an	 immutable	 order	 or	 defenders	 of	 an	 organized	society,	 the	actual	political	options	available	 in	1848	were	 limited.	Either	society	was	 nothing	 more	 than	 an	 agglomeration	 of	 individuals	 with	 no	 substance,	 or	individuals	were	 nothing	 but	 atoms	 of	 a	 Spartan	 social	 body.	 Either	 society	 and	power	were	founded	on	impersonal	relations	mediated	by	law	and	the	state,	or	it																																																									29	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	310.	
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had	to	rely	on	affective,	personal	and	private	relationships	between	its	members.	Either	individuals	were	the	spiritual	embodiment	of	a	cosmic	order	which	political	power	could	do	nothing	to	alter,	or	they	were	nothing	but	the	material	products	of	the	 collective	 which	 state	 and	 society	 could	 shape	 at	 will.	 Because	 of	 these	conceptual	 difficulties,	 the	 two	 decades	 following	 1848	 was	 a	 period	 of	 intense	deliberation	about	social	matters	and	what	could	substitute	the	unitary,	absolute	and	indivisible	self.	And	the	intellectual	deadlock	only	started	to	loosen	gradually	as	a	result	of	innovations	in	the	field	of	medicine.			Shortly	after	his	appointment	in	the	Val-de-Grâce	in	1814,	the	military	hospital	and	medical	 school	 in	 Paris,	 François	 Broussais’	 first	 publication	 ‘really	 marks	 a	turning	 point	 in	 the	 history	 of	 French	 medicine’.30	It	 attacked	 the	 pillars	 of	 the	medicine	of	the	day,	which	was	based	on	Philippe	Pinel’s	psychological	reading	of	mental	 illness.	 Following	 Pinel,	 the	 mainstream	 understanding	 focused	 on	symptoms	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 which	 the	 nature	 or	 essence	 of	 a	 disease	 could	 be	established.	 If	 illnesses	 were	 essences,	 then	 their	 symptoms	 spoke	 of	 a	 deeper	trouble	 in	 the	 spiritual	 essence	 of	 the	 individual,	 the	 moi.	 Thus	 the	 most	representative	and	influential	form	of	medicine	was	aliénisme.	Coined	in	1833,	the	term	 referred	 to	 the	 branch	 of	 science	 concerned	with	 ‘bringing	 back	 to	 reason’	(ramener	à	la	raison)	the	insane.	This	relied	entirely	on	the	ingenuity	and	firm	will	of	 the	practitioner.	The	 ‘moral	 treatment’	on	which	aliénisme	relied	was	not	 that	different	from	a	Catholic	exorcism.	The	basic	premise	was	that,	by	embodying	the	authority	of	reason	on	which	society	depended,	a	doctor	could	command	a	return	
																																																								30	Erwin	 Ackerknecht,	 ‘Broussais,	 or	 a	 forgotten	 medical	 revolution’,	 Bulletin	 of	 the	 History	 of	
Medicine,	27	(1953),	pp.	322-323.	
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to	order	 in	 the	patient.	The	 inflexible	will	of	 reason	necessarily	had	 to	overcome	any	form	of	wayward	volition	to	restore	the	universality	of	good	order.	‘In	effect’,	confessed	 Isidore-Hyacinthe	 Maire	 in	 his	 textbook	 on	 childrearing,	 ‘I	 cannot	understand	 true	 and	 conscientious	medicine	without	 the	 absolute	 submission	 of	the	 patient,	 without	 the	 complete	 abnegation	 of	 his	 will;	 in	 my	 account,	 this	 is	closer	 to	magnetism	 [hypnosis]	 than	medicine,	 but,	 in	 any	 case,	 it	 is	 only	 at	 this	price	 that	one	obtains	good	results,	because	only	at	 this	price	 the	most	 innocent	remedy	acquires	sometimes	the	most	salutary	properties,	and	sometimes	also	the	most	energetic’.31	Healing	was	just	the	placebo	effect	of	proper	authority.	The	limit	to	 the	 physician’s	 authority	was	 precisely	 the	 unequally	 distributed	 authority	 in	society.	 A	 former	 student	 of	 Jean-Étienne	 Esquirol	 and	 chief	 editor	 of	 the	influential	Annales	d’hygiène	publique	et	de	médecine	légale,	François	Leuret	was	a	leading	aliéniste	 and	 the	médecin-chef	 at	 the	Bicêtre	 hospital.32	In	 developing	his	method	of	Révulsion	morale	or	 intimidation	for	the	mad,	Leuret	had	found	that	 it	worked	better	with	women	in	general	or	with	poor	madmen	detained	in	charitable	institutions.	By	contrast,	 in	those	houses	with	characters	(personnages)	who	have	belonged	to	the	elevated	classes	of	society,	the	intimidation	treatment[…]	would	be	impossible	to	 execute	 because	 it	 would	 offend	 short-tempered	 characters	 whose	 education	does	not	allow	that	one	can	easily	impose	on	them	another’s	will.33																																																										31	Isidore-Hyacinthe	Maire,	nouveau	guide	des	mères	de	famille	(Paris,	1843),	pp.	462-463.	32	On	Leuret	 see:	 Lion	Murard	 and	Patrick	 Zylberman,	 ‘La	 raison	de	 l'expert	 ou	 l'hygiéne	 comme	science	 sociale	 appliquée’,	 European	 Journal	 of	 Sociology,	 26/1	 (1985),	 pp.	 58-89;	 Jacques	Arveillera,	 ‘Le	 syndrome	 de	 Tardieu:	Maltraitance	 des	 enfants,	médecine	 légale	 et	 psychiatrie	 au	XIXe	 siècle’,	L'évolution	psychiatrique,	 76/2	 (2011),	 pp.	 	 219–243;	D.F.	 Allen	 and	 Carole	Mariotti,	‘Les	 “Incohérents”	 et	 les	 “Arrangeurs”	 de	 François	 Leuret:	 Éléments	 pour	 une	 histoire	 du	 délire	d’interprétation’,	L'information	psychiatrique,	90/7	(2014),	pp.	567-574.	33	Académie	de	médecine,	‘Séance	du	1	Juin	1841’,	Journal	des	connaissances	médicales	(July	1841),	p.	307.	
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To	 this	psychological	 approach,	Broussais	opposed	his	physiology.	 Illnesses	were	not	essences	and	had	no	ontological	nature	 in	themselves;	 to	 focus	on	symptoms	was	to	take	the	effect	for	the	cause.	Maladies	were	only	inflammations	in	specific	organs,	 especially	 the	 gastro-intestinal	 tract.	 Inflammation	was	 a	 local	 departure	from	the	normal	state;	it	affected	specific	organs	rather	than	the	whole	being,	and	left	visible	 lesions	 in	 those	organs.	The	key	 treatment	was	 leeches.	Testimony	 to	the	success	Broussais	enjoyed	during	the	Restoration,	the	consumption	of	leeches	reached	 an	 all	 time	 high;	 while	 in	 1820	 France	 had	 a	 surplus	 of	 leeches	 and	exported	a	little	over	a	million	leeches,	by	1834	it	imported	over	22	million.	What	the	replacement	of	authority	 for	 leeches	meant	was	 that	disease	belonged	 to	 the	sphere	of	matter,	not	 the	soul,	not	 the	moi.	This	was	a	 frontal	attack	not	only	on	Pinel,	 but	 also	 on	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 psychological	 paradigm	 that	 generated	twenty-year	intellectual	war	in	French	medicine.	Broussais’	popularity	vanished	in	the	first	years	of	the	1830s	with	the	change	in	regime	and	intellectual	climate.	In	an	attempt	to	reclaim	the	limelight,	he	threw	himself	completely	behind	the	cause	of	phrenology,	which	was	compatible	with	his	materialist	view.34	His	medical	focus	would	 not	 be	 completely	 abandoned,	 and	 indeed	 it	 became	 the	 basis	 of	 Léon	Rostan’s	approach	to	medicine,	called	organicism	because,	like	Broussais,	the	focus	was	on	organs,	and	derived	the	principle	of	life	from	their	structure	rather	than	the	immaterial	 soul.	 But	 Broussais’	 legacy	 was	 entirely	 stripped	 of	 its	 radical	philosophical	 implications,	 since	 in	 Rostan	 and	 much	 of	 the	 mid-century	physiology	the	soul	was	still	at	 the	very	centre	of	medicine,	 they	 just	denied	that	‘the	soul	[is]	a	principle	capable	of	being	affected	by	illness’.35																																																									34	Ackerknecht,	‘Broussais’,	pp.	321-333.	35	For	a	discussion	of	the	different	approaches	up	to	the	1860s,	see	the	introduction	to	Th.	Liégeois,	
Traité	de	physiologie	(Paris,	1869),	quote	in	p.	35.	
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	Meanwhile,	 in	 1826,	 a	 young	 and	 promising	 scholar	 was	 half	 way	 through	 the	series	of	lectures	that	would	introduce	humanity	to	the	new	‘positive	age’	when	he	became	melancholic	and	hand	to	cancel	his	commitments.	As	Ian	Hacking	recounts,	Auguste	Comte,	 suffering	 from	an	obstinate	 depression,	 entrusted	himself	 to	 the	prestigious	aliéniste	Esquirol.	Some	eight	months	later,	he	was	dispatched	as	‘Not	cured’.	 A	month	 later,	 the	 lectures	 had	 resumed.	 In	 the	 interim,	 Comte	had	 read	Broussais	 and	was	 able	 to	 reinterpret	 his	 situation	 as	 a	 ‘cerebral	 attack’.	 It	 had	been	the	inflammation	of	a	specific	organ,	not	a	moral	aliment	of	the	depths	of	his	soul.	 It	was	not	his	 fault.36	Comte	would	apply	 these	 ideas	 to	 society	by	 focusing	not	on	volition	as	the	basis	of	social	government,	but	rather	on	a	term	he	borrowed	Broussais:	 the	 ‘normal	 state’.	 	 The	 norm	was	 susceptible	 for	 no	 good	 reason	 of	becoming	inflamed	or	disturbed	and	of	being	treated	externally	with	no	account	of	personal	will,	of	either	doctor	or	patient.	Normality	was	born,	destined	to	become	‘one	of	the	most	powerful	ideological	tools	of	the	twentieth	century’.37		But	Comte’s	realization	that	he	was	not	to	blame	also	implied	an	interesting	split	within	 the	concept	of	 the	 individual.	Disease	and	the	self	existed	 in	 two	separate	planes,	 the	 first	 a	 series	 of	 normal	 or	 inflamed	 states,	 the	 second	 an	 unrelated	domain	of	volition.	Best	remembered	for	his	dictionary,	physician	Émile	Littré	was	one	of	the	key	propagators	of	the	type	of	materialist	medicine	that	denied	the	soul	as	 Broussais	 had	 advocated.	 He	 was	 also	 the	 main	 successor	 to	 Comte	 in	 the	positivist	 school.	 He	 was	 able	 to	 sanitize	 positivism	 by	 declaring	 that	 the	
																																																								36	Ian	Hacking,	The	Taming	of	Chance	(Cambridge,	1990),	p.	167.	37	Ibid.,	p.	169.	
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subjectivist	bend	of	the	end	of	the	master’s	career	and	his	attempt	to	found	a	new	religion	 were	 to	 be	 explained	 precisely	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Comte’s	 mental	 illness.38	Instead,	positivism	was	 to	be	unwaveringly	objective.	 In	doing	so,	he	established	the	 distinction	 between	 objective	 and	 subjective	 as	 we	 now	 understand	 it,	 the	latter	 being	 ‘one	 of	 the	 greatest	 obstacles	 to	 science’39.	 Of	 importance	 to	 our	discussion	 is	Littré’s	negation	of	 free	will,	which	 led	 to	prolonged	and	medieval-sounding	debates	on	libre	arbritre	in	the	middle	decades	of	the	century.	For	Littré,	all	 human	 activity	 was	 reduced	 to	 matter,	 and	 free	 will	 was	 little	 more	 than	illusory	and	inaccurate	pictures	painted	by	the	brain.	But	the	brain	only	received	impressions	 from	 the	 nervous	 system	 which	 ‘depending	 on	 their	 texture,	 it	transforms	 into	 ideas	 and	 feelings’.40	Among	 these	 firing	 neurons,	 volition	 was	nowhere	to	be	found.	‘How	could	I	have	[free	will]’,	Littré	asked,	‘if	I	played	no	role	in	my	coming	to	this	world,	the	composition	of	my	organs,	the	time	and	place	of	my	birth?’41	Freedom	was	 but	 a	 feeling.	 ‘However	much	 one	 feels	 free,	 this	 intimate	consciousness	does	not	exclude	the	action	of	causes,	[which	are]	efficient,	although	sometimes	unperceived.	Without	experience,	the	universe	would	be	foreign	to	us,	and	it	is	apperception	of	our	distinct	and	relative	state,	vis-à-vis	objects	external	to	our	mental	life,	that	deludes	us	about	our	autonomy’.42	Thus	we	depended	on	the	exterior,	and	the	interior	was	little	more	than	illusory	self-awareness.		
																																																								38	Masahito	Hirai,	‘Objectivity	in	the	beginnings	of	the	positivism:	Dispute	between	Auguste	Comte	and	Émile	Littré’,	哲学・科学史論叢,	XVIII	(2006),	p.	26.	39	Ibid.,	p.	35.	40	Louis	Delasiauve,	‘M.	Littré	et	le	libre	arbritre’,	Journal	de	médicine	mentale,	9	(1869),	p.	67.	41	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	66.	42	Ibid.,	pp.	67-68.	
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The	 delusion	 that	 made	 up	 our	 virtual	 sense	 of	 self	 still	 mattered,	 and	 had	consequences	 in	 social	 life.	 As	 a	 result	 the	 social	 outside	 had	 the	 right	 to	 set	rewards	and	penalties.	But	knowledge	was	the	key	to	bridge	the	 interior	and	the	exterior.	 ‘One	 acquires	morality	 as	 one	 does	 science.	 In	 us	 the	 sentiment	 of	 the	good,	the	just,	which	leads	us	to	search	for	them	in	the	same	way	innate	curiosity	is	the	 motive	 for	 the	 desire	 for	 knowledge	 (connaissances).	 The	 more	 the	 level	 of	[knowledge]	raises	in	the	world,	the	more	each	individual	receives	the	influence	of	it,	 an	 admirable	 sociological	 indication.	 This	 social	 emanation	makes	 up	 for	 free	will’.43		By	 the	 1870s,	 it	 became	 increasingly	 common	 to	 speak	 of	 an	 external	 and	 an	internal	division	of	the	individual,	coinciding	with	a	separation	between	passivity	and	activity.	Thus	criminologist	and	social	reformist	Henri	Joly	wrote	that	each	man	lives	so	to	speak	two	parts	of	his	life,	one	that	is	engaged	in	society,	the	other	that	develops	entirely	within	(intérieurement)	or	 in	a	narrow	enough	circle	for	 society	 to	 be	 absent.	 Here	 the	 free	 will	 of	 the	 individual	 may	 be	 exercised	without	great	constraints,	at	least	on	the	part	of	other	men.44	The	 pathologies	 of	 this	 new	 division	 of	 the	 individual	 were	 soon	 mapped	 out.	Mental-health	 expert	 Prosper	 Despine	 now	 defined	 madness	 as	 a	 sentimental	disturbance	altering	‘the	normal	dependence	of	the	inside	towards	the	outside’.	He	identified	 the	 social	 ‘outside’	 as	 what	 nurtured,	 stimulated	 and	 regulated	 the	passive	 ‘inside’	 of	 the	 self.	 The	 inability	 to	 find	 the	 right	 balance	 between	 the	external	and	the	internal	spelt	out	two	extreme	forms	of	madness.	
																																																								43	Ibid.,	p.	68.	44	Henri	Joly,	‘[Review	of	the	works	of	]	Quetelet’,	Revue	scientifique	de	la	France	et	de	l’étranger,	46	(1872),	p.	1095.	
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If	 the	mad	has	a	 tendency	 to	 live	 in	an	excess	of	 subjectivity,	 to	 feed	off	his	own	ideas,	the	idiot,	who	cannot	elevate	himself	to	any	subjective	construction,	is	on	the	contrary	 dominated	 by	 an	 excess	 of	 objectivity,	 he	 is	 always	 crushed	 by	 the	exterior	 preponderance	 and,	 in	 absence	 of	 ideas	 of	 his	 own,	 he	 is	 only	 occupied	with	that	which	strikes	his	senses.45		The	domain	of	 the	moi	was	being	 increasingly	 reduced	 to	 a	narrow	sensation	of	interiority,	faced	with	a	dominating	exterior	over	which	it	had	no	control.	And	this	dependence	was	a	‘certain	fact’	that	‘invites	us	to	a	more	modest	conception	of	our	individuality	and	of	the	part	of	our	initiative	in	our	own	conduct’.	For	‘we	no	more	seize	the	absolute	reality	of	the	moi	than	that	of	any	other	thing.	We	only	know	the	phenomenon	 of	 ourselves	 in	 the	 entirely	 formal	 unity	 and	 in	 the	 successive	intuitions	of	consciousness’,	incapable	of	‘inform[ing]	us	pertinently	of	the	degrees	of	our	merit	or	demerit’.46		Father	 Jude	 de	 Kernaere	would	 translate	 these	 findings	 into	 political	 theory.	 He	refuted	 political	 theories	 that	 sought	 to	 establish	 the	 ‘substantial	 unity	 of	 the	human	person’	by	denying	the	duality	of	its	constituent	parts.	The	same	had	to	be	true	 of	 government	 in	 society,	 which	 consisted	 of	 two	 inseparable	 parts:	 the	governed	and	the	governors.	The	first	were	an	amorphous	‘multitude	of	members	that	 have	 among	 them	 no	 necessary	 bond’,	 capable	 of	 presenting	 itself	 ‘under	every	possible	social	or	political	form	imaginable’.	The	second	element	was	
																																																								45	Prosper	Despine,	De	la	folie	au	point	de	vue	philosophique	(Paris,	1875),	p.	977.	46	F.	Pillon,	 ‘[Review	of	Lucien	Lévy-Bruhl’s]	L’idée	de	 la	responsabilité’,	La	critique	philosophique,	1/II	(1883),	pp.	252,	254.	
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an	authority	that	makes	of	the	multitude	a	society,	in	giving	it,	according	to	its	own	nature,	 the	monarchic	or	 republican	 form,	 aristocratic	or	democratic,	 federalized	or	centralized.	The	multitude	here	is	the	matter,	the	authority	is	the	form.47			This	implied	an	abandonment	of	the	no-nonsense	universalism	of	the	first	half	of	the	century.	What	 justified	a	 form	of	government	was	no	 longer	 its	validity	 in	all	times	and	places.	 Instead,	 the	nature	of	power	was	 to	be	entirely	particular,	 one	specific	form	among	many.	‘Man’	remained	the	universal	substratum	of	things,	but	became	 only	 amorphous	 matter	 to	 be	 shaped	 from	 above.	 Belgian	 statistician	Adolphe	 Quetelet	 had	 been	 working	 in	 this	 direction	 since	 the	 mid	 1830s.	 He	fathered	a	remarkable	creature	of	statistical	abstraction	he	called	l’homme	moyen.	It	was	quite	simply	the	average	man	that	statistics	uncovered,	he	had	the	average	height	and	weight	and	so	on.	The	universal	thus	became	knowable	in	a	completely	new	way;	‘the	more	one	measures	individuals,	the	more	the	differences,	effects	of	fortuitous	 causes,	 destroy	 each	 other	 in	 order	 to	 let	 the	 general	 type	predominate’.48	He	took	this	to	be	the	absolute	general	type,	the	new	standard	of	beauty	 for	 fine	 arts,	 the	 embodiment	 of	 universality,	 finally	 stripped	 of	particularities.	And	yet	‘l’homme	moyen	varies	from	one	people	to	the	next	[…	and]	from	one	age	to	the	next’.49	Here	was	something	that	was	always	true	and	yet	not	global.	 It	 was	 now	 possible	 to	 conceive	 without	 contradiction	 of	 a	 universal	particularity	 or	 a	 particular	 universality;	 it	 was	 now	 possible	 to	 conceive	 the	
																																																								47	Jude	 de	 Kernaeret,	 ‘L'unité	 dans	 la	 personne	 humaine	 et	 dans	 la	 société’,	 La	 controverse	 et	 le	
contemporain,	VIII	(November	1886),	p.	426.	48	Joly,	‘[Review]’,	p.	1094.	49	Ibid.,	p.	1096.	
	 322	
nation-state.50	And	with	 it	 a	 new	paradigm	of	 the	modern	 individual	was	 on	 the	rise.			
Healthy	Freedom.		The	Catholic	Church	did	not	miss	out	on	the	promises	of	the	new	medical	gaze.	The	transparency	of	the	body	was	to	join	the	spiritual	deliverance	of	the	cure	d'âmes	to	enable	 a	 holistic	 comprehension	 of	 human	 existence.	 A	 ‘physiologie	 catholique’	was	 to	 apprehend	 the	 body	 and	 the	 soul	 in	 tandem	 to	 counter	 the	 godless	materialism	 of	 the	 likes	 of	 Broussais.	 Parish	 priests	 were	 to	 be	 instructed	 in	matters	of	hygiene	and	health,	while	clerics	trained	as	doctors	were	to	defend	the	faith	 in	hospitals,	 surgeries,	universities	and	academies.	Since	 the	body	 ‘is	where	the	moral	man	 is	 hidden’,	 father	 Pierre	 Debreyne	made	 the	 argument	 that	 ‘It	 is	thus	 the	 study	 of	 the	 exterior	 man	 which	 makes	 us	 penetrate	 into	 the	 interior	man’.	Consequently,	 the	knowledge	of	Catholic	physiology	was	 ‘indispensable	 for	the	clergy,	confessors,	and	directors	of	souls’,	since	they	would	find	there	‘the	key	to	the	human	heart’.	This,	Debreyne	claimed,	introduces	 them	 in	 the	 sanctuary	 of	 la	conscience	 [meaning	 both	 conscience	 and	consciousness];	 it	 reveals	 to	 us	 the	whole	man,	 that	 is,	 the	 physical,	 intellectual,	moral	 and	 social	 man.	 These	 principles	 are	 true,	 incontestable	 [and]	 irrefutable	because	 they	 emerge	 from	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 things,	 that	 is,	 from	 the	 nature	 of	man.51	
																																																								50	Émile	 Durkheim’s	 nephew	 and	most	 talented	 disciple,	Marcel	Mauss,	 recognized	 around	 1920	that	 ‘The	 word	 “nation”	 is	 of	 recent	 use,	 relatively,	 in	 the	 technical	 language	 of	 jurists	 and	philosophers,	and	even	more	in	that	of	the	peoples	themselves’.	Mauss,	Œuvres,	3	(Paris,	1969),	p.	573.	51	Pierre	Debreyne,	Physiologie	catholique	et	philosophique	(Paris,	1868),	p.	VII.	
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A	new	science	of	 ‘man’,	 ‘la	 science	de	 la	vie	de	 l’homme’,	a	 ‘double	priesthood	of	religion	 and	 medicine	 represented	 by	 the	 Catholic	 priest	 and	 doctor’,	 was	 to	encompass	 earthly	 existence	 in	 its	 totality.52	And	 this	 included	 miracles.	 In	 the	1860s,	the	Church	had	relied	on	scientists	to	help	clarify	the	most	extreme	cases	of	demonic	possession,	while	 ‘in	1883,	 a	medical	 consultation	office	was	opened	at	Lourdes,	 making	 the	 collaboration	 of	 physicians	 in	 certifying	 miracles	 there	official’.53	As	 health	 and	welfare	 services	 became	 secularized	 in	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle,	nuns,	 who	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 had	 emerged	 as	 a	 formidable	 army	 at	 the	service	of	those	who	suffered,	went	into	secular	training	schools	to	be	qualified	as	nurses	and	social	workers.54			A	 new	Catholic	 normativity	 could	 arise	 from	 this	 ‘agreement	 of	 the	 providential	and	physiological	laws’.	In	this	agreement,	L.-F.	Jéhan,	the	lay	author	of	a	Catholic	encyclopaedia	 on	 anthropology,	 had	 found	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 longevity	 in	1853.	‘[E]very	man	penetrated	by	the	sentiment	of	his	excellence,	of	the	duties	he	must	 fulfil	 on	 this	 Earth,	 must	 aspire	 to	 live	 out	 a	 long	 career,	 that	 which	 is	assigned	 to	 him	 by	 natural	 death’.	 ‘God	 gives	 him	 the	 time	 to	 accomplish	 the	serious	mission	of	his	duties.	The	 importance	of	 these	attests	sufficiently	 that	he	could	not	have	been	endowed	with	an	ephemeral	existence’.55	As	longevity	became	‘a	moral	and	respectable	end’,	Heaven	could	wait.	No	longer	was	life	in	the	hands	of	Providence;	instead	the	time	to	complete	all	the	individual’s	obligations	had	to	be	earned	through	‘the	sacrifices	he	imposed	himself	to	become	an	old	man’,	‘a	sum	of																																																									52	Ibid.,	p.	1;	Debreyne,	Le	prêtre	et	le	médecin	devant	la	société	(Paris,	1848),	p.	vii.	53	Sophie	 Lachapelle,	 Investigating	 the	 Supernatural:	 From	 Spiritism	 and	 Occultism	 to	 Psychical	
Research	and	Metaphysics	in	France,	1853-1931	(Baltimore,	2011),	p.	63.	54	Katrin	 Schultheiss,	 ‘Gender	 and	 the	 limits	 of	 anti-clericalism:	 The	 secularization	 of	 hospital	nursing	in	France,	1880–1914’,	French	History,	12/3	(1998),	pp.	229-245.	55	Jéhan,	Dictionnaire	d’anthropologie,	p.	870.	
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sustained	efforts,	 [and…]	uncommon	virtues’.56	Indeed,	 ‘longevity	 is	measured	by	the	 degree	 of	 bonnes	 mœurs’,	 which	 could	 be	 summed	 up	 in	 three	 terms:	‘temperance,	 self-mastery	 (empire	 sur	 soi-même)	 and	 purity	 of	 the	 soul’. 57	Moreover,	our	virtues	and	vices	mattered	because	they	outlived	us,	for	the	length	of	 life	 was	 determined	 by	 the	 laws	 of	 heredity	 —the	 modern	 way	 of	 making	children	 bear	 the	 sins	 of	 their	 fathers.	 Habit	 was	 key.	 Jéhan	 cited	 longevity	statistics	that	showed	that,	on	average,	 theologians	 lived	the	 longest	(to	the	ripe-old	age	of	42),	despite	 their	 ‘unfavourable	physiological	conditions’	derived	 from	their	 celibacy.	 At	 40,	 agricultural	 workers	 were	 a	 close	 second,	 while	 the	 more	mundane	industrial	and	liberal	occupations	did	not	exceed	35.	Thus	‘daily	habits	of	order	 and	 regularity’	 promised	 a	 long	 existence.58	Yet	 this	 evidence	did	not	 stop	Jéhan	from	putting	forward	a	new	‘normal	longevity’,	which	was	the	same	we	have	today:	 ‘the	 ordinary	 duration	 of	 life	 has	 been	 70	 or	 80	 years.	 All	 the	 mortality	tables	 demonstrate	 in	 effect	 that	 the	 normal	 time	 of	 death	 coincides	with	 these	figures’.59	The	 sensitive	 ones	 lived	 short	 lives,	 for	 they	 lacked	 the	 ‘firmness	 of	character	that	is	founded	upon	a	just	appreciation	of	things	which	renders	[men]	independent	 from	 the	 blows	 of	 luck’.60	The	 absence	 of	 longevity	 as	 a	 social	 goal	explained	 ‘the	agitations	of	 society’,	 for	 ‘the	rapid	succession	of	new	men	 for	 the	old’	 led	 them	 to	 start	 their	 work	 anew	 instead	 of	 continuing	 what	 was	 already	under	way.	Jéhan	ends	with	a	quote	from	Esquirol	showing	how	not	carrying	out	this	 approach	 led	 to	 an	 early	 death	 by	 suicide.61	Death	 changed,	 and	 even	 for	 a	
																																																								56	Ibid.,	p.	871.	57	Ibid.,	pp.	870,	873.	58	Ibid.,	p.	874.	59	Ibid.,	p.	871.	60	Ibid.,	p.	874.	61	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	876.	
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militantly	Catholic	author	of	an	officially-sanctioned	work,	it	was	not	a	divine	but	rather	a	social	matter	requiring	a	mobilizing	engagement	of	the	self.		No	 less	 relevant	was	 the	 solution	 that	medicine	offered	 liberals.	Rather	 than	 the	possibility	 of	 separating	 the	 normal	 from	 the	 pathological	 and	 the	 internal	 from	the	external	or	of	unifying	body	and	soul	in	a	single	perspective,	 liberals	gained	a	new	reading	of	human	universality	that	was	not	juridical.	Until	the	1860s,	only	the	legal	 and	 penal	 system	 were	 able	 to	 make	 liberalism’s	 fundamental	 distinction	between	 those	 who	 were	 legally	 irresponsible	 because	 they	 were	 incapable	 of	freedom	and	those	who	were	responsible	because	they	were	completely	free	and	autonomous.	 This	meant	 that	 the	domain	 of	 liberty	 could	 only	 be	defined	 in	 the	negative	by	prohibition,	which	required	a	restrictive	and	disciplinary	approach	to	the	law	and	the	conceptual	possibilities	of	 liberty	in	society,	since	statute	needed	to	 address	 itself	 not	 to	 the	 respectable,	 but	 to	 the	 recalcitrant	 and	 residual	elements	of	society.	Liberty	needed	to	be	governed	with	a	heavy	hand.			But	 the	medical	concept	of	 ‘incurables’	 changed	 this.	 In	his	1861	study	of	 female	work	and	salaries,	Jules	Simon,	who	was	a	leading	republican	politician	and	author	of	many	widely-read	books	on	morality,	education	or	social	reform,	argued	that		An	 enlightened	beneficence	makes	 the	 same	distinction	between	 the	poor	 that	 a	doctor	does	between	 the	 sick.	 It	has	 its	 incurables	 that	 it	 takes	under	 its	 charge:	these	 are	 those	 who	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 saved	 neither	 by	 themselves,	 nor	 by	 the	family,	veritable	castaways	(épaves)	of	charity.62	
																																																								62	Jules	Simon,	 ‘Le	salaire	et	 le	travail	des	femmes:	 IV’,	Revue	des	deux	mondes,	XXXI/32	(1861),	p.	88.	
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The	cure	 for	 the	curable	was	as	simple	as	appealing	to	their	courage,	 for	 ‘it	 is	by	their	own	efforts	 that	 [charity]	heals	 them’.	Drawing	the	 line	between	those	who	were	apt	and	inapt	for	liberty	was	no	longer	a	painstaking	moral	assessment	that	could	 best	 be	 guaranteed	 by	 judicial	 procedure;	 it	 became	 a	 routine	 material	assessment,	as	simple	as	a	doctor	naming	the	illness	that	was	visibly	there	for	the	trained	 eye.	 ‘There	 is	 no	 longer	 a	 place	 in	 society	 for	 the	 slothful,	 no	more	 than	there	ever	was	a	place	in	the	world,	even	in	the	physical	world,	for	the	useless’.63	Moral	 and	 metaphysical	 deliberations	 gave	 way	 to	 the	 self-evidence	 of	 the	palpable.	 And	 as	 in	 medicine,	 therapy	 either	 restored	 the	 health	 of	 freedom	 or	identified	those	who	were	beyond	help	and	salvation	and	needed	a	compassionate	marginalization.	 Incurability	 was	 the	 exception	 that	 confirmed	 the	 rule	 that	 all	were	 born	 to	 be	 free.	 The	 line	 between	 child	 and	 adult	 no	 longer	 hovered	threateningly	over	every	act;	it	was	a	simple	distinction	for	the	psychiatric	gaze.	All	could	 be	 taken	 as	 adults	 until	 the	 opposite	 was	 certified	 by	 a	 specialist.	 By	reducing	recalcitrance	 to	matter,	 to	unfit	bodies	rather	 than	 the	dark	recesses	of	human	nature,	liberty	was	no	longer	the	child	of	repression.	A	new	freedom,	in	the	positive,	could	be	imagined	for	all.			By	 focusing	 on	 incurability,	 Simon	 was	 able	 to	 reject	 the	 available	 disciplinary	approaches	to	social	assistance.	He	equally	rejected	the	model	of	social	reform	that	operated	 from	 above	 through	 authority	 and	 law,	 and	 from	 below	 through	 the	personal	 bonds	 of	 patronages	 and	 closed	 institutions.	 But	 the	 measures	 he	proposed	 were	 the	 same	 liberals	 had	 put	 foreword	 since	 the	 late	 eighteenth	century:	 savings,	 friendly	 societies,	 education	 and	 the	 family.	 But	 the	 focus	 had																																																									63	Simon,	‘L’éducation’,	Reforme	sociale,	III/7	(1887),	p.	685.	
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shifted	 from	 disciplining	 through	 these	 institutions	 to	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	freedom.	‘Far	from	treating	workers	as	minors	and	incapables,	let’s	hurry	to	make	men	of	them’.64			Will	 and	 reason	 did	 not	 mean	 the	 same	 thing	 that	 they	 had	 done	 a	 generation	before.	They	had	become	relative	and	highly	qualified.	Volition	had	been	reduced	to	the	impression	of	making	choices	rather	than	shaping	the	world.	The	key	was	to	provide	social	for	‘anti-social’	choices.	These	acceptable	choices	were	increasingly	presented	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 well-defined	 social	 functions.	 ‘It	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	governing	 or	 militarizing	 (enrégimenter)	 workers,	 but	 of	 making	 of	 them	husbands,	fathers	[and]	men.	It	is	necessary	to	habituate	them	to	will’.65	Hence	the	importance	Simon	saw	in	introducing	clearly	differentiated	gender	roles,	what	we	would	 now	 call	 the	 male-breadwinner	 model.	 The	 simple	 daily	 exercise	 of	productive	 and	 reproductive	 social	 functions	 in	 themselves	 could	 attach	individuals	 to	 the	 social	 order	 by	 generating	 predictable	 forms	 of	 subjectivity	 in	them.	‘The	worker	does	not	belong	to	himself	during	the	twelve	hours	he	spends	in	service	of	a	mechanical	motor;	may	he	be	at	 least	given	back	to	himself	when	he	passes	the	threshold	of	the	factory,	may	he	be	husband	and	father,	may	he	feel	the	will	 in	his	heart’.66	The	development	of	domestic	 life	 in	 itself	promised	 to	signify	the	existence	of	the	worker,	for	there	was	a	‘narrow	solidarity	that	unites	liberty,	work,	property	and	domestic	virtues’.	Thus	 the	answer	 to	 the	query	 ‘What	 is	 the	head	of	a	 family?’	could	re-signify	 the	existence	of	 the	worker	by	carving	out	 the	home	as	the	key	locus	of	the	free	choices	of	a	manly	will.	As	the	understanding	of																																																									64	Simon,	‘Le	salaire’,	pp.	86-87.	65	Ibid.,	p.	90.	66	Ibid.,	p.	91.	
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motherhood	 was	 moving	 away	 from	 abstract	 notions	 of	 nature	 and	 instinct	 to	increasingly	detailed	functions,	Simon	was	able	to	argue	the	same	for	fatherhood.	The	male	 breadwinner	was	 no	 longer	 the	 authoritative	 father,	 but	 rather	 a	 very	specific	social	role.	He	is	above	all	the	protector	and	purveyor	of	the	house:	he	is	also,	among	his	own,	the	living	reason.	Everybody	needs	to	feel	sheltered	against	all	attack	and	against	need	by	his	devotion	and	his	 force;	moreover,	everybody	should	 feel	enlightened	and	directed	by	him.	On	Saturdays,	he	acts	like	a	father	when	he	brings	home	the	earnings	 of	 his	 work,	 which	 for	 eight	 days	 will	 give	 bread	 and	 clothing	 to	 the	family;	but	he	 is	not	 just	 in	charge	of	the	bodies	of	his	children,	he	 is	responsible	for	their	souls.	Until	their	reason	matures,	it	is	up	to	him,	and	only	him,	to	decide	and	think	for	them.	If	his	mind	is	not	formed,	if	he	is	not	aware	of	his	acts,	if	he	is	condemned	by	his	 ignorance	 to	 a	perpetual	minority	 and	 childhood,	how	will	 he	carry	 out	 his	 duty?	 How	 will	 he	 be	 able	 to	 inspire	 around	 him	 confidence	 and	respect?67	But	since	the	father	was	naturally	‘absent	all	day’	then	‘Nature	has	wanted	women	to	 be	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 earliest	 education’,	 for	 which	 they	 themselves	 needed	education.68	The	 male-breadwinner	 model	 thus	 re-signified	 the	 roles	 of	 both	genders	by	linking	freedom	with	the	accomplishment	of	specific	social	roles.			Equally,	even	 the	great	men	had	 lost	 their	claim	over	reason	and	 truth.	With	 the	definitive	 split	 between	 modern	 science	 and	 religion	 from	 1840	 to	 1860,	 the	understanding	of	knowledge	changed.	As	the	means	of	arriving	at	knowledge	and	the	 consumption	 of	 knowledge	 were	 clearly	 separated	 by	 the	 rise	 of	
																																																								67	Ibid.,	p.	106.	68	Ibid.,	pp.	111,	113.	
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institutionalized	academic	disciplines,	reflection	and	thought	became	increasingly	impersonal	and	collective.	No	scientist,	no	individual	had	direct	access	to	truth;	it	had	become	a	collective	endeavour	wherein	only	a	convention	among	expert	peers	could	 determine	 what	 was	 to	 be	 tentatively	 accepted	 as	 fact.	 Th.	 Jouffroy	 had	separated	 reason,	 understood	 as	 comprehension,	 from	 knowing.	 Now	 the	 old	divinized	reason	merged	into	science,	and	knowledge,	which	Jouffroy	had	devalued	by	 recognizing	 it	 in	 animals,	 was	 opened	 up	 for	 all.	 Knowledge	 thus	 became	sanitized	and	was	no	 longer	 a	political	 threat,	 for	 the	consumption	 of	 knowledge	only	 drew	 individuals	 closer	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 social	 order	 which	 was	increasingly	thought	to	be	in	accordance	with	scientific	truths.	F.	Pillon	wrote	that	science	was	 the	 source	 that	deduced	and	 confirmed	 the	 social	 norms.	 ‘The	wise’	did	 not	 obey	 the	 law	 blindly	 as	 the	 ignorant	 did,	 but	 rather	 did	 so	 rationally,	consciously	 and	 willingly.	 ‘His	 obedience	 is	 subjectively	 free,	 because	 it	 is	 the	obedience	 of	 reason.	 It	 is	 above	 all	 science	 which	 he	 obeys,	 science,	 thanks	 to	which	 he	 is	 a	 master	 of	 himself’.69	Thus	 the	 focus	 had	 to	 shift	 from	 tutored	
transmission	to	free	consumption	of	knowledge,	for	self-righteous	moralization	did	not	 work.	 Simon	 downplayed	 ‘the	 power	 of	 direct	 preaching’	 carried	 out	 by	philanthropists	who	thought	they	could	moralize	by	giving	alms.	Simon	suggested	that	workers	agreed	with	the	preaching	in	order	to	obtain	the	alms,	but	instantly	forgot	 the	 message.	 ‘Workers	 are	 particularly	 rebellious	 against	 morality	 that	reaches	them	in	the	form	of	a	lesson.	They	ask	themselves	if	they	are	incapable	of	thinking,	and	if	they	have	such	a	need	to	be	taught’.70																																																										69 	Pillon,	 [Review	 of	 Émile	 Boutroux’s]	 Socrate	 fondateur	 de	 la	 sience	 morale’,	 La	 critique	
philosophique,	1/I	(1885),	p.	33.	70	Simon,	‘Le	salaire’,	p.	114.	
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What	was	novel	 about	Simon	and	 the	other	great	 champions	of	 education	of	 the	time,	a	 time	 in	which	 ‘almost	half	of	 the	young	conscripts	are	 illiterate’,	was	 that	instruction	was	not	 limited	to	an	authoritative	moral	guidance	but	rather	a	more	modern	 acquisition	 of	 knowledge	 by	means	 of	 reading,	 schooling	 for	 both	 sexes	and	 adult	 courses	 and	 conferences.	 ‘Above	 all,	 instruction	 is	 good	 in	 and	 of	itself.[…]	It	inspires	he	who	possesses	it	the	confidence	in	his	own	forces,	which	is	the	start	of	virility’.71	He	mentions	the	prefect’s	very	recent	approval	 in	February	1861	 of	 adult	 conferences	 in	 Paris	 where	 ‘each	 evening	 the	 amphitheatres	overflow’.	 This	 would	 become	 a	 massive	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 1870s	 and	 1880s.	This	was	thus	the	first	time	knowledge	was	intentionally	meant	to	flow	down	the	social	pyramid	as	a	means	of	holding	together	the	social	body,	and	‘Wherever	one	has	called	upon	the	intelligence	of	workers,	they	have	responded’.72			Knowledge,	choices	and	clearly-defined	social	roles	opened	up	a	new	domain	 for	liberal	 freedom	which	could	encompass	the	vast	majority	of	 the	social	body	with	no	drastic	change,	conditional	on	no	moralization	campaign	or	repression,	simply	by	giving	new	meaning	and	shape	to	the	productive	and	reproductive	roles	citizens	already	 carried	 out.	 So	 long	 as	 some	were	 as	 a	matter	 of	 fact	 deemed	 incurably	beyond	salvation,	freedom	did	not	have	to	be	feared,	but	was	rather	the	only	way	foreword.	But	 for	 the	 free,	already	 in	Simon,	 there	was	but	one	condition.	 ‘In	 the	social,	 the	 principle	 of	 government	 is	 not	 the	 law,	 but	 the	 participation	 of	 the	subject,	who	 in	 turn	only	becomes	 affirmed	 as	 a	 subject,	 in	 the	 sense	of	 a	 social	
																																																								71	Ibid.,	p.	113.	72	Ibid.,	pp.	108,	110.	
	 331	
actor,	 through	 this	 participation’.73	This	 participator	 understanding	 of	 the	 self	takes	us	to	the	work	of	Durkheim.		
Homo	Duplex:	The	Social	Self.		
	Durkheim	was	 the	 founding	 father	 of	 French	 sociology	 and	one	 of	 the	 few	 great	international	 minds	 to	 have	 moulded	 the	 basic	 substance	 of	 the	 discipline.	Although	readers	since	his	own	day	have	not	ceased	to	find	flaws	in	the	specifics	of	his	 sociological	premises,	 theories	and	methods,	 the	 framework	he	provided	still	sustains	 the	 study	of	 society.	A	normalien,	 his	 background	was	not	 scientific	 but	rather	 philosophical	 and	 ‘most	 early	 Durkheimians	 were	 philosophers’. 74		‘Durkheim’,	 said	 G.	 Gurvitch,	 ‘invented	 sociology	 as	 Christopher	 Columbus	discovered	America	in	looking	for	the	Indies:	in	wanting	to	found	a	morality	(une	
morale)’.75	Together,	 I	 will	 argue,	 the	 Durkheimian	 school	 sought	 to	 replace	 the	psychological	model	of	‘man’	by	fashioning	a	new	metaphysical	foundation	for	the	modern	individual:	a	sociological	paradigm	of	the	self.	In	1893,	Durkheim	wrote:		There	are	in	us	two	consciousnesses:	one	only	contains	the	states	that	are	personal	to	each	of	us	and	which	characterize	us,	while	 the	states	comprised	by	 the	other	one	are	common	to	all	society.	The	first	only	represents	our	individual	personality	and	 constitutes	 it;	 the	 second	 represents	 the	 collective	 type	 and,	 consequently,	society,	without	which	 it	would	not	exist.	When	it	 is	an	element	of	 the	 latter	that	
																																																								73	Procacci,	Gouverner	la	misère,	p.	312.	74	Susan	Stedman	Jones,	Durkheim	Reconsidered	(Cambridge,	2001),	p.	41.	75	Bernard	 Lacroix,	 ‘La	 vocation	 originelle	 d'Émile	 Durkheim’,	Revue	 française	de	 sociologie,	 17/2	(1976),	p.	254;	John	Brooks,	‘The	definition	of	sociology	and	the	sociology	of	definition:	Durkheim's	Rules	 of	 Sociological	Method	 and	 high	 school	 philosophy	 in	 France’,	 Journal	 of	 the	History	of	 the	
Behavioral	Sciences,	32	4	(1996),	pp.	379–407.	
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determines	our	conduct,	we	do	not	act	based	on	our	personal	interest,	but	rather	we	follow	collective	ends.76	‘These	two	aspects	of	our	psychic	life	thus	oppose	one	another	as	the	personal	and	impersonal’.	He	derived	this	 from	 ‘the	constitutional	duality	of	human	nature’,	or	the	 old	 theme	 of	 the	 homo	 duplex,	 according	 to	 which	 we	 are	 divided	 into	 ‘the	body,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 [and]	 the	 soul	 on	 the	 other’,	 which	 in	 effect	 were	 two	separate	beings.	In	this	account,	the	self	became	reduced	to	the	body,	while	society	was	the	soul.	Not	only	were	these	two	different	entities,	but	also	they	were	largely	‘independent	of	each	other’.	One	perishable	and	one	eternal,	‘the	body	and	soul	do	not	 belong	 to	 the	 same	 world’.77	Religiosity	 was	 the	 model	 on	 which	 Durkheim	constructed	 this	 opposition,	 having	 in	 mind	 specifically	 the	 divide	 between	profane	and	sacred.78	Both	were	incompatible,	mutually	exclusive	and	at	war	with	each	other.		We	 cannot	 give	 our	 selves	 over	 to	 moral	 ends	 without	 moving	 away	 from	ourselves,	 without	 unsettling	 the	 instincts	 and	 inclinations	 that	 are	 the	 most	deeply	rooted	in	our	body.	There	is	no	moral	act	that	does	not	imply	a	sacrifice.[…]	And	 this	 antinomy	 is	 so	 deep	 and	 so	 radical	 that	 in	 the	 end	 it	 can	 never	 be	resolved.	How	can	we	belong	altogether	to	ourselves	and	altogether	to	others,	or	vice	versa?79	This	 inner	 battle	 was	 constitutive	 of	 human	 nature.	 The	 self	 could	 not	 be	 in	agreement	 with	 itself	 since	 it	 was	 not	 possible	 to	 satisfy	 both	 impulses	simultaneously	or	one	of	 the	 two	entities	without	doing	 the	other	 injustice.	Pain	
																																																								76	Durkheim,	De	la	division	du	travail	social	(Paris,	1893),	p.	113.	77	Durkheim,	 ‘The	 dualism	 of	 human	 nature	 and	 its	 social	 conditions’,	 Durkheimian	 Studies,	 11	(2005),	p.	36.	78	Rosati,	Ritual	and	the	Sacred.	79	Ibid.,	p.	37.	
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and	suffering	was	thus	inevitable	since,	given	this	inner	split,		‘Our	joys	can	never	be	pure’.80			Bizarrely,	 this	 inner	war	was	 itself	proof	 that	society	had	a	separate	existence.	 If	society	were	nothing	but	the	development	of	the	individual,	both	parts	would	find	harmony.	 Instead,	 ‘society	cannot	 form	or	maintain	 itself	without	 requiring	of	us	perpetual	 sacrifices	 that	 are	 costly	 to	 us’.	 This	 was	 because	 each	 part	 made	opposing	demands	within	 the	 subject.	 Society	went	beyond	 individuals	 and	 thus	obligated	 them	 to	 go	 beyond	 themselves,	 ‘something	 which	 does	 not	 happen	without	a	more	or	less	painful	tension’.	The	contradictions	between	individual	and	collective	 interests	 were	 thus	 displaced	 to	 the	 inner	 life	 of	 the	 subject.81	The	conflict	 only	 got	 worse	 with	 time,	 as	 ‘the	 place	 of	 effort	 will	 always	 go	 on	increasing	 with	civilisation’. 82 	Therefore,	 individuals	 and	 society	 somehow	explained	 and	 necessitated	 each	 other	mutually.	 External	 representations	 ‘enter	into	us	and	thus	become	part	of	ourselves’,	while	 ‘we	attach	ourselves	to	them	at	the	same	time	as	to	ourselves’.	But	this	socialization	of	mental	space,	whereby	was	not	only	what	made	‘man’	a	‘man’,	but	it	was	equally	crucial	for	society	to	emerge,	since	 ‘society	 cannot	 constitute	 itself	 unless	 it	 penetrates	 individual	consciousnesses	 and	 fashions	 them	 “in	 its	 image	and	 likeness”’.83	The	 location	of	the	self	was	the	social,	while	the	location	of	society	was	the	self;	‘it	is	impossible	for	these	 ideals,	 the	product	of	 group	 life,	 to	 take	 form	and	above	all	 endure,	unless	
																																																								80	Ibid.,	p.	38.	81	Ibid.,	p.	44.	82	Ibid.,	p.	45.	83	Ibid.,	p.	35.	
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they	 penetrate	 individual	 consciousnesses	 and	 are	 organized	 there	 in	 a	 lasting	fashion’.84			Thus,	‘a	double	centre	of	gravity’	made	up	‘our	internal	life’.	One	was	individuality	founded	 in	 ‘our	body’.	 ‘Strictly	 individual,	 these	states	of	consciousness	attach	us	only	 to	ourselves,	and	we	can	no	more	detach	 them	 from	us	 than	we	can	detach	ourselves	 from	 our	 body’.85	Opposing	 the	 body	 was	 ‘everything	 that,	 within	 us,	expresses	something	other	than	ourselves’;	these	extra-corporeal	states	‘translate	[society]	 in	 us	 and	 attach	 us	 to	 some	 thing	 that	 goes	 beyond	 us’.86	But	 our	humanity	 was	 divided	 quite	 asymmetrically	 between	 the	 two.	 ‘Our	 different	psychic	functions	are	ascribed	unequal	value;	they	are	ranked	among	one	another,	and	it	is	those	that	depend	on	the	body	that	are	at	the	bottom	of	the	hierarchy’.87	‘It	is	 evident	 that	 passions	 and	 egoistic	 tendencies	 derive	 from	 our	 individual	constitution’,	namely	‘the	sensations	and	the	sensory	appetites’,	while	‘intellectual	and	 moral	 life’,	 or	 all	 ‘our	 rational	 activity,	 whether	 practical	 or	 theoretical,	 is	closely	 dependent	 on	 social	 causes’.	 The	 top	 of	 our	 inner	 hierarchy	 was	 thus	reserved	for	society,	since	its	greatest	achievement	was	civilization	itself.		[I]t	 is	 civilization	 that	has	made	man	 into	what	he	 is;	 it	 is	 this	 that	distinguishes	him	 from	 the	 animal.	 Man	 is	 man	 only	 because	 he	 is	 civilized.	 To	 look	 for	 the	causes	and	conditions	on	which	civilization	depends	 is	 therefore	 to	 look,	as	well,	for	the	causes	and	conditions	of	what,	in	man,	is	most	specifically	human.88		
																																																								84	Ibid.,	p.	43.	85	Ibid.	86	Ibid.,	pp.	36	44.	87	Ibid.,	p.	42.	88	Ibid.,	p.	35.	
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On	the	one	hand,	then,	Durkheim	placed	the	denigrated	animal	body,	on	the	other,	that	 which	 is	 most	 civilized,	 ‘most	 essential’,	 and	 ‘most	 specifically	 human’.	 To	society	 belonged	 language,	 symbols	 and	 concepts	 that	 necessarily	 ‘are	 always	common	 to	 a	 plurality	 of	men’.	 Inner	 antagonism	 ‘is	 no	 different	 in	 the	 order	 of	knowledge’,	 where	 (personal)	 feeling	 and	 (impersonal)	 understanding	 excluded	each	 other.	 ‘Hence	 we	 cannot	 understand	 things	 without	 giving	 up,	 in	 part,	 a	feeling	 for	 life,	 and	we	cannot	 feel	 it	without	giving	up	an	understanding	of	 it’.89	This	did	not	obliterate	the	self	as	a	thinking	subject,	but	made	all	thinking	social.	To	think,	one	must	be,	one	must	have	an	individuality.	But,	on	the	other	hand,	the	self	 cannot	 be	 altogether	 and	 exclusively	 itself,	 for	 then	 it	 would	 empty	 of	 all	content.	 If,	 to	 think,	 one	must	 be,	 one	must	 also	 have	 things	 to	 think	 about.	 Yet	what	would	consciousness	consist	of,	 if	 it	expressed	nothing	except	the	body	and	its	states?90	The	same	was	true,	mutatis	mutandis,	of	volition.	The	options	available	to	the	will	were	 socially	 determined;	 to	 exercise	 free	 will	 then	 became	 little	 more	 than	 to	choose	among	collective	ends.			But	 this	 was	 not	 a	 theory	 of	 social	 oppression.	 In	 fact,	 what	 was	 revolutionary	about	 Durkheim’s	 theory	 was	 that	 it	 erased	 coercion	 and	 obedience	 from	 the	domain	of	government.	The	 fundamental	 conflict	between	 the	 individual	and	 the	state	or	 the	part	 and	 the	whole,	was	 relocated	within	 the	 individual’s	mind.	The	social	 space	 was	 thus	 freed	 from	 any	 constituting	 conflict.	 The	 public	 and	 the	private	 sphere	were	no	 longer	at	odds	with	each	other.	The	 social	 could	only	be	experienced	 in	 an	 individualized	 form,	 while	 any	 individualizing	 understanding,																																																									89	Ibid.,	p.	38.	90	Ibid.,	p.	37.	
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like	all	language,	reason	and	thought,	was	necessarily	supra-individual.	Therefore,	the	normative	nature	of	society	was	not	in	the	contents	of	social	consciousness,	but	rather	 its	 very	 existence.	When	 social	 representations	 came	 ‘to	mingle	with	 our	individual	life,	these	various	ideals	are	themselves	individualized;	in	close	relation	with	our	other	representations,	they	harmonize	with	them,	with	our	temperament,	character,	 habits,	 etc.	 Each	 of	 us	 puts	 our	 own	 imprint	 on	 them;	 this	 is	 how	everyone	 has	 their	 personal	 way	 of	 thinking	 about’	 collective	 beliefs	 and	concepts.91	Durkheim’s	approach	was	hence	profoundly	pluralistic.	And	the	social	plurality	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 freedom	 of	 conscience,	 opinion	 or	 expression,	 but	extended	 to	 behaviour	 as	 well;	 he	 shocked	 his	 contemporaries	 by	 making	 of	immoralities	such	as	crime	and	suicide	a	normal	and	regular	aspect	of	any	society.	Private	 freedom	was	no	 longer	 in	 conflict	with	 the	 collective	good,	 even	when	 it	was	 exercised	 explicitly	 against	 the	 moral	 standards	 of	 the	 day.	 Rather	 than	making	of	deviance	a	foyer	d'infection	morale,	he	acknowledged	that	some	degree	of	 resistance	 and	 dissidence	 was	 inevitable	 and	 healthy	 in	 any	 society.	 Equally,	societies	 were	 irreducibly	 plural	 across	 time	 and	 space,	 for	 anything	 that	 could	count	as	social	had	to	make	reference	to	group	specificities	that	would	be	absent	if	the	members	‘had	lived	in	other	human	groups’.92		The	 problem	 of	 coercion	 could	 once	 again	 be	 avoided,	 because	 these	 were	impersonal	forces	that	imposed	themselves	on	the	individual,	not	through	external	agents,	 but	 as	 consciousness	and	 conscience.	 Society	was	not	 constituted	upon	a	collection	 of	 concrete	 sacred	 beliefs	 that	 were	 shared	 and	 that	 necessitated																																																									91	Ibid.,	p.	43.	92	Quoted	 in:	 Steven	 Lukes,	 ‘Introduction’,	 in:	 Durkheim,	The	 Rules	 of	 Sociological	 Method	 (New	York,	1982),	p.	4.		
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consensus,	but	 rather	upon	 the	 fact	 that	everyone	already	had	a	domain	 in	 their	consciousness	 that	 was	 an	 authoritative	 voice,	 regardless	 of	 what	 the	 voice	actually	said.		But	 even	 in	 individualizing	 and	 thus	 becoming	 elements	 of	 our	 personality,	collective	ideals	still	hold	on	to	their	characteristic	attribute,	namely,	the	prestige	with	which	they	are	invested.	Even	when	our	own,	they	speak	within	us	in	a	wholly	different	tone	and	with	another	accent	than	the	rest	of	our	states	of	consciousness:	they	 command,	 they	 inspire	 in	us	 respect,	we	do	not	 feel	 on	 a	 level	 footing	with	them.	We	understand	that	they	represent	something	in	us	superior	to	us.93	Not	only	did	all	the	contents	of	thought	come	from	this	external,	social	self,	but	also	our	 sense	 of	 self-government	 and	 self-constraint,	 operating	 as	 an	 authoritative	voice	 in	 our	 heads	 addressing	 the	 self	 ‘in	 a	 tone	 of	 command’	which	may	 order	people	 ‘to	 do	 violence	 to	 their	most	 natural	 inclinations’.	 Some	 individuals	may	well	 have	 mistaken	 this	 inner	 voice	 for	 some	 external	 authority,	 Durkheim	claimed,	but	 ‘constraining	and	necessitating	action’	arose	from	within	the	mind.94	The	 issue	of	authority	and	power	or	constraint	and	necessity	were	 turned	 into	a	separate	 consciousness	within	 individuals,	 over	which	 they	 exercised	 no	 control	and	which	they	could	struggle	against,	but	not	ignore.95			This	 authoritative	 inner	 voice	 did	 not	 only	 belong	 to	 society	 at	 large.	 It	 was	primarily	 experienced	 through	 groups.	 Group	 sentiments	 could	 be	 identified	because	 they	 possessed	 ‘an	 energy	 that	 purely	 individual	 sentiments	 cannot	match’.	These	superior	forces,	with	the	individual	 ‘does	not	recognise	as	his	own,																																																									93	Durkheim,	‘The	dualism’,	p.	43.	94	Jean	 Terrier,	 Visions	 of	 the	 Social:	 Society	 as	 a	 Political	 Project	 in	 France,	 1750-1950	 (Leiden,	2011),	pp.	142-143.	95	Quoted	in	Ibid.	
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which	steer	him,	of	which	he	 is	not	 the	master[…],	 the	 individual	 loses	 interest	 in	himself,	 forgets	himself,	gives	himself	totally	to	the	common	goal.96	Therefore	the	governing	 function	 of	 collective	 consciousness	 in	 practice	 translated	 into	 a	complete	identity	with	group	sentiments.	The	function	of	self-steering	that	was	the	hallmark	 of	 Cousin’s	moi	 was	 now	 transferred	 to	 the	 irresistible	 forces	 of	 the	group.			Any	 group	 could	 produce	 this	 effect,	 not	 directly,	 but	 rather	 by	 the	 aura	 of	authority	collective	ideas	acquired,	 ‘which	brings	the	particular	people	who	think	them	and	believe	in	them	to	represent	them	to	themselves	under	the	form	of	moral	forces	 that	 rule	 over	 and	 support	 them’.	 Such	 forces	 inspired	 ‘respect	 and	reverential	 awe,	 but	 also	 of	 gratitude	 for	 the	 comfort	we	 receive	 from	 them;	 for	they	cannot	communicate	 themselves	 to	us	without	raising	our	 ton	vital’.97	While	there	 had	 previously	 been	 a	 certain	 stiffness	 and	 seriousness	 to	 bourgeois	sociability,	 voluntary	 associations	 and	 the	maintaining	 of	 a	 careful	 separation	 of	the	 public	 and	 the	 private,	 in	 the	 1890s	 new	 distinctly	 social	 domains	 emerged	where	the	self	could	engage	as	a	matter	of	routine	in	a	more	complete,	festive,	and	careless	 social	 experience.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 doors	 were	 open	 to	 the	 plural	edifice	of	‘mass	society’,	with	its	lively	associative	and	leisure	life	and,	in	particular,	the	rise	of	modern	sport	events.			
																																																								96	Quoted	in	Ibid.,	p.	140.	Emphasis	added.		97	Durkheim,	‘The	dualism’,	p.	42.	
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Manly	bodies.		Despite	 frequent	 changes	 in	 his	 thinking,	 Durkheim	 remained	 steadfast	 on	 his	theory	 of	 two	 consciousnesses;	 he	 dedicated	 the	 rest	 of	 his	 career	 to	 its	development,	 and	 offered	 its	 most	 articulate	 formulation	 in	 1914,	 in	 the	 last	scientific	text	he	published.	As	his	work	matured,	the	space	reserved	for	individual	consciousness	 decreased	 steadily.	 From	 the	 more	 liberal	 notion	 of	 self	 as	personality	 and	 personal	 interest,	 our	 private	 domain	 increasingly	 came	 to	represent	the	body.			And	indeed,	the	‘New	Man’	that	was	born	with	the	twentieth	century	‘rendered	as	the	 chief	 concern	 the	 values	 of	 the	 body.	 This	 was	 the	 great	 revolution	 of	 the	twentieth	century.[…]	The	new	man	starts	with	the	body,	he	knows	that	the	body	is	 the	articulation	of	 the	soul	and	that	 the	soul	cannot	express,	deploy,	or	ensure	itself	other	than	in	the	body’.98	But	the	fin	de	siècle	was	equally	the	time	when	the	body	 experienced	 a	 twofold	 socialization	 and	 objectification,	 becoming	 itself	 a	primary	locus	of	government.	Firstly,	the	body	was	increasingly	apprehended	in	its	
activity	and	movement	as	a	machine	to	be	engineered,	 ‘through	the	often	narrow	and	 forced,	mercantile	 and	 spectacular	 practices	 of	 sport’,	 through	 the	 conveyor	
																																																								98	Pierre	Drieu	La	Rochelle,	 ‘Renaissance	de	l’homme	europeen’,	Recherches,	32-33	(1978),	p.	550.	For	the	unity	of	body	and	soul	in	the	New	Man	see:	George	Mosse,	The	Image	of	Man:	The	Creation	
of	Modern	Masculinity	(Oxford,	1996).	
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belt	first	introduced	in	1893,	or	through	the	he	chronometric	practices	of	scientific	factory	management	that	Frederick	Winslow	Taylor	made	known	from	1895.99			Secondly,	 in	 its	passivity	 the	body	was	the	helpless	habitat	of	 illness.	Medicine	as	we	know	 it	 today	emerged	 from	the	combination	of	 the	Pasteurian	revolution	 in	microbiology	and	the	rise	of	modern	pharmaceuticals	following	Bayer’s	synthesis	and	 commercial	 production	 of	 aspirin	 in	 1899.	 The	 first	 ushered	 a	 new	 age	 of	surgery,	since	the	‘act	of	operating	no	longer	kills:	we	are	more	or	less	masters	of	the	cuts	we	make,	we	direct	them	almost	at	will	toward	immediate	healing’.100	The	plasticity	of	workable	flesh	and	life	were	no	longer	incompatible.	With	the	second,	the	body	was	freed	from	the	cage	of	biology	and	entered	the	age	of	chemistry	and	its	 ever	 so	 subtle	 and	 precise	 technological	 interventions.	 Together,	 asepsis	 and	drugs	 rendered	 possible	 the	 modern	 reading	 of	 illness	 as	 an	 objective	 and	impersonal	 invasion	 from	 an	 evil	 external	 agent	 requiring	 the	 intervention	 of	specialists	in	order	to	eradicate	it	and	restore	normality;	human	particularity	was	pure	 circumstance,	 while	 the	 body	 was	 but	 the	 passive	 battleground.101	As	 the	inside	of	the	living	body	yielded	its	secrets	with	the	discovery	of	the	x-ray	in	1895,	so	did	the	unconscious	mind	become	transparent	to	science.	Philosopher	Maurice	Blanchot	 wrote	 of	 psychoanalysis	 and	 its	 pretention	 ‘to	 determine	 the	 interior	reality	 of	 the	 subject’:	 ‘What	 faith	 in	 reason!	 What	 confidence	 in	 the	 liberating	
																																																								99	Drieu	La	Rochelle,	‘Renaissance’,	p.	551;	J.H.	van	den	Berg,	Divided	Existence	and	Complex	Society	(Pittsburgh,	1974),	p.	96.	100	Quoted	in:	Bruno	Latour,	The	Pasteurization	of	France	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1988),	p.	46.		101	For	 an	 excellent	 analysis	 of	 medical	 rationality	 see	 François	 Laplantine,	 Anthropologie	 de	 la	
maladie	 (Paris,	 1993),	 ‘Jalons	 pour	 une	 anthropologie	 des	 systemes	 de	 représentations	 de	 la	maladie	 et	 de	 la	 guérison	 dans	 les	 sociétés	 occidentales	 contemporaines’,	 Histoire,	 économie	 et	
société,	3/4	(1984),	pp.	641-650.	
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power	of	 language!	What	 virtues	 accorded	 to	 the	most	 simple	 relation:	 one	man	speaks	and	another	listens!	And	thus	are	healed	not	only	minds,	but	bodies’.102			Therefore,	in	neither	body	nor	mind,	interiority	or	exteriority,	did	there	remain	a	domain	of	actual	particularity,	specificity,	or	uniqueness	for	the	self,	an	irreducible	and	unified	sense	of	individuality,	or	a	set	of	conceptual	boundaries	to	separate	the	individual	and	nature,	otherness,	society	or	the	state.	This	was	not	an	accident	or	a	new	form	of	tyranny,	but	rather	the	result	of	a	new	theorization	of	the	individual	that	 challenged	 the	 old	 paradigm.	 Léon	 Bourgeois,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 republican	statesmen	of	the	1890s	and	the	prime	minister	from	1895	to	1896,	was	among	the	first	 to	 have	 turned	 this	 new	 theorization	 into	 a	 political	 theory	 known	 as	
solidarisme.	 He	 argued	 that	 so	 long	 as	 ‘man’	 was	 considered	 as	 different	 from	nature	and	equal	to	others	as	an	exemplar	of	a	universal	type	created	one	and	for	all	by	divinity	at	the	dawn	of	time,	then	it	was	a	simple	logical	operation	to	deduce	that	man	was	an	absolute	endowed	with	absolute	rights	and	clear	duties.	And	such	rights	 were	 the	 appropriate	 means	 for	 an	 individual	 imagined	 as	 the	 goal	 of	existence	 and	 creation.	 But,	 Bourgeois	 argued,	 the	 understanding	 of	 ‘man’	 had	changed.	No	 longer	 ‘an	 abstraction	whose	 “one	 and	 identical”	moi	 is	 the	 a	priori	subject	of	rights	themselves’,	‘man’	was	no	longer	special	and	different	from	other	living	 beings.	 All	 creatures	 were	 subject	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 evolution	 and	 were	necessarily	 determined	 by	 their	 milieu.	 These	 realizations	 had	 profound	implications	for	the	understanding	of	the	state.	In	destroying	 the	abstract	and	a	priori	notion	of	 the	 isolated	man,	 the	 familiarity	with	 the	 laws	 of	 natural	 solidarity	 destroys	 with	 the	 same	 blow	 the	 equally																																																									102	Maurice	Blanchot,	The	Infinite	Conversation	(Mineapolis,	1995),	pp.	230,	234.	
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abstract	and	a	priori	notion	of	the	State,	isolated	from	man	and	opposed	to	him	as	a	distinct	 subject	 of	 rights	 or	 as	 a	 superior	 power	 to	 which	 he	 would	 be	subordinated.		This	was	a	paradigm	of	hazy	borders,	and	as	such	 it	went	against	 the	conceptual	boundaries	and	the	series	of	a	priori	that	upheld	the	unassailable	centrality	of	the	liberal	 individual	 and	 the	 state.	 The	 name	 for	 this	 dissolution	 of	 fundamental	conceptual	 frontiers	 in	 the	 political	 theory	 of	 traditional	 and	 present-day	liberalism	is	totalitarianism.	But	the	term	does	not	refer	to	the	absence	of	liberties,	only	to	those	specific	liberties	that	make	possible	a	certain	type	of	liberal	self	and	state	 understood	 to	 be	 the	 conceptual	 condition	 for	 all	 liberties.	 There	 existed	liberties	 and	 government	 through	 liberty	 outside	 those	 advocated	 by	 orthodox	political	 and	 economic	 liberalism.	 For	 example,	 the	 switch	 to	 a	 socialized	 self	enabled	 the	 proliferation	 of	 new	 freedoms	 in	 the	 form	 of	 unprecedented	 social	rights	we	 have	 come	 to	 identify	with	 the	Welfare	 state,	which	were	 structurally	impossible	 under	 the	 previous	 theory	 of	 indivisible	 subjectivity.	 In	 the	 next	section,	we	turn	to	the	new	liberties	that	became	available	to	the	socialized	self.			
‘I	contain	multitudes’:	The	multiple	self.			While	 in	 1893	 Durkheim	 had	 considered	 that	 personal	 consciousness	 ‘only	represents	 our	 individual	 personality	 and	 constitutes	 it’,	 we	 have	 seen	 how	 the	space	reserved	for	our	private	mind	progressively	decreased	as	Durkheim’s	work	matured,	and	in	the	end	it	was	limited	to	‘the	body	and	its	states’.	He	would	write	that	‘We	say	our	individuality	and	not	our	personality.	Although	the	two	words	are	often	taken	for	one	another,	 it	 is	 important	to	distinguish	them	with	the	greatest	
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care.	 The	 personality	 is	 made	 up	 essentially	 of	 supra-individual	 elements’.103	Therefore,	 personality	 had	 also	 been	 annexed	 to	 the	 social	 domain.	 Indeed,	 the	meaning	of	personality	changed	dramatically	in	the	fin	de	siècle.			It	 was	 in	 the	 1870s	 that	 the	 old	 ‘metaphysical’	 approaches	 across	 a	 number	 of	disciplines	 were	 substituted	 for	 their	 modern	 ‘scientific’	 ones	 we	 can	 now	recognize.	 Charles	Renouvier	 and	his	 school	 operated	 this	 change	 in	philosophy,	leading	 to	 a	 reinterpretation	 of	 Kant	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 a	 pluralistic	 and	 social	theory	 of	 consciousness.104	Susan	 Stedman	 Jones	 has	 convincingly	 shown	 the	enormous	 debt	Durkheim	had	with	Renouvier	 in	many	 of	 his	most	 foundational	suppositions.105	Théodule	Ribot	was	 the	 first	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 same	modernizing	shift	 in	psychology	 in	 the	1870s.	The	abandonment	of	 the	metaphysical	bases	of	the	 unified	 and	 indivisible	 self	 led	 to	 an	 increasingly	 unsettling	 number	 of	discoveries	 about	 the	 psyche	 especially	 thanks	 to	 hypnotism	 and	 other	experiences	 of	 complex	 automatism.	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 crucial	 of	 these	 for	 the	purposes	 of	 our	 discussion	was	 that	 of	 secondary	 or	multiple	 personalities,	 first	reported	 in	 1876	 in	 the	 journal	 Ribot	 edited.	 The	 condition	 spread	 quickly	following	its	discovery.	Ian	Hacking	has	shown	that	from	1874	to	1886	‘a	wave	of	multiplicity	 swept	 over	 France’. 106 	Initially	 interpreted	 as	 a	 form	 of	somnambulism,	 this	psychic	anomaly	would	become	pivotal	 in	 the	1880s	 for	 the	abandonment	of	the	old	model	of	the	self.																																																										103	Durkheim,	‘The	dualism’,	p.	45.	104	See	Laurent	Fedi,	Le	problème	de	la	connaissance	dans	la	philosophie	de	charles	renouvier	(Paris,	1998).	105	Jones,	Durkheim	Reconsidered,	chapter	4.	106	Ian	 Hacking,	 Rewriting	 the	 Soul:	 Multiple	 Personality	 and	 the	 Sciences	 of	 Memory	 (Princeton,	1995),	p.	128.	
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It	is	hard	to	express	the	scale	of	the	intellectual	effervescence	of	the	1880s	in	the	international	 field	 of	 consciousness	 research.	A	multitude	of	 scientists,	 occultists	and	writers	served	as	pioneers	in	the	mysterious	land	of	unconscious	consciousness	or	conscious	unconsciousness;	 their	names	and	works	were	destined	to	be	quickly	forgotten,	Robert	Louis	Stevenson’s	1886	Dr.	Jekyll	and	Mr.	Hyde	notwithstanding.	While	 men	 ‘often	 quite	 independent	 of	 each	 other’	 were	 reaching	 the	 same	conclusions	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 Atlantic	 at	 a	 dizzying	 pace,	 here	 Paris,	 as	 in	 so	many	 other	 respects,	 was	 the	 epicentre.	 ‘More	 than	 sixty	 publications	 on	suggestion,	hypnosis	and	the	dual	self	appear	 in	France	between	1885	and	1887’	alone.107			The	normalien	and	psychologist	Pierre	Janet,	the	nephew	of	philosopher	Paul	Janet,	was	one	of	the	key	figures	in	this	epistemic	change.	He	would	write	that	this	odd	discovery	‘was	the	great	argument	of	which	the	positivist	psychologists	made	use	at	the	time	of	the	heroic	struggles	against	the	spiritualistic	dogmatism	of	Cousin’s	school’,	 its	 unitary	 self	 and	 the	 system	 of	 morality	 that	 derived	 from	 it.108	But	rather	 than	dismiss	 the	 sense	of	 self	 completely	by	 reducing	 awareness	 to	brain	function,	 which	 was	 the	 existing	 alternative	 to	 Cousin’s	moi,	 which	 would	 have	meant	breaking	with	the	spiritualist	philosophical	tradition	in	which	he	had	been	educated,	Janet	argued	based	on	his	work	with	hysterical	patients,	that	‘the	fact	of	successive	 existences	 strikes	 no	 blow	 at	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 self’.	 	 Instead,	 a	 new	
																																																								107	Van	den	Berg,	Divided	Existence,	p.	41,	see	chapter	2.		108	Quoted	 in:	 Edward	 M.	 Brown,	 ‘Pierre	 Janet	 and	 Félida	 Artificielle:	 Multiple	 personality	 in	 a	nineteenth-century	guise’,	Journal	of	History	of	the	Behavioral	Sciences,	39/3	(2003),	p.	281.	
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alternative	 was	 offered	 based	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 ‘states	 of	 unconscious	consciousness’	and	a	multiplicity	of	selves.109			Not	 denying	 but	 rather	 appropriating	 and	 reinventing	 the	 self	 was	 a	 way	 of	undercutting	 the	 modernized	 and	 reinvigorated	 versions	 of	 the	 unitary,	psychological	 model	 of	 the	 self	 and	 society,	 which	 in	 France	 became	 associated	with	 the	 names	 of	 Herbert	 Spencer	 and	 Gabriel	 Tarde.	 By	 means	 of	 their	sociological	psychologies,	they	gave	new	life	to	the	old	psychological	paradigm	that	remained	 much	 more	 coherent	 and	 philosophically	 sound	 than	 the	 new	sociological	 model,	 as	 the	 on-going	 debate	 between	 Tarde	 and	 Durkheim	showed.110	In	 the	 debate	 as	 throughout	 his	 career,	 Durkheim’s	 answer	 to	 the	thorny	 questions	 he	 faced	 was	 commonly	 ignorance,	 claiming	 that	 the	 current	state	of	the	sociological	science	meant	that	we	did	not	yet	know.	The	new	scientific	model	offered	no	metaphysical	cohesion,	only	tentative	findings.	But	in	‘les	années	électriques’	 of	 the	 fin-de-siècle	 these	 results	 promised	 an	 exciting	 new	world.111	Logical	 certainties	 had	 given	 way	 to	 endless	 possibility.	 And	 the	 findings	 of	multiple	 personalities	 participated	 in	 that	 mind-blowing	 awe	 of	 scientific	discovery	of	the	time.	In	introducing	this	discovery	to	the	English-speaking	world,																																																									109	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	282.	As	Durkheim	would	attempt	to	incorporate	the	religious	into	sociology	in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 clerical-anticlerical	 disputes	 of	 the	 day,	 so	 did	 Janet	 and	 his	 fellow	psychologists	 try	 to	 annex	 the	 spiritual	 realm	 into	 their	 newborn	 discipline.	 A	 key	 device	 that	allowed	 for	 Janet’s	 breakthroughs	 into	 the	dark	 recesses	of	multiple	personalities	was	his	 use	of	‘automatic	 writing’,	 the	 technique	 with	 which	 spiritistes	 communicated	 with	 the	 dead.	 Janet’s	research	into	‘possession,	ecstasy,	and	stigmata’	and	other	supernatural	‘pathologies’	make	him	one	of	 the	 key	 sources	 for	 the	 simultaneous	 birth	 of	 both	 modern	 psychology	 and	 parapsychology.	Brown,	‘Pierre	Janet’,	p.	283;	Lachapelle,	Investigating	the	Supernatural,	chapter	3.	110	This	 pique	 between	 Tarde	 and	 Durkheim	 included	 the	 exchange	 of	 some	 26	 polemical	 texts	between	them	from	1893,	climaxing	with	a	face-to-face	debate	in	1903	in	l’École	des	hautes	études	
sociales.	 Marcia	 Consolim,	 ‘Émile	 Durkheim	 e	 Gabriel	 Tarde:	 Aspectos	 teóricos	 de	 um	 debate	histórico,	1893-1904’,	História:	Questões	&	debates,	53	(2010),	pp.	39-65.	For	a	recent	reenactment	of	the	debate	(available	on	YouTube)	see:	Eduardo	Viana	Vargas,	Bruno	Latour,	Bruno	Karsenti,	et	al.,	 ‘The	debate	between	Tarde	and	Durkheim’,	Environment	and	Planning	D:	Society	and	Space,	26	(2008),	pp.	761-777.	111	Christophe	Prochasson,	Les	années	électriques,	1880-1910	(Paris,	1991).	
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American	 psychologist	 and	 philosopher	William	 James	 praised	 Janet	 in	 1890	 for	having	proven	that	‘the	total	possible	consciousness	may	be	split	into	parts	which	coexist	but	mutually	ignore	each	other’.112	For	his	readers,	such	a	thing	must	have	seemed	beyond	Jules	Verne’s	imagination.		While	 the	 history	 of	multiple	 personalities,	 in	 France	 in	 particular,	 has	 received	scholarly	attention,	I	would	like	to	focus	on	a	neglected	legacy	of	this	discovery.113	That	is	namely	the	fact	that	multiple	personalities	offered	the	grounds	for	the	new	form	of	socialized	self	Durkheim	and	others	were	putting	forward	at	the	time,	and	also	for	its	corollary	in	a	new	understanding	of	government	(and	therefore	of	new	domains	of	 ‘freedom’)	that	made	social	pluralism	possible	 for	the	 first	 time	since	1789	by	locating	social	diversity	inside	the	self	in	a	new	way.			The	 increasing	 complexity	 of	 the	 self	 crystalized	 into	 a	 new	 paradigm	 around	1893. 114 	Dutch	 psychiatrist	 Jan-Hendrik	 van	 den	 Berg	 has	 pointed	 out	 the	synchronicity	 of	 three	major	 and	 independent	discoveries	 that	 occurred	 in	1891	and	 1893	 that	 shifted	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 self.	 The	 first	 was	 Durkheim’s	finding	in	1893	of	a	dual	consciousness.	In	1891,	James	argued	that	individuals	had	as	many	social	personalities	as	the	groups	to	which	he	or	she	belonged.	The	third	was	the	first	article	discussing	a	hysteria	patient	who	was	living	an	existence	that	was	partly	conscious	and	partly	unconscious.	 It	was	published	in	1893	by	Joseph	
																																																								112	Quoted	in:	Ibid.		113	See	especially	Hacking,	Rewriting	the	Soul.	114	For	 the	 events	 of	 circa	 1893	 in	 French	 experimental	 psychology,	 see:	 Frédéric	 Carbonel,	'L'aristocratie	aliéniste	face	au	disciple	de	Charcot:	Une	nouvelles	croisée	des	chemins	au	début	des	années	1890?’,	HAL,	00191150	(2007),	pp.	1-21;	P.	Estingoy,	‘Le	concept	d’automatisme	à	l’épreuve	de	 la	 filiation:	 De	 Charles	 Richet	 à	 Pierre	 Janet’,	 Annales	médico-psychologiques,	 166	 (2008),	 pp.	177–184.	
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Breuer	 and	 Sigmund	 Freud,	 who	 would	 soon	 base	 his	 depth	 psychology	 on	 the	understanding	that	all	humans	lived	divided	between	a	conscious	life	and	a	hostile	unconscious.115			As	these	discoveries	consolidated	a	new	form	of	compound	subjectivity,	they	were	quickly	 translated	 into	 new	 theories	 of	 government.	 In	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	1890s,	 these	 emerged	 simultaneously	 across	 the	 Anglo-European	 world.	 There	was	 agreement	 on	 the	 new	 basic	 premise	 of	 government,	 which	 rested	 on	 the	dividedness	of	the	subject	as	uncovered	by	the	fin-de-siècle	sciences	of	the	mind.	Swiss	 theorist	 Sigismond	 Balicki	 could	 not	 have	 been	 clearer	 in	 this	 respect.	 In	1895	he	wrote	that	‘Modern	research	in	experimental	psychology	has	established	that	 our	 personalities	 are	 multiple	 and	 changing’.116	He	 took	 this	 to	 mean,	 with	James,	that	we	had	as	many	personalities	as	social	roles.	He	understood	that	‘social	groupings	do	not	embrace	 the	entire	 individual’	but	only	 ‘engage	one	part	of	his	functions,	 corresponding	 to	 the	 function	 of	 the	 collective’.	 Therefore,	 individuals	were	fragmented	into	being	a	father,	worker,	political	militant,	believer	of	a	faith,	citizen	or	member	of	voluntary	associations.		Each	of	 these	associations	only	engages	a	share	of	our	 life	and	 individual	 forces.	This	share,	merged	with	collective	life,	leaves	a	particular	imprint	on	our	being	and	determines	 our	 corresponding	 personality.	 We	 have	 as	 many	 of	 these	[personalities]	as	there	are	social	communities	which	share	our	supposed	internal	unity.117	
																																																								115	Van	den	Berg,	Divided	Existence,	chapter	2.	116	Sigismond	 Balicki,	 ‘L’organisation	 spontanée	 de	 la	 société	 politique’,	 Revue	 internationale	 de	
sociologie,	3/6	(1895),	p.	451.	117	Ibid.	
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Each	of	the	social	groupings	to	which	one	belonged	was	necessarily	based	on	some	form	 of	 fundamental	 similarity	 between	 its	 members	 sharing	 that	 one,	 non-exclusive	 personality.	 Indeed,	 ‘in	 order	 for	 the	 resembling	 elements	 [éléments	
ressemblants,	meaning	the	group	members]	to	be	associated,	it	is	indispensable	for	all	the	differences	that	may	compromise	common	action	to	be	removed	(écartés)’.	In	 such	 a	 group,	 ‘individual	 particularities	 are	 erased,	 distinct	 elements	 are	removed,	 internal	 affinity	 increases,	 and	 all	 the	mass	 becomes	more	 consistent,	more	homogeneous’.118			James	had	articulated	a	similar	approach	in	1891.	‘Properly	speaking’,	he	argued,	‘a	man	 has	 as	 many	 social	 selves	 as	 there	 are	 individuals	 who	 recognize	 him	 and	carry	an	image	of	him	in	their	mind’.	This	was	instantly	qualified	along	lines	that	would	 very	 soon	 become	 commonplace.	 ‘But	 as	 the	 individuals	 who	 carry	 the	images	 fall	 naturally	 into	 classes,	 we	 may	 practically	 say	 that	 he	 has	 as	 many	different	social	selves	as	there	are	distinct	groups	of	persons	about	whose	opinion	he	cares’.119			The	 claim	 Balicki	 and	 many	 of	 his	 contemporaries	 were	 making	 was	 that	 if	multiple	personalities	were	possible,	then	the	self	could	not	be	reduced	to	its	many	personalities.	This	meant	 that	 each	 social	 role	or	 function	 constituted,	 regulated,	and	engaged	only	one	personality,	but	never	the	entire	being.	The	individual	could	not	 be	 reduced	 to	 any	 or	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 roles.	 As	 a	 result,	 individuality	 and	socialization	 no	 longer	 contradicted	 each	 other	 in	 an	 either-or	manner;	 being	 a	
																																																								118	Ibid.,	p.	457.	119	Quoted	in:	van	den	Berg,	Divided	Existence,	p.	275.	
	 349	
completely	 social	 individual	 did	 not	 exhaust	 private	 particularity	 and	 personal	freedom,	but	actually	constituted	it.	At	least	in	theory,	personalities	were	a	matter	of	 choice.	 The	 self	 was	 now	 called	 upon	 to	 fashion	 itself	 by	 creating	 a	 unique	collage	of	social	personalities	to	which	it	could	never	be	reduced.	Particularity	was	now	the	specific	and	creative	manner	in	which	one	person	engaged	with	the	social.	To	 the	 question	 ‘What	 then	 is	 the	 individual	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	of	 society?’,	Balicki	 replied	 ‘He	 is	 but	 the	 point	 of	 intersection	 of	 diverse	 collective	 currents,	diverse	 organizations,	 a	 synthesis	 of	 his	 own	 instincts	 and	 tendencies	which	 are	those	of	society’.120			Hence	 individuality	 was	 the	 ability	 to	 generate	 a	 personal	 (and	 personally	meaningful)	 synthesis	made	of	borrowed	social	elements,	which	never	had	 to	be	merged	in	the	self	or	in	some	meta-personality;	instead,	it	is	more	like	the	capacity	to	 recognize	 appropriate	 self-division	 in	 the	 self	 and	 others.	 Each	 ‘of	 his	 own	instincts	 and	 tendencies’	 had	 to	 be	 expressed	 through	 the	 fitting	 social	 channel,	‘differentiating	the	ensemble	of	his	general	aspiration	 into	precise	tendencies’.	 In	other	words,	 individuals	had	to	be	apt	 in	keeping	separate	each	of	 their	multiple	personalities	 (as	 worker,	 father,	 student,	 and	 so	 on)	 and	 not	 mixing	 up	 the	personalities	of	another.121			While	 the	 idea	of	multiple	personalities	being	 taken	 to	constitute	a	new	sense	of	social	self	may	sound	alien	to	our	ears,	 it	gains	a	sharp	focus	if	we	substitute	the	term	 personalities	 for	 its	 modern	 equivalent:	 identities.	 Until	 the	 twentieth	
																																																								120	Balicki,	‘Organisation	spontanée’,	p.	452.	121	Ibid.,	p.	456.	
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century,	the	word	identité	only	meant	mêmeté	or	sameness.	Identity	signified	that	several	things	were	one	same	thing	or	idea.	One’s	identity	in	legal	language	meant	that	 the	 man	 that	 entered	 a	 contract	 or	 committed	 an	 act	 was	 identical	 with	himself	across	time	and	space,	and	thus	legally	responsible.	Now,	the	very	basis	of	socialization	 through	 associations	 was	 group	 homogeneity	 or	 being	 identical	 in	some	 aspect.	 While	 I	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 locate	 when	 the	 modern	 usage	 of	identities	 originated,	 there	 were	 already	 signs	 by	 1899	 of	 movement	 in	 that	direction,	as	in	this	discussion	of	family	life:	‘The	affinities	of	kinship,	the	daily	life	in	 common	 predisposes	 to	 affections,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 identification	 with	others’.122		As	early	as	1883,	German	philosopher	of	history	Wilhelm	Dilthey	had	argued	that	society	 as	 the	 ‘cultural	 systems’	 that	 arose	 from	 it	 were	 made	 up	 of	 these	interlocking	 groups,	 none	 of	 which	 encompassed	 the	 whole	 individual.	Distinctness	remained	private,	 for	 it	was	only	 ‘the	similarity	of	 individuals	which	allows	them	to	share	common	contents	in	their	lives’.123	Since	these	similarities	in	turn	 generated	 a	 common	 purpose	 and	 will,	 Dilthey	 called	 groups	 ‘volitional	unities’.	These	were	theorized	as	not	only	autonomous	from	its	members,	but	most	importantly	 as	 essentially	 unchanged	 by	 them.	 Families,	 states	 or	 churches	endured	‘while	individuals	pass	in	and	out	of	them,	just	as	an	organism	continues	in	 spite	 of	 the	 appearance	 and	 disappearance	 of	 the	 molecules	 and	 atoms	 that	
																																																								122	Thérèse	Bentzon,	Causeries	de	morale	pratique	(Paris,	1913),	p.	6.	123	Wilhelm	Dilthey,	Introduction	to	the	Human	Sciences	(Princeton,	1989),	p.	100.	
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constitute	 it’. 124 	The	 same	 was	 true	 of	 culture.	 ‘Religion,	 art,	 and	 law	 are	imperishable,	while	the	individuals	in	whom	they	live	change’.125		By	1901,	Durkheim	had	adopted	this	view,	borrowing	from	his	supporters	Marcel	Mauss	and	Paul	Fauconnet	the	definition	of	sociology	as	‘the	science	of	institutions,	their	 genesis	 and	 their	 functioning’.	 This	 included	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	institutions	understood	as	an	instituting	or	‘crystalizing’	of	‘certain	modes	of	action	and	certain	ways	of	judging	which	are	independent	of	the	particular	individual	will	considered	 separately’.	 These	 were	 added	 on	 to	 the	 individual’s	 nature	 and	embodied	by	a	succession	of	individuals	 ‘without	this	succession	destroying	their	continuity’.126	With	its	inflexible	concern	with	continuity,	the	institutional	focus	on	social	groupings	and	customs	dramatically	reduced	the	space	reserved	for	people	and	human	agency	by	dissolving	them	into	an	inter-generational	and	even	god-like	temporality	where	actual	persons	were	rendered	irrelevant.		But	where	the	German	and	French	interpretations	parted	ways	was	in	the	issue	of	the	state.	What	Balicki	proposed	was	an	ideal	of	a	stateless	society,	a	‘spontaneous	organization	of	the	political	Society’.	He	argued	that	the	state	was	only	necessary	because	coercion	and	constraint	were	indispensable	to	harmonize	heterogeneous	and	 divergent	 elements.	 The	 need	 for	 government	 was	 only	 the	 result	 of	differences	in	society,	rather	than	derived	from	equality	and	sameness	of	desires.	Balicki	thus	turned	Hobbes	on	his	head.	The	opposite	of	coercive	government	was	
																																																								124	Ibid.,	p.	115.	125	Ibid.,	p.	101.	126	Quoted	in:	Lukes,	‘Introduction’,	pp.	4-5.	
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spontaneous	 action	 which	 was	 born	 out	 of	 ‘bonds	 of	 homogeneity’,	 making	possible	a	conflict-free	integration	through	unhindered	sameness.127			Durkheim	also	agreed	that	antagonism	was	what	made	the	state	necessary,	but	he	argued	 that	 conflict	 in	 society	 was	 inevitable	 due	 to	 ever	 increasing	 complexity	brought	about	by	the	division	of	labour.	While	also	emphasizing	the	homogenizing	effect	of	groups,	Durkheim	in	turn	relied	on	analogies	borrowed	from	evolutionary	biology,	 whereby	 advancement	 is	 the	 passage	 from	 homogeneity	 to	heterogeneity.128	The	‘mechanical	solidarity’	of	traditional	societies	implied	a	strict	adherence	 to	 collective	 consciousness,	 leaving	 no	 room	 for	 that	 which	made	 us	distinctive;	 thus	 ‘originally	 the	 individual	was	absorbed	 in	 the	group’.129	Growing	functional	 diversity	 was	 inseparable	 from	 moral	 pluralism	 and	 increasingly	individualized	 minds	 and	 emancipated	 individuals;	 thus	 in	 modern	 societies	individuals	 became	 increasingly	 dissimilar	 and	 specialized,	 while	 internal	divergence	within	groups	inevitably	led	to	new	groups.130	Eventual	conflicts	within	and	between	groups	were	as	 inescapable	as	 the	 inner	struggles	between	the	two	consciousnesses	 in	 individuals,	 to	 which	 the	 problem	 could	 be	 reduced.	 For	 he	interpreted	 the	 state	 as	 necessary	 because	 of	 injustice,	 the	 principal	 source	 of	which	was	 inequality.	 If	 the	state	did	not	 intervene,	 then	 families,	castes,	classes,	corporations	 and	 all	 sorts	 of	 clans	 and	 economic	 bodies	 necessarily	 would	 use	their	 superiority	 to	 completely	 subsume	 those	under	 their	 influence.	This	meant	that	it	was	necessary	to	have	‘an	equal	(sovereign)	force	that	is	more	elevated	that																																																									127	Balicki,	‘Organisation	spontanée’,	p.	460.	128	Alessandro	Pizzorno,	‘Lecture	actuelle	de	Durkheim’,	European	Journal	of	Sociology,	4/1	(1963),	pp.	31-33.	129	Durkheim,	Division	du	travail,	p.	318.	130	Ibid.,	p.	405.	
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all	the	others	and	that,	consequently,	is	capable	of	containing	and	preventing	their	excesses.	Such	a	force	is	the	State’.131			‘The	 essential	 function	 of	 the	 state’,	 Durkheim	 wrote,	 ‘is	 to	 liberate	 individual	personalities’,	 or	what	 he	would	 later	 call	 individualities.132	Without	 the	 state,	 it	seemed	as	if	the	social	consciousness	would	certainly	obliterate	the	individual	one;	and	 states	 existed	 to	 impede	 this.	 Oddly,	 this	 meant	 that	 the	 war	 between	 the	private	and	social	aspects	of	the	mind	were	not	so	much	inevitable	and	natural,	but	rather	at	once	 the	main	cause	and	effect	of	 the	state,	 the	main	goal	 that	 justified	and	necessitated	governing.	Thus	state	and	 individual	were	as	 inseparable	 in	 the	theory	of	the	two	consciousnesses	as	they	had	been	in	the	psychological	theory	of	the	self.		
	
The	culture	of	the	self.		Durkheim’s	 society	 was	 not	 far	 from	 a	 notion	 that	 had	 been	 gradually	 gaining	ground	 since	 1870,	 that	 of	 culture.	 Both	 functioned	 as	 the	 crucial	 normative	domains	 that	 structured	 the	 terms	 in	 which	 behaviour	 and	 merit	 were	 to	 be	understood.			The	social	or	the	cultural	came	to	stand	for	something	at	once	already	existing	and	containing	 its	 own	 ideal,	 simultaneously	 internalized	 and	 objectively	 external.	They	 were	 normative	 not	 because	 they	 acted	 directly	 upon	 behaviour	 and																																																									131	Durkheim,	‘L'État’,	Revue	philosophique	de	la	France	et	de	l'étranger,	148	(1958),	pp.	435-436.	In	
Division	du	travail,	p.	455	he	makes	 the	same	claim	about	 ‘the	regulatory	action	of	society’	acting	through	law.		132	Quoted	in	Jones,	Durkheim	Reconsidered,	p.	167.	
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thinking,	but	rather	because	the	socio-cultural	functioned	as	a	complete	catalogue	of	symbols,	categories	and	meanings	that	was	already	there	for	individuals	to	draw	upon.	Categories	 such	as	 the	 ideal,	 the	normal	 and	 the	pathological	were	part	of	what	Gertrude	 Jaeger	 and	Philip	 Selznick	 call	 the	 ‘the	 conception	 of	 culture	 as	 a	“design	 for	 living”.	 A	 design	 for	 living	 is	 a	 set	 of	 implicit	 and	 explicit	 standards	which,	 in	any	society,	can	be	only	approximately	embodied	 in	action.	The	society	has	its	ideal	father,	son,	workman	and	friend,	but	the	observed	role,	and	even	the	learned	 role,	may	 be	 a	 far	 cry	 from	 the	 cultural	 ideal’.133	But	 this	 understanding	does	not	take	us	far	from	the	early-nineteenth	century	notion	of	morality	as	a	set	of	 intuitive	 but	 unspecific	 and	 even	 contradictory	 ideals	 towards	which	 all	must	advance.	This	morality	of	 the	early	nineteenth	century	had	been	 locked	 in	an	all-or-nothing	 legal	 ideal,	 as	 can	be	seen	 in	 the	work	of	Henri	Nadault	de	Buffon.	 In	1862,	 in	 his	 book	 on	 child-rearing	 for	mothers	 he	 stated	 that	 ‘Submission	 is	 an	indispensable	virtue	 in	the	child’.	 It	 taught	 individuals	to	 lower	their	pride	 in	the	presence	of	the	obstacles	of	nature	or	law.		It	is	indispensable,	in	effect,	that	man	becomes	accustomed,	from	the	first	hours	of	his	 life,	 to	 obey	 blindly	 certain	 necessary	 laws:	 this	 is	 what	 I	 would	 call	 the	discipline	 of	 intelligence,	 which	 is	 irremediably	 destroyed	 by	 the	 spirit	 of	discussion.	 Laws	 are	 not	 discussed,	 there	 are	 either	 respectfully	 observed	 or	
audaciously	combatted.134		‘If	the	child	obeys,	he	benefits;	 if	he	revolts,	his	progress	stops’,	and	by	extension	the	same	was	true	for	all	members	of	society.																																																											133	Gertrude	 Jaeger	 and	 Philip	 Selznick,	 ‘A	 normative	 theory	 of	 culture’,	 American	 Sociological	
Review,	29/5	(1964),	p.	655.	134 	Henri	 Nadault	 de	 Buffon,	 L'éducation	 de	 la	 première	 enfance:	 Ou,	 la	 femme	 appelée	 à	 la	
regeneration	sociale	par	le	progrès	(Paris,	1862),	p.	253.	Emphasis	added.		
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In	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution,	 the	main	 obstacle	 for	 the	 practice	 of	government	was	the	irruption	of	volition,	either	in	the	form	of	the	General	Will	or	unruly	private	determinations.	The	main	task	of	the	self	was	theorized	as	being	the	taming	of	will	by	intellect.	Reason	was	enthroned	as	the	supreme	value	of	human	existence,	 albeit	 one	 that	 was	 itself	 infallible,	 impersonal,	 non-human	 or	 divine.	While	 each	 person	was	 called	 upon	 to	work	 on	 their	 own	 perfecting,	 this	 could	only	be	done	by	reaching	out	from	a	limited	private	intellect	to	a	reason	external	to	us,	and	embodied	only	in	the	great	men	gathered	in	the	official	academies.	Pierre	Florins,	himself	belonging	to	more	than	a	dozen	such	scientific	academies,	offered	a	Manichean	choice	between	instinct	and	intellect.	‘Instinct	does	not	learn,	it	does	not	 instruct,	 develop	 or	 prefect	 itself.	 Intelligence	 learns,	 instructs,	 develops	 and	prefects	itself’.135	This	hollowing	out	of	volition	was	completed	in	Littré’s	vision	of	man	 as	 matter.	 Free	 will	 and	 personal	 autonomy	 from	 the	 milieu	 was	 but	 an	illusion	derived	from	the	electrical	impulses	in	the	human	brain.	Lucien	Lévy-Bruhl	separated	 law	 and	morality,	 grounding	 the	 first	 in	 impersonal	 public	 utility	 and	defence,	 and	 the	 latter	 in	 freedom	of	 conscience.	Wrongdoers	 could	be	punished	simply	because	they	had	broken	the	 law	of	 the	 land,	rather	than	having	to	 locate	them	as	rational	and	free	moral	agents	within	the	metaphysical	order.	Law	was	a	factual	and	blind	machine	with	entirely	objective	rules	and	penalties,	rather	than	a	moral	 cause	 one	 either	 accepted	 blindly	 or	 combated	 audaciously.136	Durkheim	reduced	 individuality	 to	 little	 but	 form,	 whose	 essences,	 shapes	 and	 contents	belonged	to	the	impersonal	consciousness	of	society.			
																																																								135	Pierre	Florins,	De	la	raison,	du	génie,	et	de	la	folie	(Paris,	1861),	p.	142.	136	Lucien	Lévy-Bruhl,	L’idée	de	la	responsabilité	(Paris,	1884).	
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But	awareness	of	the	‘fact’	that	society	was	an	impersonal	machine	that	ploughed	on	through	the	ages	regardless	of	humans,	opened	up	the	possibility	of	creatively	using	personal	will	and	choices	(be	they	real,	illusory	or	socially	determined)	in	a	novel	manner	of	creative	self-fashioning.	By	locating	the	impersonal	inside	the	self	but	beyond	 its	 control,	Durkheim	opened	up	a	new	domain	of	 individual	agency,	which	 I	 think	 can	 be	 captured	 in	 Jaeger	 and	 Selznick’s	 emphasis	 on	 individual	symbolization	and	adaptation.	in	 the	 struggle	 against	 alienation,	 man	 transforms	 the	 instrumental	 and	 the	impersonal,	 the	 physical	 and	 the	 organic,	 into	 a	 realm	 of	 evocative,	 expressive,	person-centered	meaning.[...]	 It	 is	an	effort	 to	make	 the	world	rich	with	personal	significance,	 to	 place	 the	 inner	 self	 upon	 the	 stage,	 to	 transform	 narrow	instrumental	 roles	 into	 vehicles	 of	 psychic	 fulfillment.	 It	 implicates	 the	 self	 and	strives	to	invest	the	environment	with	subjective	relevance	and	meaning.137	By	 1900,	 the	 individual	 was	 being	 called	 to	 participate	 and	 integrate	 into	 a	collective	 system	 by	 endowing	 it	 with	 personal	 meaning	 through	 ‘the	transformation	 of	 an	 impersonal	 setting	 into	 a	 personal	 one’.138	Early	 twenty	century	 nationalist	 rallies,	 1st	 May	 Fêtes	 du	 Travail	 or	 football	 matches	 did	 not	imply	 the	 blind	 acceptance	 of	 socially	 normative	 categories,	 but	 rather	 the	individual’s	investment	in	them	by	conferring	onto	them	personal	meaningfulness,	in	other	words,	the	person’s	identification	with	them.			The	 inability	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 symbolization	 is	 what	 Durkheim	 called	 anomie,	which	 he	 explored	 in	 depth	 as	 the	 source	 of	 suicide. 139 	Anomie	 meant	
																																																								137	Jaeger	and	Selznick,	‘Normative	Theory’,	pp.	659-660.	138	Ibid.,	p.	658.	139	See:	Durkheim,	Suicide	(Glencoe,	1951).	
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‘normlessness,	lawlessness’,	‘unrestraint,	abandonment’	or	‘derangement’,	in	short,	it	 was	 the	 absence	 of	 solidarity,	meaning	 the	 social	 regulation,	 organization	 and	coherence	 of	 the	plurality	 of	 social	 functions.140	But	more	 importantly,	 it	was	 an	updated	version	of	the	liberal	axiom	that	one	should	not	govern	too	much	or	two	little.	Thus	Durkheim	proposed	 ‘a	 just	middle	between	 two	extremes,	 between	a	minimum	 and	 a	 maximum.	 The	 individual	 may	 get	 lost	 where	 society	 is	 too	compact,	or	where	it	subordinates	him	too	narrowly	to	its	own	designs	(“altruistic”	suicide);	but	 just	 as	much	 in	 the	opposite	 situation,	when	 the	 social	 fabric	 is	 too	loose,	 impeding	 the	 individual	 from	 fixing	 limits	 to	 his	 own	 desire	 (“anomic”	suicide)’.141	‘Anomie	is	especially	a	lack	of	definition	of	individual	ends’.	In	such	a	state,	 individuals	 'have	 lost	 the	 criteria	 that	would	 allow	 them	 to	 evaluate	 their	own	individual	ends,	the	measure	of	values,	the	possibility	to	be	integrated	in	the	collective	 consciousness.	 Society	 is	 in	 a	 state	 of	 immoderation,	 malfunction,	anomie’.142	This	dialectic	of	identification	or	anomie	also	occupied	the	attention	of	jurist	Maurice	Hauriou,	whose	1896	Cours	de	science	social	sought	to	separate	‘the	objective	elements	of	progress	from	the	problem	of	conduct’.	He	opined	that	When	 an	 individual	 concerns	 himself	with	 leading	 a	 truly	 social	 conduct,	 that	 is,	with	adapting	to	society	even	his	unconscious	energies,	with	making	the	direction	of	 these	 agree	 with	 the	 common	 direction	 [of	 society],	 he	 accepts	 this	 base	 of	traditional	 beliefs	 without	 debate,	 as	 a	 product	 of	 a	 revelation.	 When	 out	 of	scepticism	or	dilettantism	he	does	not	act	this	way,	he	is	not	playing	with	an	open	hand	 (il	 ne	 joue	pas	 franc-jeu),	 and	 if	 there	were	 not	 a	majority	 of	 loyal	 players,	society	would	not	be	possible.143																																																									140	Van	den	Berg,	Divided	Existence,	p.	100.	141	Jacques	Donzelot,	Invention	du	social	(Paris,	1984),	p.	84	142	Pizzorno,	‘Lecture	actuelle’,	pp.	20-21.	143	Maurice	Hauriou,	Cours	de	science	sociale	(Paris,	1896),	p.	31	
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The	pathological	nature	of	this	 lack	of	 identification	with	social	roles	would	soon	become	the	foundation	of	psychoanalysis.	Psychoanalyst	Erik	Erikson	wrote	that	Freud	was	once	asked	what	he	thought	a	normal	person	should	be	able	to	do	well.	The	questioner	probably	 expected	 a	 complicated	 answer.	But	Freud,	 in	 the	 curst	ways	of	his	old	days,	is	reported	to	have	said	‘Lieben	und	arbeiten’	(to	love	and	to	work).144	In	 1930,	 Freud	 made	 the	 same	 claim	 in	 writing,	 and	 specified	 that	 ‘love’	 here	meant	 sexual	 attraction	 as	 well	 as	 mother-child	 affection.145 	In	 other	 words,	normality	 for	 psychoanalysts	 was	 to	 find	 contentment	 and	 meaning	 in	 the	inevitable	social	functions	of	production	and	reproduction.146		By	 contrast,	 this	 process	 of	 objectification	 of	 the	 self	 through	 symbolization	 and	identification	 was	 what	 Marx	 termed	 alienation.	 In	 capitalist	 production	 the	objects	of	the	world	stood	as	alien	to	‘man’,	even	if	they	were	of	his	own	creation.	This	 led	 to	 experiencing	 the	 world	 and	 even	 oneself	 receptively	 and	 passively.		Marx	argued	that	alienation	turned	a	person’s	human	essence	into	‘a	means	for	his	
individual	existence’,	 thus	 ‘alienate[ing]	 from	man	his	 own	body,	 external	 nature,	his	mental	life,	and	his	human	 life’.	Existence	becomes	experienced	'as	an	activity	which	is	directed	against	himself,	independent	of	him	and	not	belonging	to	him'.147	But	in	the	twenty	years	after	Marx’s	death	in	1883,	the	nature	of	alienation	would	shift,	requiring	the	increased	participation	of	the	alienated.	This	is	best	captured	in	the	following	lines	by	Thomas	Merton:	‘Alienation	begins	when	culture	divides	me	against	myself,	puts	a	mask	on	me,	gives	me	a	role	I	may	or	may	not	want	to	play.																																																									144	Erik	Erikson,	Childhood	and	Society	(St	Albans,	1977),	p.	238.	145	Sigmund	Freud,	Civilization	and	its	Discontents	(New	York,	1962),	p.	48.	146	The	same	premise	can	be	found	in	our	own	time	among	psychoanalysts	such	as	Frank	Pittman.		147	Erich	Fromm,	Marx’s	Concept	of	Man	(New	York,	1961),	pp.	45,	43.	
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Alienation	is	complete	when	I	become	completely	identified	with	my	mask,	totally	satisfied	 with	 my	 role,	 and	 convince	 myself	 that	 any	 other	 identity	 or	 role	 is	inconceivable’.148			It	was	this	very	game	of	masks	and	conceivability	sustained	by	self-conviction	that	marked	the	new	self	in	1900.	And	with	it	dawned	a	new	age	of	opportunity	for	self-definition.		
The	will	to	belong.		
	Franklin	 Ankersmit	 wrote	 that	 ‘it	 seems	 impossible	 for	 Tocqueville	 to	 describe	democracy	without	an	appeal	to	paradox’.149	And	one	of	the	irreducible	paradoxes	of	liberalism	as	a	form	of	government	is	that	new	freedoms	were	inseparable	from	and	unthinkable	without	new	constraints.	The	sociological	paradigm	of	the	self	left	very	 little	 space	 for	 what	 one	 could	 theorize	 as	 individuality.	 Reduced	 to	 the	instincts	and	sentiments	lodged	in	the	body,	it	would	seem	the	self	was	reduced	to	a	social	automaton.	And	yet,	the	shift	from	the	psychic	to	the	social	self	opened	up	an	unprecedented	space	for	human	freedom.	It	was	specifically	a	form	of	freedom	that	we	can	more	easily	recognize	today,	one	that	relied	entirely	upon	the	will	and	was	experienced	as	choices,	from	which	we	derived	our	specificity	as	individuals.			At	 the	 time	 a	 philosophy	 teacher	 in	 a	 provincial	 lycée,	 Jules	 Payot	 published	
L’éducation	de	 la	 volonté	 in	 1894.	 By	 1909	 it	 had	 gone	 through	 32	 editions	 and																																																									148	Thomas	Merton,	Seeds	(Boston,	2002),	p.	9.	149	Frankin	 Ankersmit,	 Aesthetic	 Politics:	 Political	 Philosophy	 Beyond	 Fact	 and	 Value	 (Stanford,	1996),	p.	331.	
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several	translations	and	its	author	had	become	a	prominent	theorist	of	education.	The	success	of	the	book	was	inseparable	from	the	novelty	of	its	aim.	‘I	have	heard	many	 youths	 complain	 about	 the	 absence	 of	 a	method	 to	 arrive	 at	 self-mastery	(maîtrise	de	soi).	I	offer	them	what	has	been	suggested	to	me	by	almost	four	years	of	studies	and	meditations’.	Payot	claimed	to	have	systematized	the	innovations	in	experimental	psychology	of	the	last	two	decades	and	especially	those	by	Ribot,	to	whom	 the	 work	 was	 dedicated,	 and	 translated	 them	 into	 a	 practical	 manual	offering	a	tempting	form	of	power:	 ‘to	make	the	future	be	that	which	we	want	it	to	
be’.	The	premise	was	that	‘we	can	carry	out	the	education	of	our	own	will,	and	with	time	and	 the	knowledge	of	 the	 laws	of	our	 [psychological]	nature	we	are	sure	 to	arrive	 at	 an	 elevated	 self-mastery’.150	It	 was	 dedicated	 to	 those	who	 carried	 out	‘prolonged	 and	 persevering	 intellectual	 labour’,	 and	 takes	 for	 granted	 that	 the	reader	is	a	young	student	between	the	ages	of	18	and	25.			Payot	was	one	of	 the	pioneers	of	 a	new	genre	which	departed	 from	 the	 conduct	book	 or	 moral	 guide	 of	 old.	 Rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 normative	 behaviour,	 the	emphasis	 is	 rather	on	 the	ability	 to	 shape	oneself	 through	volition.	This	was	 the	literal	moulding	of	 the	 self	 into	 a	work	of	 art	 that	 took	Edgar	Quinet’s	words	 as	programmatic:		Each	man	 is	a	sculptor	who	must	correct	his	marble	or	clay	until	he	has	brought	out	 from	 the	 confused	 mass	 of	 our	 coarse	 instincts	 an	 intelligent	 and	 free	character,	 the	 just,	 that	 is,	he	who	regulates	his	actions	 following	a	divine	model,	
																																																								150	Jules	Payot,	L’éducation	de	la	volonté	(Paris,	1895),	p.	269.	
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who	knows,	when	needed,	how	to	strip	clean	the	mortal	life	as	the	sculptor	strips	clean	the	marble	to	reach	the	interior	sculpture.151		Through	 sheer	willpower,	 one	was	not	 to	become	different,	 but	 rather	 eradicate	differences	 within	 to	 reach	 the	 universal	 marble	 hiding	 behind	 the	 tasteless	particularities	of	all	 ‘men’.	The	new	emphasis	on	what	moralist	and	literary	critic	Thérèse	 Bentzon	 called	 self-work	 (travail	 sur	 soi-même)	 is	 evocative	 of	 what	Foucault	called	‘arts	of	existence’	or	‘techniques	of	the	self’,	meaning:152		those	 intentional	 and	 voluntary	 actions	 by	 which	 men	 not	 only	 set	 themselves	rules	of	conduct,	but	also	seek	to	transform	themselves,	to	change	themselves[…]	and	 to	 make	 their	 life	 into	 an	 oeuvre	 that	 carries	 certain	 aesthetic	 values	 and	meets	certain	stylistic	criteria.153	At	the	turn	of	the	century,	the	work	of	Nietzsche	and	Marcel	Proust	perhaps	best	developed	the	notions	of	aesthetic	fashioning	of	the	self.154	In	Bentzon’s	work,	this	‘aesthetics	 of	 existence’	 involved	 a	 complete	 re-framing	 of	 ethical	 relations	with	the	 self,	 the	 other	 and	 society.	 Following	 the	 form	 of	 traditional	 advice	 books,	Bentzon	published	in	a	1899	work	on	practical	morality	that	reads	as	a	subjectivity	manual,	 offering	 the	 feminine	 reader	 a	 way	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 her	 life,	circumstances	and	relationships	by	signifying	them	in	relation	to	social	roles	and	national	utility.	Émile	Coué	offered	a	more	simplified	approach;	from	the	1910s	he	became	a	celebrity	because	of	his	use	of	autosuggestion	or	self-hypnosis.	He	taught	how	 to	 change	 one’s	 life	 and	 health	 by	 using	 the	 imagination	 and	 tirelessly																																																									151	Quoted	in:	Ibid.,	p.	263.	152	Bentzon,	Morale	pratique,	p.	261.	The	notion	of	 travail	sur	soi-même	 seems	 to	have	been	quite	new	in	France	at	the	time.	As	Bentzon	was	considered	an	expert	in	American	literature	and	affairs,	perhaps	she	borrowed	the	term	from	the	United	States.	153	Foucault,	The	History	of	Sexuality,	Volume	II:	The	Use	of	Pleasure	(New	York,	1990),	pp.	10-11.	154	Duncan	 Large,	 Nietzsche	 and	 Proust:	 A	 Comparative	 Study	 (Oxford,	 2001);	 Lanier	 Anderson,	‘What	 is	 a	 Nietzchean	 Self?’,	 in:	 Christopher	 Janaway	 and	 Simon	 Robertson	 (eds),	 Nietzsche,	
Naturalism,	 and	Normativity	 (Oxford,	 2012),	 pp.	 202-235;	 Joshua	 Landy,	 '"Les	 Moi	 en	Moi":	 The	Proustian	Self	in	Philosophical	Perspective’,	New	Literary	History,	32/1	(2001),	pp.	91-132.	
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repeating	 the	positive	statement	 ‘Every	day,	 in	every	way,	 I'm	getting	better	and	better’.155	Payot	came	somewhere	in	the	middle	of	these	two	figures.			Written	 with	 the	 grand	 claims	 and	 the	 nervous	 prose	 of	 present-day	 self-improvement	books,	Payot	rejected	both	the	belief	in	innate	character	and	in	free	will.	 The	 first	was	 false	 and	 the	 second	 childish,	 since	 it	made	 self-change	 seem	easy	 and	 thus	 discouraged	 people	 from	 trying.	 Transforming	 oneself	 was	 an	arduous	 process	 and	 a	 slow	 conquest.	 Like	 all	 liberty	 and	 things	 of	 value,	 self-mastery	 ‘is	the	reward	of	the	strong,	the	skilful,	[and]	the	persevering.	Nobody	is	free	without	meriting	 it.	 Liberty	 is	 not	 a	 right,	 nor	 a	 fact,	 it	 is	 a	 reward’.	 Liberty	meant	 ‘self-mastery,	the	assured	domination	in	us	of	noble	sentiments	and	moral	ideas	 over	 the	 sprouts	 of	 animality’.	 Everyone	 was	 capable	 of	 achieving	 this	‘conquest	 of	 oneself’,	 ‘even	 in	 the	 most	 desperate	 cases’.156	Provided	 the	 right	psychological	 techniques,	 ‘In	order	 to	 assure	our	 liberty,	 all	 that	 is	needed	 is	 for	our	 imagination	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 conceiving	 a	 life-plan	 to	 realize’.157	With	 time,	patience	 and	 tenacity,	 intelligence	 would	 be	 liberated,	 and	 would	 ‘slowly	 and	surely	seize	power	and	become	a	dictatorship:	a	dictatorship	tempered	only	by	the	laziness	of	the	sovereign	and	the	temporary	revolt	of	the	subjects’.158			The	 technique	was	 very	 simple.	 Since	 ‘our	 actions	 are	 almost	 exclusively,	 if	 not	exclusively,	provoked	by	affective	states’,	it	was	by	engaging	our	emotions	that	we	
																																																								155	See:	Hervé	Guillemain,	La	méthode	Coué:	Histoire	d’une	pratique	de	guérison	au	XXe	siècle	(Paris,	2010)	and	Lindsay	Yeates,	‘Emile	Coue	and	his	method’,	Australian	Journal	of	Clinical	Hypnotherapy	
&	Hypnosis,	38/1	(2016),	pp.	3-79.	156	Payot,	L’éducation,	pp.	28-29,	274.	157	Ibid.,	p.	33.	158	Ibid.,	p.	65.	
	 363	
could	create	new	behaviour.159	In	order	 to	establish	 stable	habits	 linking	an	 idea	and	 a	 conduct,	 the	 connection	 needed	 to	 be	 established	 in	 ‘the	 heat	 of	 affective	states’;	 ‘Our	 end	 is	 to	 provoke	 in	 the	 soul	movements	 of	 hate	 or	 love’,	 ‘vigorous	affections	or	 vehement	 repulsions’.160	While	he	 gave	 indications	on	how	 to	 ‘feed’	some	spontaneous	feelings	or	ideas	and	‘starve’	others	and	‘bar	the	entry	of	painful	thoughts	 and	 emotions	 into	 our	 consciousness’,	 the	 foundation	 of	 this	 technique	was	 what	 he	 called	 contemplation	 or	 meditation. 161 	Carried	 out	 in	 exalted	emotional	 states,	 it	 consisted	 in	 a	 very	 vivid	 visualization	 and	 reliving	 of	 target	situations.	 In	 this	 meditative	 emotional	 stir,	 Payot	 claimed	 that	 links	 between	ideas,	feelings	or	ideas	and	emotions	could	be	either	consolidated	or	broken.	The	goal	was	 to	 ‘provoke	 resolutions,	 pose	 rules	 of	 conduct	 [and]	 escape	 the	 double	whirlwind	 of	 states	 of	 consciousness	 of	 inner	 origin	 and	 those	 provoked	 by	 the	external	world’.162	This	clearly	 included	emancipation	 from	peer	 influence.	 ‘Their	vanity	 is	 so	 great	 towards	 age	 20	 that	 it	 subjects	 them	 submissively	 to	 public	opinion,	 that	 is,	 the	 opinion	 of	 their	 peers.[…	 But]	 He	 knows	 that	 most	 of	 his	comrades	have	never	reflected	on	the	direction	of	their	own	lives,	he	knows	they	are	 dragged	 along	 as	 in	 a	 whirlwind,	 unconscious	 playthings	 tossed	 around	 by	exterior	 forces,	 and	 he	 gives	 no	 more	 importance	 to	 their	 opinion	 than	 does	 a	psychiatrist	to	the	madmen	he	examines’.163		In	short,	this	was	a	method	of	emotional	self-manipulation.	But	what	is	interesting	is	 that	 the	 sole	 purpose	 and	 only	 application	 of	 this	 technique	was	 to	 become	 a																																																									159	Ibid.,	p.	94.	160	Ibid.,	pp.	66,	93,	98.	161	Ibid.,	p.	272.	162	Ibid.,	p.	128.	163	Ibid.,	p.	225.	
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better	worker.	The	whole	aim	of	self-mastery	was	to	vanquish	sloth.	The	student	was	 expected	 to	 shun	 his	 comrades’	 dispersion,	 and	 centre	 his	 meditation	 on	‘seek[ing]	through	simple	and	familiar	reflections	to	“make	himself”	love	work	and	make	himself	detest	 the	soft,	useless	and	stupid	 life	of	 the	 idler’.164	The	path	was	that	of	meditations	so	 rich	 that	 they	could	be	 ‘savoured’	by	visualizing	 things	 ‘to	the	smallest	concrete	details’.	The	student	had	 to	enumerate	 the	many	pleasures	provided	by	work.	But	this	could	not	be	merely	verbal,	since	‘Words	are	short	and	confortable	signs[…],	mediocre	spirits	think	with	words,	abstract	and	dead	things,	such	that	there	is	no	impact	in	their	inner	life’.		For	example,	do	not	say:	my	parents	will	be	happy!	Evocate	 the	memory	of	your	father,	see	the	manifestations	of	his	joy	for	each	of	your	successes,	see	him	in	your	imagination	 receive	 the	 complements	of	 the	 family	 friends;	 represent	 to	yourself	the	pride	of	your	mother,	her	pleasure	to	be	on	holiday	walking	by	the	hand	with	a	son	she	is	proud	of.165	The	 next	 step	 to	 ‘the	 joys	 of	 self-mastery’,	 the	 source	 of	 all	 happiness	 and	knowledge,	was	to	turn	resolutions	into	new	habits.	The	reader	was	reminded	that	in	public	we	do	not	belong	 to	ourselves,	we	were	part	of	a	party,	 that	we	had	 to	acquire	a	lifestyle	in	agreement	with	duty	and	remain	self-coherent.	‘This	is	why	it	is	important,	when	one	breaks	with	a	life	of	laziness,	to	do	so	with	courage,	to	give	one’s	word	of	 honour	 to	 oneself	 and	others.	One	 changes	 restaurant,	 apartment,	[and]	relations[…]	In	one’s	presence,	the	ridicule	of	work	is	never	allowed,	nor	is	the	praise	of	wayward	student	life.[…]	It	is	thus	in	every	respect	necessary	to	join	action	 and	 meditation’.166	Action	 included	 seeking	 out	 suitable	 institutionalized	
																																																								164	Ibid.,	p.	98.	165	Ibid.,	p.	99.	166	Ibid.,	p.	140.	
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sociability	 in	 youth	 associations	 over	 informal	 sociability	 and	 relations	
mondaines.167	The	 book	 also	 includes	 a	 long	 section	 on	 ‘bodily	 hygiene’,	 whose	laws	one	had	to	follow	in	order	for	the	whole	scheme	to	work.			Both	self-improvement	authors	such	as	Payot,	Coué	or	Bentzon	and	the	occult	and	‘New	 Age’	 spirituality	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle	 developed	 a	 common	understanding	of	self-mastery.168	But	the	belief	that	a	more	elevated	self	would	be	brought	about	through	self-discipline	was	by	no	means	exclusive	to	these	groups.	Behavioural	 experts,	 military	 thinkers	 and	 philosophers,	 including	 Nietzsche’s	
Übermensch	and	Bergson’s	moi	profond,	also	emphasized	the	possibility	and	need	of	a	higher	or	deeper	self	 to	emerge	as	 the	 final	emancipator	and	 fully-sovereign	philosopher-king	 of	 inner	 governing.	 Thus	 while	 there	 seemed	 to	 remain	 little	room	 in	 the	 modern	 self	 for	 pure	 interiority	 and	 extra-social	 particularity,	 it	continued	 being	 defined	 and	 problematized	 as	 site	 of	 governing,	 where	hierarchical	 authority,	 as	 in	 mass	 democracies,	 was	 constantly	 scrutinized,	challenged,	consolidated	and	legitimated.	The	task	of	governing	was	to	succeed	in	the	 external	 or	 social	 worlds,	 operating	 as	 organized	 spaces	 of	 interaction,	 by	fashioning	oneself	out	of	 them	and	 in	 their	 image.	The	psychological	self	had	not	had	the	project	of	becoming	a	superior	entity.	The	transcendental	self	was	beyond	the	 grasp	 of	 the	 personal	 and	 constituted	 a	 law-giving	 authority	 that	was	 above	challenge,	and	which	could	at	best	constitute	the	utopian	horizon	and	moral	North	towards	 which	 the	 well-governed,	 disciplined	 and	 obedient	 self	 ought	 to	 move	through	 the	 types	 of	 exercises	 of	moral	 deliberation	 outlined	 by	 Elie	 Luzac.	 The																																																									167	Ibid.,	pp.	227-228.	168	Olav	 Hammer,	Claiming	Knowledge.	 Strategies	of	Epistemology	 from	Theosophy	 to	 the	New	Age	(Leyde,	 2004);	 Dante	 Germino,	'Henri	 Bergson:	 Activist	 Mysticism	 and	 the	 Open	 Society’,	The	
Political	Science	Reviewer,	9	(1979),	pp.	1-37.	
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sociological	 self,	 in	 turn,	 was	 tasked	 with	 labouring	 to	 chose,	 signify,	 embody,	become	 and	 defend	 each	 of	 its	 own	 plural	 and	 group-dependent	 set	 of	authoritative	 and	 transcendental	 selves.	 Payot’s	 work	 illustrates	 the	 degree	 of	personal	 investment	 in	 the	 social	 order	 that	 became	 conceivable	 in	 the	 fin	 de	siècle.	Next	we	will	explore	how	social	government	started	to	change	to	reflect	this	ideal.		
The	will	to	(dis)obey.		While	 the	 second	chapter	explored	profound	changes	 in	 the	conceptualization	of	authority,	this	chapter	has	shown	how	an	objective,	and	external	power	came	to	be	situated	 within	 the	 modern	 individual.	 The	 goal	 of	 self-mastery	 that	 Payot	explored	 substituted	 the	 submission	 to	 a	 commanding	 superior	 for	 a	 voluntary	surrender	 to	 an	 impersonal	 social	 power	 that	 each	 had	 to	 work	 to	 signify,	internalize	 and	 obey.	 From	 1890	 to	 1910,	 there	 was	 widespread	 debate	 and	condemnation	 of	 authority	 in	 many	 different	 fields,	 leading	 to	 a	 new	understanding	of	 social	 government.	On	 the	one	hand,	 this	 implied	 subordinates	could	 make	 unprecedented	 claims	 upon	 authorities.	 Philosophy	 professor	 P.-D.	Pontsevrez	 readily	 recognized	 that	 ‘The	 State	 owes	 its	 citizens	 protection	 and	assistance’.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 had	 to	 be	 a	 complete	 submission	 to	 social	power.	‘He	who	refuses	to	obey	the	law	seems	to	create,	in	his	own	profit	and	out	of	his	own	authority,	a	particular	law,	a	privilege;	by	this	very	fact,	he	imposes	his	will	 on	 his	 equals,	 thus	 breaking	 equality’	 and	 thus	 the	 basis	 of	 citizens’	 claims	upon	the	state.	This	new	understanding	of	compliance	led	to	wider	access	to	and	new	understandings	of	welfare	schemes	and	medical	treatment.	We	saw	how	child	
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abandonment	or	assistance	and	infant	welfare	clinics	sought	to	become	as	widely	available	as	possible	 in	the	fin	de	siècle.	Doctor	Louis	Fiaux	argued	for	a	hospital	system	that	relied	on	 ‘complete	 liberty’	 in	which	all	coercion	would	cease	for	the	treatment	of	venereal	diseases.	 'We	demand	 that	any	 individual,	man	or	woman,	may	voluntarily	receive	treatment	at	 the	hospital,	 through	the	public	assistance’s	outdoor	programmes	or	any	doctor	chosen’	by	the	patient.169	Behind	this	freedom,	medics	working	in	new	fields	of	expertise	such	as	clinics	devoted	to	infant	welfare	or	 syphilis	 hoped	 that	 the	 free	 will	 of	 patients	 would	 make	 up	 for	 the	 lack	 of	legally-mandated	treatment	and	supervision.	But	this	meant	a	change	in	logic.	No	longer	did	the	pauper	have	to	procure	handouts;	it	was	now	the	state	that	had	to	seek	 out	 and	 entice	 the	 assisted.	 This	 implied	 a	 crisis	 in	 the	moral	 economy	 of	social	assistance	that	had	relied	on	the	exchange	of	meagre	benefits	and	advice	for	the	poor’s	deference	and	gratitude,	as	this	section	will	analyse.		The	common	ideal	 that	emerges	 from	these	debates	on	republican	authority	was	that	 of	 a	 ‘voluntary	 discipline	 that	 identifies	 the	 law	 with	 liberty’,	 as	 Gabriel	Séailles	claimed.	He	was	the	founder	of	the	Société	des	universités	populaires	that	offered	 adult	 conferences	 for	 workers.	 Created	 as	 a	 domain	 of	 post-schooling	sociability	that	would	establish	needed	‘points	of	contact’	between	different	social	classes,	the	ultimate	aim	of	the	society	was	to	‘make	new	men	for	a	new	society’	by	recognising	 that	 ‘we	will	 only	 change	 the	milieu	 by	 chaining	 ourselves’	 through	active	 cooperation	 and	 mutual	 understanding.170	The	 source	 of	 authority	 and	order	was	now	 inside	 the	self	and	required	 full	participation	rather	 than	passive																																																									169	Louis	Fiaux,	L'organisation	actuelle	de	la	surveillance	médicale	de	la	prostitution	(Brussels,	1899),	p.	67.	170	Quoted	in:	Marcel	Fournier,	‘La	Fondation	universitaire	de	Belleville	et	la	Société	des	universités	populaires’,	Revue	politique	et	parlementaire,	6/XXII	(1899),	p.	327.	
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subservience.	 Agricultural	 economist	 Daniel	 Zolla	 expected	 that	 the	 ‘sincere	acceptance	 of	 the	 strict	 rules	 of	 voluntary	 discipline’	 on	 the	 part	 of	 organised	workers	and	cooperatives	would	solve	the	‘question	ouvrière’	and	the	problems	of	the	 economy,	 if	 not	 leading	 to	 'a	 regime	 of	 “social”	 production’,	 then	 at	 least	 to	more	humane	'conditions	of	independence	and	wellbeing'	for	workers.171			These	 changes	 applied	 to	 both	 the	 governing	 of	 the	 self	 and	 of	 society.	 Authors	such	as	Bentzon	and	Pontsevrez	 taught	readers	 to	wilfully	 internalize	and	 follow	authority	in	self-steering,	the	home	and	child	rearing,	the	school,	the	workplace	or	the	barracks.	We	have	seen	the	importance	of	these	changes	in	self-government	in	the	work	of	Payot.	 In	 this	 section	 I	will	 consider	how	 these	 changes	affected	 the	army,	 while	 the	 last	 two	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 consider	 their	 effect	 on	schooling.	I	will	explore	the	changes	in	military	and	pedagogical	thought	and	policy	as	 a	 way	 of	 documenting,	 in	 the	 manner	 done	 in	 the	 first	 chapter,	 how	 these	changes	 in	the	understanding	of	the	self	gave	rise	to	specific	technologies	for	the	government	of	society.	The	changes	in	schooling	were	not	only	important	but	also	highly	strategic	for	the	Third	Republic.	They	were	also	fundamental	for	Durkheim,	who	 spent	 most	 of	 his	 career	 lecturing	 not	 on	 sociology,	 but	 on	 education	 and	pedagogy.172	These	 were	 critical	 domains	 in	 which	 he	 sought	 to	 establish	 new	secular	grounds	for	authority	in	a	modern	social	order,	largely	following	the	steps	Cousin	had	 taken	 in	 the	1830s.173	And	he	was	very	 influential.	 Indeed,	Durkheim																																																									171	Daniel	Zolla,	‘Revue	des	questions	ouvrières	et	de	prévoyance’,	Revue	politique	et	parlementaire,	6/XIX	(1899),	p.	153.	172	Daniela	 Barberis,	 ‘Moral	 education	 for	 the	 elite	 of	 democracy:	 The	 Classe	 de	 Philosophie	between	sociology	and	philosophy’,	 Journal	of	History	of	the	Behavioral	Sciences,	 38/4	 (2002),	pp.	355–369.	173	Howard	Peterson,	 ‘The	quest	 for	moral	order:	Emile	Durkheim	on	education’,	 Journal	of	Moral	
Education,	4/1	(1974),	pp.	39-46;	W.S.F.	Pickering,	‘Durkheim	and	moral	education	for	children:	A	recently	discovered	lecture’,	Journal	of	Moral	Education,	24/1	(1995),	pp.	19-36.	
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together	with	Janet	and	Ribot,	among	others,	were	widely	cited	as	the	sources	of	the	 new	 understanding	 of	 discipline.174	Part	 of	 the	 broader	 shift	 in	 subjectivity	being	 considered,	 the	 intellectual	 changes	 related	 to	 the	 abandonment	 of	 strict	discipline	 for	 free	 compliance	 led	 to	 a	 series	 of	 official	 regulations	 that	 affected	both	martial	and	schooling	policy	 in	France	at	 the	turn	of	 the	century,	as	we	will	see.	The	 changes	 in	punishment	 and	disciplining	were	 also	mirrored	 in	both	 the	civilian	 and	 military	 judicial	 and	 penal	 systems	 in	 the	 pre-War	 ‘crisis	 of	repression’.175	However,	despite	the	lengthy	discussion	and	official	regulations,	the	practices	 of	 disciplining	 only	 changed	 very	 gradually.	 Jean-Claude	 Caron	 has	documented	 the	 resistance	 to	 change	 in	 the	 schooling	 system,	 where	 physical	punishments	continued	to	be	applied	well	into	the	new	century.176	In	the	military,	the	innovations	in	this	field,	which	only	applied	in	times	of	peace,	received	a	timid	application	and	a	reversal	during	the	War.177	But	rather	than	a	return	to	the	past,	there	emerged	in	the	first	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	and	in	the	trenches	a	‘new	 type	 of	 hierarchical	 relationship’	 and	 a	 more	 fluid	 and	 negotiable	understanding	of	authority	and	obedience,	as	Leonard	Smith	and	Emmanuel	Saint-Fuscien	have	 shown.178	These	 transformations	will	 be	explored	 to	 show	how	 the	
																																																								174 	Emmanuel	 Saint-Fuscien,	 ‘Forcer	 l'obéissance:	 intentions,	 formes	 et	 effets	 d'une	 pratique	militaire	dans	l'activité	combattante	de	la	Grande	Guerre’,	in:	André	Loez	and	Nicolas	Mariot	(eds),	
Obéir/désobéir:	Les	mutineries	de	1917	en	perspective	 (Paris,	2008),	p.	35	and	 ‘Pourquoi	obéit-on?:	Discipline	et	 liens	hiérarchiques	dans	 l'armée	 française	de	 la	Première	Guerre	mondiale’,	Genèses	75/2	(2009),	p.	3.	175	Dominique	Kalifa,	‘Magistrature	et	“crise	de	la	repression”	à	la	veille	de	la	Grande	guerre,	1911-1912’,	Vingtième	siècle,	 67/1	 (2000),	 pp.	 43-59;	 Saint-Fuscien,	 ‘Entre	 guerre	 et	 paix:	 La	décennie	décisive	de	la	justice	militaire	française,	1906-1916’,	Mil-neuf-cent,	33/1	(2015),	pp.	15-30;	Bernard	Schnapper,		‘La	correction	paternelle	et	le	mouvement	des	idées	au	dixneuvième	siècle,	1789-1935’,	
Revue	historique,	534	(1980),	pp.	319-349.	176	Jean-Claude	Caron,	À	l'école	de	la	violence:	Châtiments	et	sévices	dans	l'institution	scolaire	au	XIXe	
siècle	(Paris,	1999).	177	For	 the	 continuities	 between	 1870	 and	 1905	 see:	 Odile	 Roynette,	 ‘Bons	 pour	 le	 service’:	
L'expérience	de	la	caserne	en	France	à	la	fin	du	XIXe	siècle	(Paris,	2000).	178	Leonard	 Smith,	 Between	Mutiny	 and	 Obedience:	 The	 Case	 of	 the	 French	 Fifth	 Infantry	 Division	
during	World	War	I	(Princeton,	1994);	Saint-Fuscien,	‘Pourquoi	obéit-on?’,	p.	4	and	A	vos	ordres?:	La	
relation	d'autorité	dans	l'armée	française	de	la	Grande	Guerre	(Paris,	2011).	
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shifts	in	selfhood	were	supported	and	encouraged	by	state	policy	towards	the	turn	of	the	century	in	France.			When	 the	 Berteaux	 law	 was	 passed	 on	 21	 March	 1905,	 all	 Frenchmen	 had	 to	provide	 two	 years	 of	 ‘personal,	 equal,	 and	 obligatory’	 military	 service	 for	 their	country.	 As	 the	 army	 entered	 the	 democratic	 age	 after	 a	 decade	 of	 scandals	brought	 about	 by	 the	 Alfred	 Dreyfus	 affair,	 général	 Jules	 Bourelly	 was	 greatly	disturbed	by	how	social	developments	seemed	to	undermine	the	very	core	of	army	life,	 in	 particular	military	 obedience.	 The	nineteenth	 century	 had	 little	 to	 say	 on	this	 point.	 The	 1891	 military	 regulations	 had	 copied	 its	 1833	 predecessor	verbatim.		Since	discipline	constitutes	the	principal	force	of	armies,	it	is	important	that	every	superior	 obtain	 from	 his	 subordinates	 a	 complete	 obedience	 and	 submission	 at	
every	 instant,	 that	 orders	 be	 executed	 literally,	 without	 hesitation	 or	murmur;	 the	authority	that	gives	them	is	responsible,	and	complaints	are	only	permitted	to	the	inferior	when	he	obeys.179	There	 were	 strict	 penalties	 for	 disobedience,	 which	 in	 case	 of	 war	 involved	‘punishment	by	death	with	military	degradation’.		The	several	scares	of	a	military	coup	d’état	in	the	1880s	changed	this.	After	the	first	such	panic	in	1882,	commander	Jean-Marie-Arthur	Labordère	was	the	first	to	raise	the	alarm	in	the	Senate.	Given	the	choice	between	the	firing	squad	and	marching	on	 the	 enemy,	 how	 should	 soldiers	 react	 if	 that	 enemy	was	 the	 Republic	 itself?	What	would	happen	to	the	soldier	that	refused	to	carry	out		‘a	fragrant	violation	of	
																																																								179	Quoted	in:	Jules	Bourelly,	‘La	discipline	militaire’,	La	nouvelle	revue,	29	(1908),	pp.	289-290.		
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the	 law’?	 Absolute	 obedience,	 he	 insisted,	 should	 be	 distinguished	 from	 an	obedience	 ‘qui	 a	 une	 limite’,	 but	 the	 senators	 voted	 this	 down	307	 to	 38.	 Those	who	 as	 Labordère	 wanted	 to	 see	 the	 military	 established	 upon	 the	 principle	 of	
obedience	 to	 the	 law	 found	 little	 support	 among	 the	 state	 elites,	 uneasy	 about	making	compliance	reliant	on	subjective	judgement.			After	the	Berteaux	law,	‘Another	theory	of	military	discipline	tends	to	spread’.	This	view	stated	that	‘Military	discipline	is	based	on	respect,	esteem	and	conviction’.	The	times	had	 changed,	 some	argued,	 recruits	were	no	 longer	 the	poor	 and	 illiterate	castaways	unable	 to	pay	 for	 a	 substitute.	The	 citizen-soldier	was	more	 educated	and	 enlightened	 than	 ever	 before,	 he	 was	 ‘an	 intelligent	 bayonet	 and	 not	 an	automaton’.	180	In	 a	 state	 of	war,	what	was	 needed	was	 a	 self-disciplined	 soldier	capable	of	operating	autonomously	even	when	superiors	were	not	watching.	This	was	the	controversial	view	championed	by	captain	Paul	Simon,	who	was	close	to	general	Louis	André,	the	minister	of	war	from	1900	to	1904.	He	taught	a	course	on	oral	education	at	Saint-Cry,	 the	 foremost	French	military	academy,	where	he	had	as	students	a	 large	part	of	 the	officers	who	were	called	to	the	 frontlines	 in	1914,	including	 a	 young	 Charles	 Gaulle.181	Simon	 and	 his	 followers	 argued	 that	 it	 was	time	to	humanize	the	army.	Bourelly	found	this	to	be	much	worse	than	obedience	to	 the	 law.	Martial	order	now	rested	on	 ‘personal	opinion’,	 ‘more	or	 less	 thought	out,	more	or	less	reasoned,	more	or	less	durable’.	 It	 ‘replaced	the	general	duty	of	complete	 obedience	 for	 a	 sort	 of	 vague	duty	 of	 conscience	which	 each	would	be	
																																																								180	Ibid.,	pp.	295,	298.	181	Saint-Fuscien,	‘Forcer	l'obéissance’,	p.	35;	Paul	Simon,	Instruction	des	officiers	(Paris,	1905)	and	
La	discipline	moderne	(Paris,	1909).	
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free	to	carry	out	in	their	own	way’.182	What	was	being	proposed	was	no	less	than	‘voluntary	submission’	or	‘voluntary	consent’.183	Maurice	Berteaux,	the	minister	of	war	who	gave	his	name	to	the	universal	conscription	law,	stated	that		it	 is	 necessary	 to	 make	 an	 effort	 to	 obtain	 voluntary	 discipline	 based	 on	 the	elevated	sentiments	of	devotion	to	the	patrie,	on	the	exact	knowledge	of	duty;	we	will	arrive	there	by	developing	moral	education.184	Henri	 Marty,	 in	 a	 context	 unrelated	 to	 the	 military,	 perhaps	 phrased	 it	 more	explicitly.	 In	 complex	 societies	 where	 hierarchies	 were	 mixed	 up	 rather	 than	layered,	he	argued	that	discipline	was	more	necessary	than	ever.		The	form	under	which	it	presents	itself	to	us	has	equally	varied:	we	reject	passive	and	 depressive	 submission,	 and	 we	 aim	 to	 accept	 and	 impose	 a	 voluntary	discipline	based	on	self-mastery	(maîtrise	de	soi-même).185	Moral	education	and	self-mastery	spoke	of	the	same	aims	behind	Payot’s	method,	a	complete	and	unconditional	identification	with	society.	Now	this	was	being	taken	as	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 new	 reform	 of	 the	 most	 fundamental	 aspect	 of	 military	 life.	Bourelly	 was	 appalled.	 ‘Voluntary	 discipline!	 Who	 would	 have	 dreamt	 twenty	years	ago	of	 joining	 those	 two	words?’.	One	had	 to	go	back	much	 further	 to	 find	similar	ideas	expressed.	The	willing	submission	of	soldiers	was	discussed	in	1793,	but	never	translated	 into	military	regulation	as	was	being	done	towards	1900.186	However,	Bourelly’s	contemporaries	 inscribed	 the	new	 ideas	 into	 the	memory	of	the	 Revolution.	 In	 a	 speech	 given	 to	 commemorate	 the	 centenary	 of	 the	Revolution’s	battle	of	Valmy,	education	minister	Bourgeois	claimed	that	the	source	
																																																								182	Bourelly,	‘Discipline	militaire’,	pp.	295,	298.	183	Anonymous,	'Questions	militaires’,	La	revue	hebdomadaire,	17/VIII	(August	1908),	pp.	411-419.	184	Quoted	in	Ibid.,	p.	297.		185	Henri	Marty,	‘Conferences	et	les	séances	récréatives’,	La	science	sociale,	25/71	(1910),	p.	104.	186	Eugène	Carrias,	La	pensée	militaire	française	(Paris,	1960),	p.	201.	
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of	 the	 victory	 had	 been	 the	 existence	 ‘between	 the	 soldiers	 of	 Valmy	 and	 their	chiefs	 of	 a	 bond	 much	 narrower	 than	 those	 of	 material	 authority,	 a	 voluntary	discipline	 that	was	 even	more	 rigorous	 than	 that	 of	 the	 armies	 of	 Frédéric’	 II	 of	Prussia.187	The	 glorious	 successes	 of	 the	 French	 Revolution	 were	 being	 used	 to	craft	a	new	understanding	of	the	nation	at	war	that	relied	on	Bergson’s	idea	of	élan	
vital,	meaning	 ‘vital	 impetus’	or	 ‘vital	 force’,	 an	abstract	 force	capable	of	 shaping	the	 very	 inner	 drives	 of	 soldiers.	 Historian	 Ian	 Ousby	 has	 argued	 that	 ‘military	training	 consisted	 less	 in	 advocating	 strategy	 or	 tactics	 than	 in	 inculcating	 and	celebrating	 a	 warrior	 code’.188 	In	 strongly	 Durkhemian	 terms,	 captain	 Simon	defined	‘modern	discipline’	in	a	widely-publicized	public	speech	as		a	 sort	 of	 religion,	 having	 its	 faith:	 patriotic	 and	 military	 beliefs;	 its	 charity:	sentiments	 of	 patriotism,	 affection,	 [and]	 honour;	 its	 rites:	 the	 salute	 to	 the	 flag,	honours;	 having	 its	music	 and	 its	 hymns;	 having	 its	 practices:	 the	 habitudes	 of	obedience,	work,	[and]	hygiene;	having	finally	its	saints:	the	brave,	and	its	martyrs:	soldiers	who	died	in	the	field	of	honour.189		The	 approach	 that	 came	with	universal	 conscription	had	weakened	 the	 army	on	several	fronts,	Bourelly	further	argued.	‘[O]ne	only	elevates	the	soldier	in	his	own	eyes	by	lowering	officers	and	lessening	their	authority’;	 ‘in	raising	to	his	eyes	the	importance	 of	 his	 personality	 [soldiers	 are]	 rendered	 less	 apt	 to	 submit	 to	 the	hands	 of	 chiefs,	 that	 is,	 less	 disciplined’.190 	The	 error	 originated	 in	 the	 new	understanding	of	the	military	as	an	institution	of	republican	citizenship.	‘Under	the																																																									187 	Bourgeois,	 ‘Discours	 pronounce	 le	 20	 septembre…’,	 Bulletin	 administratif	 du	 Ministère	 de	
l’instruction	publique,	LII/1014-1040	(1892),	p.	450.	188	Ian	Ousby,	Road	 to	Verdun:	World	War	 I's	Most	Momentous	Battle	and	 the	Folly	of	Nationalism	(New	York,	2002),	[ebook].	189	Quoted	in:	Anonymous,	'Questions	militaires’,	La	revue	hebdomadaire,	17/VIII	(August	1908),	p.	417.	190	Bourelly,	‘Discipline	militaire’,	pp.	299,	301.	
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pretext	that	the	barracks	are	the	prolongation	of	primary	schooling	and	a	school	of	civility,	the	syllabus	for	the	education	of	the	troops	has	been	populated,	in	the	form	of	conferences	and	otherwise,	of	subjects	that	are	foreign	to	the	end	for	which	the	army	 was	 created,	 that	 is,	 war’.191	There	 was	 also	 a	 tendency	 to	 focus	 on	 the	obligations	of	 the	superiors	and	 ignore	as	much	as	possible	those	of	 the	recruits.	The	intervention	in	strikes	had	hurt	the	good	image	of	the	institution,	and	so	had	the	continuous	attacks	of	the	press,	especially	on	high-ranking	officers,	and	the	bad	press	 given	 to	 army	mutinies.	 He	 does	 not	mention	 Alfred	 Dreyfus.	 Politics	 had	invaded	the	ranks	of	military	hierarchy,	while	the	internationalist	and	anti-military	propaganda	did	not	 cease	 to	demoralize	 those	 in	uniform.192	‘In	 effect,	 discipline	based	 on	 obedience	 is	 more	 than	 just	 a	 factor	 of	 success	 for	 war’,	 Bourelly	concluded,	‘it	is	the	sine	qua	non	condition	for	it;	an	army	where	it	does	not	reign	may	gain	some	passing	advantages,	but	it	is	destined	to	a	final	defeat’.193		Bourelly	 was	 not	 the	 only	 one	 to	 anguish	 over	 the	 discipline	 problems	 of	 the	young.	In	1902,	one	incident	in	Angers	signalled	that	the	old	forms	of	charity	were	in	crisis.	As	other	municipalities	across	France	in	the	nineteenth	century,	the	city	of	Angers	usually	 ran	assistance-through-work	schemes	or	ateliers	de	charité	 in	 the	winter,	when	 there	was	 least	work	 in	 the	 city.	 These	 charity	workshops	 usually	paid	only	the	most	basic	survival	wages,	three	or	four	times	below	average	private	sector	wages,	 in	exchange	for	unqualified	 labour	 in	public	works.	The	premise	of	these	forms	of	assistance	par	le	travail	was	to	offer	work	rather	than	humiliating	handouts.	It	was	not	a	right	in	any	way,	and	was	only	granted	to	those	who	were																																																									191	Ibid.,	p.	299.	192	Ibid.,	pp.	299-300.	193	Ibid.,	p.	298.	
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deferential,	 submissive	 and	 laborious,	 principally	 if	 they	 were	 burdened	 with	family	 obligations,	 and	 even	 then	 for	 no	more	 than	 about	 three	 days	 per	 week.	Benefits	were	just	enough	to	avoid	starvation.			In	 January	 1902,	 it	 came	 to	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 city	 and	 the	 inspector	 of	 road	works	that	109	men	had	registered	and	been	accepted	in	the	programme	but	not	collected	their	admittance	letters	from	the	police	department,	while	only	94	were	being	 employed	 for	 three	 days	 a	 week	 each.	 The	 Bourse	 du	 travail,	 a	 work-placement	 office	 through	 which	 municipalities	 started	 implementing	 the	 first	unemployment	 benefits	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century,	 was	 instructed	 to	 only	 offer	subsidies	to	those	who	were	working	in	the	city	quarries.	This	measure	instantly	doubled	the	number	of	recruits	in	the	workshops.	This	‘modified	almost	instantly	the	 spirit	 of	 our	 teams’,	 according	 to	 the	 road-works	 inspector.	 ‘Previously,	 our	teams	of	workers	were	composed	by	pères	de	famille	or	the	elderly	by	whom	the	few	 young	 men	 were	 flanked	 and	 work	 was	 carried	 our	 very	 reasonably’.	 Now	everything	 changed.	 The	 new	 recruits	 were	 very	 young	 and,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	undisciplined	and	lazy.		Everywhere,	 these	 are	 but	 youths	 playing	 around	 like	 brats	 (gamins)	 or	chatterboxes	 (bavards),	 babbling	 away	 for	 hours	 at	 end	 reclined	 on	 their	 tools,	distracting	the	others	from	their	occupations,	in	the	end	imposing	the	maxim	that	men	 hired	 by	 the	 ‘winter	 workshops’	 are	 not	 obliged	 to	 provide	 any	 amount	 of	labour	in	exchange	for	the	allowance	of	1.50	francs	that	the	city	[of	Angers]	grants	them.	At	least	a	third	of	the	workers	employed	produced	nothing	at	all,	and	labour	costs	soared	to	three	times	the	market	value.	
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One	can	visit	any	of	the	construction	sites	at	any	moment	and	one	is	almost	certain	to	see	most	of	the	men	occupied	in	any	other	thing	but	work.	As	a	general	rule,	the	supervisors	 have	 observed	 that	 the	 elderly	 and	mature	men	 occupy	 themselves	conscientiously,	but	conversely	the	youths,	especially	those	aged	around	17	to	20	produce	 hardly	 any	work.	Moreover,	 the	 latter	 do	 not	 tolerate	 observations	 and	are	always	ready	to	threaten	or	hit	those	who	direct	them.	
L’assistance	par	le	travail	was	the	hallmark	of	nineteenth	century	assistance.	It	was	the	 basic	 premise	 of	 the	 English	 poorhouses	 and	workhouses,	 replicated	 in	 one	form	or	another	across	Europe.	But	the	youths	of	the	new	century	seemed	to	think	that	work	 and	welfare	 benefits,	 obedience	 and	 assistance,	were	 not	 one	 and	 the	same.	Thus,	the	very	logic	of	the	system	no	longer	worked.		We	believe	that,	 in	these	circumstances,	the	very	humanitarian	measure	taken	by	the	 Conseil	 municipal	 aiming	 at	 providing	 work	 to	 those	 who	 lack	 it,	 is	 not	appreciated	as	it	should	by	those	in	whose	favour	it	is	applied	and	that	to	continue	the	misguided	ways	 followed	 up	 to	 now	 cannot	 constitute	 but	 a	most	 damaging	waste	for	the	budget	of	the	City	of	Angers.	To	highlight	 the	urgency	of	change,	 the	 inspector	raised	 the	spectre	of	abuse.	He	claimed	 to	 have	 seen	 a	 foreigner	 arrive	 saying	 that	 he	 heard	 that	 in	 Angers	everybody	was	given	work,	while	 local	 employers	and	owners	had	 started	 firing	their	workers	in	the	winter	since	they	would	have	a	guaranteed	municipal	wage	in	the	 workshops.	 While	 this	 was	 likely	 an	 exaggeration,	 the	 chief	 engineer	 put	forward	 a	 very	 ambitious	 reform.	Those	with	 family	 responsibilities	 and	 serious	workers	should	be	employed	six	days	a	week,	with	no	help	for	the	rest.194			
																																																								194	A[rchives	]M[unicipales	de	]A[ngers].	2Q9.	‘Rapport	de	l’inspecteur	de	la	voirie’,	6	January	1902.	
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From	de	 fin	de	siècle,	 the	old	moral	understanding	of	poverty	was	giving	way	 to	more	 mechanistic	 and	 impersonal	 interpretations	 of	 social	 problems.	 In	 1909,	Durkheimian	 Max	 Lazard	 published	 his	 study	 on	 work	 statistics	 in	 France	 and	Germany.	He	found	that	the	number	of	unemployed	depended	on	economic	laws,	meaning	 that	 personal	 factors	 had	 no	 influence	 in	 them.	 From	 the	 poor,	 the	unemployed,	 and	 their	 moral	 recalcitrance,	 the	 debate	 could	 shift	 to	 the	impersonality	of	unemployment,	as	a	social,	not	individual	phenomenon.	Christian	Topalov	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 same	 types	 of	 conclusions	 were	 being	 reached	simultaneously	 in	 France,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Britain.195 	In	 1907,	 William	Beveridge,	whose	1942	report	would	become	the	basis	of	the	British	Welfare	state,	was	occupied	studying	the	job	market	in	London.	What	struck	him	with	regards	to	temporary	work	was	not	that	the	masses	of	casual	workers	were	unemployed,	but	that	 they	were	 able	 to	 survive,	 that	 they	 had	 enough	work	 to	 keep	 them	 there,	alive.	 It	meant	 that	 some	were	 able	 to	 survive	with	 no	 fixed	work	 commitment,	simply	 off	 the	 opportunities	 the	 capital	 and	 its	 working-class	 neighbourhoods	offered,	thus	‘resisting	total	dependence	on	wages’.196	‘Those	people	who	managed	to	survive	in	the	very	heart	of	major	cities	by	working	one	day	and	not	the	other,	had	to	be	weeded	out’.197The	solution	was	to	organize	work	so	as	to	give	the	stable	worker	 enough	 to	 make	 a	 decent	 wage	 and	 leave	 the	 causal	 workers	 with	 no	income,	 forcing	 them	to	become	either	decent	 full-time	workers	or	vagrants	 that	would	be	subject	to	repression.198	By	inventing	unemployment	as	a	social	fact,	the	
																																																								195	Christian	Topalov,	Naissance	du	chômeur,	1880-1910	(Paris,	1994).	196	Topalov,	 ‘The	 invention	 of	 unemployment:	 Language,	 classification,	 and	 social	 reform,	 1880-1910’,	in:	Bruno	Palier	(ed.),	Comparing	Social	Welfare	Systems	in	Europe,	I	(Paris,	1995),	p.	505.	197	Ibid.,	p.	503.	198	The	turn	of	the	century	was	the	golden	age	of	the	vagrant	as	a	mythical	figure,	whose	presence	in	 public	 discourse	 was	 disproportionate	 to	 actual	 errancy.	 Guy	 Haudebourg,	 Mendiants	 et	
vagabond	en	Bretagne	au	XIXe	siècle	(Rennes,	1998)	;	T.B.	Smith,	 ‘Assistance	and	repression:	Rural	
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new	work	policy	would	wrestle	work	assistance	from	unions;	 in	the	new	system,	which	since	then	remains	unchanged,	‘benefits	were	to	be	denied	both	to	strikers	and	to	workers	who	would	not	accept	offers	by	the	public	employment	agency’.199		The	messy	lives	of	working	class	individuals	did	not	have	to	be	reformed,	but	only	made	 impossible	 through	 new	 impersonal	 work	 policies,	 modern	 slum	 clearing,	and	 urban	 planning.200	The	 two	 main	 consequences	 Topalov	 highlights	 in	 this	process	 are	 the	 following:	 ‘First,	 “the	 dangerous	 classes”	 or	 “the	 poor”	 were	classified	again	 into	new	categories,	 each	of	which	having	 to	be	 taken	care	of	by	appropriate	 techniques.	 Second,	 “the	 social	 question”	 was	 faded	 out	 by	 being	disarticulated	into	a	series	of	“social	issues”.	To	be	solved	each	of	them	called	for	a	set	of	separate	technologies’.201		I	believe	these	changes	in	the	understanding	of	work	and	assistance	can	already	be	assessed	 in	Angers	 in	1902.	The	young	no	 longer	 interpreted	assistance	 in	moral	and	personal	terms,	while	the	chief	engineer	wished	to	distinguish	the	committed,	full-time	worker	from	the	opportunists	by	taking	the	kind	of	approach	Beveridge	would	take	five	years	later.			These	 transformations	 stood	 at	 a	 considerable	 distance	 from	 the	 disciplinary	understanding	of	the	poor	the	nineteenth	century	had	witnessed.	Measured	from	
																																																																																																																																																																		exodus,	vagabondage	and	social	crisis	in	France,	1880-1914’,	Journal	of	Social	History,	32	4	(1999),	pp.	 821-846;	 Jean-François	 Wagniart,	 Le	 vagabond	 à	 la	 fin	 du	 XIXe	 siècle	 (Paris,	 1999).	 I	 would	argue	that	these	turn-of-the-century	discourses	and	moral	panics	served	to	further	establish	a	clear	difference	between	full-time	workers	and	the	rest.	Jean-Claude	Beaune,	Le	vagabond	et	la	machine:	
Essai	sur	l’automatisme	ambulatoire,	médecine,	technique	et	société,	1880-1910	(Paris,	1983).	199	Ibid.,	p.	500.	200	Topalov,	 ‘From	the	 “social	question”	 to	 “urban	problems”:	Reformers	and	 the	working	class	at	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century’,	International	Social	Science	Journal,	42/3	(1990),	pp.	325-334.	201	Topalov,	‘The	invention’,	p.	502.	
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the	 old	 paradigm,	 there	 appeared,	 as	 it	were,	 an	 actual	 right	 to	 insubordination	among	 the	 downtrodden.	 But	 from	 the	 new	 paradigm,	 the	 goal	 was	 not	 total	submission	 but	 active	 and	 virile	 agreement	 and	 identification,	 or,	more	 globally,	consensus.	 Thus	 there	 no	 longer	 needed	 to	 be	 a	 gendarme	 standing	 guard	 for	decency	and	the	social	order	in	every	public	meeting	of	more	than	20	individuals	and	 in	 every	 provincial	 dancehall.	 Instead,	 ‘we	 accept	 and	 impose	 a	 voluntary	
discipline	based	on	self-mastery’,	meaning	everybody	was	given	 the	benefit	 of	 the	doubt	 with	 regards	 to	 his	 or	 her	 conduct.	 Causing	 trouble	 reflected,	 then,	 an	absence	 of	 self-mastery,	 which	 meant	 little	 else	 that	 full	 identification	 in	 social	roles.	 While	 absence	 of	 self-mastery	 was	 not	 against	 the	 law,	 it	 reflected	 a	behavioural	 pathology	 requiring	 expert	 intervention	 for	 the	 social	 good.	Childishness	was	no	longer	a	moral	but	a	psychiatric	category.	The	delinquency	of	old	became	illness	and	maladjustment.	The	juridical	analogies	became	medical.			Towards	men	like	Bourelly,	the	paradigm	shift	of	the	turn	of	the	century	was	most	unkind.	It	had	ruthlessly	struck	the	very	foundations	of	authority,	that	sacred	and	unchallenged	 truth	 of	 the	 defunct	 century.	 What	 they	 encountered	 was	 not	insubordination,	 but	 something	 much	 more	 disturbing:	 entitlement.	 To	 say	 that	command	needed	 to	be	 founded	on	 ‘respect,	esteem,	 and	conviction’	was	another	way	of	saying	that,	as	the	rest	of	the	new	social	paradigm,	it	relied	on	identification,	in	 this	 case	 between	 superior	 and	 inferior,	 ruler	 and	 ruled.	 There	 was	 no	obedience	without	wholehearted	belief.	Only	then	would	the	subject	yield	its	holy	right	to	autonomy	in	a	peaceful	and	willing	surrender,	not	to	force,	but	to	faith.			
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In	the	tense	military	environment	between	1870	and	1914,	theories	of	subjectivity	in	 fin-de-siècle	 France	 were	 taken	 seriously	 enough	 to	 have	 inspired	 military	reforms.	Under	conceptions	of	a	new	and	totalizing	form	of	wilful	compliance	and	blind	nationalism,	more	could	be	demanded	from	soldiers	than	had	been	possible	under	a	system	of	absolute	obedience.	For	these	were	no	longer	bodies	at	war,	 it	was	a	combat	of	souls.	With	armies	of	self-mastered	‘new	men’,	wars	became	total.	We	 will	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 new	 ideas	 of	 normality	 that	 came	 to	 sustain	 a	 new	pedagogic	understanding.		
Les	anormaux	normaux:	The	normalities	of	the	self.			In	1915,	Alfred	Moulet	signalled	an	epoch	change	in	French	history:	the	end	of	the	utopian	belief	in	the	powers	of	education.	The	creators	of	the	republican	primary	school	assigned	their	moralizing	action	an	almost	unlimited	power.	 If	 one	 looks	back	at	 the	parliamentary	debates	 in	1880,	one	 will	 find	 there	 a	 resolutely	 optimist	 conception.	 It	 animates	 all	 discussions;	and	 the	 adversaries	 of	 the	 secularising	 programme	 attack	 it	 with	 even	 more	vehemence	 in	 the	measure	 that	 they	 are	 persuaded	 as	well	 that	 schooling	 is	 all-powerful	over	mœurs.202	‘Its	like	a	creed:	primary	schooling	forms	honest	men	and	the	good	citizen’.	It	dated	back	 to	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 and	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 still	 ‘our	 primary	schools	carries	in	it	this	generous	naivety’.	 Indeed,	 ‘“la	panacée	scolaire”	 in	many	points	has	proven	itself	ineffective’.203																																																											202	Alfred	Moulet,	L’école	primaire	et	l’éducation	morale	démocratique	(Paris,	1915),	p.	12.	203	Ibid.	
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Since	the	French	Revolution	schooling	was	 inseparable	 from	the	wider	project	of	social	government.	With	the	rise	of	emulation,	moreover,	it	became	the	template	of	social	hierarchy.	In	the	classroom	there	was	a	single	rank	table	in	which	everybody	would	be	allocated	their	place.	In	competition	with	others,	each	was	to	be	ranked	strictly	according	to	their	 temporary	 level	of	merit.	 It	was	this	single	standard	of	distinction	 that	 became	 the	 basis	 of	 a	meritocratic	 and	 hierarchical	 society.	 The	ideal	was	for	positions	to	be	as	unambiguous,	incontestable	and	un-appealable	in	society	as	they	were	in	the	classroom,	were,	following	Guizot	‘Édouard	is	forced	to	cede	 the	 first	place	 to	Alphonse’.	Moulet	 informs	us	 this	was	no	 longer	 the	 case.	The	panacée	scolaire	was	no	longer	a	panacée	politique.		The	logic	of	the	new	model	can	be	perfectly	illustrated	by	one	phrase:	 le	criminel	
normal.	 As	 with	 discipline	 volontaire,	 contemporaries	 in	 the	 1900s	 could	 have	exclaimed:	 ‘Who	 would	 have	 dreamt	 twenty	 years	 ago	 of	 joining	 those	 two	words?’.	The	 reason	was	very	 simple.	Criminals	had	always	been	 considered	 the	clearest	embodiment	of	monstrosity,	pathology,	or	abnormality.	The	term	‘normal	criminal’	was	thus	an	oxymoron.			The	term	arrived	in	France	through	translations	of	Italian	criminologists,	the	best	in	 the	world	at	 the	 time.	Across	 the	Alps,	 a	 group	of	 criminologists	 in	 the	1890s	sought	to	 introduce	a	more	 flexible	reading	of	criminal	responsibility	by	handing	over	 to	medical	 specialists	 all	 criminals	 deemed	 abnormal,	 and	 not	 just	 the	 old	category	 of	 the	 criminally	 insane.	 The	 defenders	 of	 a	 more	 traditional	 juridical	approach	 challenged	 this	 medical	 takeover	 of	 justice.	 In	 the	 1893	 French	translation	 of	 his	 Sociologia	 criminale	 Enrico	 Ferri	 had	 criticized	 Francesco	
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Poletti’s	 notion	 of	 normal	 and	 abnormal	 criminals,	 a	 concept	 ‘absolutely	contradicted	by	the	givens	of	criminal	physio-psychology’.	 ‘The	truly	normal	man	does	 not	 commit	 crimes’,	 Ferri	 argued.	 ‘To	 say	 thus	 normal	 criminal	 is	 to	 say	something	[that	is]	inexistent	and	even	scientifically	inconceivable’.204	At	the	turn	of	 the	 century,	 the	 term	 started	 to	 be	 used	 in	 France	 by	 proponents	 of	 a	medicalization	 of	 criminal	 responsibility.205	The	 issue	was	 taken	 up	 in	 the	 1910	international	congress	of	criminology	held	 in	Washington,	D.C.	The	congress	was	to	 vote	 on	 the	 following	 proposition:	 ‘No	normal	 criminal,	 regardless	 of	 age	 and	hardening,	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 not	 susceptible	 to	 amelioration’.206	Amédée	Constantin,	general	inspector	of	administrative	services	in	France,	‘disapproved	of	the	employment	of	in	this	text	of	the	word	normal’.207	Pastor	Gallagher	concurred.	‘The	expression	normal	criminal	seems	to	be	lend	itself	to	misunderstanding	here,	it	seems	to	me,	because	many	criminologists	claim	that	every	normal	criminal	is	an	abnormal	woman	or	a	man’.	But	he	objected	on	very	different	grounds	that	Ferri	had.	 ‘If	 one	 refers	 here	 to	 a	 normally	 constituted	 individual,	 the	 proposed	resolution	is	just;	but	even	in	this	sense,	it	is	too	restrictive,	since	an	abnormal	man	may	become	normal	 through	an	appropriate	medical	 treatment’.	 In	other	words,	the	 congress	 objected	 the	 idea	 of	 incurability	 implied	 in	 saying	 that	 only	 the	normal	 criminals	 could	 be	 ameliorated.	 As	 Gallagher	 pointed	 out,	 some	may	 be	cured.	But	the	new	medical	approach	focused	on	treatment	rather	than	diagnosis	and	 outcome.	 If	 all	 could	 be	 ameliorated	 by	 ‘appropriate	 medical	 treatment’,	incurability	 was	 no	 longer	 placed	 outside	 medicine;	 abnormality	 no	 longer																																																									204	Enrico	Ferri,	La	sociologie	criminelle	(Paris,	1893),	p.	380.	205	Raymundo	 Nina	 Rodrigues,	 La	 folie	 des	 foules	 (s.l.,	 1901),	 p.	 6;	 Raoul	 de	 la	 Grasserie,	 Des	
principes	sociologiques	de	la	criminologie	(Paris,	1901),	p.	88.	206 	Louis	 Guillaume	 and	 Eugène	 Borel	 (eds),	 Actes	 du	 Congrès	 pénitentiaire	 international	 de	
Washington,	Octobre	1910,	I	(Groningen,	1913),	p.	150.	207	Ibid.,	p.	151.	
	 383	
signalled	 the	 limit	 of	 therapy,	 whose	 vast	 interior	 now	 encompassed	 the	 whole	social	body,	but	rather	its	starting	point.	‘After	a	discussion	on	the	meaning	of	the	word	 “normal”,	 in	 which	 many	 members	 took	 part’,	 which	 unfortunately	 is	 not	included	in	the	minutes,	the	proposition	was	reworded	and	passed	as	follows:	‘No	detainee,	whatever	 their	 age	 or	 background,	must	 be	 considered	 as	 incapable	 of	reform’.208	The	 existence	 of	 the	 normal	 and	 the	 abnormal	 criminal	 thus	 became	validated,	and	each	entrusted	to	specific	therapeutics	of	reform.			Since	Comte	borrowed	it	from	Broussais	and	it	started	being	applied	to	society	in	the	mid	century,	the	notion	of	normality	had	acquired	two	meanings.	One	the	one	hand,	 it	 signalled	 what	 was	 most	 frequent	 and	 common,	 what	 all	 shared,	 what	defined	belonging.	On	the	other,	to	be	normal	was	to	be	mediocre;	since	normality	was	 so	 common,	 in	 itself	 it	 had	 no	 value.209	The	 term	 thus	 marked	 both	 the	minimum	requirement	for	participation	in	social	life	and	an	insufficient	condition	for	 success	 in	 social	 life.	 It	 made	 explicit	 the	 minimum	 level	 of	 conformity	 and	identification,	while	 highlighting	 the	 need	 for	 further	 effort	 and	hard	work.	 It	 at	once	 integrated	 everyone	 into	 the	 social	 body	 (eventually	 even	 the	 incurables),	and	carved	out	a	new	space	for	hierarchy	and	the	elitism	of	those	who	performed	above	the	average,	who	exceeded	the	norm.	Normality-abnormality	should	not	be	understood,	 then,	 as	 an	 all-or-nothing	 bipolar	 opposition	 modelled	 on	 the	 old	moral-immoral	 couplet.	 Instead,	 it	was	a	 scale	mapping	out	and	organizing	a	 full	progression	 of	 diversity.	 In	 society	 at	 large,	 the	 term	 served	 as	 a	 complete	nosology	of	the	socially	desirable	and	the	pathological,	identifying	a	multiplication	
																																																								208	Ibid.,	p.	152.	209	Hacking,	Taming	of	Chance,	pp.	ix,	178.	
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of	points	of	technocratic	intervention,	normalizing	therapeutics	and	travail	sur	soi-
même.			Normality	 was	 the	 updated	 and	 much	 improved	 version	 of	 Guizot’s	 classroom	ranking.	 A	multiple	 self	 could	 no	 longer	 be	measured	 against	 a	 single	 standard.	Instead,	each	of	 the	groups	and	group	 identities	making	up	 the	plural	 self	would	manage	their	internal	diversity	against	their	own	standard	of	normality.	It	became	possible	 to	conceive	of	criminals	as	a	social	group	having	 their	own	 internal	and	particular	 standards	 and	pathologies	making	 some	normal	 and	others	 abnormal.	French	 schooling	 now	 needed	 a	 new	 model	 that	 did	 not	 rely	 on	 ranking	 and	comparison.				
Point	d'émulation:	Governing	through	particularity.			The	nineteenth	century	had	attempted	to	govern	individuals	in	their	universality.	‘Man’	was	 to	belong	 to	 the	generality,	 to	 the	civic	community	of	equals.	And	that	required	 sacrificing	 all	 particularities	 through	 unrelenting	 discipline	 and	 moral	obedience.	In	the	fin	de	siècle,	this	suddenly	generated	much	anxiety.	The	changes	we	have	seen,	 including	the	 irruption	of	 the	subconscious,	shifted	the	 focus;	now	what	 experts	 saw	 was	 that	 behind	 the	 submission	 there	 lurked	 dangerously	repressed	and	ungoverned	impulses.	And	the	only	way	to	know	and	access	these	was	 by	 bringing	 particularity	 back	 to	 the	 surface	 of	 government.	 A	 good	way	 of	gauging	 this,	and	at	 the	same	 time	reviewing	 the	profound	shift	we	have	seen	 in	the	government	of	subjectivity	 in	the	 last	quarter	of	 the	nineteenth	century,	 is	 to	focus	 on	 the	 pedagogical	 changes	 this	 shift	 materialized.	 We	 will	 consider	 the	
	 385	
changes	 taking	place	 in	 French	 schools,	 including	 the	 two	 social	 extremes	of	 the	system:	on	the	one	hand,	the	pre-schools	or	nursery	schools,	which	mostly	catered	to	the	children	of	workers	and	was	the	foundation	of	the	vast	schooling	project	the	Third	Republic	developed,	and,	on	the	other,	the	secondary	schools,	which	serviced	only	 70,000	 students	 in	 the	 country,	 the	 richest	 two	 or	 three	 per	 cent	 of	 each	cohort,	 who	 ‘were	 the	 ruling	 class	 or,	 at	 least,	 its	 nursery’.	 ‘The	 programs	 and	degrees	of	secondary	education’,	Eugen	Weber	wrote,	‘built	the	fortifications	of	the	bourgeoisie’.210		In	his	letter	to	secondary	school	personnel	dated	15	July	1890,	the	then	minister	of	education	 Léon	 Bourgeois	 informed	 them	 of	 the	 reforms	 that	 had	 been	 in	 the	pipeline	‘after	almost	twenty	years’;	‘in	the	Senate	I	recently	indicated	the	general	outlines	of	the	reform	that	calls	for	this	schooling	whose	orientation,	methods,	and	even	its	name	are	not	yet	fixed.	The	details	and	means	of	execution	of	this	reform	are	still	under	study’.211	While	much	remained	hazy,	action	needed	to	be	taken	as	the	result	of	profound	fear	that	had	emerged	of	the	dangers	hiding	behind	a	perfect	order.		In	 a	 school	 grounds	 where	 the	 time	 of	 recreations	 is	 regularly	 spent	 in	 slow	promenades	 or	monotonous	 talk,	 a	monitor,	 even	 a	 very	 attentive	 one,	 does	 not	see	any	problem.	This	very	calm,	nonetheless,	has	every	reason	to	trouble	us	and	is	in	 itself	 a	 grave	 symptom,	 if	 one	dreams	 that	 in	 that	prolonged	 inoccupation	 the	body	 little	 by	 little	 becomes	 anaemic	 and	withers	 and	 that,	 in	 the	 boredom	 that	follows,	characters	end	by	becoming	embittered	and	irritated.	In	pedagogy,	no	less																																																									210	E.	Weber,	My	France:	Politics,	Culture,	Myth	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1991),	pp.	228-229.	211	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres	du	personnel	administratif	et	enseignant	des	lycées	et	collèges’,	
Bulletin	administratif	du	ministère	de	l'instruction	publique,	supplément	au	no.	922	(1890),	pp.	417,	420.	
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than	 in	 political	 economy,	 ‘what	 one	 does	 not	 see’	 often	 has	 as	 grave	 effects	 as	‘what	one	sees’.212	Pauline	 Kergomard	 highlighted	 the	 same	 problem	 in	 nursery	 schools.	 In	 1881,	Kergomard	 was	 appointed	 general	 inspector	 of	 nursery	 schools,	 as	 part	 of	 the	complete	 makeover	 of	 the	 institution	 education	 minister	 Jules	 Ferry	 was	implementing.	Formerly	known	as	salles	d’asile,	 in	1881	they	became	the	modern	
écoles	maternelles	 or	maternal	 schools.	 For	 forty	 years	Kergomard	would	devote	herself	to	breathing	life	into	the	new	institution.	She	wrote:		In	 the	 école	maternelle,	 all	 children	 resemble	 each	 other;	 discipline	 has	made	 of	them	a	sort	of	machine;	they	are	not	really	living.	Life	reclaims	its	rights	as	soon	as	they	step	onto	the	street,	each	becomes	spontaneously	himself,	having	shaken	the	discipline	that	made	of	him	all	day	an	artificial	being.213	Discipline	was	precisely	what	made	proper	government	impossible.	The	old	ways	generated	a	profound	order,	but	one	sustained	on	a	farce.	‘This	submissive	child	is	in	 a	 state	 of	 rebellion’,	 Moulet	 warned,	 ‘bad	 feelings	 agitate	 him’	 below	 his	apparent	calm.214	Severity	had	become	the	end.	This	was	no	 less	 than	 ‘une	crime	de	 lèse-enfance’	 according	 to	 Kergomard.	 ‘Until	 now,	 l’école	 maternelle[..]	 has	applied	itself	above	all	to	discipline,	to	discipline	materially.[…]	Thanks	to	material	discipline,	 one	 avoids	 stampedes,	 tumult,	 one	 obtains	 silence,	 without	 which	 no	teaching	is	possible.[…	But]	the	triumph	of	discipline	is	the	defeat	of	education’.215	For	Bourgeois,	the	source	of	evil	was	also	‘purely	repressive	discipline’,	which,		
																																																								212	Ibid.,	p.	419.	213	Pauline	Kergomard,	L’éducation	maternelle	dans	l’école	(Paris,	1889),	p.	33.	214	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	59.	215	Kergomard,	L’Éducation	maternelle,	p.	31-32.	
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resting	 on	mistrust,	 using	 only	 constraint,	 is	 happy	with	 an	 apparent	 order	 and	exterior	 subjection,	 under	which	 are	 dissimulated	 the	 bad	 instincts,	 compressed	but	not	corrected,	and	the	deaf	revolts	that	will	escalate	later.216	He	 condemned	 this	 form	 of	 discipline	 as	 clumsy	 and	 narrow-minded,	 since	 it	sacrificed	future	security	to	the	appearance	of	order	in	the	present.	For	Bourgeois,	such	 a	 discipline	 ‘refuses	 to	 see	 the	 profound	 disorder	 it	 tolerates,	 and	 still	 less	that	 which	 it	 creates’,	 since	 punishment	 only	 made	 the	 student	 irritated	 and	resentful	against	teachers.217		All	were	agreed	as	 to	 the	solution.	Bourgeois	saw	 ‘liberal	discipline’	as	being	 the	way	foreword,	 for	 it	sought	 the	 improvement	rather	than	the	containment	of	 the	child;	 the	 aim	 was	 not	 to	 repress	 but	 ‘to	 win	 over’	 the	 student.	 This	 for	 of	discipline,	 he	 argued,	 ‘wants	 to	 touch	 the	depths,	 the	 conscience,	 and	obtain	not	that	surface	tranquillity	that	does	not	last,	but	the	interior	order,	that	is,	the	child’s	consent	 to	 a	 rule	deemed	necessary:	 it	wants	 to	 teach	him	 to	 govern	himself’.218	Kergomard	highlighted	how	 this	 constituted	 a	 radically	new	approach.	 ‘In	 effect,	the	 exclusively	 collective	 approaches	 that	 have	 made	 of	 each	 child	 an	 abstract	unity	in	the	group	impede	the	blossoming	of	individuality’.	And	what	did	this	mean	if	not	the	irreducible	particularities	of	each?	Save	a	few	exceptions,	one	does	not	remark,	among	the	children	that	populate	our	
écoles	maternelles,	 any	prominent	qualities	or	defects.	 I	 am	often	 terrified	by	 the	extreme	ease	with	which	they	can	be	conducted.	This	ease	comes	from	their	moral	sleep.219																																																									216	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	pp	424-425.	217	Ibid.	218	Ibid.,	p.	424.	219	Kergomard,	L’éducation	maternelle,	p.	34.	
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The	 meaning	 of	 education	 had	 changed.	 For	 Kergomard,	 the	 path	 to	 moral	awakening	was	proper	mothering.	So,	 the	attempt	was	 to	reduce	 the	crucial	 role	mothers	played	in	character	formation	to	techniques	that	could	be	applied	in	the	nurseries.	The	 ideal	of	 the	école	maternelle	was	 to	 substitute	and	 institutionalize	the	mother,	hence	the	title	of	her	work:	Maternal	Education	(or	Upbringing)	in	the	
School.	After	 all,	 so	many	mothers	were	unqualified	or	 too	busy	making	a	 living.	And	 what	 was	 discovered	 as	 most	 distinctive	 about	 mothering	 was	 the	individualising	treatment	and	knowledge	of	the	child.		Interrogate	 a	mère	de	 famille,	 a	 conscientious	mother,	 who	 studies	 her	 children,	who	makes	an	effort	 to	develop	 in	 then	 certain	dispositions	 and	halt	 others;	 she	will	 tell	 you	 not	 only	 the	 absolute	 differences	 that	 are	 blindingly	 obvious	 in	 the	character	of	each,	but	also	the	differences	in	detail,	the	nuances.[…]	What	the	mère	
de	 famille	 fears	 the	 most	 is	 a	 colourless	 child,	 without	 apparent	 qualities	 or	defaults.		But	99	per	cent	of	the	students	did	not	have	that	luck;	their	mothers	‘do	not	have	the	necessary	time	or	the	culture’	and	thus	could	only	gain	a	broad	overview	of	the	child’s	character.	This	is	what	the	école	maternelle	existed	to	remedy.	‘A	very	broad	discipline,	barely	noticeable,	will	make	it	possible	to	study	the	dispositions,	[and]	direct	them	towards	the	end	of	gradually	developing	characters’.220		Each	 layer	of	 the	schooling	system	was	to	have	an	analogous	aim.	 ‘Developing	 in	them	what	makes	them	men,	thus	what	they	have	in	common	as	humans’,	the	good	teacher	 ‘wakes	 up	 in	 them	 at	 the	 same	 time	 their	 individual	 and	 particular	
																																																								220	Ibid.,	p.	73.	
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dispositions,	 their	 personality’.221 	Instead	 of	 imagining	 the	 universal	 and	 the	particular	 as	 pitted	 against	 each	 other,	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 the	 self	 was	 now	entrusted	 to	 harmonize	 these.	 ‘Individual	 variety	 is	 as	 important	 for	 collective	progress	 as	 the	 community	 of	 aspirations	 and	 the	 unanimity	 of	 tendencies’.222	Under	 the	 guidance	 of	 new	 pedagogical	 techniques,	 individuals	were	 to	 learn	 at	school	 how	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 group	without	 being	 lost	 in	 it.	 In	 the	 classroom	 ‘the	child	 feels	 known	 and	 recognized,	moving	 along	with	 a	 collective	 and	 raised	 for	social	 life,	 but	 aware	 also	 that	 he	 remains	 himself,	 under	 the	 gaze	 of	 a	 vigilant	teacher,	which	follows	him’.223			These	 changes	 implied	 a	 overhaul	 of	 the	 system	 of	 punishments	 and	 rewards,	which	now	had	to	satisfy	two	equally	important	aims:	‘the	good	order	which[…]	is	the	need	and	the	right	of	all,	and	individual	improvement	that	is	our	duty	towards	each’.224	Most	of	the	harsh	penalties	were	banned.	‘One	will	preferably	make	use	of	bad	marks,	 that	 touches	 the	 self-love	 of	 children	without	 humiliating	 them,	 that	allows	 for	 repentance	 and	 reparation,	 that	 can	 be	 reinforced,	 weakened,	 or	erased’.225 	For	 Bourgeois,	 punishment	 signalled	 weakness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	teacher.	Authority,	he	claimed,	depended	on	the	person	to	establish	a	reputation	of	being	equitable.	‘The	ideal	we	propose	to	all	our	teachers	is	to	acquire	an	authority	such	 that	 it	 dispends	 them	 most	 often	 from	 having	 to	 turn	 to	 rigorous	measures’.226	
																																																								221	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	340.	222	Ibid.,	p.	342.	223	Ibid.,	p.	341.	224	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	424	225	Ibid.,	p.	425.	226	Ibid.	
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	Moulet	 concurred.	 Punishment	 in	 schools	 had	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 same	 principles	being	floated	by	criminologists.	The	idea	was	to	‘apply	the	individualization	of	the	penalty,	 which	 is	 the	 justice	 of	 the	 future’.227Indeed,	 ‘punishments	 should	 be	adequate	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 students,	 not	 to	 that	 of	 the	 teacher’.228	It	 was	therefore	crucial	to	know	the	students	in	their	individuality.	‘A	wise	teacher	choses	the	means	according	to	the	age,	temperament,	[and]	tastes	of	the	students,	which	he	knows,	which	he	must	know	 individually’.229	The	 ‘personal	 intervention	of	 the	teacher’	had	to	‘find	the	path	of	that	rebellious	heart’;	‘he	knows	how	to	adapt	[the	penalty]	to	fit	the	punished	child;	and	he	never	forgets	that	the	moralizing	effect	of	chastisement	 resides	 not	 in	 the	 penalty	 itself,	 but	 in	 the	 manner	 it	 has	 been	inflicted	and	in	which	it	has	been	received	by	the	child’.	Discernment	was	required	to	 ‘take	 into	account	 the	diversity	of	 temperaments	more	or	 less	susceptible	and	delicate’.230	A	vain	child	gave	in	to	a	reproach,	while	an	obstinate	one	would	need	extra	homework.	Some	would	rebel	 if	punished	 in	public,	while	others	would	no	respond	unless	chastised	 in	 front	of	 their	peers.	To	 ‘suppose	that	all	children	are	equal	in	intelligence	and	dispositions	is	rewarding	or	punishing	not	the	child,	but	nature!’.231	Equally,	a	first	offence	could	not	be	punished	as	a	repeated	one.	The	old	disciplinary	 system,	 Moulet	 argued,	 ‘has	 no	 variety,	 no	 nuances,	 and	 the	 very	monotony	of	 its	means	renders	 these	punishments	 illusory’.	 ‘Thus	punishment	 is	the	 exception	 in	 a	 school	 directed	 by	 a	 good	 teacher’.232The	 reason	 for	 this	was																																																									227	Quoted	in:	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.		62	228	Pierre	 A.	 Dufrenne,	 ‘De	 la	 discipline’,	 Revue	 de	 l’enseignement	 primaire	 et	 primaire	 superieur,	28/16	(1906),	p.	250.	229	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	53.	230	Ibid.,	pp.	59-62.	231	Ibid.,	p.	349.	232	Ibid.,	p.	61-63.	
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that	the	difficult	and	‘incorrigible’	students	were	to	be	apprehended	by	specialized	institutions	 other	 than	 the	 school.	 The	 precondition	 for	 Bourgeois’	 disciplinary	reform	was	 this	 split	 between	maisons	de	discipline	 (reformatories)	 and	maisons	
d’éducation	(schools).233		The	same	changes	and	attacks	applied	to	rewards,	which	were	to	be	as	sparse	as	punishments.	 Rewards	 fostered	 laziness,	 satisfaction	 with	 brief	 and	 mediocre	efforts,	they	tended	to	become	the	only	motivation	and	they	developed	in	the	child	emotions	that	were	antidemocratic,	if	not	immoral,	but	in	any	case	belonging	to	a	lower	 order.234	They	 equally	 lent	 themselves	 to	 envy,	 jealousy	 and	 deception.	Emulation	 in	 particular	 had	 to	 go.	 It	 too	 easily	 degenerated.	 Instead,	 ‘one	 will	compare	 the	 composition	 of	 each	 student	 with	 himself	 rather	 than	 with	 his	peers’.235Success	 and	 effort	 could	 only	 be	 measured	 against	 one’s	 individuality.	Since	there	was	no	longer	a	shared	measure	of	success	for	all,	emulation	no	longer	belonged	in	schools	as	in	was	seen	as	promoting	vanity	and	egotism;	it	was	at	most	to	be	 reserved	 for	 the	école	maternelle.	 ‘Without	 renouncing	 the	happy	effects	of	emulation,	especially	among	young	children,	one	will	refrain	from	overly	exciting	it	and	by	bad	means’.	Rewards,	Bourgeois	wrote,	would	depend	on	good	will	rather	than	success	and	 ideally	would	consist	of	no	more	than	congratulations.	The	aim	was	to	get	the	student	to	behave	following	only	the	dictates	of	conscience	‘of	which	the	reprimands	and	praise	are	but	the	authorized	and	indisputable	expression’.236	Moulet	compared	emulation	with	using	a	piece	of	sugar	as	lure	to	train	a	dog.		
																																																								233	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	426.	234	Moulet,	École	primaire,	pp.	51-52.	235	Dufrenne,	‘De	la	discipline’,	p.	251.	236	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	426.	
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This	 type	 of	 emulation	 through	 rewards	 is	 artificial	 and	 not	 very	honourable.	When	it	is	lacking	in	life,	where	nothing	assures	man	a	reward	and	a	piece	of	sugar,	where	will	the	child	who	has	become	an	adult	then	find	the	force	to	progress?	What	reasons	will	he	give	himself	to	progress?	Why	want	to	improve	himself	if	rewards	remain	random,	or	if,	even	having	been	promised,	they	lack,	or	they	seem	to	him	a	priori	insufficient?237		Instead,	 education	 was	 to	 tap	 into	 the	 ‘profound	 sources	 where	 the	 child,	 the	future	man,	draws	from	the	moral	source’.238	‘Having	recognized	the	individual	in	the	 child,	we	 exhort	 him	 to	 be	 that	which	 he	 promises	 to	 be’.239	The	 goal	 of	 the	system	 was	 for	 the	 child	 to	 know	 him	 or	 herself	 as	 the	 new	 basis	 of	 self-government.	 Proper	 rewards	 ‘enlighten	 the	 child	 about	 himself,	 calls	 him	 to	 a	judicious	 life,	brings	out	of	his	consciousness	the	obscure	 force	that	helps	him	to	do	good’.	The	child	would	come	to	develop	and	obey	this	obscure	force.	With	‘each	of	the	small	victories	he	claims	over	himself’,	 ‘he	feels	that	 it	 is	himself	he	obeys;	the	 authority	 towards	 which	 he	 is	 so	 docile,	 is	 his	 conscience’	 (meaning	 both	conscience	and	consciousness).	To	develop	this	inner	authority	was	to	live	‘freely	in	self-obedience’.	Submission	was	recognized	as	socially	crucial,	but	the	self	was	now	 internalizing	 and	managing	 the	 conflicts	 and	 ethical	 problems	of	 command,	legitimizing	social	powers	by	 internalizing	their	contradictions.	 ‘Because	he	must	obey	—order	 commands	 this—	 then	may	 it	be	always	 that	which	 is	best	 in	him’	
																																																								237	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	53.	238	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	427.	239	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	342.	
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that	he	obeys.	 ‘This	 is	 the	price	of	 liberty,	as	of	happiness;	and	there	 is	no	better	definition	of	Duty’.240		‘It	 is	 with	 punishments	 as	 with	 rewards:	 the	 goal	 is	 to	 touch	 the	 better	moi	 of	children,	and	affirm	it	in	the	struggle	against	the	inferior	moi’.	The	teacher	had	to	‘ally	himself	with	the	former	against	the	latter’.	Educators	could	now	operate,	as	it	were,	 inside	 the	 fragmented	moi.	 ‘It	 is	 truly	 an	 alliance,	 defensive	 and	 offensive,	which	 the	 teacher	 signs	 with	 infantile	 nature	 against	 that	 which	 opposes	 or	menaces	 it’.	 By	 taking	 sides	 in	 this	 battle	 of	 selves	 inside	 the	 child,	 the	 teacher	could	do	 little	else	 than	 ‘realize	 in	 the	child	 the	balance	of	 forces	between	action	and	 constraint’.241	The	 end	 result	was	 the	 ‘affectionate	 and	 charming	 tyranny	 of	the	Good	 to	 love,	and	not	of	 the	Evil	 to	 fear’.242	The	moral	education	syllabus	 for	third-year	 male	 middle-school	 students	 of	 the	 École	 primaire	 supérieure	summarized	 the	 importance	of	 schooling	 in	 this	process.	 ‘Conclusion:	 if	 the	child	
loves	instinctively	the	good,	he	needs	to	know	it;	l’éducation	morale	has	as	its	object	responding	 to	 that	 need;	 it	 will	 depend	 on	 the	 child	 to	want	 [to	 know]	 it;	 the	constant	diligence	of	the	school	to	form	that	will’.243	The	school	was	now	imagined	able	of	shaping	not	only	desires,	but	also	the	very	will	to	desire.			The	key	means	of	 achieving	 these	 results	was	by	 fostering	 self-confidence	 in	 the	child	and	pointing	out	 that	with	every	 step	 in	 the	 right	direction	he	was	already	good,	for	‘How	will	he	become	[virtuous]	if	he	is	not	so	already,	at	least	a	little?’	But	there	 could	 only	 be	 room	 for	 such	 self-love	 if	 the	 child	was	 properly	 tutored	 in																																																									240	Ibid.,	pp.	54,	60.	241	Ibid.,	p.	355.	242	Ibid.,	p.	59-60,	63.	243	Léon	Martin	(ed.),	Encyclopédie	municipale	de	la	Ville	de	Paris,	I	(Paris,	1904),	p.	621.	
	 394	
developing	 it.	 ‘This	 voluntary	 discipline	 thus	 has	 as	 its	 principle	 and	 rule	 the	confidence	in	ourselves,	with	the	condition	that	a	wise	and	foresighted	education	has	known	how	to	subject,	through	all	teachings	and	disciplines,	our	activity	to	the	rule	 of	 a	 duty’.244	Moulet	 made	 plain	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 of	 these	 reforms:	 ‘moral	education,	 as	 France	 conceives	 and	 carries	 it	 out,	 is	 a	 pedagogy	 of	 obedience	 in	liberty’.245	In	more	detail,	middle-school	moral-education	teachers	were	instructed	to	 ‘show	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	 nation	 that	 man	 fully	 realizes	 his	 nature,	 where	 he	becomes	a	true	man,	that	is	a	moral	person,	aware	of	his	duties	and	his	rights;	that	the	function	of	the	individual,	as	a	member	of	a	nation,	is	to	cooperate	voluntarily	with	the	work	of	the	nation	in	human	civilization’.246			The	school	was	still	crucial,	but	no	longer	enough.	It	could	not	compete	against	the	family	and	the	street.	By	instilling	high	values,	it	uprooted	the	child	from	his	or	her	milieu,	only	to	be	soon	abandoned	by	the	system	‘to	his	solitude’.	‘Primary	school	students	 leave,	 in	 general,	 when	 the	 crisis	 of	 puberty	 is	 staring	 for	 them’.	 At	puberty,	 ‘that	 decisive	 moment	 in	 the	 psychological	 and	 moral	 formation	 of	 a	human	being’,	the	child	found	him	or	herself	‘without	an	authorized	guide’.	There	was	a	sudden	need	for	post-and	extra-school	institutions,	which	were	not	limited	to	 intellectual	 development	 initiatives	 such	 as	 Séailles’	 Société	 des	 universités	populaires.	Moulet	argued	that	schooling	would	achieve	nothing	if	‘education	after	the	 school	 did	 not	 sustain	 it,	 start	 it	 afresh,	 [and]	 prolong	 it’.	 For	 ‘the	 school	 is	helpless	 with	 only	 its	 own	 resources	 to	 raise	 the	 virtuous	 man	 and	 the	 aware	citizen.	After	school	and	outside	the	most	active	and	best	school,	there	is	social	life,																																																									244	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	354.	245	Ibid.,	p.	356.	246	Martin	(ed.),	Encyclopédie,	p.	621.	
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which	 forms	 or	 deforms,	 sharpens	 or	 blunts,	moralizes	 or	 demoralizes’.247	Social	belonging	 for	 children	 or	 adults	 could	 not	 come	 about	 without	 the	 individual	becoming	enmeshed	in	a	network	of	overlapping	groups	where	alone	the	new	style	of	 individuality	 could	 emerge.	 Universal	 military	 service	 as	 a	 prolongation	 of	schooling	was	part	of	 the	solution,	but	 the	key	came	from	the	multitude	of	after-school	institutions	that	emerged	at	the	fin	de	siècle.	The	word	patronage	would	no	longer	 refer	 to	 institutions	 that	 sequestered	 inmates	 from	 the	 world,	 but	 had	already	gained	their	current	meaning	of	institutions	of	extra-curricular	sociability	for	children.	Summer	camps,	the	scouts,	sporting	associations,	religious	sociability,	and	so	on,	all	sought	to	no	longer	leave	the	individual	to	his	or	her	own	solitude.	In	an	institutionalized	society,	the	individual	would	no	longer	be	abandoned.			The	 most	 fascinating	 thing	 about	 these	 pedagogical	 changes	 is	 that	 the	 teacher	could	now	carry	out	the	old	role	of	the	self:	that	of	an	intermediary	between	inner	forces	 at	 war.	 The	 self	 no	 longer	 relied	 on	 the	 person	 to	 develop;	 it	 was	 just	another	thing	one	learnt	at	school.	More	than	ever	before,	subjectivity	had	simply	become	 a	 technique,	 and	 one	 that	 did	 not	 require	 much	 participation	 of	 the	subject.	Education	had	gained	the	same	ability	medicine	had:	at	once	able	to	grasp	‘man’	in	his	generality	and	particularity.	By	the	fin	de	siècle,	pedagogy	had	joined	a	very	large	domain	of	expertise	capable	of	producing	citizens.	It	was	time	for	a	new	understanding	of	physical	and	intellectual	education.		
																																																								247	Moulet,	École	primaire,	pp.	14-17.	
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In	Body	and	Mind.		At	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle,	 behaviour	was	 no	 longer	 an	 end	 in	 itself,	 but	 rather	 only	 a	means.	 Since	 free	 will	 was	 considered	 little	 more	 than	 the	 force	 of	 habit,	 the	routines	that	made	up	bad	conduct	could	themselves	be	reformed,	by	focusing	on	the	 habit-creating	 causes	 rather	 than	 combating	 behaviour,	 which	 was	 only	 an	effect.	Once	the	danger	of	erratic	behaviour	was	exorcised,	it	revealed	itself	to	be	a	crucial	 asset.	 It	 was	 the	 individualizing	 vehicle	 through	which	 the	 nature	 of	 the	person	could	be	known;	it	signalled	the	areas	needing	intervention.	Only	a	free	and	spontaneous	behaviour	could	make	the	subject	transparent	to	power	and	reflected	back	to	him	or	her.	That	is	why	the	big	pedagogical	cause	of	the	fin	de	siècle	was	to	let	 children	 play	 freely	 or	 practice	 sports.	 Only	 in	 spontaneity	 could	 difference	emerge	to	be	governed.			Other	 than	 the	 ‘indirect	 method’	 we	 have	 considered	 above,	 dependant	 on	 the	personal	 bond	 between	 the	 teacher-expert	 and	 the	 student	 and	 mediated	 by	rewards	and	punishments,	more	direct	means	were	also	at	play.	The	very	structure	of	 order	 of	 the	 school,	 its	 layout	 and	 curricula,	 was	 to	 create	 an	 impersonal	environment	 where	 obedience	 came	 naturally.	 For	 Kergomard,	 ‘material	 habits	already	 imply	 that	 there	 is	 discipline	 in	 school.	 Each	 [student]	 gradually	 learns	what	he	must	do	and	to	do	it	at	the	appropriate	moment[…]	The	discipline	of	the	
école	 maternelle	 is	 a	 result:	 the	 result	 of	 being	 occupied’.248	Children	 no	 longer	needed	to	be	micro-managed,	because	there	was	an	overall	structure	from	where	
																																																								248	Kergomard,	L’éducation	maternelle,	p.	47.	
	 397	
order	derived.	‘One	has	forgotten	a	fundamental	truth;	that	an	occupied	child	looks	after	himself,	and	that	it	becomes	possible	to	look	after	a	large	number	of	children	when	they	are	busy	and	interested’.249	Force	was	no	longer	what	made	it	possible	to	govern	behaviour.	‘The	child	is	born	active;	we	must	provide	the	nourishment	of	his	activity’.250	And	that	activity	could	be	directed.			‘Play	 is	 the	work	of	 the	 child’,	 argued	Kergomard,	 ‘it	 is	his	 trade,	his	 life’.251	Play	was	fundamental	and	needed	to	be	encouraged	by	all	means	available	and	not	just	among	the	little	ones.	Of	secondary-school	students	Bourgeois	said:	‘In	disdaining	the	 games	 of	 their	 age,	 our	 students	 do	 not	 know	 what	 damage	 they	 do	 to	themselves.	But	we	must	know	for	them’.252	The	well-off	children	of	the	nineteenth	century,	 who	 did	 not	 play,	 now	 became	 problematic.	 ‘Il	 y	 a	 quelque	 chose	 de	malade	ou	qui	va	l’être	dans	une	jeunesse	qui	ne	joue	pas’,	Bourgeois	added.	At	the	time	Jules	Simon	had	become	a	champion	of	child’s	play.	 ‘The	right	 I	demand	for	children,	is	the	right	to	play.[…]	I	demand	active	play,	what	the	English	call	athletic	games’,	military	exercises,	and	gymnastics,	‘but	that	which	I	demand	above	all	else	is	play;	the	development	of	physical	force	in	joy	and	liberty’.253		Spontaneous	 play	was	 the	 only	way	 to	 fully	 grasp	 the	 individuality	 of	 the	 child.	Moulet	 made	 this	 clear:	 ‘it	 would	 be	 inexcusable	 for	 a	 teacher	 not	 to	 observe	keenly	 the	 students’.	 The	 best	 time	 to	 do	 this	 was	 when	 they	 did	 not	 feel	themselves	 to	 be	 supervised,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 playground.	 Hence	 the	 importance																																																									249	Ibid.,	p.	93.	250	Ibid.,	p.	20.	251	Ibid.,	p.	54.	252	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	418.	253	Simon,	‘L’éducation’,	p.	678.	
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given	to	play	within	the	new	pedagogical	system.	By	studying	in	great	detail	every	characteristic	 trait	 of	 the	 child,	 the	 teacher	 would	 find	 the	 ‘revelation	 of	 a	personality	 that	 is	 still	uncertain	and	awkward,	but	which	appears	 to	 those	who	know	how	 to	 search	 for	 it.254		 A	more	personal	 and	 relaxed	 environment	 served	this	purpose,	 for	 ‘the	 child	gives	himself	with	naivety	 to	 the	 teacher	he	 loves’.255	The	 child’s	 natural	 spontaneity	 and	 innocence	 had	 to	 be	 integrated	 into	 the	pedagogical	project.			Equally,	 play	 and	 sports,	 and	 indeed	 any	 strenuous	 physical	 activity,	 were	inseparable	 from	hygiene	and	a	culture	of	 the	body	that	had	become	the	basis	of	fin-de-siècle	 subjectivity.	 ‘Physical	 education,	 carefully	 maintained	 by	 youths,	 is	the	best	ally	of	moral	education’,	argued	Bourgeois,	who	in	no	clear	way	seemed	to	distinguish	bodily	training	and	hygiene	from	each	other	or	from	the	broader	moral	aim.	 He	 instructed	 teachers	 to	 give	 particular	 attention	 to	 appearance	 and	propriety.		Cleanliness	 is	 in	 itself	 a	 virtue;	 it	 implies	 the	 respect	of	one’s	 self	 and	others.	He	who,	 in	 childhood,	 has	 acquired	 through	 a	 long	 habit	 this	 regular	 and	 simple	propriety	 that	 demands	 the	 continuous	 surveillance	 of	 one’s	 self	 will	 be	 on	 the	path	to	moral	progress.	Because	of	the	types	of	techniques	and	ethics	of	the	self	it	generated,	hygiene	had	become	 the	 new	 shortcut	 to	 morality.	 The	 body	 had	 been	 socialized,	 and	 now	mediated	our	respect	for	others	and	ourselves.	The	benefits	of	appropriate	care	of	the	body	spilled	over	to	many	other	domains.	For	Bourgeois	a	clean	body	gained	
																																																								254	Moulet,	École	primaire,	p.	342.	255	Ibid.	
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through	effort	would	imperceptible	translate	into	a	better	behaviour,	which	in	turn	led	to	a	better	use	of	language,	which	in	time	reformed	the	person’s	mœurs.	In	playing,	gymnastic	exercises,	the	regular	care	of	the	body	and	behaviour	(tenue),	there	 is	 also	 for	 the	 mind	 (pensée),	 the	 will	 and	 sentiment	 as	 it	 were	 a	 natural	discipline	whose	effects	go	farther	than	one	may	think	and	that	makes	it	possible	to	make	many	economies	on	the	repressive	discipline	of	statutes	and	punishments.	Equally,	one	of	the	main	pillars	of	the	école	maternelle	was	hygiene,	and	not	only	the	sanitary	state	of	the	child.	‘It	is	not	the	appearance	of	cleanliness	we	want,	it	is	
cleanliness.	What	we	must	 obtain	 from	 the	mères	de	 famille	 is	 for	 the	 children’s	entire	 bodies	 to	 be	 washed	 each	 morning;	 it	 is	 the	 absolute	 cleanliness	 of	 the	head’.256	If	 not	 their	 children	 could	 be	 expelled.	 ‘When	 the	mother	 sees	 that	 it’s	
serious,	 that	 it	 is,	 for	 her,	 a	matter	 of	 being	 or	 not	 being	 discharged	 of	 her	 child	during	working	hours,	she	will	take	with	regards	to	him,	and	little	by	little	without	reservations	for	herself	as	well,	habits	of	cleanliness’.257	Hygiene	thus	became	the	cornerstone	 of	 the	 new	 edifice	 of	 selfhood	 and	 project	 of	 social	 government;	 it	directly	 touched	upon	 the	 three	goals	Bourgeois	now	gave	secondary	and	higher	education:	‘education	of	intelligence,	education	of	the	body,	education	of	the	will’.	In	his	textbook	on	gymnastics	intended	for	the	‘development	of	the	viral	forces	and	civic	 education	 of	 populations',	 Guillaume	 Docx	 argued	 that	 properly	 directed	games	‘exercise	the	body,	senses,	conception,	judgement,	perspicacity,	imagination	and	cold-blood	of	the	child;	these	become	habituated	to	observing	rules,	voluntary	discipline	[and]	respecting	the	rights	of	others’.	Play	also	developed	their	personal	initiative,	sociability	and	morality.258	The	body	became	a	pillar	of	subjectivity	to	be	
																																																								256	Kergomard,	L’éducation	maternelle,	p.	17.	257	Ibid.,	p.	22.	258	Guillaume	Docx,	La	gymnastique	rationnelle	(Namur,	1884),	p.	234.	
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developed	 inside	 and	 outside	 the	 school	 at	 every	 level.	 Thus	 the	 ‘university	will	have	 completed	 all	 its	 tasks’,	 Bourgeois	 argued,	 ‘when	 youths	 leave	 their	 hands	with	a	 robust	and	 flexible	body,	 a	 solid	 instruction	and	a	 sound	 judgment,	 a	will	that	 is	 upright	 and	 in	 command	 of	 itself’.259	Therefore,	 a	 new	 type	 of	 embodied	subject,	and	a	new	type	of	panacea,	was	being	cast	as	the	objective	of	the	schooling	system	at	the	turn	of	the	century.260		This	 focus	 on	 the	 body	 meant	 that	 schooling	 came	 under	 attack	 for	 being	 too	intellectual.	 The	 buzzword	 for	 school	 reformers	 in	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle	 became	
surmenage	 intellectual,	 meaning	 mental	 exhaustion	 or	 overburdening.	 From	 the	nursery	 school	 to	 university,	 students	 were	 depicted	 as	 victims	 of	 a	 monstrous	intellectualism	 and	 mandarinism.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 in	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle	 the	emphasis	 changed	 from	 understanding	 to	 knowing,	 from	 holding	 the	 keys	 of	reason	to	consuming	information.	Thus,	like	behaviour,	knowledge	was	no	longer	an	end	in	itself.			Simon	estimated	that	secondary	schools	required	a	student	to	devote	eleven	hours	and	a	half	per	day	to	intellectual	work.261	There	was	no	time	left	for	anything	to	do	with	 the	 body;	 ‘during	 the	 very	 brief	 recreation	 break	 one	 grants	 them,	 they	remain	 in	 a	 corner	 stupefied	 by	 their	 work,	 chatting	 or	 strolling	 like	 grave	bourgeois	 men’.262	Intellectual	 overwork	 was	 also	 denounced	 in	 nurseries.	 For	Kergomard,	factitious	discipline	went	hand-in-hand	with	‘premature	teaching’	and																																																									259	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	416-417.	260	For	 the	period	after	 the	War	see:	 Joan	Tumblety,	Remaking	the	Male	Body:	Masculinity	and	the	
Uses	of	Physical	Culture	in	Interwar	and	Vichy	France	(Oxford,	2012).	261	Simon,	‘L’éducation’,	p.	679.	262	Ibid.	
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‘over-the-top	 instruction’	 which	 was	 equally	 as	 oppressive	 to	 children	 and	 the	development	of	their	intelligence.	‘Thanks	to	this	dogma:	“the	child	is	in	school	to	become	 learned	 (savant)”,	 our	 early-childhood	 schools	 are	 inhumane,	 unnatural	schools’.263	The	aim	of	school,	then,	was	no	longer	intellectual,	but	rather	focused	on	 the	 arduous	 development	 of	 the	 multiple	 self	 that	 was	 able	 to	 merge	 into	multiple	social	groups	without	renouncing	individuality.		The	 heavy	 and	 exhaustive	 curricula	 in	 the	 secondary	 schools	 needed	 to	 be	simplified.	 The	 important	 thing	 was	 not	 the	 syllabus	 or	 the	 content	 of	 the	information	 and	 skills	 the	 students	 learned;	 ‘the	 useful	 thing	 par	 excellence	 is	intelligence	 itself,	 because	 only	 it	 is	 capable	 of	 applying	 knowledge	 with	discernment	 and	 appropriateness	 and	 only	 supplemented,	 sometimes,	 to	 the	inevitable	 insufficiencies	 of	 all	 knowledge,	 by	 a	 reflection	 and	 general	 methods	whose	 resources	 are	 infinite’.264	The	 aim	 was	 to	 form	 discerning	 consumers	 of	knowledge,	who	had	some	criteria	on	how	to	apply	it,	and	where	to	find	its	‘infinite	resources’.	An	excessively	scholarly	education	was	thus	not	only	unnecessary,	but	also	dangerous.	We	 have	 realized	 this	 simple,	 and	 thus	 most	 often	 unknown,	 truth:	 that	 the	intellectual	 capacities	 of	 the	 child	 remain	 more	 or	 less	 today	 what	 they	 have	always	been,	while	the	sum	of	science	acquired	increases	every	century	and	every	day.[…	 S]chooling	 must	 be	 general	 without	 doubt	 in	 its	 principles,	 but	 not	encyclopaedic	in	its	matter,	the	beginning	of	wisdom	will	be	to	allow	ignorance.265			
																																																								263	Kergomard,	L’éducation	maternelle,	p.	34.	264	Bourgeois,	‘Lettre	aux	membres’,	p.	421.	265	Ibid.	
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The	upper-class	calm	and	effeminate	ways	of	the	nineteenth	century	was	gradually	giving	 way	 to	 the	 focus	 on	 the	manly	 and	 vigorous	 body.	 In	 a	 much-applauded	speech,	Simon	made	plain	how	much	had	changed.		One	gives	society	a	small	and	ridiculous	mandarin	who	has	no	muscles,	who	cannot	 jump	over	a	barrier,	who	cannot	elbow	his	way	through	the	crowd	(jouer	des	coudes),	who	cannot	shoot	with	a	rifle,	who	cannot	ride	a	horse,	who	is	afraid	of	everything,	who,	in	turn,	is	stuffed	with	all	sorts	of	useless	knowledge	 (connaisances),	who	does	not	know	the	most	necessary	 things,	who	 cannot	 give	 anyone	 advice,	 or	 give	 it	 to	 himself,	 who	 needs	 to	 be	directed	 in	 all	 things	 and	who,	 feeling	 his	weakness	 hand	 having	 lost	 his	edge,	throws	himself	as	a	last	resort	into	that	State	socialism	[saying]	 ‘The	state	needs	to	take	me	by	the	hand,	as	University	has	done	up	to	now’.266				The	very	profound	changes	that	took	place	in	the	schooling	of	the	rich	and	the	poor	in	France	at	the	turn	of	the	century	reflect	the	deeper	transformation	in	the	self	we	have	 been	 discussing	 at	 length.	 Towards	 1900,	man	 had	 become	 at	 once	 highly	fragmented	and	whole.	Moulet	denied	the	will	could	be	 isolated	at	all.	All	human	faculties	were	in	solidarity	with	each	other.	‘The	will	is	a	manner	of	behaving	and	conducting	oneself,	 a	way	of	 thinking,	 feeling,	desiring,	 acting,	 and	 reacting	 [that	has]	 become	 habitual	 and	 very	 easy’.	 It	 was	 not	 a	 distinct	 faculty	 anyone	 could	isolate	 and	 manage.	 ‘One	 forms	 the	 will	 in	 learning	 to	 think,	 feel,	 and	 act	normally’.267	The	best	way	to	bring	about	this	normality	was	to	elicit	conviction	by	appealing	to	the	emotions,	by	‘Touching	the	child	in	the	living	depth	of	his	heart’.	It	
																																																								266	Simon,	‘L’éducation’,	p.	682.	267	Moulet,	École	primaire,	pp.	346-347.	
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was	 ‘the	 fecund	emotions	that	engender	a	strong	will’.	But	once	again,	 the	model	was	 religious.	 ‘Our	will	 is	 our	 joyous	docility	 to	 a	 faith,	 religious	 or	 not,	 and	 the	declaration	 of	 a	 generous	 belief’.268	For	 indeed	 the	 twentieth	 century	 man	 was	fashioned	out	of	faith.			
Conclusion	
	This	 chapter	 has	 analysed	 the	 gradual	 rise	 of	 a	 multiple	 understanding	 of	 the	individual	that	crystalized	into	a	new	paradigm	of	the	self	and	the	state	in	the	fin-de-siècle.	While	 I	 have	 focused	 on	 the	work	 of	Durkheim,	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	process	leading	up	to	his	findings	after	1893	shows	that,	as	with	the	Cousin	school,	this	was	not	 the	work	of	one	man,	but	 rather	 the	 culmination	of	 a	 long	 series	of	public	 debate	 on	 the	 problems	 of	modernity.	While	 the	 key	 to	 Cousin’s	moi	 had	rested	in	a	clear	separation	of	the	personal	and	the	universality	of	reason,	the	fin-de-siècle	 experience	 of	 the	 self	 had	 few	 clear	 boundaries.	 The	 exclusively	individual	 aspects	 of	 the	 self	 kept	 receding	 before	 the	 expansion	 of	 the	 social	domain.	 In	my	view,	this	accounts	 for	the	very	shallow	sense	of	 interiority	of	 the	fragmented	 and	 paralyzed	 self	 that	 was	 found	 in	 modernist	 literature	 after	1900.269	According	to	Edward	Said,	these	works	of	fiction	stood	for	‘a	general	loss	of	faith	in	the	ability	of	novelistic	representation	directly	to	reflect	anything	other	than	 the	 author’s	 dilemmas’. 270 	This	 change	 also	 seems	 to	 have	 affected	portraiture.	 Laura	 Asok	 has	 analyzed	 a	 change	 from	 the	 representation	 of	problematically	unitary	selves	gave	way	towards	the	end	of	the	century	to	eroded																																																									268	Ibid.,	pp.	351-352.	269	Dennis	 Brown,	 The	 Modernist	 Self	 in	 Twentieth-Century	 English	 Literature:	 A	 Study	 in	 Self-
Fragmentation	(New	York,	1989).	270	Quoted	in:	Roddey	Reid,	Families	in	Jeopardy	(Stanford,	1993),	p.	282..	
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and	disintegrating	depictions	of	the	individual.271	However,	this	inner	contraction	of	 the	 domains	 of	 individuality	 was	 met	 with	 an	 outward	 expansion	 of	 the	possibilities	 and	 opportunities	 for	 social	 belonging.	 Through	 the	 development	 of	what	we	would	now	call	identities,	the	subject	gained	an	ability	for	self-fashioning	through	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 social	 identities,	 each	 of	 which	offered	their	own	parameters	of	normality.	A	clearly-defined	personality	was	not	only	 recognized	 as	 valuable	 and	 necessary	 for	 social	 life,	 but	 the	 individual	was	offered	a	series	of	techniques	of	the	self	that	promised	to	turn	the	personality	into	an	aesthetic	creation.	Through	new	hygienic	approaches,	the	body	also	opened	up	to	be	shaped	and	moulded.	While	the	alienation	of	the	self	and	body	derived	from	the	medical	materialism	 introduced	by	Broussais,	 the	diseased	body	also	offered	new	 liberties.	 The	 empowering	 effects	 that	 bodily	 alienation	 had	 for	 the	 young	Comte	has	been	confirmed	for	the	period	through	the	work	of	medical	historians	in	the	 United	 States.	 In	 his	 study	 of	 fin-de-siècle	 homosexuality,	 Bert	 Hansen	 has	highlighted	that	the	‘discovery’	of	the	medical	‘pathology’	enabled	‘sufferers’	to	re-interpret	 their	 difference	 in	 ways	 that	 reduced	 guilt	 and	 the	 sense	 of	 personal	deficiency.272	As	 had	 been	 the	 case	with	 Comte,	 it	was	 not	 their	 fault.	What	 had	previously	been	moral	problems	that	directly	concerned	the	self	could	now	be	cast	as	 an	 objective	 medical	 condition.	 Motherhood	 equally	 benefited	 from	 being	understood	as	a	matter	of	hygienic	technique	rather	than	virtue.	The	treatment	of	
																																																								271	Laura	Asok,	 'Alienated	Selves:	Portraiture	in	Nineteenth-	and	Twentieth-Century	France’,	Ph.D.	thesis,	 Princeton	University	 (Princeton,	 2010);	 Gen	Doy,	Picturing	 the	Self:	Changing	Views	of	 the	
Subject	in	Visual	Culture	(London,	2005).	272	Bert	Hansen,	 ‘American	physicians’	“discovery”	of	homosexuals:	A	new	diagnosis	in	a	changing	society,	 1880-1900’,	 in:	 Charles	 Rosenberg	 and	 Janet	 Golden	 (eds),	 Framing	 Disease:	 Studies	 in	
Cultural	History	 (New	Brunswick,	1992),	pp.	104-133;	See:	Régis	Revenin,	 ‘Paris	gay,	1870-1918’,	in:	Revenin	(ed.),	Hommes	et	masculinités	de	1789	à	nos	jours	(Paris,	2007),	pp.	21-41;	‘L’emergence	d’un	 monde	 homosexual	 modern	 dans	 le	 Paris	 de	 la	 Belle	 Époque’,	 Revue	 d’histoire	moderne	 et	
contemporaine,	 53/4	 (2006),	pp.	74-86;	Donald	Reid,	 ‘Review:	Homosexuality	 in	Modern	France’,	
French	Politics	and	Society,	15/4	(1997),	pp.	54-62.	
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the	 poor	 followed	 an	 analogous	 process.	 The	 shift	 from	 indigence	 as	moral	 and	personal	to	an	objective	and	social	category	enabled	an	unprecedented	expansion	in	the	number	of	services	and	recipients	of	welfare	programmes.		In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 century,	 intellectual	 understanding	 and	 the	 inequality	 of	intellects	 had	 been	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 the	 social	 hierarchy.	 From	 the	 work	 of	Simon	 in	 the	 1860s	 to	 the	 pedagogical	 reform	 Bourgeois	 introduced	 in	 1890,	knowledge	came	to	be	seen	as	a	new	technique	of	attachment	to	the	social	order	instead	 of	 a	 threat.	 Knowledge	 thus	 became	 increasingly	 socialized	 through	 the	popular	 conferences	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	 1860s	 through	 to	 the	 new	 republican	system	 of	 universal	 and	 free	 education	 introduced	 in	 the	 1880s.	 But	 this	 was	achieved	at	the	price	of	reducing	knowing	to	an	article	of	consumption.	In	turn,	the	qualified	production	of	scientific	knowledge	became	associated	to	a	long	process	of	study	 and	 effort	 as	well	 as	 to	 an	 ever-increasing	 specialization.	Men	 such	 as	 the	baron	de	Gérando,	Charles	Dupin	or	Louis-René	Villermé	who	had	made	original	contributions	in	a	range	of	disciplines	would	be	relegated	to	the	past.	In	the	second	half	of	 the	nineteenth	century	scholars	started	to	specialize	 in	a	single	discipline.	Henri	Poincaré	was	the	last	mathematician	to	have	made	significant	contributions	to	all	fields	of	his	discipline.	By	the	time	of	his	death	in	1912,	scholarship	was	being	bound	by	the	restraints	of	increasingly	fragmented	fields	of	specialization.		If	 the	 fin	 de	 siècle	 offered	 an	 ideal	 of	 a	 harmonious	 society,	 it	 was	 only	 by	internalizing	in	the	subject	many	of	what	had	been	the	causes	for	social	conflict	in	the	 nineteenth	 century.	 Active	 participation	 in	 society	 required	 a	 great	 deal	 of	inner	 conflict,	 as	 had	been	 the	 case	 throughout	 the	nineteenth	 century.	By	1900	
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the	 internal	 struggle	 had	 at	 once	 become	 subtler	 and	 more	 challenging.	 The	multiple	self	was	now	changed	with	harmonizing	the	universal	and	the	particular,	the	 state	 (recast	 as	 society)	 and	 the	 individual,	 collective	 and	personal	 interests,	group	consensus	and	individuality,	national	and	local	belonging,	faith	and	science	or	 cooperation	 and	 competition.	 This	 had	 to	 be	 worked	 out	 individually	 while	maintaining	 and	 respecting	 the	 boundaries	 to	 the	 different	 context-specific	personalities	 of	 the	 self	 and	 others,	 that	 is,	 while	 identifying	 as	 a	 multitude	 of	competing	identities.			In	 particular,	 institutions	 required	 employees	 to	 separate	 the	 personal	 and	impersonal	dimensions	of	their	work.	This	would	have	seemed	remarkable	half	a	century	earlier	when	person	and	function	were	closely	linked.	Part	of	the	conflict	between	 departmental	 inspectors	 and	 the	 charitable	 notables	 who	 served	 in	welfare	and	hospital	boards	came	from	the	difference	in	social	rank.	The	charitable	boards	were	made	up	of	well-established	local	gentlemen	who	exercised	their	role	without	 monetary	 compensation.	 They	 refused	 to	 be	 monitored	 by	 ‘a	 salaried	agent	and	too	often	their	subaltern’,	which	I	would	understand	to	mean	their	social	inferior.273	The	 notables	 generally	 belonged	 to	 the	 class	 of	 rentiers,	 that	 is,	 men	who	 tended	 to	 retire	 in	 their	 forties.274	The	belief	 in	 the	 inferiority	of	employees	was	 not	 only	 typical	 of	 their	 class	 though.	 Mid-century	 fouriéristes	 and	
phalanstèriens,	 who	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 freedom	 understood	 as	 self-possession	 of	 having	 ‘the	 property	 of	 one’s	 person’;	 after	 the	 French	 Revolution	‘man	has	once	again	become	free,	 that	is,	that	he	does	not	belong	to	anyone’	else.	Taken	to	its	logical	end	this	view	meant	that	‘the	soldier	or	the	employee	has	fallen																																																									273	Conseil	Général	de	la	Corrèze,	Session	de	1851	(Tulle,	1851),	p.	313.	274	Eugen	Weber,	My	France	(Cambridge,	Mass.,	1991),	p.	228.	
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into	 half-slavery’.	 Whether	 simple	 ouvriers	 or	 hauts	 fonctionnaires,	 anyone	following	orders	 in	 their	work	was	 ‘no	 longer	 free:	 they	have	alienated	a	part	of	their	personality	and	depend	on	the	will	of	other	men	who	regulate	their	actions	and	 the	 employment	 of	 their	 faculties	 without	 consulting	 them’.275	At	 the	 fin	 de	siècle,	whether	in	the	school	or	in	the	office,	the	individual	was	expected	to	manage	partial	 alienation	 and	 integration	 into	 the	 group	 structure	 without	 complete	estrangement	from	the	personality.	This	process	could	allow	new	freedom	for	the	employee.	 Starting	 soon	after	 the	1901	 law	on	associations,	public	workers	very	quickly	 organized.	 By	 1914,	 almost	 all	 civil	 servants	 were	 organized	professionally.276	The	play	of	multiple	identities	meant	that	civil	servants	were	not	restricted	 to	 either	 identifying	 as	 either	 underlings	 or	 private	 persons	 and	representing	 either	 common	 or	 individual	 interests,	 instead	 they	 were	 able	 to	mobilize	and	actively	identify	as	a	group.		The	 capabilities	 of	 guardianship,	 of	 exercising	 power	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 its	recipients,	greatly	multiplied	at	the	fin	de	siècle.	Through	new	techniques	of	self-work	 and	 self-mastery,	 individuals	 were	 called	 upon	 to	 gradually	 and	painstakingly	build	a	governing	higher	self	capable	of	controlling	and	shaping	the	body,	 the	 passions,	 the	 knowing	 mind,	 social	 identities	 and	 belongings	 and	 an	active	compliance	and	engagement	with	society	and	social	functions.	The	promises	of	 self-command	 were	 raised	 to	 new	 heights.	 In	 tandem,	 experts,	 doctors	 and	teachers	 gained	 new	 capabilities	 of	 governing	 others.	 New	 scientific	understandings	 of	 emotional	 attachment,	 mind	 and	 will	 offered	 a	 new	 vantage																																																									275	Emile	Bourdon,	 'Mélanges:	La	 liberté	 selon	 les	économistes’,	La	phalange:	Journal	de	la	science	
sociale,	XIV/II	(1845),	pp.	169-170.	276	Judith	Wishnia,	The	Proletarianizing	of	 the	Fonctionnaires:	 Civil	 Service	Workers	and	 the	Labor	
Movement	under	the	Third	Republic	(Baton	Rouge,	1990),	chapters	2-5.	
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point	 from	where	 to	 know	 and	 conduct	 the	 other,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 tutee’s	 natural	propensities	were	 given	 free	 rein	 in	moments	 of	 play	 and	 ease.	 Gymnastics	 and	hygiene	 made	 possible	 new	 interventions	 capable	 of	 shaping	 the	 subject’s	embodied	 relationship	 to	 self	 and	 others.	 The	 insistence	 on	 loosened	 discipline	both	opened	up	the	space	needed	for	the	free	play	of	spontaneous	action	in	which	particularities	emerged	and	further	delegated	to	the	subject	the	need	for	a	mindful	and	severe	self-government	compatible	with	social	liberties.					The	rise	of	the	plural	self	and	the	shift	in	the	notion	of	government	it	implied	put	to	rest	 many	 of	 the	 old	 ghosts	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 from	 the	 confrontation	between	the	individual	and	the	state	to	the	problem	of	morality	or	the	assistance	of	 the	 poor.	 	 New	 freedoms	 and	 new	 constraints	 awaited	 the	 ever-changing	modern	individual	in	the	new	century.		 	
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Conclusion.					This	thesis	has	provided	a	fluid	history	of	both	the	modern	individual	and	the	state	practices	 of	 which	 it	 was	 inseparable.	 The	 analysis	 was	 driven	 forward	 by	 the	problem	 of	 governing	 the	 self	 and	 other,	 which	 both	 united	 and	 separated	 the	individual	and	the	state,	while	traversing	the	self’s	interior,	the	home,	the	hospice,	the	 hospital,	 the	 church,	 the	 barracks	 or	 the	 school.	 This	 transversal	 problem	of	governing	 can	 be	 found	 formulated	 more	 or	 less	 explicitly	 in	 a	 vast	 array	 of	political,	 philosophical,	 pedagogical,	 scientific,	 administrative,	 religious,	 literary,	self-improvement	and	moral	 texts	and	debates.	Through	these	I	have	shown	that	the	 actual	 formulations,	 diagnostics	 and	 solutions	 given	 to	 the	 problem	 of	governing	did	not	stop	changing	throughout	 the	nineteenth	century.	And	yet,	 the	very	 tension	 that	 defined	 governing	 as	 a	 problem	 remained	 a	 constant	 between	1800	 and	 1900.	 This	 tension	 derived	 from	 human	 relationships	 having	 been	conceptually	 reduced	 to	 either	 vertical	 bonds	 of	 inequality	 or	 horizontal	 ties	 of	sameness,	each	of	which	produced	the	other,	in	the	same	way	that	the	inequalities	between	 parent	 and	 child	 or	 teacher	 and	 pupil	 produced	 equal	 and	 governing	adults	 capable	 of	 reproducing	 the	 cycle.	 I	 have	 found	 this	 tension	 between	inequality	and	equality	was	translated	into	a	thinkable	and	practicable	rationality	of	governing	 in	 the	 legal	 figure	of	guardianship	as	 it	applied	 in	 the	 family	and	 in	social	 assistance.	 The	 guardian	 was	 a	 hierarch	 who	 legitimately	 conducted	
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behaviour	 for	 a	 clear	purpose:	 to	produce	 and	 reproduce	equality	 in	 freedom	 for	the	greater	good,	and	thus	render	his	or	her	authority	unnecessary.	The	guardian	was	to	know	how	to	hold	the	sceptre	of	power	and	then	burry	it	when	the	job	was	done,	 when	 the	 governed	 had	 blossomed	 into	 governors	 of	 the	 self	 and	 others,	relatives	 or	 strangers.	 The	 contradiction	 of	 such	 a	 self-reproducing	 and	 self-perpetuating	understanding	was	that	equality	and	freedom	could	only	be	arrived	at	through	an	apprenticeship	requiring	hierarchy	and	constraint.	In	the	self	or	the	collective,	 the	desire	and	pursuit	of	an	 ideal	 future	produced	an	accelerating	and	shifting	 world	 where	 the	 contrasts	 between	 progress	 and	 backwardness	 grew	exponentially	 and,	 with	 them,	 the	 flight	 forward	 towards	 an	 increased	 need	 for	governing	 that	 further	 multiplied	 the	 disparities	 it	 existed	 to	 eliminate.	 As	 the	nineteenth	century	progressed,	this	rationality	came	to	be	increasingly	widespread	or	even	hegemonic.	We	saw	that	Catholics	and	conservatives,	plural	communities	that	were	more	or	less	opposed	and	or	critical	of	many	of	these	systemic	changes	that	 came	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 political	 and	 economic	 liberalism,	 also	 came	 to	embrace	 the	 logic	 of	 guardianship.	 Celebrated	 in	 grassroots	 devotion	 to	 Saint	Joseph,	authorized	writings	on	friendship	or	Papal	encyclicals,	guardianship	in	the	Church	emphasized	the	functional	father	over	the	absolute	Father,	thus	reflecting	the	wider	shift	in	rationality	of	which	it	was	part.			Therefore,	 there	 are	 two	 axes	 structuring	 this	 work.	 The	 first	 axis	 is	 that	 of	 an	historical	form	that	remained	stable	during	the	long	nineteenth	century,	while	the	second	comprises	the	fluidity	of	the	form’s	constantly	changing	contents.	The	crux	of	 the	 first	 axis	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 guardianship.	 While	 the	 philosophy	 of	 the	Enlightenment	 defined	 some	 human	 beings	 as	modern	 individuals	 fit	 for	 liberty	
	 411	
and	 not	 others,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 freedom	during	 the	 French	 Revolution	 rested	 squarely	 on	 the	 ability	 to	 operate	 this	hierarchical	 distinction.	 In	 this	 system	 of	 constant	 comparison,	 ‘men’	 were	contradictorily	 born	 both	 equal	 and	 unequal,	 worthy	 and	 unworthy.	 These	defining	differences	in	quality	and	moral	worth	among	persons	came	to	depend	on	behaviour.	 The	 modern	 subject	 was	 expected	 to	 internalize	 and	 attempt	 to	neutralize	 these	 inherent	 structural	 contradictions	 by	 adopting	 a	 deliberate	conduct,	wherein	every	action	reflects	a	choice.	The	long	apprenticeship	needed	to	become	 a	 modern	 self	 was	 equated	 with	 legal	 minority	 and	 the	 blank-slate	 of	infancy.	The	success	of	this	learning	process	was	the	task	of	guardianship.	This	was	a	 conceptually	 non-coercive	 way	 of	 moulding	 those	 not	 yet	 able	 to	 govern	themselves	and	others	 in	accordance	with	 freedom.	 It	was	exercised	 through	the	family	 at	 the	 micro	 level	 and	 through	 social	 assistance	 at	 the	 macro	 level.	Guardianship	 intended	 to	 produce	 and	 reproduce	 the	 modern	 individual	 as	 the	normative	subject	of	modern	collectives.			The	second	axis	has	thrown	into	sharp	relief	the	fact	that	the	conceptual	contents,	practical	arrangements	and	actual	lived	meaning	of	the	as	the	individual,	the	state,	the	 family	 or	 social	 assistance	 never	 stopped	 changing	 across	 time	 and	 space	 in	France	 in	 the	 long	 nineteenth	 century.	 Indeed,	 these	 modern	 institutions	 that	organized	the	public-private	divide	not	only	had	no	essence,	but	also	experienced	important	mutations	from	one	decade	to	the	next	as	well	as	a	significant	diversity	in	the	way	they	were	thought	of	and	performed	at	any	one	time.	Even	when	two	paradigmatic	shifts	dramatically	altered	the	experience	of	these	four	institutions	in	1800s-1830s	 and	 1880s-1914,	 the	 belief	 in	 their	 taken-for-granted	 naturalness,	
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reality	 or	 necessity	was	 able	 to	 seamlessly	 conceal	 the	 long-term	 contradictions	between	 their	 form	 and	 contents.	 While	 the	 overall	 systemic	 discrepancies	remained	 hidden	 inside	 the	 self,	 the	 historian	 may	 document	 these	 as	 they	emerged	 in	 a	 partial	 but	 more	 or	 less	 intelligible	 form	 in	 the	 many	 and	fragmentary	 disciplines	 and	 domains	 of	 thought	 and	 action	 that	 made	 up	 the	modern	public	sphere.	By	casting	light	on	these	incongruities	through	time,	I	have	endeavoured	 to	 situate	 these	 nineteenth-century	 institutions,	 and	 the	 logic	 of	guardianship	 that	gave	 them	meaning,	within	 the	domain	of	artefact,	history	and	human	agency	rather	than	of	‘nature’,	as	all	genealogists	since	Nietzsche	have	done	in	their	own	fields.			While	 the	 disparate	 case	 studies	 that	 allowed	me	 to	 arrive	 at	 these	 conclusions	may	 resemble	 impressionistic	 sketches,	 when	 taken	 together	 they	 draw	 out	 the	elusive	 silhouette	 of	 the	 ‘structures	 of	 experience’	 underlying	 modernity	 and	individuality	 in	 nineteenth-century	 France.	 This	 analysis	 remains	 an	 open	framework	into	which	many	more	case	studies	can	be	brought	into	play	in	order	to	offer	and	increasingly	nuanced	understanding	of	these	processes.			Since	 at	 least	 the	 French	 Revolution	 very	 profound	 discontinuities	 and	 changes	took	place	 in	 the	 short	 span	of	 individual	 temporalities	which	were	able	 to	alter	‘the	whole	 fabric	of	men’s	personality’,	as	Norbert	Elias	put	 it.1	While	 there	 is	no	doubt	that	transformations	in	culture,	social	usage,	or	mentalities	have	tended	to	
																																																								
1	Norbert	Elias,	Power	and	Civility	(New	York,	1982),	p.	285.		
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operate	 in	 the	 longue	 durée,	 this	 changed	 with	 liberalism.	 Since	 the	 eighteenth	century	we	have	seen	that	the	shaping	of	morality	and	behaviour	was	the	central	goal	 of	 this	 rationality	 of	 government.	 This	 was	 because	 liberal	 ‘liberty’	 both	required	 and	 produced	 a	 certain	 ordering	 of	 the	 human	 psyche	 and	 social	relations.	 ‘Psychology’	 provided	 the	 keys	 to	 interpreting	 and	 experiencing	 the	human	mind	as	a	universal	phenomenon,	that	 is,	 it	provided	a	common	cognitive	template	 that	could	be	applied	 to	decipher	all	men,	 in	all	 times,	everywhere.	 If	 it	was	assumed	that	the	psyche	was	the	cause	of	all	human	activity,	then	this	made	it	possible	 to	 analyse	 the	motivations	 and	 predict	 the	 effects	 of	 one’s	 actions	 and	those	of	others,	a	skill	that	promised	to	translate	into	social	advancement.	This	had	a	pull	effect.	Liberal	government	also	mobilized	processes	that	were	destructive	of	traditional	community	ties	and	 local	social,	economic	and	cultural	structures	and	hierarchies.	 This	 had	 a	 push	 effect.	 In	 their	 place	 was	 founded	 an	 increasingly	mobile	 and	 fluid	 world,	 were	 there	 were	 fewer	 and	 fewer	 certainties,	 but	 an	increasing	 sense	 of	 a	 social	 body,	 united	 by	 shared	 and	 increasingly	 normative	cultural	 references	 and	 embodied	 in	 the	 nation-state.	 The	 state	 was	 at	 once	 a	burden	 and	 a	 saviour,	 always	 promising	 much	 more	 than	 it	 delivered,	 always	secreting	a	deficit	between	the	awareness	of	danger	it	generated	and	the	security	it	satisfied.	 In	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 loud	 promise	 of	 progress	 and	 the	 dismay	 of	reality,	there	developed	a	competitive	social	life	among	‘equals’,	where	the	position	of	 no	 actor	 or	 roll	 was	 stable,	 where	morality	 and	 knowledge	were	 founded	 on	equally	 uncertain	 grounds,	 where	 the	 social	 order	 stood	 at	 once	 glorified	 and	condemned,	where	there	was	no	hiding	from	the	moral	panics	of	the	day,	and	only	the	privacy	and	interiority	of	the	home	was,	at	best,	a	temporary	refuge.	Navigating	the	 modern	 storm	 was	 a	 strategizing,	 comparing,	 measuring	 self,	 cast	 as	 both	
	 414	
subject	and	object	of	permanent	observation	and	narrativization	of	the	self	and	the	milieu.	 The	 dream	 of	 the	 Panopticon	 and	 perfect	 disciplining	 simply	 meant	 to	supply	 the	 person’s	 inability	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 strategizing,	 steering,	 observation,	and	narativization	of	his	or	her	own	self.	The	poor	house	was	a	simple	training	into	the	self-objectifying	mechanisms	of	psychology.		The	 1830	 revolution	 was	 the	 bourgeois	 revolution	 in	 France.	 It	 invented	 the	bourgeoisie	 as	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 came	 to	 know	 it,	 as	 a	 dynamic	 imagined	community	 self-destined	 to	be	 the	 first	 truly	universal,	 rational	polity	 in	history;	the	first	men	to	envision	and	construct	the	one,	truly	natural,	transcendental	order.	It	 also	 invented	 an	unprecedented	 form	of	material	 and	 spiritual	 human	misery:	pauperism.	A	complete	branch	of	the	liberal	savoir	d’État	was	devoted	to	this	new	object.	 It	 was	 the	 state	 elite	 that	 uncovered,	 analysed,	 sensationalized	 and	vulgarized	the	extent	of	the	new	poverty,	the	shortcomings	of	the	industrial	order	and	the	retreat	of	traditional	moral	authority.	This	made	plain	the	dearth	of	virtue	in	 the	 urban	 environment.	 The	 same	 state	 elite	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 law,	government	 and	 coercion	 were	 incapable	 of	 producing	 virtuous	 citizens.	 The	solution	could	only	come	 from	each	 individual	person	 freely	and	wholeheartedly	accepting	and	subjecting	to	the	social	and	moral	order	and	behaving	accordingly.	The	wealthy	would	abandon	the	superstitious,	self-serving,	indolent	vices	from	the	aristocratic	past;	the	poor,	their	filthy,	promiscuous,	nomadic	and	careless	ways.	In	their	place	would	rise	 the	bourgeoisie	and	 the	classes	laborieuses,	 and	with	 them	the	 modern	 nuclear	 family.	 While	 domesticity	 was	 alien	 to	 most	 bourgeois	household	in	the	1840s,	by	the	fin	de	siècle	it	had	become	‘une	grande	réalité	de	la	
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vie	 ouvrière’.2	But	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 class	 never	 was	 the	 solid,	 orderly	structure	 that	 contemporary	 and	 twentieth-century	 scholars	 imagined	 it	 to	 be.	Class	was	 an	 imagined,	 representational	 community	 of	 immense	 complexity	 and	differentiation,	whose	identity	and	legitimacy	as	‘class’	was	constantly	challenged,	while	 the	symbolic,	discursive	boundaries	separating	 them	from	the	old	rich	and	poor	were	never	secured.	Any	form	of	modern	belonging	and	 identity	required	a	relentless	process	that	signified,	negotiated	and	performed	selfhood.		By	exploring	the	long	nineteenth	century,	I	have	identified	and	analysed	the	shift	from	 one	model	 of	 subjectivity	 to	 another.	 In	 the	 psychological	 paradigm	 of	 the	self,	 there	 was	 a	 melodramatic	 battle	 between	 the	 one	 eternal	 and	 universal	cosmic	 order	 linking	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	monstrosity,	 on	 the	 other.	 Both	 the	 individual	 and	 the	 state	 were	 unitary,	indivisible,	 and	 in	 constant	 need	 to	 police	 boundaries	 and	 avoid	 promiscuity	between	categories	(private-public,	man-woman,	civil	society-political	society,	and	so	on).	It	was	a	personal	struggle	between	good	and	evil	that	was	lived	in	society	as	much	as	in	the	body	and	demanded	commitment	and	urgent	action.			In	the	sociological	paradigm	of	the	self,	the	specific	society	or	culture	was	a	given,	hugely	complicated	and	permanent	fact	of	life,	science	and	our	psyches;	and	it	was	the	task	of	the	individual	to	escape	complete	insignificance	by	making	sense	of	and	signifying	his	or	her	life,	body	and	the	hazy	boundaries	of	the	institutional,	cultural	and	 social	 context.	 The	 ready-made	way	 to	 do	 this	 was	 to	 adopt	 existing	 social	identities	 linked	to	collective	roles	or	 functions	as	a	context-dependent	collective																																																									2	Nicholas	Green,	The	Spectacle	of	Nature	 (Manchester,	1990),	p.	137;	Michelle	Perrot,	Les	femmes	
ou	les	silences	de	l’histoire	(Paris,	1998),	p.	151.	
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personality,	indeed	as	ontological	hats	to	wear	depending	on	the	occasion.	Mother,	woman,	 football	 fan,	 patriot,	 bretonne,	 worker,	 socialist,	 trade-unionist,	 student,	Catholic,	etc.,	each	label	could	be	experienced	vividly	as	an	all-embracing	I	am,	but	instantly	deserted	for	another	equally	soliciting	identity	when	the	context	changed.	Given	the	ability	to	 identify	and	intervene	in	pathological	cases,	space	opened	up	for	a	social	plurality	that	did	not	threaten	the	social	ordering,	but	rather	upheld	it.		In	 the	 psychological	 paradigm,	 a	 person’s	 value	 in	 society	 was	 derived	 from	 a	common	pool	of	competitive	merit,	which	was	allocated	by	a	kind	of	stock	market,	with	 its	 ups	 and	 downs,	 requiring	 constant	 comparison,	 measurement	 and	antagonism.	In	the	sociological	paradigm,	value	depended	on	subjects	themselves,	on	their	capacity	to	use	self-discipline	in	order	to	turn	the	social	context	into	value	by	actively	signifying	and	representing	themselves	into	it	through	the	development	of	their	personality.	This	could	best	be	done	by	freely	seeking	out	full	involvement	in	merit-allocating	 institutions,	 each	 functioning	 as	microcosms	 that	 reproduced	and	 found	 security	 in	 the	 psychological	 model.	 For	 the	 more	 complete	 the	identification	 not	 only	with	 the	 collective	 ‘mind’	 but	 also	with	 the	 vast	 array	 of	institutions	 that	gave	 it	structure,	 the	greater	 the	social	advantages	 to	be	gained.	The	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 saw	 an	 explosion	 of	 formal	 sociability,	 in	 the	 form	 of	corporations,	 unions,	 and	 voluntary	 associations.	 Each	 of	 these	 organized	 and	regulated	 a	 specific	 social	 identity	 built	 on	 some	 communality	 such	 as	 age,	occupation,	 station,	 gender	 or	 opinion,	 and	 containing	 its	 own	 parameters	 of	compliance	and	deviance.			
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Rather	than	confronting	discourses	and	practices,	the	first	and	third	chapter	have	underscored	 the	 internal	 logic	 of	 a	 new	 structure	 for	 the	 governing	 of	 self	 and	other.	 The	modern	 self	 depended	 on	 an	 inner	 division	 and	 conflict.	 One	 the	 one	side	 of	 the	 divide,	 there	 emerged	 the	 overlapping	 roles	 of	 internal	 spectator	 or	narrator,	 the	 observing,	 calculating	 mind,	 the	 internalized	 authority	 figure,	 the	choosing	 and	 desiring	 moral	 self	 or	 the	 disciplining	 intermediary	 as	 a	 referee	between	 transcendental	 and	 animalistic	 tendencies.	 On	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	battlefield,	we	 find	 the	 large	cast	of	unruly,	 impulsive	 ‘others’	 that	populated	 the	self	 and	 which	 were	 the	 object	 of	 an	 internal	 project	 of	 governing.	 There	 were	internal	governors	and	governed.	The	condition	 for	 this	 confrontation	 to	emerge	was	vanity,	which	was	tied	to	a	socialized	sense	of	interiority	that	displaced	basic	needs	and	fears	of	material	self-preservation	into	the	unlimited	realm	of	symbolic	survival	 and	 self-fashioning	 through	 desire.	 Simple	 techniques	 such	 as	 school	rankings	or	moral	self-analysis	educated	the	subject	into	some	specific	practices	of	self-comparison	 and	 self-judgement	 that	 underpinned	 vanity.	 Such	 techniques	 of	(self)governing	 came	 together	 to	 form	 a	 complex	 mechanism	 of	 interlocking	technologies	that	was	pursued	by	state	elites,	especially	between	1830	and	1848.	For	 some,	 that	 technology	 affected	 basic	 material	 survival,	 which	 could	 be	administered	through	 increased	taxes	or	prices,	restricted	access	 to	 the	 land	and	mobility,	laws	repressive	of	labour,	local	solidarities,	customary	survival	strategies	and	 vagrancy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 array	 of	 socio-economic	 structural	 mutations	 then	termed	 ‘industrialism’,	 including	 the	 attack	 on	 mainmorte	 and	 Old-Regime	livelihoods.	 This	 often	 led	 to	 the	 fear	 or	 reality	 of	 hunger	 and	 repression,	which	new	 policies	 sought	 to	 tie	 to	 self-disgust	 over	 one’s	 social	 identity	 or	 frustrated	desires.	 For	 others,	 the	 new	 sweeping	 structural	 changes	 tended	 to	 gradually	
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generalize	insecurities	about	social	survival	and	standing.	This	could	mean	fear	of	loosing	status,	dispossession,	economic	crisis,	crime	and	revolution	or,	in	any	case,	the	 constant	 and	uncertain	 striving	 towards	 conformity	with	a	 systemic	 ideal	by	means	 of	 internalizing	 the	 contradictions	 and	 conflicts	 inherent	 to	 the	 ideal.	 For	school	 children,	 insecurity	 came	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 pure	 system	 of	 competitive	ranking	 among	 age	 and	 gender	 peers,	 requiring	 constant	 self-steering,	 self-comparison	 and	 an	 internalization	 of	 hierarchical	 structures.	 For	 yet	 others,	insecurity	 could	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 large	 scale	 religious,	 social,	 political	 or	environmental	moral	panics	and	 scandals,	 generated,	 consolidated	and	amplified	by	the	media,	social	experts,	public	inquiries	and	institutions	and	state	policies.			In	 these	 scenarios,	 among	 others,	 if	 the	 cause	 and	 resolution	 of	 the	 systemic	insecurities	 and	 incongruences	 became	 interpreted	 as	 depending	 on	 one’s	behaviour	 and	 if	 one	 identified	 with	 the	 position	 of	 insecurity,	 that	 is,	 if	 one	assumed	 personal	 responsibility	 for	 structural	 problems,	 then	 the	 governmental	technologies	would	have	succeeded	in	fostering	the	desired	form	of	psychological	self.	Such	a	self	was	characteristically	mobilized	into	being	by	the	seemingly	urgent	need	to	act,	choose,	take	action,	make	a	stand	or	take	sides.	Such	a	self	would	adopt	a	distinctive	view	of	him	or	herself	from	the	outside,	thus	being	able	to	judge	and	compare	 status	 and	 morality	 from	 an	 abstractly	 impersonal	 and	 universal	viewpoint	which	would	 tend	 to	 conform	 itself	 to	 societal	 ideals	 of	 the	 self.	 This	internal	 splitting	 of	 perspective,	 this	 multiplication	 of	 the	 ideally	 unified	 self,	would	then	require	the	more	mature	self	to	dominate	and	conduct	the	behaviour	of	 the	 more	 primitive	 and	 internally	 disowned	 ‘other’,	 a	 juncture	 at	 which	 the	problem	of	self-government	would	mirror	the	wider	problem	of	the	government	of	
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others.	 My	 focus	 has	 therefore	 been	 on	 the	 twofold	 process	 whereby	 people	become	categorized	and	categories	peopled.		I	have	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	the	conceptualization	of	childhood.	I	have	placed	 the	 child	 at	 the	 source	 of	 the	 question	 of	 ‘otherness’.	 Fuelled	 by	 a	 dual	desire	and	fear	of	what	one	is	not,	the	modern	self	was	bound	by	a	struggle	away	from	 disorder	 and	 towards	 perfection.	 The	 inner	 conflicts	 that	 played	 such	 a	defining	 role	 in	 both	 paradigms	 of	 subjectivity	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 were	inseparable	 from	 a	 denigrating	 concept	 of	 childhood.	 The	 parallels	 between	childhood	 and	 animality,	 insanity,	 unreason,	 barbarity,	 femininity,	 passivity,	mobility,	disorder,	hopelessness	and	so	on,	necessitated	an	intermediary	entity	for	self-control	and	self-government.	Equally,	the	clear	distinction	established	during	the	 French	 Revolution	 between	 legal	 majority	 and	 minority	 grounded	 a	 new	understanding	of	authority	that	could	be	limited	and	utilitarian.	Towards	the	fin	de	siècle,	 the	 child	 became	 the	main	 object	 of	 institutional	 treatment.	 As	 parenting	became	more	 functional	 and	 technical,	 schools	 and	 supporting	 institutions	were	able	 to	 substitute	 the	 family	 for	 standardized	 methods	 of	 individualization	 and	personality	development.		The	changes	that	took	place	towards	1900	altered	the	nature	of	public	assistance.	The	 interwar	 years	 seem	 a	 foreign	 land	 to	 the	 student	 of	 nineteenth	 century	assistance.	 After	 the	 Great	 War,	 the	 preoccupation	 with	 hygiene	 and	 the	 fight	against	 tuberculosis	 gradually	 extended	 the	 aims	 of	 social	 assistance	 to	 larger	portions	 of	 the	 population.	 Instead	 of	 the	dames	 of	 nineteenth-century	 charities,	urban	space	was	now	under	the	surveillance	of	social	workers.	Their	aims	was	no	
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longer	 limited	 to	 the	 poor,	 but	 rather	 extended	 to	 the	whole	 of	 the	 social	 body	which	was	to	be	reengineered	along	hygienist	lines.	Laura	Lee	Downs	has	studied	the	Colonies	de	Vacances	movements	that	started	with	the	new	century.	Cities	such	as	 Suresnes	 (Hauts-de-Seine)	 gave	 every	 child	 the	 right	 to	 spend	 six	 (and	 later	eight)	weeks	of	 the	summer	vacation	 in	 the	countryside,	 free	of	charge	 for	 those	who	 could	 not	 afford	 it.3	This	 was	 part	 of	 the	 urban	 experiment	 in	 municipal	socialism	carried	out	by	the	administration	of	Henri	Sellier.	After	a	period	of	great	success	between	1920	and	1933	 in	which	most	urban	children	spent	 time	 in	 the	countryside,	 either	 with	 their	 families	 or	 through	 a	 programme,	 the	 numbers	dropped	 sharply	 because	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis.	 In	 Suresnes,	 the	 proportion	 of	children	holidaymakers	went	from	a	stable	74	to	80	per	cent	of	children	until	1933	to	 60	 per	 cent	 in	 1935.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Ministere	 du	 travail	 moved	 to	 support	municipal	colonies	 in	1935,	which	enabled	municipalities	 to	withhold	 the	part	of	unemployment	allocations	destined	for	dependent	children	in	order	to	cover	part	of	the	municipality’s	cost	of	sending	these	to	colonies	de	vacances.	Families	on	the	dole	 either	 sent	 the	 children	 away	 or	 lost	 the	 supplementary	 allocation.	 This	became	 an	 instrument	 through	which	 families	 could	 be	 pressured.	 Sellier	made	plain	 this	 policy	 in	 a	 1936	 memo	 to	 the	 assistentes	 scolaires	 in	 saying	 that	 ‘the	municipality	 is	 authorized	 to	 require	 that	 all	who	 receive	unemployment	 benefit	send	 their	 school-age	 children	 to	 the	 colonies	 de	 vacances’.4	Thus,	 spending	 the	summer	vacations	in	the	countryside	had	gone	from	being	a	largesse	provided	by	private	charities	to	right	to	an	obligation,	at	least	for	some,	over	the	course	of	just	fifteen	years.																																																										3	Laura	Lee	Downs,	Childhood	in	the	Promised	Land:	Working-Class	Movements	and	the	Colonies	de	Vacances	in	France,	1880-1960	(Durham,	N.C.,	2002),	pp.	113,	126-129,	113.	4	Quoted	in	Ibid.	181,	emphasis	added	by	L.L.D.,	see,	pp.	180-182.	
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		R.	 H.	 Hazemann	 was	 one	 of	 the	 social	 experts	 who	 in	 Vitry-sur-Seine	 (Val-de-Marne)	were	developing	similar	social	service	system	as	Sellier	was	implementing	in	Suresnes.	 In	a	programmatic	 textbook	on	municipal	social	services,	Hazemann	offered	a	succinct	definition	of	social	assistance	as	an	institution	that	derived	from	the	desire	to	uphold	society;	it	is	thus	a	necessity;	it	indirectly	derives	from	a	feeling	of	guilt	that	Society	feels	towards	the	individual	who	 cannot	 subsist,	 even	 if	 his	 degree	 of	 social	 degradation	 originates	 from	 an	individual	fault.5	While	the	individual	was	to	be	helped	regardless	of	personal	circumstances,	he	or	she	was	depicted	as	a	passive	party.	In	effect,	the	tendency	was	for	individuals	to	receive	 social	 assistance	 regardless	 of	 their	 will.	 Hazemann	 argued	 that	 the	democratic	notion	of	a	 ‘social	debt’	 ties	to	the	scientific	knowledge	of	 ‘the	causes	and	effects	 of	 human	weaknesses’	 required	blurring	of	 lines	between	public	 and	private	charity	in	order	to	offer	a	more	totalizing	approach	to	assistance.6	Édouard	Fuster,	professor	of	assistance	and	social	foresight	at	the	Collège	de	France,	wrote	the	 introduction.	 He	 argued	 forcefully	 for	 the	 ‘intensification’	 and	‘individualization’	of	social	assistance	in	order	to	bring	about	une	rééducation	de	la	
personnalité	in	beneficiaries,	as	the	Americans	were	doing	at	the	time.7			From	the	late	nineteenth	to	the	early	twentieth	century	there	was	not	only	a	move	away	from	means-tested	assistance.	Whereas	access	to	social	aid	in	the	nineteenth																																																									5	R.H.	Hazemann,	Le	service	social	municipal	et	ses	relations	avec	les	oeuvres	privées	(Paris,	1929),	p.	85	6	Ibid.,	pp.	vii,	15-16.	7	Edouard	Fuster,	‘Introduction’,	in:	Ibid.,	pp.	vi,	xii.	
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century	 was	 highly	 restricted,	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 it	 increasingly	 became	mandatory	in	cities	like	Suresnes	or	Vitry.	While	within	the	psychological	model	of	the	 nineteenth	 century	 the	 notion	 of	 assistance	 served	 as	 a	 means	 of	 moral	management,	 the	 sociological	 model’s	 ‘social	 service’	 became	 an	 instrument	capable	of	managing	the	socialization	of	individuals.		We	have	also	explored	how	individuals	were	called	upon	to	invest	their	world	with	meaning.	Modernity	was	characterized	for	the	world	itself	being	absent	of	its	own	meaning	and	value.	The	disenchanted	world	was	a	devalued	world.	Nothing	was	worth	anything	unless	there	was	a	collective	demand	granting	it	meaning.	Guizot	argued	that	nothing	was	good	or	bad	in	itself,	for		man	 has	 nothing	 in	 him	 that	 cannot	 be	 used	 to	 the	 benefit	 of	 good	 and	 evil:	everything	depends	on	the	principles	on	which	he	is	accustomed	to	act	and	judge.	Unfortunately,	 one	 governs	 children,	 as	men,	 rather	 by	 their	 faults	 than	 by	 their	qualities:	one	wants	to	make	them	obey?	One	uses	their	weaknesses;	one	wants	to	get	them	to	do	something?	One	employs	all	the	seductions	of	interest.8	Since	 1789,	 from	 Kant	 to	 Durkheim,	 the	 desired	 alternative	 was	 the	 same,	governing	through	mœurs,	natural	 law,	the	drives	of	the	soul,	common	sense,	 the	blindly	accepted	revelation	of	social	tradition,	culture,	a	civic	faith	or	unconscious	programming.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 choice-less	 choice	 of	 voluntary	virtue,	 so	 that	 ‘man’	 would	 resemble	 his	 ideal,	 the	 ultimate	 good.	 The	 ultimate	good	was	to	stand	as	the	ultimate	signifier	of	existence.	But	this	was	only	possible	if	 each	 individual	 chose	 to	 perpetually,	 actively,	 and	 militantly	 give	 meaning	 to	socially-produced	 significations.	 Only	 faith	 had	 power.	 During	 the	 whole	
																																																								8	Guizot,	Méditations,	pp.	290-291	
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nineteenth	 century,	 the	 person	 was	 given	 the	 choice	 to	 fully	 identify	 with	 the	subjectivity	 structure	 and	 the	 social	 order	 or	 be	 an	 outcast.	 In	 the	 twentieth	century	 that	 choice	 disappeared.	 In	 exchange	 the	 person	 gained	 the	 privilege	 of	using	the	social	fabric	to	fashion	outfits	or	at	least	consume	ready-made	costumes.	And	yet	the	capacity	to	signify	the	world	that	modernity	so	generously	granted	the	modern	 subject	 was	 and	 remains	 the	 source	 of	 all	 freedom.	 The	 means	 of	valorisation	 cannot	be	 alienated.	The	 innate	power	 each	person	possesses	 is	 the	ability	to	attribute	value	to	anything,	including	his	or	her	own	existence.	The	pages	above	have	shown	that	 individuals	have	been	actively	 investing	 their	world	with	meaning	for	centuries.			Therefore,	my	findings	contradict	those	of	the	sociologists	of	the	individual	quoted	in	the	introduction.	The	sociological	understanding	of	modern	identities	and	group	belonging,	as	we	have	seen,	is	not	constitutive	of	the	modern	individual	but	rather	has	 a	 history,	 as	 does	 the	 tendency	 to	 reduce	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 individual	 to	choosing	social	 identities.	The	modern	individual	 is	not	a	fixed	reality,	but	a	very	fluid	historical	experience.	And	in	this	ceaselessly	changing	character	is	where	the	liberty,	agency	and	potential	of	human	beings	is	located,	invented	and	dreamt.			
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